Pakistan

It was a busy news year in South Asia, with events that will have far-reaching consequences for the region. Between India’s historic election, a hard-won unity government in Afghanistan, and ongoing political turmoil in Pakistan combined with shocking terrorist attacks, South Asia made the front pages around the world for many different reasons. Like last year, I’ve tried to sift through the year’s developments and assess which will have lasting effects on the countries in the region and beyond. Herewith my personal selection of 2014’s most consequential stories in South Asia: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wins single-party majority in India, Narendra Modi becomes prime minister: Every general election in India is the world’s largest, and the 2014 elections to India’s Lok Sabha (House of the People) broke previous records. More than 550 million citizens turned out to vote in a nine-phase election stretching across six weeks. Narendra Modi took campaigning to a new level, criss-crossing the country to campaign, even appearing as a hologram before crowds he could not reach in person to stump for economic growth and good governance. And the BJP triumphed, coming out of a decade in opposition to secure a single-party majority, a feat not seen in India in thirty years. Markets responded positively to the news of a clear political mandate, with the Bombay Stock Exchange index reaching a then-record high the day the results were announced. While Modi placed great emphasis on economic growth during the campaign, his government’s reform efforts once in office have been less dramatic than expected; observers are now looking to his first full-year budget, due in February. Following protracted disputes, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah agree on power-sharing unity government in Afghanistan: The 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan unfolded over a lengthy five months, with an April first round, a June runoff, and ongoing accusations of election tampering thereafter. Intensive U.S. diplomacy through September helped achieve a power-sharing agreement for a “unity government,” allowing the country to move forward at a delicate time with international forces in the process of drawing down—and questions about regional stability increasingly voiced. With major high-level visits, China further cements development, economic, and strategic ties with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka: 2014 was the year that the People’s Republic of China unveiled its Silk Route and Maritime Silk Route connectivity strategies for the larger Asia region, complete with maps and major bilateral visits with South Asian countries. India has long worried about Chinese “encirclement” through what some analysts have termed a “string of pearls” presence throughout South Asia; in 2014 senior official bilateral visits at the head of government/head of state level took place between China and Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh, plus a foreign minister-level visit to Nepal (a 2014 visit of Nepal’s prime minister to China for an expo did not involve a Beijing stop). Each of these visits resulted in substantial announcements of economic assistance especially focused on infrastructure development. China has become a major economic partner—in many cases the top trading partner and/or leading foreign investor—in much of South Asia. President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September began with economic optimism but quickly turned to tension after Chinese troops incurred across the undemarcated border with India. U.S. and NATO troops complete handover of security operations in Afghanistan, scaling back to supporting role: December 2014 marked the ceremonial end of NATO responsibility in Afghanistan, as well as the transition of U.S. troops to a “train and support” mission, with Afghan security forces now in the lead. The international troop presence will remain at around thirteen thousand in early 2015, with the drawdown to resume on its path to phasing down to a small assistance role by the end of 2016. At its peak in 2011, the international coalition troop presence in Afghanistan was 140,000. Many countries in the region fear that a rapid drawdown could result in regional instability, as in Iraq, if Taliban and other terrorist attacks increase. Pakistani civilian government squeezed between military and street mobs, another setback for democracy: Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, came to power in a 2013 election widely heralded as a triumph for Pakistani democracy: the first peaceful transfer of power from one civilian government to another. Yet a year later, Sharif found his government beset with problems—especially a months-long “sit-in” street protest led by Imran Khan and the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf party that derailed the government from accomplishing anything for 126 days. Khan demanded that the democratically elected government step down as he claimed its victory was due to poll rigging. (Note: Khan called off his sit-in following the Taliban attack on a school in Peshawar in December.) Indian economy begins to pick up, regains “stable” rating, institutional investors return to India: During the last three years of India’s previous government, the country’s once-bright investment story lost its luster due to numerous corruption scandals and a more difficult investment environment. In 2012, Standard & Poor’s lowered its outlook on India to “negative.” Since India’s credit rating was already at BBB-, the lowest investment grade, a negative outlook put India at risk for downgrade to junk status. Prime Minister Modi, elected this year on a mandate for growth, made pitching for foreign investment among his top foreign policy priorities. Institutional investors came back quickly, pleased with the outlook for doing business, and India regained a “stable” outlook for its credit rating. Economic growth ticked up to 5.6 percent (from 5.0 percent in 2013), with both the IMF and World Bank forecasting growth over 6 percent in 2015. With a $2 trillion economy, India is the region’s economic engine. Awami League’s Sheikh Hasina reelected to five-year term in Bangladesh in low-turnout election: Following months of street violence and threats by the opposition party Bangladesh National Party (BNP) to boycott the national elections in Bangladesh should a caretaker government not oversee the process, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina went ahead with elections on January 5. Half the seats were uncontested, due to the BNP’s boycott, and the ruling Awami League was reelected handily amid violence that killed eighteen. Official figures put voter turnout at 40 percent, but press reports suggested lower turnout of some 20 to 30 percent. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit convenes after three-year delay, passes important agreement on regional energy: The regional association covering the least-integrated region in the world, SAARC, has long been troubled by the difficult relationship between India and Pakistan, which has prevented the association from accomplishing anything significant in trade and interconnectivity. Making matters worse, the host country responsible for the summit in 2012—Nepal—failed to pull together a meeting in 2012 (and again in 2013) due to its own internal political troubles. That said, once the gathering convened in November 2014, it actually managed to result in an agreement on regional energy signed by all eight countries. Agreements on regional rail connectivity and motor vehicles, however, were not concluded when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the sole hold out, declined to sign. Taliban attack school in Peshawar, more than 130 children murdered: On December 16, Taliban terrorists attacked children attending a military school in Peshawar. As Pakistan and the rest of the world came to learn of the horrors unleashed on innocent schoolchildren—and as the Pakistani Taliban came forward to claim responsibility for the attack, termed a “reprisal” for military attacks on the Taliban—the gravity of Pakistan’s uncontrolled terrorism problem began to sink in. A public debate has resumed within Pakistan about the country’s direction, and its relationship to the Taliban, while arrests of the December 16 perpetrators are underway. Nearly simultaneously, a Pakistani court granted bail to one of the Mumbai attack planners, a Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist, leading some leading experts to question whether the Peshawar attack would result in any change after all, or whether it would be business as usual, as usual. Sri Lankan president calls early election, surprise defection creates viable opposition candidate: Sri Lanka’s strongman president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, has handily won election twice, and his current term runs through 2016. In November, he invoked a provision in the Sri Lankan constitution that allows for early elections, which could theoretically allow him to secure a mandate through to 2022. Yet in a surprise development, an opposition candidate emerged when Maithripala Sirisena defected from Rajapaksa’s own party (as well as his cabinet) to energize and lead an umbrella opposition coalition. Sirisena appears to be attracting more support, with additional members of parliament leaving Rajapaksa for Sirisena. Rajapaksa is embattled internationally, with successive UN Human Rights Council resolutions raising questions about his government’s responsibility for human rights and humanitarian law violations at the end of the country’s civil war in 2009. His increasingly centralized management of Sri Lanka has also raised questions domestically about authoritarianism. The election has been set for January 8, 2015. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa  

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, Ariella Rotenberg, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Pakistan engulfed in anger and grief after the Taliban kills 132 schoolchildren and sixteen teachers. Members of the Pakistani Taliban attacked a military school in Peshawar, killing 132 schoolchildren and 16 teachers, many of them shot at point-blank range and some burned alive. The Taliban claimed that the attack was to avenge Pakistani military operations in the northwest Taliban haven of North Waziristan. Though the school that was attacked was officially a military school, the victims included children of both military members and civilians. The Pakistani military offensive in North Waziristan has been underway since June, and the military redoubled its efforts and killed sixty-two militants in the region after the school attack. Additional militants were killed in a series of offenses in the Khyber tribal region. A Taliban spokesperson promised more attacks on military schools throughout Pakistan. 2. Armed siege of Sydney café leaves two hostages and gunman dead. Man Haron Monis, an Iranian refugee and self-styled sheikh, stormed a café in central Sydney on Monday, forcing his hostages to display an Islamic flag. The end of the sixteen-hour crisis, though unclear, appeared to occur when Monis fired on his hostages, prompting the New South Wales police force to storm the café and kill him. Monis was known to the police—he was free on bail in two separate criminal cases—and was also wanted by the Iranian government for committing fraud. Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott has since ordered a sweeping government review of the siege and the events leading up to it, noting that the ordeal may have been preventable. 3. FBI blames North Korea for Sony cyberattack; The Interview is cancelled. On Friday, the FBI formally accused North Korea of the cyberattack on Sony and expressed deep concern over its “destructive nature.” The White House, meanwhile, categorized the attack against Sony as a “serious national security matter.” U.S. President Barack Obama also addressed the matter in a news conference on Friday, calling Sony’s decision to pull The Interview “a mistake.” The administration is considering a proportional retaliatory response to the attack, but the nature of the response is not yet clear as North Korea is already under a slew of economic sanctions for its nuclear program. 4. Abe re-elected in Japan’s snap election. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won another four years in office, and the ruling coalition, composed of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Komeito party, will continue to govern Japan with a two-thirds majority in the Lower House of Parliament. With opposition parties in disarray, it was not a surprise that the government handily won the snap election, which was an attempt by Abe to gain renewed momentum for his policy priorities, in particular his economic reform plan (“Abenomics”). Not all are persuaded by the strength of the win, however, as voter turnout was at a postwar low, and one-fourth of the seats remain in opposition hands. 5. U.S. and Japan set new laws on renewable energy products and production. The U.S. Department of Commerce increased tariffs on imports of solar panels from China and solar cells from both Taiwan and China, closing a loophole that allowed Chinese companies to avoid tariffs by using photovoltaic cells made in Taiwan. Chinese manufacturers also benefited from unfair subsidies from the Chinese government, which enabled the sale of these products below manufacturing cost.  In other renewable energy news, Japan’s trade ministry announced they would set stricter rules for production and sales of renewable energy, particularly for solar-produced electricity, to help ensure a stable energy supply. Immediately following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Japanese renewable energy incentive program offered some of the highest rates for solar-produced electricity in the world, creating a flurry of interest in renewable energy applications. But the supply of energy is as yet unstable and applications to connect to the power grid have far exceeded the utilities’ acceptable capacity to take the unstable renewable energy supplies. Bonus: Responding to potato shortage, McDonald’s in Japan trims its fry portions. While stateside fast food portion control is of increasing interest because of public health concerns, the Japanese french fry downsize stems from a potato shortage. Japan imports is the largest Asian market for French fries from the United States, but a labor dispute between the Pacific Maritime Association and U.S. dockworkers has delayed shipments of frozen spuds. McDonald’s in Japan has tried to compensate for the shortage by flying in potatoes from the U.S. East Coast. The shortage, perhaps, could finally put a muzzle on Japanese students’ taste for french fry parties.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, Andrew Hill, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Leaders gather in Beijing for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. A wide range of issues are expected to be addressed throughout the week of APEC meetings, an agenda perceived as tailor-made for China. One of the most important topics is the Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), an initiative critics fear will take momentum from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks. With the aim of rebooting Asia-Pacific growth, Chinese officials also announced a series of economic measures, including more bank credit for high-tech imports and quicker approvals for meat and seafood shipments. Other items on the forum agenda include an anti-corruption transparency network, climate issues, and regional support for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 2. Suicide attack on the border of India and Pakistan raises security concerns in both countries. More than sixty people were killed in a suicide attack on the Pakistan side of the Wagah border between India and Pakistan, the site of a renowned flag-lowering ceremony where spectators from both countries gather each night. The attack occurred on the Pakistan side of the border, and separate Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter groups have claimed responsibility. The groups cited the Pakistan Army’s ongoing operation in North Waziristan as the reason for the suicide attack. However, a spokesman from one of the groups also threatened that attacks against India were in the pipeline. Both countries have amped up their security in response to the deadly bombing. 3. New tensions mount between China and Japan over coral poachers. Japan’s foreign minister on Tuesday warned China to keep their fishing vessels out of Japanese waters after six Chinese fishing captains suspected of illegally hunting red coral were arrested. In Tokyo, lawmakers are demanding harsher penalties for poachers, while in Beijing, China’s foreign ministry said it was taking measures to prevent coral poaching. Tokyo claims that over 200 Chinese fishing boats have been poaching the coral, which is used to make high-end jewelry in China. The new flare-up in Sino-Japanese tensions comes as the heads of both countries prepare for a potentially landmark meeting at the upcoming APEC summit. 4. British banker charged with murder in Hong Kong. A twenty-nine-year-old British banker has been charged in a murder case after police found the bodies of two women in his apartment in Hong Kong, including one body hidden in a suitcase. Rurik Jutting, until recently a Hong Kong-based employee of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, appeared in court on Monday. The case is a shock to Hong Kong, where the murder rate is low. The victims, Seneng Mujiasih and Sumarti Ningsih, both Indonesian women in their twenties, are believed to have been sex workers. Though prostitution in Hong Kong is legal, many sex workers come to the city on tourist or domestic worker visas, as both victims did. 5. China passes counterespionage law. Beijing revised its 1993 National Security Law, replacing it with a new set of rules that focuses more on foreign individuals and organizations and Chinese nationals that engage with them. The law grants domestic security agencies the right to confiscate property if the individual or organization fails “to stop or change activities considered harmful to national security.”  The law comes as both the United States and China have traded accusations of spying and cyberespionage, and foreign nationals have been under increased scrutiny of late. Some Chinese leaders accused the United States and Britain of instigating the protests in Hong Kong, and earlier this month, Chinese authorities detained two Canadians on suspicion of spying. Bonus: For relaxing times, make it Suntory time. Suntory’s Single Malt Sherry Cask 2013 this week was named 2015’s best whiskey in the world, to appear in next year’s Jim Murray’s Whiskey Bible. This year marks the first time a Scottish whiskey was not in the top five since the publication started in 2003. It also marks the first time in the publication’s history in which a Japanese whiskey topped the list. The Yamazaki distillery, Japan’s first whiskey distillery, has been making whiskey since 1923.

Earlier this month, the Pew Research Center released the second of two major reports detailing findings from a global public opinion survey on economic issues conducted last spring in forty-four countries. Read together, the two reports reveal something you might not have guessed: Bangladesh is among the countries most supportive of the free market, and certainly the most free-market, trade-oriented country surveyed in South Asia. At least as far as public opinion is concerned, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh is a capitalist haven. First, the data. The spring 2014 survey asked a variety of questions about the benefits or losses from trade, beliefs about inequality, optimism or pessimism about the future, and support for a free market. A report released last month focused on beliefs about trade, and this month’s looked at inequality as well as beliefs about capitalism and the market. Across all forty-four countries surveyed, Bangladesh emerged as the world’s second most supportive of a free market economy. Eighty percent of those surveyed expressed support. Vietnam was the only country with higher levels of support, with 95 percent of respondents supportive. The next three countries most supportive of the free market were South Korea, China, and Ghana. Source: Pew Research Center, October 2014, “Emerging and Developing Economies Much More Optimistic than Rich Countries about the Future.” In addition, in comparison to the two other South Asian countries included in the survey—India and Pakistan—Bangladesh once again exhibited higher levels of approval for trade and foreign investment. Public opinion in Bangladesh greatly favors open trade, believes trade creates jobs and leads to better wages, and sees foreign investment as a net positive. We hear much more about India’s post-reforms tiger economy, but Bangladeshis are eight percentage points more supportive of the free market than India (72 percent) and eighteen percentage points more supportive than Pakistan (62 percent). When asked for views on growing trade, 91 percent of Bangladeshis surveyed responded that it was either "very good" or "somewhat good," compared to 76 percent of Indians answering in the same way. Bangladeshi public opinion also much more broadly believes trade creates jobs and leads to higher wages in comparison with public opinion in India and Pakistan. The question on which Indian responses exceeded Bangladeshi responses focused on optimism for a better life at home, with 78 percent of Indians surveyed stating that they would recommend staying in India (instead of going abroad for work) for a better life, and 71 percent of Bangladeshis surveyed recommending the same. Source: Pew Research Center, September 2014, “Faith and Skepticism about Trade, Foreign Investment” and Pew Research Center, October 2014, “Emerging and Developing Economies Much More Optimistic than Rich Countries about the Future” For those who follow South Asia these findings make sense. The Bangladeshi economy has benefited greatly over the last two decades from an export-oriented push at the entry level of the manufacturing space—garments. Bangladesh is now the world’s number two garment exporter, just after China. As I have written previously, despite known problems with workplace safety and labor rights in this sector, its more than 5,000 factories employ some four million Bangladeshis, mainly women, and the sector has significantly boosted Bangladesh’s economy. The garment sector is export-oriented, supplying some $20 billion in exports to the world. That Bangladeshis see trade and the free market system in a very positive light, despite the “People’s Republic” of the country’s official name, makes a great deal of sense given the positive impact Bangladesh has seen from trade and the free market. It’s a good news story about globalization that the world often misses. For further reading, see: Pew Research Center, “Faith and Skepticism about Trade, Foreign Investment” and Pew Research Center, “Emerging and Developing Economies Much More Optimistic than Rich Countries about the Future.” Top photo credit: Dhaka, April 2014. Photo by Sharada Prasad CS licensed under CC BY 2.0.  Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa

What a day for South Asia. The Norwegian Nobel Committee has awarded this year’s Peace Prize to Pakistan’s Malala Yousufzai and India’s Kailash Satyarthi, both passionate advocates for children’s rights. The Nobel Committee’s decisions highlight a focus on the role of social advocacy and social impact on poverty, children’s education, and empowerment of women and girls in South Asia. Malala Yousufzai is recognized around the world for standing up to the Taliban, who shot her in the face for her outspoken support of girls’ education; Kailash Satyarthi is known in India for his decades-long dedication to ending child labor. It’s clear that the Nobel Committee views the hard work of education and children’s rights as vital components in making South Asia a more peaceful place. In the announcement of this year’s award, Nobel Committee chair Thorbjorn Jagland noted that, “The Nobel Committee regards it as an important point for a Hindu and a Muslim, an Indian and a Pakistani, to join in a common struggle for education and against extremism.” The Nobel Committee’s message here is lost on no one—particularly at a moment when cross-border firing has erupted again along the India-Pakistan border. But it’s also the case that the vibrant civil societies, home to rights activists, in India and in Pakistan can hardly be faulted for the unresolved conflict between their two countries. In fact, there’s been a long history of India-Pakistan civil society collaboration to try to overcome tensions in the region, be it the recent Aman ki Aasha (Hopes of Peace) effort, the journalism exchanges, efforts by artists and theater groups to cross borders, or the border vigils on both sides led annually by journalist activists, to name just a few. There was even a period in the mid–2000s when it seemed as if cricket diplomacy might have a lasting effect, only to be disrupted by the Mumbai attacks in 2008. While cricket diplomacy is getting underway again, hopes are not as high as they were before Mumbai. Indian and Pakistani business associations have also joined together in a common effort to promote cross-border trade as a step toward reducing the enmity between India and Pakistan. Numerous trade fairs, bringing Indian businesses to Pakistan, and Pakistani businesses to India, have been mounted over the past few years by the leading chambers of commerce on both sides. Talk with any of the business chambers from either country, and they’ll all say the same thing: both Indian and Pakistani business stands to gain from increased cross-border trade. There’s no disagreement on the need for a common effort. So the Nobel Committee’s message isn’t for those already seized with the importance of normalizing India-Pakistan relations—because the constituencies exist, and have been trying for years. We should be very clear about who it is for, however. It’s for those who would prevent better ties from ever developing between India and Pakistan, and who work to disrupt peace efforts when they are underway. It’s for known terrorists like al Qaeda and the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani Network, and myriad others. These groups, despite UN sanctions and sanctions under applicable U.S. laws, remain at large in Pakistan, and particularly in the case of Lashkar-e-Taiba founder Hafiz Saeed, who regularly holds public rallies against India and the United States. It’s these groups whose continued existence creates the ever-present threat of another attack on India, casting a shadow over every effort to try to make peace. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa

Although I am not CFR’s South Asia expert, the past month of protests in Pakistani by Pakistani politician Imran Khan, who has been camped out close to parliament along with his supporters, brings to mind many other similar protests that have happened in Asia in the past ten years—in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries. What is notable about these new types of street protests, which Khan’s demonstrations fall into, is that unlike decades of protests that called for various reforms to political systems, these protests actually in many ways are designed to subvert and possibly overthrow democracy. Indeed, the region, and some other developing nations like Egypt, has witnessed the rise of anti-democratic protests. In Khan’s case, he and his supporters are camped out near parliament because they claim that the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is illegitimate because of irregularities in last year’s parliamentary elections and because Sharif’s government has done a poor job on many policy fronts, including dealing with flooding in Kashmir, Pakistan’s constant energy crisis, and the Pakistani Taliban. All of these complaints have some truth to them. Sharif’s government has stumbled repeatedly. Pakistani elections are notorious for fraud, and Sharif’s party is hardly clean, though most outside observers concluded that, despite serious irregularities in last year’s vote, Sharif’s party won the elections last year. Holding protests to highlight a government’s failings or the corruption of the electoral process is a normal part of a vibrant democracy, but Khan’s protests are, potentially, much more damaging, since they seek remedies outside of the normal democratic process. Instead of highlighting the Sharif government’s flaws and rallying support for the opposition (Khan’s party and others) for the next election, Khan is taking the protests much farther. He is trying to make the capital—and thus the country—ungovernable and thus bring down a democratically elected government through extra-constitutional means. Some of Khan’s supporters also have suggested that the protests will pave the way for the military to take power again and restore better government, in a country whose entire history has been plagued by military coups. A coup would be a disaster; Sharif’s ascendance was the first democratic transition in Pakistani history. In these ways, the Khan protests resemble the street demonstrations that took place in Thailand between the fall of 2013 and May 2014, when the Thai military, about as fond as the Pakistani military of putsches, staged a coup. Thailand is now run by a junta with a thin veneer of civilian officials, and the junta government has launched a harsh crackdown on civil liberties and political freedoms. Before the coup, middle class and wealthy Thai protestors in Bangkok used many of the same strategies as Khan’s supporters to topple an elected—if somewhat venal and ineffective—government under then-Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. They tried to make parts of Bangkok ungovernable, invading government ministries and preventing civil servants from getting to work and elections from being held. Many of the Thai protesters also pushed for the military to step in, which in May it ultimately did, dealing an enormous blow to Thai democracy. In other countries in Asia, like the Philippines and Indonesia, similar types of anti-democratic protests, which use the form of popular street demonstrations to achieve what are effectively anti-democratic results, have multiplied as well. In Indonesia, supporters of losing 2014 presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto rallied for weeks in an attempt to intimidate Indonesia’s election commission and top court to reverse the results of the election and call a new vote. (They failed, and Joko Widodo will be sworn in as Indonesia’s president in the fall.) Now, many of Prabowo’s supporters are rallying to push for a new law tabled in parliament  (a law that, polls show, is very unpopular among Indonesians) that would get rid of direct elections for regional and local leaders across the archipelago, which would be a serious step back for Indonesian democracy and its (mostly) successful process of political decentralization. In the Philippines, demonstrators rallied in 2001—again, mostly rich and middle class men and women—in the streets of Manila in an attempt to force out the elected government of populist Prime Minister Joseph Estrada, or to get the military to remove Estrada. As in Thailand, they succeeded, and Estrada fled Malacanang Palace, with a push from the military, and gave up his presidency. Hopefully, Khan and his allies will not achieve the same result.

Daniel Markey is a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.  This post is one of a three-part Asia Unbound series following a recent CFR trip to India and China. See related posts from my colleagues Alyssa Ayres and Elizabeth Economy. Among the most consistent themes we heard throughout our travel in India and China was anxiety over developments in Afghanistan. While not a huge surprise—after all, there’s plenty of concern about Afghanistan’s trajectory here as well—it was useful to be reminded how New Delhi and Beijing perceive their interests, to hear their misgivings about U.S. drawdown plans, and to learn more about how India and China are attempting to manage the situation as it unfolds. Afghanistan’s history as a hub for anti-Indian terrorism (with Pakistani sponsorship), location bordering energy-rich Central Asia, opportunities for trade and investment, and longstanding cultural ties all motivate Indian interests there. In at least some Indian policy circles, there is also a tendency to read the impending U.S. military departure from Afghanistan as part of a broader shift: the waning of U.S. power and influence, or at least the narrowing of Washington’s global ambition. The contrast with New Delhi and Beijing is sharp; in both of those rising Asian giants, uncommonly powerful, energetic leaders are now at the helm. Resigned to the reality that U.S. forces are leaving Afghanistan sooner than many Indians think wise, New Delhi has agreed in principle to work with Russia to provide weapons to friendly Afghan forces. The crucial unanswered question is whether India will choose to make the arrangement operative. Since 9/11, Washington has always opposed Indian military involvement in Afghanistan, fearing that Pakistan would interpret it as a provocative escalation and start another round of externally-sponsored civil war. But as U.S. forces withdraw, sooner or later Washington will lose its effective veto power over Indian policies. If Afghan politics and security start to unravel, India will make its own calculations about the costs and benefits of greater intervention, whether by overt or (given the apparent predilections of its new national security advisor, Ajit Doval) covert means. India is, however, doing more than just hedging against downside risk in Afghanistan. For years, New Delhi has contributed to a range of Afghan development projects. These include private sector efforts to encourage Indian investment in Afghanistan and to improve Afghan capacity to promote foreign investment on its own. As valuable as these private initiatives may be, they remain small-scale; all involved are painfully aware that they float on the waves of broader political and security developments. China, like India, fears the consequences of an unstable Afghanistan and worries that the U.S. commitment will come up short. The good news is that Beijing has come to perceive that its near-term aims in Afghanistan are consistent with those of the United States: fighting terrorism and avoiding a relapse into civil war. To the extent the two sides disagree, it is over the specific sources of threat. China, for instance, views Uighur separatists as a more pressing concern than al-Qaeda. Beijing appears remarkably eager to cooperate with the United States in Afghanistan. After years of standing aloof from regional multilateral efforts, Beijing is now deeply invested in the Istanbul Process, a ministerial-level dialogue that brings together all of Afghanistan’s neighbors and major donors. Having decided to host the next conference in Tianjin, Chinese officials are eager to make it a meaningful event. They plan to link the group’s efforts to China’s own long-term scheme to develop a “New Silk Road” running through Central Asia all the way to Europe. The success of that grand project will hinge, especially in the conflict-prone territories of South and Central Asia, on whether China learns how to translate its massive foreign investments into local good will and sustainable development. To this end, some Chinese officials suggest Beijing is trying to expand its regional expertise and capacity to understand the political dynamics in developing states. Such efforts have been spurred, in part, by China’s disastrous failure to anticipate Myanmar’s 2011 decision to suspend the Myitsone Dam project. With billions of dollars of Chinese investments already on the line in Afghanistan (and tens of billions planned for the vaunted China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), progress along these lines cannot come fast enough. The more immediate problem for Beijing is Afghanistan’s ongoing political uncertainty. Without a new government in Kabul, Chinese officials have already been forced to postpone the Istanbul Process conference once, and are likely to have trouble holding to the presently scheduled date of August 29, given anticipated delays in Afghanistan’s election audit and negotiations between the presidential contenders. Beijing’s hope—one undoubtedly shared by U.S. officials—is to use the meeting as a means to confer the international community’s blessing on the next Afghan government. One way to deal with the problem would be to invite both of Afghanistan’s presidential contenders to Tianjin, but Chinese officials are clearly reluctant to move ahead with what would be a diplomatically cumbersome alternative. The news that Beijing has appointed a new special envoy for Afghanistan provides further evidence of China’s decision to play a more active role in Afghanistan. It also suggests that Beijing intends to strike a more conciliatory and constructive posture on its western periphery than it has on its eastern front. For the United States, this is a welcome, if belated, development, and one worth encouraging. Follow Daniel Markey on Twitter: @MarkeyDaniel

This post is one of a three-part Asia Unbound series following a recent CFR trip to India and China. See related posts from my colleagues Alyssa Ayres and Daniel Markey. Chinese president Xi Jinping is on the march, laying the groundwork for a highly integrated Asia with China at the center. Over the past year, Xi, along with Premier Li Keqiang, has been touting the region as Beijing’s number one foreign policy priority—a shift that  moves the United States out of the top spot. Of course East Asia—including Southeast Asia—has long been a target of China’s affection: it is the economic jewel of the broader Asia Pacific. Central Asia, in turn, has occupied the most critical position in China’s security thinking. And now South Asia appears poised to assume its own unique role in China’s vision of an integrated Asia. Throughout a ten-day trip to India and China, my colleagues, Alyssa Ayres and Dan Markey, and I heard discussion of South Asia as a significant element in China’s regional economic and security plans. As Alyssa details in her post, there are a number of new economic and security organizations under development that engage some or all parts of the region, including a new BRICS bank, an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and a security based accord, “The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia.” These efforts are further complemented by the grand-scale new Silk Route (which will run from central China through Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, ending in Italy) and Maritime Silk Route that will follow a path from coastal China through to the Malacca Strait, north around the horn of African through the Red Sea and concluding in the Mediterranean. There are also more narrowly constructed regional economic development plans such as the China-Pakistan corridor and the Bangladesh-Myanmar-India-China corridor. While most Chinese officials and analysts with whom we met were quite enthusiastic about Beijing’s prospects for both economic and security cooperation in the region, there were cautionary notes. Discussions with a Chinese trade official, for example, highlighted the propensity of Chinese investment to cause as many problems on the political front as benefits on the economic front for Beijng. The official noted that there is a tendency for Chinese officials and businesspeople to engage only with senior government officials in host countries and assume that they will enforce any investment deal that is reached. The Chinese often have only a poor understanding of the situation on the ground and thus are ill equipped to deal with local communities who are not on board with Chinese plans. In this regard, the official commented that India was a strong competitor for China, offering better language, cultural, and public relations capacity in host countries. There is also the possibility that other countries will balk at Beijing’s extensive integration plans. Although nominally of benefit to the entire region, at least one Chinese scholar commented that it would be extremely important for other countries to realize explicitly the benefits of the integration effort—it could not be perceived as simply serving China’s interests. In Myanmar, for example, the $20 billion Kyaukpyu-Kunming railway project that Beijing had planned to run from Yunnan through Myanmar all the way to the Bay of Bengal is in danger of cancellation by the Burmese. This could sharply limit China’s ability to complete the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. India may also prove a more challenging partner than many in Beijing anticipate. As Alyssa notes in her post, there is substantial concern among Indian officials and analysts over the border dispute. And in general, while the Indians we met were enthusiastic about enhancing the Sino-Indian economic relationship, they were far more concerned about China’s broader political and security intentions than the Chinese seemed to understand. Then there is the United States. Here there was mostly cautious optimism. Some Chinese analysts saw significant opportunities for cooperation, highlighting the potential for the United States and China as “outside powers” to shape regional security. As Dan notes in his post, the Chinese are concerned about the security outlook in Afghanistan, particularly after the U.S. troop withdrawal. A number of Chinese viewed security in Afghanistan as a likely fruitful area for U.S.-China cooperation, although at least one suggested that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization would have to be included in such discussions. Overall, the Chinese outlook on the future of the region was long term and patient. In discussions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the concern and urgency that mark discussion and debate in Washington were noticeably missing. At least one Pakistani official based in Beijing clearly appreciates the approach, noting that in contrast to the United States, “China gives advice but no pressure.”

The second installment of Asia Unbound’s new podcast series. Our guest is Aqil Shah, lecturer at Princeton University’s Department of Politics and author of The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Harvard, 2014). Dan Markey, senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, spoke with him on arguments made in his book, which examines the military’s contentious relationship with Pakistan’s civilian government. Listen to the podcast here. https://soundcloud.com/cfr_org/asia-unbound-a-conversation-with-aqil-shah

Secretary of State John Kerry formally announced today that the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), Ambassador Jim Dobbins, would retire from the position at the end of this month. His deputy, Dan Feldman, will succeed him as special representative. This is as good a time as any, given the reduced role of the United States and the changing international presence in Afghanistan today, not to mention in the coming years, to fold the special representative role back into the regional bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA). Doing so will permit better policy coordination within the State Department and across the U.S. government on South and Central Asia in the years to come. Secretary Kerry’s statement, as well as the New York Times article breaking the news of Ambassador Dobbins’s retirement this morning, offered no indication of change in the institutional structure of the SRAP position. In previous administrations, Afghanistan and Pakistan had been part of the South and Central Asia bureau. Earlier arrangements for managing U.S. relations with those countries had grouped them with Bangladesh under one office director, with India/Sri Lanka/Nepal handled by a separate office. In the 2000s, with increased U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, an Afghanistan coordinator role separately handled the uptick in work volume, with Pakistan and Bangladesh still under one office. These offices reported to the assistant secretary of South and Central Asia through the relevant deputies. In 2009, the Obama administration appointed larger-than-life Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to serve as the first special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. As someone who had dealt with a huge range of foreign policy issues (assistant secretary for both East Asia and Europe—the only person to have held both these giant roles), he had also served as ambassador to Germany and brokered the Dayton Accords that ended war in Bosnia before becoming the Cabinet-rank U.S. ambassador to the UN at the end of the Clinton administration. An indefatigable problem-solver, Ambassador Holbrooke occupied a special place in U.S. foreign policy across every Democratic administration. As would befit someone of his stature, the special representative designation meant that this role reported directly to the secretary of state, as a separate channel outside of the South and Central Asia bureau. The Afghanistan and Pakistan offices were placed in a reporting relationship to the special representative as well. Bangladesh was moved to the India/Nepal/Sri Lanka office. This new configuration meant that the South and Central Asia bureau had a large carve-out in the middle of its geography, where the assistant secretary, deputy assistant secretaries, office directors, and various desks covered India and the smaller South Asian countries along with the Central Asian stans, but with a missing AfPak middle. One of the deputy SRAPs was dual-hatted as a deputy assistant secretary in the South and Central Asia bureau, but that person’s office and bulk of attention remained within SRAP. This arrangement permitted a tightly focused policy push across the U.S. government on Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it also created a parallel bureaucracy alongside the SCA regional bureau, which resulted in communication and coordination gaps by virtue of that institutional separation. Parallel bureaucracies don’t facilitate ease of policy coordination, particularly on the nuts and bolts of bureaucracy like invitations to and participation in meetings (especially if the numbers are limited, as happens all the time in government), clearing on memos, representation of issues for decisionmaking, etc. Parallel bureaucracies, as any historical institutionalist would note, create incentive structures and path dependencies specific to their interests. Other regionally-focused special envoys, by contrast, tend to report to the regional assistant secretary. For example, in the East Asia and the Pacific bureau, the earlier special envoy for Burma, the special envoy for human rights in North Korea, and the special envoy for Six-Party talks positions all report to the assistant secretary. In the Africa bureau, the special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and the special envoy for the Great Lakes region report to the assistant secretary. These all show that focused envoy roles embedded in the regional bureau can work well. The United States has committed to a troop drawdown in Afghanistan that reshapes the level of our engagement in our longest war. Whatever happens in the coming years, we need to expand our engagement with the countries throughout the South and Central Asian region as their security interests are most immediately affected by Afghanistan’s future. As I have argued elsewhere, we particularly need to dramatically increase the scope of our consultations and coordination on Afghanistan with regional power India--the fifth largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan and a partner with clear security concerns in the region. A seamless overview of U.S. relations throughout the SCA region, and the impact of the coming drawdown in Afghanistan, would be far easier to accomplish if our focused diplomacy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan was embedded within the South and Central Asia bureau. Secretary Kerry, now’s the perfect time to fold SRAP back into SCA. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, Charles McClean, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Abe fires the “third arrow” of his growth strategy Abenomics. Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe announced the “third arrow” of his economic reform policy this week. The third arrow, experts say, is important but difficult, and seeks to address issues of tax reform, population decline, and immigration, as well as trade and agricultural reform. This phase follows the first (a fiscal stimulus) and the second (massive quantitative easing to provide a monetary boost). “Abenomics” claims to address the large challenges threatening Japan’s economy, including one of the biggest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world and an ageing society. 2. South Korean soldier kills five, wounds seven comrades. A South Korean army sergeant in the 22nd Infantry Division in Goseong, Gangwon Province, went on a shooting spree last weekend at his post near the border of North Korea. Following an extensive manhunt, authorities captured the fugitive soldier on Monday after a prolonged stand-off that included a suicide attempt. It was revealed on Tuesday that the South Korean military used a decoy body to divert attention while the shooter was transported to the hospital. The soldier’s motivations are still unknown, but officers serving with him said he had difficulties adapting to military life. Every able male South Korean citizen must serve two years in the military. This is the third case of a South Korean soldier turning fire on his fellow soldiers, and all three incidents took place in the tense border areas between North and South Korea. 3. Pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong agitate for change. More than 740,000 Hong Kongers went to the polls this week to vote in an unofficial referendum on how to choose the territory’s next leader. China claims the right to vet candidates for Hong Kong’s chief executive and says the candidates must, among other characteristics, “love China.” The referendum, run by the pro-democracy Occupy Central group, was called “illegal” by mainland China and a Chinese newspaper accused the United States of backing Hong Kong separatists. The online voting platform for the referendum was hit by a major cyberattack which interrupted the poll, as was a major newspaper supportive of Occupy Central; the perpetrators could not be immediately identified. Separately, Hong Kong lawyers marched in defense of judicial independence, responding to Beijing’s release last month of a white paper reaffirming China’s control over the special administrative region. 4. Operation Zarb-i-Azb continues. The Pakistani military carried out air strikes in North Waziristan and the Khyber tribal region on Tuesday, killing at least forty-seven suspected militants and destroying twenty-three hideouts in the second week of the operation. Although the Pakistan’s army commander directed “that all terrorists along with their sanctuaries must be eliminated without any discrimination,” chances are many militant leaders have already moved to safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So far, almost 500,000 internally displaced persons have registered with the government;  the influx of internal refugees has introduced its own set of problems including the spread of polio from unvaccinated children coming from North Waziristan. 5. China sends minister-level official to Taiwan for the first time. Zhang Zhijun, the head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office and top cross-strait negotiator, is the first Chinese ministerial-level official to visit Taiwan since the two sides split in 1949. He met with Wang Yu-chi, the chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council. Zhang also spoke with Kaoshiung city mayor Chen Chu, a major player of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, which is more suspicious of close ties with the mainland and has at times called for Taiwanese independence. Zhang spent most of his trip meeting with local businesses, students, farms, and an aboriginal village. A small group of fewer than one hundred protested the meeting and were kept far from Zhang. Bonus: North Korea calls new Seth Rogen movie an act of war. A spokesmen for the North Korea foreign ministry threatened “merciless” retaliation if the U.S. government does not block the release of the movie "The Interview," calling the film “the most undisguised terrorism.” The movie stars James Franco and Seth Rogen as a producer and talk-show host who land an interview with Kim Jong Un and later get pulled into a CIA assassination plot. This is not the first time North Korean dictators have been used as “comic fodder.”