Asia

Myanmar

  • Myanmar
    Is Rakhine State Home to a Growing Insurgency?
    Rakhine State, where violence has been escalating for two months after Rohingya militants allegedly attacked a border guard post on October 9, is spiraling into chaos. As I noted in a recent post, the government of Aung San Suu Kyi seems unable, or unwilling to control security forces operating in northern Rakhine State, where they have been numerous reports of reprisal killings, beatings, and house-burnings against Rohingya in the weeks since October 9. The Myanmar government reportedly has made parts of northern Rakhine State off-limits to journalists and aid groups, making it hard to assess the true state of damage there. The unrest in western Myanmar has been going on for at least five years, since a first round of violence in the early 2010s. As army rule gave way to quasi-civilian rule in Myanmar at that time, violence against Rohingya expanded throughout Rakhine State, driving over 100,000 people out of their homes, and destroying many Rohingya communities. At the time, many Rohingya fled Myanmar or crowded into makeshift camps, but there were few attacks by Rohingya on Buddhist Rakhines or state institutions. That may be changing. Now, in a comprehensive report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) lays out a new potential impact of the years-long campaign, by security forces, paramilitaries, and average citizens, against the Rohingya in Rakhine State. According to ICG’s investigators, Rakhine State is witnessing the “emergence of a new Muslim insurgency there. The current violence is qualitatively different from anything in recent decades, seriously threatens the prospects of stability and development in the state and has serious implications for Myanmar as a whole.” Indeed, ICG is the first to report that a sizable militant network has emerged among Rohingya. It argues, based on extensive interviews, that:   The insurgent group, which refers to itself as Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement, HaY), is led by a committee of Rohingya émigrés in Saudi Arabia and is commanded on the ground by Rohingya with international training and experience in modern guerrilla war tactics. It benefits from the legitimacy provided by local and international fatwas (religious judicial opinions) in support of its cause and enjoys considerable sympathy and backing from Muslims in northern Rakhine State, including several hundred locally trained recruits.   Some other Myanmar-based reporters and civil society groups have questioned the ICG report, wondering whether the reported militant network is really that well trained and equipped, given that the Myanmar security forces mostly seem to be arresting alleged militants with knives, or ancient guns, Still, the possibility that Rohingya angered by the state’s growing political, social, and economic marginalization of them, would eventually turn to violence, could never be ruled out. Even before ICG’s report outlined the rise of new militant Muslim networks in Rakhine State, some Myanmar security experts had warned that scorched earth government tactics, and the disenfranchisement of most Rohingya before last year’s elections, would eventually fuel a counteraction. ICG notes:   Disenfranchisement prior to the 2015 [national and state] elections severed the last link with politics and means of influence. At the same time, the disruption of maritime migration routes to Malaysia closed a vital escape valve, particularly for young men whose only tangible hope for the future was dashed. An increasing sense of despair has driven more people to consider a violent response.   Indeed, even before this report there have been rumors floating around for years among diplomats and security experts in Myanmar that the Islamic State, militant groups based in Persian Gulf states, and older, seemingly defunct Rohingya militant groups that operated in the 1990s and 2000s, were trying to recruit young men in Rakhine State. Militant groups were allegedly targeting those alienated by the violence of the early 2010s, and trying to convince them to launch attacks against Rakhine Buddhists and representatives of the state. Until early October, these rumors seemed just that. The question now is, how widespread has militancy become among Rohingya---and how much support militant sentiment might have? How real and how large is this supposed insurgency? ICG has identified a potentially new and dangerous militant network, but it is unclear how much it draws on the actual views of the Rohingya population. Second, and most important, how can the Myanmar security forces---notorious for abusing civilians and allegedly complicit in the attacks on Rohingya going back to the early 2010s---effectively prosecute a campaign to shut down militant networks without turning to even more brutal tactics against the entire Rohingya population? As ICG notes, de facto head of government Aung San Suu Kyi has little actual control over the military, or little desire to exert control. Since early October the armed forces operating in Rakhine State appear to be operating without any civilian leadership from Naypyidaw. To eradicate militant networks, security forces in Rakhine State will have to increase intelligence gathering, work with regional governments to understand growing radicalism in Rakhine State---but also stop the wanton beating, torture, and killing of civilians in Rakhine State that has, too often, been the norm for security forces. The army’s usual scorched earth tactics have been the major source of the chaos in Rakhine and are totally counterproductive in any strategy to combat militant groups. But given what has taken place since early October, as the Myanmar security forces have been unleashed with few checks in northern Rakhine State, it is hard to imagine any new, more nuanced approach to the Rakhine conflict occurring.
  • Asia
    What Does the Bloodshed in Rakhine State Tell Us?
    The ongoing bloodshed in Rakhine State, where security forces reportedly are engaging in a rising pattern of abuses against Rohingya, seems to be worsening. International human rights groups have warned that violence is escalating, and Kofi Annan, head of an international commission to study conditions in Rakhine State, this week told reporters he was “deeply concerned” with reports of dozens of Rohingya killed in the state in recent weeks, according to the New York Times. Human rights groups have warned that security forces are targeting groups of Rohingya for extrajudicial executions and also are blocking aid shipments to areas of northern Rakhine State. The New York Times reports, “Activists have relayed stories of rapes, arson, targeted killings and other atrocities said to have been committed against the Rohingya there by the army since Oct. 9, when insurgents killed nine police officers in attacks on border posts." In late November, former UN Peace Prize winner Jose Ramos Horta and Benedict Rogers, a leading Myanmar rights activist, warned that Rakhine State was at risk of descending into ethnic cleansing resembling the past tragedies in Rwanda and Bosnia, among others. Aung San Suu Kyi’s government has done little to stop the unfolding violence. Senior generals have said that there are no abuses happening in Rakhine State currently, and Aung San Suu Kyi has chosen a top army general and current vice president, Myint Swe, to investigate the attacks in Rakhine State. Myint Swe headed military intelligence under the former junta, which repeatedly crushed protests, including the 2007 Saffron Revolution. In addition, Aung San Suu Kyi has chastised the international community for fueling division in western Myanmar, claiming that the international community is “drumming up cause for bigger fires of resentment” in Myanmar. There are three lessons we can clearly see from the response, or lack thereof, of the Myanmar government to the rising violence, apparent arson, and forced displacement in Rakhine State. First, Aung San Suu Kyi appears to have minimal personal interest in issues related to the Rohingya. During the 2014–2015 campaign season, she rarely spoke about the Rohingya, and when she did so she often downplayed the violence that has occurred in Rakhine State over the past five years. The broadest base of her support comes from the majority ethnic Burmans, and there is little political capital to be gained among most Burmans from advocating for the Rohingya. Since becoming de facto head of the Myanmar government earlier this year, Aung San Suu Kyi has appointed Annan’s commission but invested little personal time or use of her bully pulpit to address the situation in Rakhine State. Although she said, last spring, that resolving conflict in Rakhine was a priority, in recent weeks she has just said, over and over, that Naypyidaw is in control of the situation in northern Rakhine. Or, she has blamed foreign groups for stirring up tension in Rakhine State. She has continued saying this despite ongoing abuses and significant evidence that Naypyidaw does not have control of the chaos in Rakhine. On other domestic challenges, the former Nobel laureate has been much more personally engaged, showing that she can indeed command the bully pulpit impressively. Aung San Suu Kyi has been more than willing to use her bully pulpit to address ongoing civil conflict in the north and northeast. It is reasonable to assume that she regards the violence in Rakhine State as less important, less deserving of her attention than the conflict in the north and northeast, as well as many other Myanmar issues. Second, Aung San Suu Kyi and her government either cannot control the military forces operating in Rakhine State, or they choose not to, perhaps for fear of alienating the army, which retains enormous political influence. There is no evidence, either from published reports or from my own conversations with Myanmar government advisors, that Aung San Suu Kyi and other civilian leaders are taking real, concrete steps to scrutinize the actions of security forces in western Myanmar and to end the climate of impunity for forces involved in abuses in Rakhine State. A lack of government control of the military is unsettling; a disinterest in controlling an armed forces that have been accused, for decades, or massive crimes, is an unsettling prospect as well. Placing Myint Swe, regarded as a military hard-liner, as a top investigator into the Rakhine crisis, does not suggest a serious desire to investigate the security forces’ actions. Third, despite considerable media coverage of Malaysian Prime Minister Najib tun Razak’s recent speech warning about abuses in Rakhine State, there is actually little evidence other Southeast Asian nations will do anything concrete to stop the bloodshed. Earlier this week, Najib told a crowd in Kuala Lumpur that “enough is enough” and that Aung San Suu Kyi has to take more dramatic action to stop crackdowns on Rohingya. Like most Malaysian Malays, the Rohingya are Muslims, and a sizable group of Rohingya has fled to Malaysia, although they mostly do not have legal status in Malaysia. But Najib, like other leaders in the consensus-first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), will do little more than offer occasional public statements and possibly meet in private with Aung San Suu Kyi to encourage her to take stronger action to protect rights in western Myanmar. ASEAN’s long history shows that the organization is ill-equipped to do anything concrete about human rights crises, and that is not likely to change now, even though ASEAN has a human rights charter that supposedly obliges member-states to respect rights. What’s more, Najib (and most other regional leaders) is not exactly a stirring spokesman for respecting rights. His government has presided over a crackdown on civil society and opposition politicians over the past three years. He is, most likely, highlighting the violence in western Myanmar as a way of seeming tough on Muslims’ rights, and distracting domestic attention from his squabbles with former members of Malaysia’s governing coalition, regular large street protests, an ongoing corruption scandal, and other domestic challenges facing his administration.
  • China
    Rakhine Lockdown, Hong Kong Disqualifications, Choigate, and More
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Rohingyas suffer under Rakhine lockdown. Myanmar’s Rakhine State, home to roughly 1.1 million stateless Muslims self-identified as Rohingya, has been on military lockdown since October 9 following attacks on three border security posts. Government officials claim that the perpetrators were members of a jihadist organization, and that military exercises are counterterrorism measures. The military’s goal is to eradicate the presence of the group Aqa Lul Mujahidin, which is reportedly linked to the Organization for Rohingya Security, an armed group active during the 1990s. Over 130 people have died and 234 have been arrested in the heaviest wave of violence in the region since 2012. The local Rakhine government has vowed to demolish all “illegal” structures, including over 2,500 homes, 600 shops, twelve mosques, and over thirty schools, all belonging to Rohingya. As of November 13, Human Rights Watch has identified via satellite over 430 destroyed buildings in villages that have become military strongholds where food is scarce and rape and looting by soldiers are common occurrences. The organization is calling for Myanmar’s government to establish a UN-assisted investigation, but authorities are rejecting all allegations of violence and closing off the area to Western journalists. At least 500 Rohingya refugees have fled to neighboring Bangladesh where they are residing in four refugee camps. 2. Pro-independence Hong Kong lawmakers disqualified from taking office. Hong Kong’s High Court ruled that Sixtus “Baggio” Leung and Yau Wai-ching, elected in September, had willfully and deliberately insulted China by refusing to swear allegiance to the “Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,” in effect declining to take their oaths. During their swearing-in, they had referred to the “Hong Kong nation” and used a derogatory term for China, while wearing flags saying “Hong Kong is not China.” The court’s decision was expected after Beijing’s recent announcement that anyone advocating for the city’s independence would be barred from holding office there. Leung and Yau intend to contest the ruling. A different attempt to unseat a pro-democracy lawmaker failed Friday, when the High Court dismissed the case against Lau Siu-lai, who had registered her protest by taking extremely long pauses during her swearing-in. 3. Choigate continues to roil Korean politics. President Park is facing a second investigation into her ties with confidante Choi Soon-sil, who allegedly used her close relationship with Park to coerce Korean companies into donating millions to nonprofit foundations used by Choi for personal gain. In response to concerns voiced by opposition leaders that the Ministry of Justice is linked too closely to the president and the executive branch to conduct a credible investigation, the National Assembly passed a measure on Thursday appointing an independent special counsel to conduct a separate probe in addition to the one being conducted by the Ministry of Justice. Despite weeks of massive public protests, increasing calls in the National Assembly for her to resign or be impeached, and with her approval rating hovering between 5 and 10 percent, Park seems intent on completing her single, five-year term of office that ends next year. 4. Blasphemy case brought against Jakarta governor. The investigation into Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Christian from Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community, stems from comments he made in reference to a Quranic verse that some believe bans Muslims from having a non-Muslim leader. Basuki, who also goes by the nickname Ahok, implied this interpretation might be used to draw voters away from him during his re-election campaign. Although he apologized for his comments, there have been ongoing protests against him including a rally of more than one hundred thousand on November 4. Other supporters, however, including Muslims, have rallied around him in advance of the February election. According to authorities, Ahok’s case could go to court in approximately one month and a travel ban will be placed on him during the investigation. Blasphemy convictions can result in up to five years of jail time under Indonesian law.  Ahok assumed his current position when former governor Joko Widodo was elected president. And while the two have been political allies in the past, the blasphemy investigation may strain ties between them and project an image of Indonesia as a nation of religious intolerance. 5. Abe meets Trump. Last night at Manhattan’s Trump Tower, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid a visit to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump for an unofficial ninety-minute meeting. Though the get-together was hastily planned, and just a brief stopover for Abe on his way to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru this weekend, there were hopeful signs from both sides: Trump called it the start of a “great friendship,” and Abe claimed he was “convinced Mr. Trump is a leader in whom I can have great confidence.” But the two leaders will need to do more than establish a personal rapport in the coming years to make the alliance work. Trump suggested during his campaign that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons to defend itself and that it should share more of the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, throwing into question his support for the alliance. He also made promises to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal that would buoy Japan’s flagging economy. If that happens, China is likely to fill the free-trade vacuum with its own deal. Bonus: Chinese internet hails the pheasant-elect. Images of a golden pheasant bird at China’s Hangzhou Safari Park flew across the web after a local journalist observed the similarities between the bird’s flaxen coif and that of President-elect Donald Trump. The bird, named Little Red for its crimson body, garnered much attention among Chinese netizens, some of whom found the bird more attractive than Trump. While the bird’s online popularity may not last much beyond the next news cycle, Little Red’s keeper indicated that he expected the bird’s popularity to draw more visitors to the park. And the golden pheasant isn’t the only of nature’s creatures that have earned Trumpian comparisons; others include caterpillars, rabbits, and howler monkeys.
  • Myanmar
    What is Happening in Western Myanmar?
    Over the past month, the situation in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, which has been extremely volatile since an eruption of violence in the early 2010s, has deteriorated once again. Following an attack on police outposts near the border with Bangladesh in early October, which killed at least nine policemen, the state is on edge. Some human rights groups have reported that the security forces and police, as well as individuals, are striking back at ethnic Rohingya, since militant Rohingya Muslims were believed to be behind the killings of the police. Although the security forces, which are dominated by Buddhist ethnic Rakhines, supposedly have been targeting only militant suspects, they have spread their net widely, unleashing a wave of destruction. For more on my analysis of the increasingly dangerous situation in western Myanmar, see my new article for World Politics Review. 
  • Asia
    Podcast: The Changing Face of Myanmar
    Podcast
    On this week’s Asia Unbound podcast, Richard Cockett, former Southeast Asia correspondent for the Economist and author of Blood, Dreams and Gold: The Changing Face of Burma, weaves a vivid narrative of Myanmar’s colonial past and its legacy for the nation today. As he brings to life the tumultuous history of Southeast Asia’s newest democracy, Cockett highlights the role of the “plural society,” a mercantilist jumble of ethnicities brought together under British rule to exploit local resources. In Myanmar’s case this plurality never led to integration. Instead it set the stage for rising ethnic Burmese nationalism in the 1960s, military rule, and ongoing ethnic strife. Even Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s de facto head of state, is a product of the institutions that built modern Myanmar a half-century ago argues Cockett: no longer simply a symbol of democracy, she is playing the shrewd politician by toeing the line of Burmese nationalism. To hear more about the fascinating history that has beget today’s Myanmar, listen to our conversation below.
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of September 23, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Samir Kumar, Gabriella Meltzer, and David O’Connor look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Deadly forest fires exact major toll on Southeast Asia. A study published this week in Environmental Research Letters by public health and atmospheric modeling experts at Harvard University and Columbia University reveals the severe public-health ramifications of forest fires that engulfed Indonesia in 2015. The researchers estimated that fires deliberately set to clear land for agricultural purposes caused the premature deaths of 91,600 people in Indonesia, and 6,500 and 2,200 deaths in Malaysia and Singapore, respectively. These figures exclude damage done to children and infants or miscarriages caused by the toxic haze. Fatalities resulted from exposure to fine particulate matter, commonly referred to as PM2.5, which can result in health problems including asthma, bronchitis, lung cancer, and cardiovascular disease. The fires, exacerbated by severely dry El Niño conditions, destroyed 10,000 acres of land and resulted in $30 billion worth of economic losses for the country. The annual fires have strained relations between Indonesia and its neighbors, and the government’s response is a greater crackdown on private companies and individuals who ignited the fires for commercial gain. 2. Eighteen Indian soldiers killed by militants in Kashmir. Early Monday morning, four militants crossed the Line of Control, the de facto border between India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, and attacked an Indian army outpost in the remote village of Uri, killing eighteen soldiers. India attributed the attack to Jaish-e-Mohammed, an anti-India terrorist group with ties to Pakistan’s intelligence service most notable for their 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh dubbed Pakistan a “terrorist state” in a tweet, while General Raheel Sharif, the chief of the Pakistan army, condemned a “hostile narrative propagated by India.” An outspoken senior member of India’s ruling party called for aggressive action against Pakistan, remarking, “for one tooth, the complete jaw,” but Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his advisors appear settled on a policy of aggressive diplomacy to isolate Pakistan in multilateral fora. Reaction to the attack from major countries like Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, was uniform in referencing, implicitly or explicitly, the role that Pakistan may have played in support of terrorist groups. 3. Greenpeace finds chemical accidents occur nearly daily in China. A report released by Greenpeace on Wednesday reveals that China experienced 232 chemical accidents in the first eight months of 2016—nearly one a day—causing 199 deaths and 400 injuries. The report comes little more than a year after a mismanaged chemical storage facility in Tianjin exploded, leaving 173 people dead and hundreds more wounded. Using government-provided data, Greenpeace found that more than half of chemical accidents occur during transportation, while 27 percent occur during production. Leaks caused 43 percent of accidents, while fire and explosions accounted for 27 and 16 percent, respectively. The report notes that the true number of accidents is likely higher than official statistics indicate. Furthermore, these accidents often result in casualties due to the close proximity of chemical plants to densely populated areas. The most recent such accident occurred on Tuesday, when an explosion at a chemical plant in Yantai caused four deaths. 4. Record numbers of Burmese refugees settle in the United States. Recently, the number of Burmese refugees resettling in the United States has exceeded that of Syrian refugees doing the same. Even as the civil war in Syria worsens and the debate surrounding resettlement of Muslim refugees becomes increasingly fervent, a growing number of Burmese nationals, many Muslim, have quietly settled in the United States. According to the U.S. Department of State, from October 2015 to mid-September 2016, 11,902 Burmese refugees and 11,598 Syrian refugees were resettled in America. An increasing number of those from Myanmar are Rohingyas, a self-identified Muslim ethnic minority group that has suffered persistent persecution in Myanmar by the Buddhist majority. The surge in refugees was exacerbated by long-standing and increasingly severe discriminatory practices against the Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine state, causing thousands of Rohingya refugees to flee Myanmar. Figures from the Refugee Processing Center show that Rohingya arrivals from Myanmar jumped from just over 650 in the 2014 fiscal year to 2,573 last year. The majority of Rohingya Muslims end up in the United States after spending years in refugee camps in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. 5. Write-downs increase on Chinese non-performing loans. Chinese banks have undertaken further efforts to get non-performing loans (NPLs) off their balance sheets. In the first half of 2016, the number of NPLs written off by the four largest Chinese banks rose by 44 percent, and in the year’s first three months China experienced the slowest growth of NPLs in three years. Some of China’s largest banks–such as China Construction Bank, China Merchants Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China–have announced plans to sell $600 million worth of securities backed by NPLs. In addition to write-downs, bad loans have also been bought up by state-controlled asset management companies and addressed through other government initiatives. Concerns about credit growth and the stress bad loans place on China’s banking system have been mounting. However, estimates of the ratio of NPLs to all corporate loans in China vary considerably between institutions depending on the types of loans included: the IMF places it at 15 percent, but the Chinese government says it is just 1.7 percent. Bonus: North Korea, cyber superpower. North Korea, isolated economically and diplomatically, is also largely cut off from the global internet, but it does have a small web presence. How small? The country has a total of twenty-eight websites on its top-level domain, .kp. A slip-up by an administrator at a North Korean nameserver this week resulted in the list of all the country’s websites that face the internet being visible to anyone who requested them. The websites include an airline, sites showing off the country’s culture and cuisine, the website of Kim Il-sung University, and several state news outlets. You can find a full list here. Oddly, twenty-eight seems to be something of a magic number in North Korea: Kim Jong-un, the country’s dictator, was appointed head of the Korean Workers’ Party when he was twenty-eight and the country has twenty-eight approved haircuts.
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of October 21, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, David O’Connor, Gabriel Walker, and James West look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. In western Myanmar, a lockdown by security forces. Reports that thirty people have been killed by official Myanmar security forces in reprisal for the October 9 border post assaults that left nine police officers dead have increased fears of mounting violence in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Rakhine state, bordering Bangladesh, has long been troubled by unrest, and was the site of conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in 2012 that left hundreds dead. These killings have provoked accusations from Rohingya activists of an official security force campaign targeting Rohingya civilians. The Rohingya are denied citizenship by the Myanmar government, which views the group as Bangladeshi migrants, and suffer human rights violations such as denial of health care and education, forced labor, and sexual violence due to their outcast status. Neither version of the killings has been independently verified; however, an advocacy group recently stated that it had interviewed witnesses who described what seemed to be extrajudicial killings by military forces. The Myanmar government has attributed the October 9 attacks to an organized Muslim militant group, though no solid evidence has been provided and the government has since backtracked somewhat from the charge. 2. Hospital blaze in India kills over twenty. A fire at the private SUM Hospital and Medical College in the eastern city of Bhubaneswar killed twenty-two and critically injured forty people on Monday evening. The fire, which broke out in the hospital’s intensive care unit, was reportedly caused by a short-circuit in the central air conditioning unit that spread to the ICU and dialysis unit. The over twenty victims likely perished from inhaling carbon monoxide. Following the fire, the National Human Rights Commission issued a notice to the state government of Odisha, stating that “the callous attitude and lapses of the authorities, if any, amounted to violation of right to life of the patients.” This is demonstrated by the fact that recommended changes based on a 2013 fire safety audit were not implemented. In addition, the hospital is facing allegations that during the evacuation of roughly 500 patients, those in critical condition were taken off life support, leading to their deaths. Manoj Ranjan Nayak, the owner of SUM Hospital and trustee of its managing Shiksha O’Anusandhan Charitable Trust, was arrested along with four other officials. This incident is only one of many similar in India, which has poor public safety regulations. Prime Minister Modi said on Twitter that he was “deeply anguished” by the loss of life. 3. Two Americans killed by Afghan service member. On Wednesday, a gunman opened fire on several Americans at a military base near Kabul, killing a U.S. service member and civilian contractor while wounding three others. The gunman, who was killed in the ensuing firefight, was reportedly wearing an Afghan military uniform—if confirmed as an insider attack, or a so-called “green-on-blue” incident, it would mark the first such attack on American service personnel in more than a year. The attack is the latest event in a series of concerning news from Afghanistan: the Taliban once again threaten Kunduz in the north, the city they briefly seized in late September 2015; more than one hundred Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) personnel were killed earlier this month in an ambush near Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province in the south that has been nearly completely surround by Taliban forces; and the ANDSF continue to suffer near-record-high casualties as the Taliban continue multiple operations in provinces across the country. 4. Australia doubles down on blocking Chinese bids. Over the past two months, Australia has blocked two high-profile investment attempts by Chinese companies in the country: one $7.6 billion bid by State Grid Corp. of China to purchase a majority stake in Ausgrid, a major electricity distributor, and another $277 million bid in part by Shanghai Cred Real Estate Stock Co. to purchase S. Kidman & Co., Australia’s largest cattle farm that covers over 1 percent of the continent. The bids were nominally vetoed because of “national interest” and “security concerns,” but Beijing pushed back, urging for Australia’s openness, transparency, and nondiscrimination. Opinions toward Chinese investment within Australia have been mixed, with some advocating for more leniency in foreign investment and others for greater transparency on the investor’s part to allay local concerns. Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans stressed the importance of taking national security concerns seriously, but also stated that the Australian government must “come up with some clear ground rules soon” for foreign infrastructure investments, or “a great deal of damage will be done,” likely to international ties. 5. China cracks down on Crown Resorts. Eighteen of the Australian casino company’s employees were detained last week in connection with efforts to stop the promotion of gambling in China, where it is a crime outside of Macau and Hong Kong. Among those arrested is Crown’s vice president of VIP international affairs, who is tasked with attracting high-level clients to the company’s Australian casinos, where a majority of the top players are now from mainland China. The fallout of the arrests is not limited to Crown, but is expected to have wider consequences for the casino industry, spelling trouble for Macau’s already beleaguered economy. Bonus: A hot dog by any other name… Calls by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia for the U.S. chain Auntie Anne’s to change the name of a snack known as the “pretzel dog” sparked a brouhaha in Malaysia this week. The head of the department suggested that the items sold at Malaysian outlets should be renamed “pretzel sausages” to receive halal certification, since dogs are deemed unclean. This isn’t the first time such a change has been proposed. For example, at some restaurants, root beer is labelled as “RB” to avoid confusion with an alcoholic beverage. Many Malaysians criticized the recent decision as making them look naïve or unsophisticated, but as halal food becomes a bigger market worldwide, this may not be the last we hear of these debates.
  • Myanmar
    Instability Rising Again in Western Myanmar
    Rakhine State, in western Myanmar, has been rocked by violence over the past five years. As the Myanmar government transitioned from a military junta to a quasi-civilian regime and, now, to a government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), gangs and paramilitaries have repeatedly attacked Rohingya communities. Over 140,000 Rohingya have been driven from their homes in Rakhine State, with many winding up in camps that are little more than barren internment centers. Their homes have been taken over, making it unlikely they could ever return. The violence has been part of a broader rise in anti-Muslim sentiment that has swept through Myanmar since the early 2010s. This violence has included firebombings and other attacks on Muslim-owned stores, mosques, and other sites throughout the country. In my article for the Washington Monthly earlier this year, I outlined the vast devastation wreaked upon western Myanmar. Earlier this year, there was some hope that the NLD-led government, which had mostly ignored the violence in western Myanmar during its campaign in 2015, was starting to take proactive steps to foster reconciliation in the west and find some lasting solution that would address the disenfranchisement and brutality against Rohingya. On the campaign trail last year, Aung San Suu Kyi regularly dismissed concerns about the unrest and abuses in Rakhine State. Then, this past summer, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government appointed a commission, headed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to assess the situation in Rakhine State. The commission could possibly write recommendations for fostering reconciliation, the restoration of human rights, and development in western Myanmar. The establishment of the commission was widely praised by international rights groups and organizations working with the Rohingya. But now, the situation in western Myanmar appears to be further deteriorating, in what is surely Rohingya advocates’ worst nightmare. On October 9, someone launched assaults on border police posts in Rakhine State, and since then the security forces have reportedly waged a fierce campaign in Rakhine State, although it remains unclear who they are fighting. Still, the government Monday told Myanmar reporters that at least thirty people had been killed in fighting in Rakhine State since October 9, and some Rohingya organizations claim that security forces and other actors in Rakhine State also have started forcing Rohingya from their homes, detaining groups of Rohingya, and burning down houses. These claims---both the number killed since October 9 and the reports of detentions---remain unverified Still, some Myanmar government officials and foreign observers are speculating that groups of Rohingya, furious at their mistreatment over the past five years, are now going to take up arms against local police, security forces, and other officials---and that the October 9 attacks were the first blow in the battle. Yet Rohingya militant groups that have been mentioned by the Myanmar authorities as linked to the October 9 attacks have no prior track record, and several Myanmar experts who focus on Rakhine State had never heard of these organizations. In reality, every Myanmar official I spoke with admitted that they had little information about these supposed organizations---and that they were unsure if these organizations existed at all. Some apparent groups of Rohingya have posted videos on social media in the past two weeks, celebrating the October 9 attacks and calling for a battle in Rakhine State, but it remains unclear who these posters are or whether they really have any connection to the past two weeks’ worth of violence. Nonetheless, violent attacks by Rohingya in western Myanmar would not only undermine the Rohingyas’ international standing but also possibly undermine the work of the Annan commission. A spate of violent attacks by Rohingya militants could give the government and local security forces the pretext to attack back, using further tactics like burning homes and forcing Rohingya into internment camps. Moreover, a deteriorating security situation, particularly in northern Myanmar, has made it harder and harder for aid workers to get food and other essentials to civilians on the ground there. According to a new article in the New York Times, the UN World Food Program and other aid agencies are unable to move food to some parts of northern Rakhine due to the closure of some roads after October 9 and the temporary bans on movement to several areas. The World Food Program has had deliveries into parts of Rakhine State. The situation in western Myanmar once again looks very grim.
  • Myanmar
    Podcast: Myanmar’s “Democratic” Reform
    Podcast
    Earlier this week, as the latest stop on an historic visit to the United States, Burmese State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi made her first official appearance before the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. Last week she met with U.S. President Barack Obama, who announced plans to lift sanctions on Myanmar to ensure that “the people of Burma see rewards from a new way of doing business and a new government.” But are Myanmar’s citizens really experiencing a “new government,” and is Aung San Suu Kyi’s political performance measuring up to her renown as a symbol for democratic change? On this week’s Asia Unbound podcast, Marie Lall, professor at the University College London and author of Understanding Reform in Myanmar: People and Society in the Wake of Military Rule, presents an account of Myanmar’s political transition that, while recognizing advances in political reform, nonetheless raises concerns about the common narrative. Lall describes Myanmar’s roadmap to democracy as the ruling junta’s “retirement package,” which ensures a peaceful political evolution while preserving the military’s say in important parliamentary decisions. Additionally, the openness and transparency the Burmese people expected under a National League for Democracy (NLD)–led government have yet to materialize. Lall also points out two worrying signs in Aung San Suu Kyi’s early tenure: that she has left no room for dissent within the NLD, and that she has expressed little public concern for the fate of the Muslim minority in western Myanmar that self-identifies as the Rohingya. Listen below to hear Lall’s take on Myanmar’s reform progress thus far, and find out why she describes the country’s new leadership as “democratic”—quotation marks included—at least for the time being.
  • Myanmar
    Will Aung San Suu Kyi’s Visit Spark U.S. Investment in Myanmar?
    Later this week, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi will visit Washington, as part of a broader trip to the United States that will include addressing the United Nations General Assembly. In addition to meeting President Obama, Vice President Biden, and several senators and congresspeople, Suu Kyi reportedly will appear at a dinner hosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council. There, she plans to outline Naypyidaw’s economic strategies, and likely make a pitch to potential U.S. investors in sectors ranging from mining to telecommunications. But will anything Suu Kyi says, or a reduction in U.S. sanctions on Myanmar, actually spark significantly increased U.S. investment in the country? To be sure, foreign investment is rising sharply overall in Myanmar – up 18 percent year-on-year between March 2015 and March 2016, according to data from Myanmar’s investment authority. But at this point, total approved U.S. direct investment in Myanmar stands at around $250 million although that number surely will increase over the next ten years. Still, $250 million is a small figure, and U.S. companies’ projects make up a handful of proposals currently being vetted by Myanmar’s investment authorities. By comparison, total Singaporean direct investment in Myanmar stands at over $50 billion, while Japan, which was once a nonfactor in Myanmar, has become the eighth largest source of foreign direct investment, and could well be the biggest source by the end of this decade. The head of a Singapore business delegation visiting Myanmar this week told reporters that Myanmar was now the favorite country for Singaporean companies looking for new investment opportunities abroad. These figures for U.S. investment are unlikely to grow that much even if Suu Kyi outlines, in Washington, a clear plan for fostering macroeconomic stability and if the Obama administration relaxes some sanctions.  (The White House is reportedly considering relaxing some remaining sanctions, but is waiting to do so until consulting with Suu Kyi and her aides later this week.) There are large obstacles to U.S. investment in Myanmar that have little to do with sanctions, and that will remain for years, if not decades. The country’s labor force is expensive, when compared to other countries in the region that have increasingly attracted manufacturing investment, like Vietnam. High electricity costs and office rents (in Yangon), and poor physical infrastructure, are major deterrents to companies selling consumer goods. With the price of oil and other commodities currently low, even some of Myanmar’s natural resources are not as attractive as they once were. In addition, although Suu Kyi has taken important steps toward a national peace deal that would bring significant political stability, a lasting national ceasefire is a long way off. The most powerful ethnic insurgency walked out of the Suu Kyi-led peace conference in August. Political instability will remain a part of life, as will military involvement in many sectors of the economy. In addition, as I have written numerous times, while Myanmar has been cited by the White House as a powerful signal of democratic change, and the influence of the rebalance to Asia, the country is of much less strategic importance to the United States than it is to Asian powers like Japan, China, India, and even Singapore. The NLD’s victory has not made the country much more important strategically – to the United States. Since the NLD’s dominant election victory last November, the Japanese government, which had already identified Myanmar as vitally important to Tokyo’s regional interests, has promised nearly $1 billion in loans and grants for the country, to be disbursed roughly over the next year. China, India, and other Asian powers also have substantial aid programs in Myanmar, targeted partly to help boost investment in the country. U.S. assistance is ramping up, and the United States will become a much larger player in aid in Myanmar. But in the near term, the U.S. aid and economic presence will remain relatively small.  
  • Myanmar
    What Aung San Suu Kyi Hopes to Gain From Her U.S. Visit
    Later this week, Myanmar State Counselor, and de facto head of government, Aung San Suu Kyi travels to the United States. She will address the United Nations General Assembly and will meet with President Barack Obama in the White House this Wednesday. She also will hold meetings with a range of other U.S. officials, Myanmar specialists, and companies. As James Hookaway of the Wall Street Journal notes, the trip clearly solidifies Aung San Suu Kyi’s role as de facto head of government, although she is not technically president. And Aung San Suu Kyi has been careful to balance her state diplomacy, visiting China last month before Myanmar’s national peace conference, and in advance of her trip to the United States. She also has visited other powers important to Myanmar such as Thailand. What does the Myanmar leader hope to gain from this trip to the United States? For one, according to numerous Myanmar officials, she hopes to gain clearer support from the Obama administration for her approach to handling the ongoing tensions in western Rakhine State. There, where conflict has erupted between Buddhists and Muslims since the early 2010s, Aung San Suu Kyi’s seeming indifference to the plight of the Muslim Rohingya initially damaged her image in the United States, and globally. Now, she has asked former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to head up a commission tasked with investigating the violence in Rakhine State, where more than 140,000 Rohingya have been driven out of their homes, with many living in displaced persons camps in the state now. Some human rights groups, like Fortify Rights (a group focusing on the Rohingya and Rakhine State) have welcomed the appointment of Annan, which potentially gives the investigation more credibility. The appointment of Annan also has helped rehabilitate Aung San Suu Kyi’s image among human rights groups in the United States and elsewhere. But Annan is still working on a commission---it will not have any powers to enforce any recommendations it makes, as the former UN Secretary General himself has made clear. The Obama administration likely will press Aung San Suu Kyi to be clearer about how she will address many of the entrenched social and economic problems in Rakhine State, including land grabbing, which remains a persistent problem. Second, Aung San Suu Kyi will push for enthusiastic U.S. government support of her strategy for achieving a permanent and national peace. The peace conference organized by the National League for Democracy (NLD) government last month received only a mixed reception from many of the remaining ethnic insurgencies; the largest, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), had its representatives walk out of the meeting. U.S. officials should press Aung San Suu Kyi for clearer indications of how she plans to handle the next meetings of the national peace dialogue, how she plans to woo back the UWSA and other insurgents to the peace table, and what her vision is for some kind of future, more federal Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi also will likely want the Obama administration, and U.S. investors, to publicly support the NLD’s economic strategy. Although this remains relatively vague, the new Myanmar government has rolled out a strategy that seems to prioritize making Myanmar’s agricultural sector more productive, improving macroeconomic stability, making the financial sector more stable, and addressing endemic corruption. However, the government has not made clear how it plans to address several extremely important economic issues, including the continuing problem of land confiscation, and the lack of clear land tenure laws. The NLD government has created a commission to assess land tenure challenges, but some Myanmar rights groups worry that the commission will simply bury land disputes. Even more worryingly, the government also has offered no clear direction about how it will address the fact that groups linked to current and past armed forces leaders have control over many sectors of the Myanmar economy. The ongoing influence of the armed forces over so much of the economy is a factor that adds to graft, opaque business dealings, land tenure problems, and many other challenges. Aung San Suu Kyi also likely will push the White House for further reductions in U.S. sanctions, as a broader sign of U.S. support for the direction of Myanmar’s democratization. Last spring, the Obama administration relaxed some remaining U.S. sanctions on Myanmar, after the big NLD election victory last year and Aung San Suu Kyi’s successful formation of a government. Opinion within the NLD remains divided on how far Aung San Suu Kyi should push, but some sanctions relief would be seen by most NLD members---and probably most Myanmar citizens---as another signal of support for the government’s political and economic programs.
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of September 9, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. North Korea conducts fifth nuclear test. Pyongyang celebrated the sixty-eighth anniversary of the country’s founding today by conducting its fifth and largest nuclear test. The Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK claims that the nuclear warhead “has been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic rockets,” and that the DPRK can now produce “a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power.” South Korean President Park Geun-hye has condemned Kim Jong-un’s “fanatic recklessness,” and U.S. President Barack Obama says that Pyongyang’s actions will have “serious consequences.” China, North Korea’s major economic partner and ally, firmly opposes the nuclear test and urges Pyongyang to refrain from further provocative activities. When asked whether Beijing will take specific measures in response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterates its commitment to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserving regional stability. The UN Security Council has announced an emergency meeting to address the nuclear test. 2. Zika debuts in Southeast Asia. Malaysia confirmed its first case of the Zika virus in a twenty-seven-year-old pregnant woman on Wednesday. The Malaysian health ministry is uncertain how exactly she acquired the virus, given that her husband works in neighboring Singapore and the two live in a city close to the border. It is possible that the woman was either bitten by an infected mosquito in Malaysia or that the virus was transmitted sexually by her husband, who has also shown symptoms of Zika. Roughly 200,000 Malaysians make the daily commute to Singapore, which has reported 292 cases in a span of just over one week. The Singaporean government initially responded by isolating Zika-positive patients, but decided to terminate the practice since roughly 80 percent of cases are asymptomatic. Singapore’s warm and humid climate, along with its high population density, make it an ideal locale for the Zika-spreading Aedes aegypti mosquito. The outbreak will likely take a serious toll on Singapore’s economy as officials anticipate a downturn in tourism and local consumption. 3. China pledges to respond to Kyrgyz embassy attack. New information has emerged on last week’s car bombing at the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security identified the attackers as Uighurs linked to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and said the bombing had been called for and supported by people linked to the Nusra front, which operates in Syria. The driver of the car was a Uighur who held a passport from Tajikistan, and an Uzbek national was also implicated. In addition, five Kyrgyz nationals were detained and warrants have been issued for two Turkish residents. Responding to the updates on the attacks, foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying noted that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement had previously conducted attacks against China, and vowed to “firmly strike against them.” As Hua implied, the bombing will likely accelerate China’s counterterrorism efforts. The attack also renews concerns about the security of Chinese nationals and investments in Central Asia, including new projects under the Belt and Road initiative, as well as connections between Uighur groups and terrorist organizations in Syria or other parts of the Middle East. 4. Japan to provide patrol vessels to Philippines. In a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced an agreement for Tokyo to provide more ships to Manila. Japan had previously supplied the Philippines with ten ships, the first of which were delivered in August. The recent announcement includes two ninety-meter vessels—comparable to the largest ships in Japan’s own coastguard fleet—and a loan of up to five used TC-90 surveillance planes. As the Philippines continues to wrangle with China over disputed maritime claims, the Tokyo-Manila deal illustrates the Pacific trend toward increasingly bigger coastguard vessels—valuable additions to more traditional naval vessels due to their ability to deter rivals with lesser risk of military escalation. The new deal could also be construed as an attempt by Japan to increase security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and their aggregate naval resources to better counterbalance Chinese strength in the Pacific. Despite no direct stake in the South China Sea disputes, which has embroiled China and many Southeast Asian nations, Japan remains largely reliant on trade dependent on free passage through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Japan and China also still remain at odds over the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and continue to have stand-offs between Japanese coast guard and Chinese fishing vessels. By supporting the Philippines and other regional states, it is possible that Japan hopes to build a unified front against Chinese actions and thus fortify its own security. 5. U.S. covert war legacy troubles Laos. Laos, a country of around 7 million, faces continued strife from unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from Washington’s covert war in the region. In the years since Laos was pounded by B-52 bombers in the 1960s and 1970s, the damage from accidents involving UXO illustrates how history might prove to be a stumbling block for U.S. attempts to “pivot to Asia.” Laos, a poor country with little international recognition, is estimated to have suffered the heaviest per capita bombing in history due to the U.S. covert war against the North Vietnamese–backed Pathet Lao communists. President Obama, in his visit to Laos this week, stated that the United States “did not acknowledge” the war in Laos “at the time.” In his speech, Mr. Obama also declared that the United States would contribute an extra $90 million for ordnance clearance in Laos and assistance for victims over the next three years. U.S. aid over two decades of around $100 million has lessened bomb casualty rates from a high of hundreds a year, but a significant number of Laotians continue to be killed or injured by UXO. The additional U.S. funding will hopefully facilitate a closer look at how pervasive the problem of UXO is across the nation. This, however, is a daunting task: mine-clearing agencies estimate that over 270 million bombs were dropped on the country between 1964 and 1973, and approximate that as many as a third did not explode. Bonus: Luxury comes to Myanmar. Six years ago, one newspaper editor described Yangon, the former capital of Myanmar, as a “crumbling colonial relic.” Today, luxury brands are creeping in to peddle their wares to the city’s wealthy tourists and emerging upper class. Since 2012, when the government relaxed automobile import regulations, Jaguar, BMW, and Mercedes opened up showrooms. Swiss watch boutiques sprang up in upscale hotels, and retail space blossomed. But the Burmese economy is one of contradiction: well-heeled drug lords and former military leaders control a $30-billion-a-year jade trade while per capita GDP is below $2,000 and half of the rural population lives in poverty. As political and economic reforms begin to reshape the country in the coming years, the size of its economy and number of ultra-rich are both predicted to skyrocket—and those with newly greased palms are eager to show off their wealth. But will Myanmar’s citizens at large enjoy the riches, or will a resource curse beset them first?
  • Asia
    Great Promise, but Still Huge Obstacles to Myanmar Peace
    Over the past week, Myanmar has held its eagerly awaited national peace conference in Naypyidaw, the capital. Adding to the weight of expectations, United Nations Secretary General Ban ki-Moon attended the conference, and told participants, “There is a long road ahead, but the path is very promising.” But the conference itself has delivered mixed results. For more on my analysis of the Panglong 2 conference, and what it means for the possibility of nationwide peace in Myanmar, see my new World Politics Review piece.
  • Myanmar
    What to Expect at Aung San Suu Kyi’s Peace Conference
    Next week, Aung San Suu Kyi and a host of other dignitaries, including United Nations Secretary General Ban ki-Moon, will preside over a major peace conference in Naypyidaw. The conference is billed as a kind of sequel to the Panglong conference, held in February 1947, and presided over by Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, Aung San. At the original Panglong, Aung San, then essentially interim head of the government, and many ethnic minority leaders agreed to work together in a national government. The agreement they made was supposed to create a kind of federal state, though leaders from several large minority groups did not participate at Panglong. The deal essentially fell apart anyway, as Aung San was assassinated, and Myanmar drifted into civil war and then, eventually, military rule. The idea of a truly federal and effective state would have to wait. Aung San Suu Kyi hopes that next week’s conference will begin to do what her father’s could not, putting Myanmar on the road to a real, nationwide peace and setting the stage for a new conception of the country, which might include redrawing some of the borders of Myanmar’s states. Since independence, the country has never really enjoyed national peace, and a truly sustainable, nationwide peace agreement would be one of the most remarkable achievements in modern Asian history. It also would pave the way for significant investment in areas of the north and east of Myanmar that have been home to insurgencies for decades. The peace conference also could send a clear message, to all Myanmar citizens, that only a more decentralized, federal form of government will work in such an ethnically and religiously diverse country. Although other countries in Southeast Asia, like Indonesia, have embraced political and economic decentralization, it has always been a hard sell to many Burmans, and to some ethnic minorities who feel that accepting even some degree of a rule from Naypyidaw will result in their areas becoming increasingly Burmanized. There are some very positive signs for the meeting next week, which is officially called the Union Peace Conference, but is also known as the 21st Century Panglong Conference. During her visit to China last week, Aung San Suu Kyi got a public commitment from Beijing to support the peace talks, including a not-so-subtle signal that holdout insurgent groups---those that have not signed a previous cease fire---should participate. China has substantial leverage over some of these holdouts. During the Aung San Suu Kyi visit to China, three of the holdout groups with close links to China released a letter saying that they will attend the Union Peace Conference. A meeting between Aung San Suu Kyi and the head of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank also was a signal that Beijing hopes to play a role as peace-maker in Myanmar, and then potentially push infrastructure development links between southwestern China and northern Myanmar. Indeed, it is highly possible that some of the eight holdout groups will sign a national ceasefire agreement next week. Several Myanmar officials have suggested that the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), one of the two biggest and most heavily armed holdouts, will sign next week. This seems overly optimistic, although many reports suggest that the KIO’s preparatory meetings with government officials have been positive, with progress being made. And the UN Secretary General’s attendance at the conference is an important signal of how the international community strongly backs a peace deal. In addition, it appears that senior Myanmar military leaders have decided to strongly back the 21st Century Panglong Conference idea. That the armed forces would want peace might seem intuitive. Yet continuing insurgencies provided a rationale for decades of military rule, and also for the armed forces to remain closely involved in politics even as the country began its transition to civilian government in the early 2010s. So, it was not a cinch that top military leaders would necessarily support a peace conference. And some regional commanders indeed may not support the peace talks; Myanmar army units this week reportedly have been launching aerial attacks on Kachin Independence Army positions, not exactly conveying a message of peace. But Aung San Suu Kyi and the government still will have major hurdles toward a real national peace. Most important, what will become of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the largest and by far most militarily powerful ethnic insurgent group? Wa leaders have expressed their support for the conference, and it appears that Wa representatives will attend the conference. This is an important signal from an insurgent group that probably cannot be defeated militarily. Still, what deal could satisfy Wa leaders and the people of UWSA-held territory, who have been used to a kind of de facto independence for decades? Perhaps the recognition of a Wa State, as one of the states in a federal Myanmar, would be enough to satisfy many ethnic Wa. The peace conference negotiations indeed could produce the outlines of a future Wa State, which would then be hammered out in the follow up talks that are supposed to be held every few months after the initial conference. But Wa leaders have built massive fortunes, allegedly through narcotrafficking. Even with a high degree of autonomy, would a Wa State no longer actually run by the UWSA be able to continue its massive illegal activities? Wa regions could become important trading hubs, but licit trade alone would not make up for the loss of revenues if the UWSA disarmed and gave up narcotrafficking. The Wa regions do not have the natural resources, like timber or copper, which other ethnic minority areas possess.
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of July 1, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Bochen Han, Theresa Lou, and Gabriella Meltzer look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Nepalis seeking employment in Afghanistan face severe risks. Faced with a faltering economy and few job opportunities following the devastating April 2015 earthquake, thousands of Nepalis have sought employment in Afghanistan as security contractors at foreign missions, military bases, and embassies. An attack by the Taliban that killed fourteen Nepalese guards hired by private security firm Sabre International for the Canadian embassy in Kabul demonstrates the inherent risk involved in this venture. Many of these foreign employees have remarked that they are more financially and physically vulnerable than their Western counterparts. The Nepalese guards must work several months to recover enormous debts incurred by broker fees to secure their posts and are paid lower wages. In addition, they are escorted around the city in regular minibuses rather than armored cars, and live in separate facilities with far more stringent rules. Following the attack, the Nepalese government has announced that it is restricting all citizen travel to Afghanistan and will facilitate the travel of those who wish to return to Nepal. 2. China suspends diplomatic communication with Taiwan. This week, China suspended communication mechanisms between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan due to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s failure to endorse the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus refers to the tacit understanding that both parties recognize the “one China” principle, but each side has its own interpretation of the term. Beijing views the acceptance of the consensus as the prerequisite for normalized cross-strait relations and thus blames Taiwan for the suspended communication. Tsai maintains that Taiwan will seek other options to continue dialogue with China. Ties between the two sides have chilled after Tsai and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party took power in January’s presidential and legislative elections. The decision to cut communication with Taipei is seen as Beijing’s latest effort to hinder Tsai’s domestic agenda of reviving the island’s slowing economy. 3. United States upgrades Thailand in human trafficking report. The U.S. Department of State raised Thailand from Tier 3, for those doing most poorly in addressing human trafficking issues, to Tier 2 in its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report. In recent years sex trafficking and the trafficking of Rohingya involved in fishing were major concerns in Thailand. Observers largely attributed this year’s upgrade to improvements in labor conditions and anti-trafficking efforts in the seafood industry. Some speculate, however, that geopolitics may color the objectivity of the TIP report. Last year, Voice of America reported that the rankings of fourteen nations with strategic value had been increased. Particularly controversial was the upgrade of Malaysia, which the Bangkok Post called “blatantly politicized” due to Malaysia’s involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, which were ongoing at the time. Some speculate that Thailand’s upgrade this year occurred not only because of actual improvements, but also because the United States was worried that the Thai government was listing too far towards China. Still, one can hope that the desire to maintain Tier 2 status will encourage further Thai efforts to crack down on trafficking. 4. UN human rights rapporteur wraps up visit to Myanmar. Today, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee concluded her first official visit to the National League for Democracy-led regime. The twelve-day visit, made at the invitation of the Myanmar government, allowed Lee to assess the progress in implementation of recommendations she had made in March to the administration, the findings of which will be released in a report to the UN General Assembly in September. Lee’s meetings with authorities and civil-society groups struck a firm but uncontroversial tone amidst an ongoing battle over words that had her previously condemned by the government and continuously reviled by radical nationalist Buddhist groups. Myanmar’s state counselor and de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi received Lee early last week, during which Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated that the government will—and that outside entities should—avoid using “divisive” and “emotive” terms like “Bengali” and “Rohingya” to describe the persecuted Muslim minority group in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state (and rather use “Muslim community in the Rakhine state”). Lee’s delicate balancing hasn’t fully pleased either side, however, with Muslim groups lamenting her lack of commitment to them on behalf of the UN, and Buddhist groups preemptively dismissing her upcoming report as “biased.” 5. Vietnam considers motorcycle ban. As traffic congestion in Hanoi worsens, local officials have announced a plan to ban motorcycles in the city center starting in 2025. The city currently has more than 4.9 million motorcycles, with between eight and twenty thousand new ones being registered in the city each month in 2015. However, meeting growing demand for transportation will require expanding public transit systems, and Hanoi officials also intend to double the number of buses and construct two new urban rail lines. China has also begun implementing similar restrictions in recent months, banning electric bikes and limiting traffic in the nation’s congested capitol. Bonus: Falun Gong fights back on the street and in court. Flushing, NY, home to one of the largest Falun Gong followings in North America, is also now the birthplace of a Brooklyn court battle between two Chinese immigrant groups. In a federal lawsuit filed in March 2015, Falun Gong members have accused the Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance (CACWA), a group with alleged ties to the Chinese Communist Party, of pursuing an “ongoing campaign of violent assaults, threats, intimidation, and other abuses” against them. Falun Gong practitioners are a stalwart presence on crowded Flushing streets, often handing out flyers that promote the spiritual practice and raise awareness about persecution the group faces within China. CACWA has its own counter-propaganda that refers to Falun Gong as an evil cult. Members of the two groups occasionally engage in scuffles, described as anything from “typical” New York City street arguments to “attacks,” depending on the perspective. With the final ruling impending, the latest official news is that the plaintiff’s motion to seal the case from the public record has been denied. But in a battle for hearts and minds, can there really be a winner?