Myanmar

Later this week, Myanmar State Counselor, and de facto head of government, Aung San Suu Kyi travels to the United States. She will address the United Nations General Assembly and will meet with President Barack Obama in the White House this Wednesday. She also will hold meetings with a range of other U.S. officials, Myanmar specialists, and companies. As James Hookaway of the Wall Street Journal notes, the trip clearly solidifies Aung San Suu Kyi’s role as de facto head of government, although she is not technically president. And Aung San Suu Kyi has been careful to balance her state diplomacy, visiting China last month before Myanmar’s national peace conference, and in advance of her trip to the United States. She also has visited other powers important to Myanmar such as Thailand. What does the Myanmar leader hope to gain from this trip to the United States? For one, according to numerous Myanmar officials, she hopes to gain clearer support from the Obama administration for her approach to handling the ongoing tensions in western Rakhine State. There, where conflict has erupted between Buddhists and Muslims since the early 2010s, Aung San Suu Kyi’s seeming indifference to the plight of the Muslim Rohingya initially damaged her image in the United States, and globally. Now, she has asked former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to head up a commission tasked with investigating the violence in Rakhine State, where more than 140,000 Rohingya have been driven out of their homes, with many living in displaced persons camps in the state now. Some human rights groups, like Fortify Rights (a group focusing on the Rohingya and Rakhine State) have welcomed the appointment of Annan, which potentially gives the investigation more credibility. The appointment of Annan also has helped rehabilitate Aung San Suu Kyi’s image among human rights groups in the United States and elsewhere. But Annan is still working on a commission---it will not have any powers to enforce any recommendations it makes, as the former UN Secretary General himself has made clear. The Obama administration likely will press Aung San Suu Kyi to be clearer about how she will address many of the entrenched social and economic problems in Rakhine State, including land grabbing, which remains a persistent problem. Second, Aung San Suu Kyi will push for enthusiastic U.S. government support of her strategy for achieving a permanent and national peace. The peace conference organized by the National League for Democracy (NLD) government last month received only a mixed reception from many of the remaining ethnic insurgencies; the largest, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), had its representatives walk out of the meeting. U.S. officials should press Aung San Suu Kyi for clearer indications of how she plans to handle the next meetings of the national peace dialogue, how she plans to woo back the UWSA and other insurgents to the peace table, and what her vision is for some kind of future, more federal Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi also will likely want the Obama administration, and U.S. investors, to publicly support the NLD’s economic strategy. Although this remains relatively vague, the new Myanmar government has rolled out a strategy that seems to prioritize making Myanmar’s agricultural sector more productive, improving macroeconomic stability, making the financial sector more stable, and addressing endemic corruption. However, the government has not made clear how it plans to address several extremely important economic issues, including the continuing problem of land confiscation, and the lack of clear land tenure laws. The NLD government has created a commission to assess land tenure challenges, but some Myanmar rights groups worry that the commission will simply bury land disputes. Even more worryingly, the government also has offered no clear direction about how it will address the fact that groups linked to current and past armed forces leaders have control over many sectors of the Myanmar economy. The ongoing influence of the armed forces over so much of the economy is a factor that adds to graft, opaque business dealings, land tenure problems, and many other challenges. Aung San Suu Kyi also likely will push the White House for further reductions in U.S. sanctions, as a broader sign of U.S. support for the direction of Myanmar’s democratization. Last spring, the Obama administration relaxed some remaining U.S. sanctions on Myanmar, after the big NLD election victory last year and Aung San Suu Kyi’s successful formation of a government. Opinion within the NLD remains divided on how far Aung San Suu Kyi should push, but some sanctions relief would be seen by most NLD members---and probably most Myanmar citizens---as another signal of support for the government’s political and economic programs.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. North Korea conducts fifth nuclear test. Pyongyang celebrated the sixty-eighth anniversary of the country’s founding today by conducting its fifth and largest nuclear test. The Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK claims that the nuclear warhead “has been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic rockets,” and that the DPRK can now produce “a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power.” South Korean President Park Geun-hye has condemned Kim Jong-un’s “fanatic recklessness,” and U.S. President Barack Obama says that Pyongyang’s actions will have “serious consequences.” China, North Korea’s major economic partner and ally, firmly opposes the nuclear test and urges Pyongyang to refrain from further provocative activities. When asked whether Beijing will take specific measures in response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterates its commitment to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserving regional stability. The UN Security Council has announced an emergency meeting to address the nuclear test. 2. Zika debuts in Southeast Asia. Malaysia confirmed its first case of the Zika virus in a twenty-seven-year-old pregnant woman on Wednesday. The Malaysian health ministry is uncertain how exactly she acquired the virus, given that her husband works in neighboring Singapore and the two live in a city close to the border. It is possible that the woman was either bitten by an infected mosquito in Malaysia or that the virus was transmitted sexually by her husband, who has also shown symptoms of Zika. Roughly 200,000 Malaysians make the daily commute to Singapore, which has reported 292 cases in a span of just over one week. The Singaporean government initially responded by isolating Zika-positive patients, but decided to terminate the practice since roughly 80 percent of cases are asymptomatic. Singapore’s warm and humid climate, along with its high population density, make it an ideal locale for the Zika-spreading Aedes aegypti mosquito. The outbreak will likely take a serious toll on Singapore’s economy as officials anticipate a downturn in tourism and local consumption. 3. China pledges to respond to Kyrgyz embassy attack. New information has emerged on last week’s car bombing at the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security identified the attackers as Uighurs linked to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and said the bombing had been called for and supported by people linked to the Nusra front, which operates in Syria. The driver of the car was a Uighur who held a passport from Tajikistan, and an Uzbek national was also implicated. In addition, five Kyrgyz nationals were detained and warrants have been issued for two Turkish residents. Responding to the updates on the attacks, foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying noted that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement had previously conducted attacks against China, and vowed to “firmly strike against them.” As Hua implied, the bombing will likely accelerate China’s counterterrorism efforts. The attack also renews concerns about the security of Chinese nationals and investments in Central Asia, including new projects under the Belt and Road initiative, as well as connections between Uighur groups and terrorist organizations in Syria or other parts of the Middle East. 4. Japan to provide patrol vessels to Philippines. In a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced an agreement for Tokyo to provide more ships to Manila. Japan had previously supplied the Philippines with ten ships, the first of which were delivered in August. The recent announcement includes two ninety-meter vessels—comparable to the largest ships in Japan’s own coastguard fleet—and a loan of up to five used TC-90 surveillance planes. As the Philippines continues to wrangle with China over disputed maritime claims, the Tokyo-Manila deal illustrates the Pacific trend toward increasingly bigger coastguard vessels—valuable additions to more traditional naval vessels due to their ability to deter rivals with lesser risk of military escalation. The new deal could also be construed as an attempt by Japan to increase security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and their aggregate naval resources to better counterbalance Chinese strength in the Pacific. Despite no direct stake in the South China Sea disputes, which has embroiled China and many Southeast Asian nations, Japan remains largely reliant on trade dependent on free passage through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Japan and China also still remain at odds over the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and continue to have stand-offs between Japanese coast guard and Chinese fishing vessels. By supporting the Philippines and other regional states, it is possible that Japan hopes to build a unified front against Chinese actions and thus fortify its own security. 5. U.S. covert war legacy troubles Laos. Laos, a country of around 7 million, faces continued strife from unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from Washington’s covert war in the region. In the years since Laos was pounded by B-52 bombers in the 1960s and 1970s, the damage from accidents involving UXO illustrates how history might prove to be a stumbling block for U.S. attempts to “pivot to Asia.” Laos, a poor country with little international recognition, is estimated to have suffered the heaviest per capita bombing in history due to the U.S. covert war against the North Vietnamese–backed Pathet Lao communists. President Obama, in his visit to Laos this week, stated that the United States “did not acknowledge” the war in Laos “at the time.” In his speech, Mr. Obama also declared that the United States would contribute an extra $90 million for ordnance clearance in Laos and assistance for victims over the next three years. U.S. aid over two decades of around $100 million has lessened bomb casualty rates from a high of hundreds a year, but a significant number of Laotians continue to be killed or injured by UXO. The additional U.S. funding will hopefully facilitate a closer look at how pervasive the problem of UXO is across the nation. This, however, is a daunting task: mine-clearing agencies estimate that over 270 million bombs were dropped on the country between 1964 and 1973, and approximate that as many as a third did not explode. Bonus: Luxury comes to Myanmar. Six years ago, one newspaper editor described Yangon, the former capital of Myanmar, as a “crumbling colonial relic.” Today, luxury brands are creeping in to peddle their wares to the city’s wealthy tourists and emerging upper class. Since 2012, when the government relaxed automobile import regulations, Jaguar, BMW, and Mercedes opened up showrooms. Swiss watch boutiques sprang up in upscale hotels, and retail space blossomed. But the Burmese economy is one of contradiction: well-heeled drug lords and former military leaders control a $30-billion-a-year jade trade while per capita GDP is below $2,000 and half of the rural population lives in poverty. As political and economic reforms begin to reshape the country in the coming years, the size of its economy and number of ultra-rich are both predicted to skyrocket—and those with newly greased palms are eager to show off their wealth. But will Myanmar’s citizens at large enjoy the riches, or will a resource curse beset them first?

Over the past week, Myanmar has held its eagerly awaited national peace conference in Naypyidaw, the capital. Adding to the weight of expectations, United Nations Secretary General Ban ki-Moon attended the conference, and told participants, “There is a long road ahead, but the path is very promising.” But the conference itself has delivered mixed results. For more on my analysis of the Panglong 2 conference, and what it means for the possibility of nationwide peace in Myanmar, see my new World Politics Review piece.

Next week, Aung San Suu Kyi and a host of other dignitaries, including United Nations Secretary General Ban ki-Moon, will preside over a major peace conference in Naypyidaw. The conference is billed as a kind of sequel to the Panglong conference, held in February 1947, and presided over by Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, Aung San. At the original Panglong, Aung San, then essentially interim head of the government, and many ethnic minority leaders agreed to work together in a national government. The agreement they made was supposed to create a kind of federal state, though leaders from several large minority groups did not participate at Panglong. The deal essentially fell apart anyway, as Aung San was assassinated, and Myanmar drifted into civil war and then, eventually, military rule. The idea of a truly federal and effective state would have to wait. Aung San Suu Kyi hopes that next week’s conference will begin to do what her father’s could not, putting Myanmar on the road to a real, nationwide peace and setting the stage for a new conception of the country, which might include redrawing some of the borders of Myanmar’s states. Since independence, the country has never really enjoyed national peace, and a truly sustainable, nationwide peace agreement would be one of the most remarkable achievements in modern Asian history. It also would pave the way for significant investment in areas of the north and east of Myanmar that have been home to insurgencies for decades. The peace conference also could send a clear message, to all Myanmar citizens, that only a more decentralized, federal form of government will work in such an ethnically and religiously diverse country. Although other countries in Southeast Asia, like Indonesia, have embraced political and economic decentralization, it has always been a hard sell to many Burmans, and to some ethnic minorities who feel that accepting even some degree of a rule from Naypyidaw will result in their areas becoming increasingly Burmanized. There are some very positive signs for the meeting next week, which is officially called the Union Peace Conference, but is also known as the 21st Century Panglong Conference. During her visit to China last week, Aung San Suu Kyi got a public commitment from Beijing to support the peace talks, including a not-so-subtle signal that holdout insurgent groups---those that have not signed a previous cease fire---should participate. China has substantial leverage over some of these holdouts. During the Aung San Suu Kyi visit to China, three of the holdout groups with close links to China released a letter saying that they will attend the Union Peace Conference. A meeting between Aung San Suu Kyi and the head of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank also was a signal that Beijing hopes to play a role as peace-maker in Myanmar, and then potentially push infrastructure development links between southwestern China and northern Myanmar. Indeed, it is highly possible that some of the eight holdout groups will sign a national ceasefire agreement next week. Several Myanmar officials have suggested that the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), one of the two biggest and most heavily armed holdouts, will sign next week. This seems overly optimistic, although many reports suggest that the KIO’s preparatory meetings with government officials have been positive, with progress being made. And the UN Secretary General’s attendance at the conference is an important signal of how the international community strongly backs a peace deal. In addition, it appears that senior Myanmar military leaders have decided to strongly back the 21st Century Panglong Conference idea. That the armed forces would want peace might seem intuitive. Yet continuing insurgencies provided a rationale for decades of military rule, and also for the armed forces to remain closely involved in politics even as the country began its transition to civilian government in the early 2010s. So, it was not a cinch that top military leaders would necessarily support a peace conference. And some regional commanders indeed may not support the peace talks; Myanmar army units this week reportedly have been launching aerial attacks on Kachin Independence Army positions, not exactly conveying a message of peace. But Aung San Suu Kyi and the government still will have major hurdles toward a real national peace. Most important, what will become of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the largest and by far most militarily powerful ethnic insurgent group? Wa leaders have expressed their support for the conference, and it appears that Wa representatives will attend the conference. This is an important signal from an insurgent group that probably cannot be defeated militarily. Still, what deal could satisfy Wa leaders and the people of UWSA-held territory, who have been used to a kind of de facto independence for decades? Perhaps the recognition of a Wa State, as one of the states in a federal Myanmar, would be enough to satisfy many ethnic Wa. The peace conference negotiations indeed could produce the outlines of a future Wa State, which would then be hammered out in the follow up talks that are supposed to be held every few months after the initial conference. But Wa leaders have built massive fortunes, allegedly through narcotrafficking. Even with a high degree of autonomy, would a Wa State no longer actually run by the UWSA be able to continue its massive illegal activities? Wa regions could become important trading hubs, but licit trade alone would not make up for the loss of revenues if the UWSA disarmed and gave up narcotrafficking. The Wa regions do not have the natural resources, like timber or copper, which other ethnic minority areas possess.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Bochen Han, Theresa Lou, and Gabriella Meltzer look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Nepalis seeking employment in Afghanistan face severe risks. Faced with a faltering economy and few job opportunities following the devastating April 2015 earthquake, thousands of Nepalis have sought employment in Afghanistan as security contractors at foreign missions, military bases, and embassies. An attack by the Taliban that killed fourteen Nepalese guards hired by private security firm Sabre International for the Canadian embassy in Kabul demonstrates the inherent risk involved in this venture. Many of these foreign employees have remarked that they are more financially and physically vulnerable than their Western counterparts. The Nepalese guards must work several months to recover enormous debts incurred by broker fees to secure their posts and are paid lower wages. In addition, they are escorted around the city in regular minibuses rather than armored cars, and live in separate facilities with far more stringent rules. Following the attack, the Nepalese government has announced that it is restricting all citizen travel to Afghanistan and will facilitate the travel of those who wish to return to Nepal. 2. China suspends diplomatic communication with Taiwan. This week, China suspended communication mechanisms between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan due to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s failure to endorse the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus refers to the tacit understanding that both parties recognize the “one China” principle, but each side has its own interpretation of the term. Beijing views the acceptance of the consensus as the prerequisite for normalized cross-strait relations and thus blames Taiwan for the suspended communication. Tsai maintains that Taiwan will seek other options to continue dialogue with China. Ties between the two sides have chilled after Tsai and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party took power in January’s presidential and legislative elections. The decision to cut communication with Taipei is seen as Beijing’s latest effort to hinder Tsai’s domestic agenda of reviving the island’s slowing economy. 3. United States upgrades Thailand in human trafficking report. The U.S. Department of State raised Thailand from Tier 3, for those doing most poorly in addressing human trafficking issues, to Tier 2 in its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report. In recent years sex trafficking and the trafficking of Rohingya involved in fishing were major concerns in Thailand. Observers largely attributed this year’s upgrade to improvements in labor conditions and anti-trafficking efforts in the seafood industry. Some speculate, however, that geopolitics may color the objectivity of the TIP report. Last year, Voice of America reported that the rankings of fourteen nations with strategic value had been increased. Particularly controversial was the upgrade of Malaysia, which the Bangkok Post called “blatantly politicized” due to Malaysia’s involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, which were ongoing at the time. Some speculate that Thailand’s upgrade this year occurred not only because of actual improvements, but also because the United States was worried that the Thai government was listing too far towards China. Still, one can hope that the desire to maintain Tier 2 status will encourage further Thai efforts to crack down on trafficking. 4. UN human rights rapporteur wraps up visit to Myanmar. Today, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee concluded her first official visit to the National League for Democracy-led regime. The twelve-day visit, made at the invitation of the Myanmar government, allowed Lee to assess the progress in implementation of recommendations she had made in March to the administration, the findings of which will be released in a report to the UN General Assembly in September. Lee’s meetings with authorities and civil-society groups struck a firm but uncontroversial tone amidst an ongoing battle over words that had her previously condemned by the government and continuously reviled by radical nationalist Buddhist groups. Myanmar’s state counselor and de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi received Lee early last week, during which Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated that the government will—and that outside entities should—avoid using “divisive” and “emotive” terms like “Bengali” and “Rohingya” to describe the persecuted Muslim minority group in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state (and rather use “Muslim community in the Rakhine state”). Lee’s delicate balancing hasn’t fully pleased either side, however, with Muslim groups lamenting her lack of commitment to them on behalf of the UN, and Buddhist groups preemptively dismissing her upcoming report as “biased.” 5. Vietnam considers motorcycle ban. As traffic congestion in Hanoi worsens, local officials have announced a plan to ban motorcycles in the city center starting in 2025. The city currently has more than 4.9 million motorcycles, with between eight and twenty thousand new ones being registered in the city each month in 2015. However, meeting growing demand for transportation will require expanding public transit systems, and Hanoi officials also intend to double the number of buses and construct two new urban rail lines. China has also begun implementing similar restrictions in recent months, banning electric bikes and limiting traffic in the nation’s congested capitol. Bonus: Falun Gong fights back on the street and in court. Flushing, NY, home to one of the largest Falun Gong followings in North America, is also now the birthplace of a Brooklyn court battle between two Chinese immigrant groups. In a federal lawsuit filed in March 2015, Falun Gong members have accused the Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance (CACWA), a group with alleged ties to the Chinese Communist Party, of pursuing an “ongoing campaign of violent assaults, threats, intimidation, and other abuses” against them. Falun Gong practitioners are a stalwart presence on crowded Flushing streets, often handing out flyers that promote the spiritual practice and raise awareness about persecution the group faces within China. CACWA has its own counter-propaganda that refers to Falun Gong as an evil cult. Members of the two groups occasionally engage in scuffles, described as anything from “typical” New York City street arguments to “attacks,” depending on the perspective. With the final ruling impending, the latest official news is that the plaintiff’s motion to seal the case from the public record has been denied. But in a battle for hearts and minds, can there really be a winner?

It’s that time of year again---when Washington cooks, the public transport goes on extended holiday, people head to the beach, and I offer some thoughts on books to take with you on vacation if you have an interest in Asian history, Southeast Asian politics, and Southeast Asian culture. Keep in mind that none of these books are exactly traditional “beach reads”---light page-turners that you can flip through while also watching your kids bury themselves in sand. One recent work that I recommend highly is China’s Future by David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University. Shambaugh is always worth reading on China, but in this relatively slim new work he concisely outlines his thesis that the Communist Party is beginning to crack---that China is actually less stable domestically than many outsiders think, and that China cannot defy the trend of history by continuing to get richer without opening its political system. I don’t share Shambaugh’s certainty that the Party is entering a “protracted” demise---Beijing has proven far more resilient than many Chinese and foreign observers had thought---but the book is insightful and clear. Another worthy new title, and one of several new works on Myanmar, is Blood, Dreams, and Gold: The Changing Face of Burma by former Economist Southeast Asia bureau chief Richard Cockett. During his time with The Economist, Cockett traveled widely in Myanmar, which was beginning to open up after decades of military rule and economic isolation. I wrote a longer review of Cockett’s new book, along with other new books on Myanmar, in the Washington Monthly earlier this year. In short, Cockett offers non-specialist readers an overview of the many, knotted reasons why Myanmar, a country that six decades ago had built a fragile democracy and seemed poised to take off economically, collapsed into a poor, military thugocracy that lasted for fifty years. In addition, Cockett has traveled so extensively in Myanmar today that he paints a full picture of the country seemingly on the verge of democratization, following the transition to civilian rule in the early 2010s and last November’s landmark national elections. He guides the reader in teasing out why the military, so long in control and so ruthless, was willing to give up power in the early 2010s, though it remains to be seen whether the military has fully retreated to the barracks. He also offers extensive reportage from some of the most economically depressed, conflict-torn parts of the county, like remote Chin State, where foreign reporters rarely venture. Cockett is not highly optimistic about Myanmar’s prospects for democratic consolidation; he believes its insurgencies remain too deeply engrained, its army retains too much influence, and its institutions are far too weak for democracy to take strong hold. For people who want to know more about the crisis in western Myanmar, where some 150,000 ethnic Rohingya have been driven from their homes since the transition to civilian rule in Naypyidaw in the early 2010s, I also recommend The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide by Azeem Ibrahiim, a fellow at Oxford and a professor at the U.S. Army War College. The book is not the easiest to read---the prose is sometimes a bit confusing---but it is, right now, the essential guide to the ongoing, largely ignored crimes against humanity in western Myanmar. It is highly depressing material, especially considering how little pressure has been put on Naypyidaw to address the situation in the country’s west. Finally, consider picking up A Life Beyond Boundaries, the posthumous memoir of Benedict Anderson, perhaps the most influential Southeast Asia scholar of the twentieth century. Anderson, who died last year, was instrumental in expanding Southeast Asia studies in the United States. He also played a central role in bringing the massacres in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966 to the attention of the world. For his role in producing a report, done by a team of researchers at Cornell University, on the massacres, Anderson was banned from Indonesia until the end of the Suharto regime. Anderson later wrote multiple influential books on the Philippines and Thailand, and---in 1983---gained an even wider audience with his landmark work, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. In it, he redefined the study of nationalism, arguing that nations are socially constructed, and that these large, constructed communities were only launched by the creation of the printing press and other modern inventions. In later life, as Southeast Asia began to democratize, and shed some of the sociocultural traditions Anderson had studied, Anderson dedicated himself to disparate projects on Southeast Asian culture and religion, and the impacts of modernization. In addition, he was apparently determined to show that scholarship should never mean narrowing one’s focus too much, a point he returns to regularly in his memoir.

Of all the ethnic, racial, and religious minorities in the world, wrote the Economist last year, the Rohingya may well be the most persecuted people on the planet. Today nearly two million Rohingya live in western Myanmar and in Bangladesh. Inside Myanmar they have no formal status, and they face the constant threat of violence from paramilitary groups egged on by nationalist Buddhist monks while security forces look the other way. Since 2012, when the latest wave of anti-Rohingya violence broke out, attackers have burnt entire Rohingya neighborhoods, butchering the populace with knives, sticks, and machetes. They beat Rohingya children to death with rifle butts and, quite possibly, their bare hands. Since then, half the population of Myanmar’s Rohingya has been displaced. Some have tried to escape to other Southeast Asian nations on rickety boats often operated by human traffickers. If the migrants do not die of dehydration or heat stroke, they are often picked up by pirates or the Thai navy—which may not be much better than getting nabbed by pirates. Exhaustive reporting by Reuters seems to suggest that Thailand’s navy is closely involved in shuttling Rohingya refugees into slave labor in Thailand’s seafood, fishing, and other industries. Rohingya women who do not have enough to pay traffickers are forced into marriages or prostitution. For more on the state of the Rohingya today, and how they might fare under the NLD-led government in Myanmar, see my new piece on the Rohingya in the Washington Monthly.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. China releases ambitious plan to clean up polluted soil. In 2014, the Chinese government disclosed that approximately 20 percent of its arable land was contaminated, primarily with heavy metals and agricultural chemicals from industry and farming. This Tuesday, the central government released a long-awaited action plan as a first major step to control and remedy the widespread problem, known as the last of the “three big campaigns” in Chinese environmental protection along with air and water pollution. The plan aims to stabilize and improve soil quality so that 90 percent of contaminated sites are safe for use by 2020, and 95 percent by 2030. It also includes provisions for improving the transparency of soil quality data and emphasizes more severe penalties for polluters. One Greenpeace expert praised the proposal as “pragmatic,” in that it would take steps to ensure that soil pollution would not “lead to major problems” for the millions affected. Since the cost of cleaning up all of China’s polluted soil will top $1 trillion, the plan may prove to be a lucrative opportunity for companies offering soil remediation services in the coming years. 2. Malaysia’s hudud law sparks controversy. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak backed a bill originally put forth by the Parti Islam se-Malaysia to strengthen Islamic courts and introduce hudud, a system of punishment under Islamic law. The punishments included under hudud can be severe including stoning and amputation, although the prime minster said that Malaysia will not permit anything that will draw blood or cause injury. While the new punishments would apply just in the nation’s syariah courts, which are only for Muslims, the proposal has nonetheless launched considerable debate. Members of parties such as the Malaysian Indian Congress have said the bill violates Malaysia’s constitution and notions of a secular government. Additionally, two non-Muslim ministers in the cabinet, Liow Tiong Lai and Mah Siew Keong, announced they will resign if the bill passes after debate in October. Two east Malaysian states, Sarawak and Sabah, have also threatened to split with the rest of the country over the bill. Some speculate that the prime minister, who is tainted by the 1MDB corruption scandal, views the bill as a way to firm up support among Muslim voters before upcoming by-elections. A proposal that is already sowing discord among members of the ruling coalition and that threatens to inflame ethnic tension hardly seems like the path to success though. 3. Death of environmentalist sparks reflection on police brutality in China. Beijing city authorities are investigating the death of a young environmental official in police custody last month. The man, Lei Yang, was arrested by plainclothes police outside of a Beijing massage parlor on the evening of May 7 on suspicion of soliciting prostitutes. Less than an hour later, police took him to a hospital, claiming he had suffered a heart attack and died. The story is disputed by Lei’s family and friends, who say there is no history of heart disease in his family, claim he was on his way to the airport to receive relatives, and question why police took several hours to notify his family of his death and deleted messages from his phone. In response to these claims, police took to the press, trying to clarify their story, only to have public opinion flare up in anger against them after netizens began questioning inconsistencies in the official report of the incident. The debate over Lei’s death has raised questions about how commonly individuals die in police custody in China and if this incident would have gotten a full investigation if Lei had not been young, a new father, and a graduate of one of China’s best universities. 4. Number of internally displaced Afghans on the rise. Amnesty International reported on Tuesday at a press conference in Kabul that the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Afghanistan has doubled since 2013 to roughly 1.2 million.  Despite the fact that these are people living in camps lacking sufficient health, food, or water facilities, the financial resources allocated to the fifteen-year crisis are at their lowest point since 2009. The United Nations requested $393 million in humanitarian funding for 2016, but, as of May, has only been able to raise a quarter of this request. The majority of civilians have fled their communities in recent years due to a flagging economy with only 1.9 percent growth and continuing violence carried out by the Taliban. In fact, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan has said that 2015 “was the most dangerous year on record for civilians since 2009” with at least eleven thousand casualties, one-fourth of whom were children. Although the Afghan government endorsed the "National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons" in 2014, corruption-ridden institutions and a state lacking capacity and expertise have been unable to deliver on promises made to IDPs and forced evictions are a daily threat. 5. Bangladesh conducts first census of Rohingya. The census, which began this week, will not only allow the Bangladeshi government to gain a more accurate count of how many Rohingya  live both inside and outside of refugee camps, but will also give greater insight into the group’s economic circumstances. Estimates of the number of Rohingya in the country range from three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand. A significant number of Rohingya began fleeing from Myanmar to Bangladesh beginning in 2012, and have continued with renewed cycles of violence. While Myanmar agreed to repatriate 2,415 people from Bangladesh in 2014, this has not yet occurred. Some expressed concern that the current census, conducted with assistance from the International Organization for Migration, would serve as preparation to deport Rohingya from Bangladesh. Censuses have proved difficult for the Rohingya in the past; during the 2014 census in Myanmar, the government did not allow individuals to identify as Rohingya and said they should register as Bengali instead. Bonus: North Korea says “Vote Trump, not that dull Hilary.” Presumptive Republican nominee Donald Trump’s latest endorsement came from a surprising source: North Korea. Two weeks after Trump’s speech, during which he declared he would have “no problem speaking to [Kim Jong-un],” a North Korean state media published an op-ed praising Trump as a wise and far-sighted presidential candidate. This is not the first time Trump has expressed unconventional ideas related to U.S. foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula. In a previous interview, Trump stated that he would be willing to withdraw U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea unless they pay more for U.S. military presence. He also suggested that it might not “be a bad thing for [the United States]” for Japan to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Though a senior North Korean official has called Trump’s willingness to engage with Kim merely an insincere gesture for the presidential election, U.S. allies are increasingly worried about Trump’s “America first” agenda.

Rachel Brown is a research associate in Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. China ranks first in many things – population, greenhouse gas emissions, foreign treasury holdings – but openness toward refugees is one arena in which it has not traditionally been considered a leader. It therefore came as surprise when China ranked first in Amnesty International’s recently released “Refugees Welcome Index,” a survey that polled over 27,000 people in twenty-seven nations on their attitudes toward refugees. This put it ahead of nations such as Germany and Canada that have already taken in thousands of Syrian refugees. China also topped the list in citizens’ reported willingness to accept a refugee into their homes, with a whopping 46 percent of respondents willing to do so. (In the next highest nation, the United Kingdom, the share was just 29 percent.) While the Chinese data may not be fully representative as it was collected from just 1,055 respondents in eighteen major cities, the survey nonetheless caught people off guard.  The results fly in the face of multiple aspects of China’s past policies and attitudes toward refugees, namely: The Chinese government provides little financial support for international refugees. In 2015, the Chinese government ranked just fifty-first among both private and national donors to the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), giving only $941,841, less than one-eighth the amount given by private Chinese donors. (The Chinese government has also provided other humanitarian assistance to Middle Eastern countries resettling refugees and donated ten thousand tons of food for Syrian refugees in February 2016). The government also has not shown particular tolerance toward those fleeing to China’s own borders. China is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention against Torture, but as of December 2015, UNHCR reported just 727 displaced "persons of concern" in China. The same month, the UN Committee Against Torture criticized China’s policy of deeming North Korean defectors economic migrants not refugees and forcibly deporting them. This behavior violates China’s international treaty obligations since North Korean defectors may face “persecution, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention and, in some cases, sexual violence” after repatriation. And just two weeks ago, a report indicated that China planned to send home Kokang refugees, an ethnic Chinese population from Myanmar, who had been living in Yunnan province. Officials don’t respect refugee status abroad much either. Last year, multiple Chinese dissidents were returned from Thailand despite receiving arrangements for resettlement as asylees and being granted a UNHCR letter of protection. Chinese citizens may not actually be so enthusiastic about taking in refugees. In a poll by China’s state-run Global Times shortly after the Amnesty report’s release, 90.3 percent of respondents said they didn’t want “to receive refugees in their own homes,” and 79.6 percent opposed having them in their own city or as a neighbor. Popular comments on the survey echoed this less tolerant attitude and called on Western nations to bear full responsibility. One user wrote, “I’m only willing to accept a refugee from a natural disaster, and will absolutely not accept a refugee from a civil war because conflict refugees are of America’s own making and all of the consequences should be assumed by America. We absolutely cannot pay the bill for America’s homicidal maniacs!” Another wrote, “America, the ‘model for global citizens,’ can come do patrols in the South China Sea, why can’t they be a model for housing refugees????” So which survey is more accurate? Most likely neither entirely reflects national sentiments. The Global Times survey was open to anyone online, but the paper is known for its nationalistic readership and controversial positions; meanwhile GlobeScan, who conducted Amnesty’s survey, held phone interviews with members of urban, adult populations, who may be more tolerant of refugees. Linguistic confusion could also have skewed Amnesty’s results. A Quartz article noted that the word used for refugee in the survey, nanmin (难民), can refer either to someone fleeing across international borders or to someone internally displaced due to a natural disaster or other cause. In China, the authors observe, people might be more willing to host the latter. Indeed, China placed highly on questions including just the term nanmin but ranked nineteenth on a question that specifically referenced being “able to take refuge in other countries to escape war or persecution.” (Interestingly, the Global Times poll also only used nanmin, but did reference the Amnesty survey). Despite the Amnesty survey’s potential flaws, reasons for optimism remain. In the study, Chinese respondents placed first in one last category: the belief that their government should be doing “more to help refugees fleeing war or persecution.” 86 percent of respondents supported this statement. China has successfully integrated refugees before and could do so again. Most of the approximately three hundred thousand refugees resettled during the Vietnam War now enjoy full rights. If anywhere close to 86 percent of Chinese citizens truly believe their government should do more, it’s time for them to start advocating for policy changes, including potential resettlement.

Helia Ighani is the assistant director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won a majority of the votes after a landslide election in November 2015, becoming the first fully civilian-led government in Myanmar’s history. Once in power in April 2016, the NLD government released nearly two hundred political prisoners detained by the former military junta government, demonstrating Suu Kyi’s commitment to democratizing the country. However, the new NLD government has not yet attempted to reconcile animosity among Myanmar’s various ethnic groups—in particular, its Rohingya population. Up to 1.1 million Rohingya live in Myanmar, facing serious human rights violations, and thousands have been displaced due to violence with Buddhist nationalists (see CFR’s Global Conflict Tracker for an overview of the sectarian violence in Myanmar). Many have criticized Suu Kyi for refusing to touch the Rohingya issue, including the Dalai Lama. A new Center for Preventive Action (CPA) report, Securing a Democratic Future for Myanmar, highlights this concerns and the importance of U.S. involvement in the country’s transition to democracy. Priscilla A. Clapp, the former chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Myanmar and senior advisor to the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Asia Society, argues that reforms over the past five years have transformed Myanmar “from a country of little strategic interest to the United States into one that promises substantial benefit to core U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and beyond.” Yet, as the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Myanmar Derek Mitchell expressed at a recent CPA event, the “deep reservoir of mistrust in the country must be overcome,” regarding the reconciliation of the recognized 135 ethnic minorities in Myanmar and the “very delicate issue” of the Rohingya minority. Washington has already begun to change its tone on Myanmar. The new U.S. ambassador to Myanmar Scot Marciel said he will continue to use “Rohingya”—considered a controversial term by many hardline Buddhists who refer to the unrecognized population as “Bengali”—when referring to the large Muslim community in Myanmar, despite being asked by the government to not bring up the issue. While Washington hinted that it is considering reversing its sanctions policy toward Myanmar, it is counting on the new government to improve human rights conditions. The Obama administration will decide on whether to continue the sanctions when the underlying legal basis for the program expires next week. Clapp details policy options for facilitating a democratic transition with the NLD government, including U.S. policy recommendations relating to human rights conditions and sanctions on Myanmar. Over the coming year, she recommends that the United States should: • Assist with the establishment of a reconciliation government. • Provide assistance for economic development and conflict mediation in Rakhine State and encourage the new government to give legal status to the Rohingya minority. • Revise the legal structure of remaining sanctions and begin to sunset sanctions specific to Myanmar. • In consultation with the NLD, develop a strategy to expand dialogue with Myanmar’s military.   In the long term, she encourages the United States to: • Expand the purview of U.S. assistance to include capacity-building for government institutions. • Help rebuild the justice system. • Promote economic development at the state level to consolidate peace with ethnic minorities. • Lead a regional effort to find a humane solution to Rohingya statelessness and legal status in neighboring countries. • Promote Myanmar’s political and economic integration into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).   Read Securing a Democratic Future for Myanmar to get Clapp’s full analysis and learn more about Myanmar’s transition to democracy.

Three new annual reports, from the U.S. State Department, Freedom House, and Reporters without Borders, add further evidence to worries that much of Southeast Asia is experiencing an authoritarian revival. Released this week, Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press report (for which I served as a consultant for several Southeast Asia chapters) reveals that in nearly all the ten ASEAN nations, press freedom regressed significantly last year. Freedom House’s findings are similar those of Reporters Without Borders annual Press Freedom Index, which was released earlier this month. In it, the scores of Thailand, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian nations dropped, as compared to their scores in 2015. Like Freedom House’s report, RSF’s analysts use a range of indicators to reflect the overall level of press freedom in each nation. These falls are not surprising---Malaysia has shuttered major publications that have reported on the 1MDB scandal swirling around Prime Minister Najib tun Razak, Thailand’s junta is proving increasingly intolerant of dissent, Brunei has promulgated harsh new sharia-based laws, and other Southeast Asian nations like Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam remain highly intolerant of independent reporting. And these declines in press freedom are indicative of a broader trend. As I have written, much of Southeast Asia has regressed from democratic transition over the past decade; its retrenchment is symptomatic of a broader, global authoritarian revival. Finally, the State Department’s annual country reports on human rights provides more evidence of the democratic downfall of a region that was once touted as an example of political progress. While Myanmar made significant strides toward democracy in 2015, and Indonesia and the Philippines remained vibrant democracies, the country reports show that most of the rest of the region regressed in terms of rights and freedoms. Thailand came in for a particularly harsh assessment, with the State Department noting, “The interim [Thai] constitution remained in place during the year, as did numerous decrees severely limiting civil liberties, including restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and the press.” The country reports further noted that in Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei, among other Southeast Asian nations, there were signs of growing repression in 2015. In the coming months, Southeast Asia’s political trajectory will become even clearer. The NLD-led government in Myanmar is beginning to develop a policy agenda, and its actions will clarify how successfully it can manage a difficult transition from military rule---whether Myanmar becomes more like Thailand, where the armed forces never really returned to the barracks, or like Indonesia, where the power of the armed forces has been curbed significantly. Thailand will hold a referendum, in August, on a new constitution midwifed by the junta. The Thai coup government has essentially barred any open discussion of the new constitution, which contains clauses that could perpetuate the military’s influence and drastically weaken the power of elected members of parliament in the future. However, it seems unlikely that the coup government will resort to outright rigging the constitutional referendum, though it will try its hardest to sway Thais to vote for the draft. The junta has cracked down on most types of dissent, so Thais may use the referendum to voice their frustrations. If the new constitution passes by only a small percentage of the vote, or is even defeated, it would suggest that there is sizable antigovernment sentiment bubbling up in Thailand. Finally, there are the upcoming elections in the Philippines, to be held next week. Some Philippine civil society activists worry that strong popular support for vice presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr, son of the former dictator, and for presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte, who allegedly oversaw brutal anticrime strategies as mayor of Davao, marks a rising popular frustration with the difficulties of democratic government---a longing for a strongman who can just get things done, ignoring institutions or checks on power. Since the Philippines is the most established and vibrant democracy in the region, the results of its presidential election will be another powerful signal of regional trends.

The expectations for Myanmar’s new, National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government are almost impossibly high. After five decades under military or quasi-military rule, many Myanmar citizens expect the NLD government to make a decisive break with the country’s authoritarian past, while also promoting greater equality---and reforming the economy enough to foster stable growth that benefits more than just Myanmar’s elites. All these expectations are being heaped on a government led by ministers who, because of the country’s bleak political past, have little or no experience in governance and administration, and who belong to a political party organized around the dominating figure of Aung San Suu Kyi. The fact that the armed forces have little intention of simply receding from politics, a position reiterated by the head of the military on Armed Forces Day last month, only further complicates the NLD’s ability to govern. Although there are regional examples of countries, like Indonesia, where the armed forces have eventually been maneuvered out of politics, there are also many Southeast Asian examples, as like neighboring Thailand, where the generals never really returned to the barracks. Some younger NLD members worry too, about Suu Kyi’s dominance---she has not only taken two ministerial positions but also a newly created position as minister counselor, making her a de facto head of state. The combination of portfolios held by the Nobel laureate, and the weak popular credentials of many other ministers, gives Suu Kyi enormous power in the policymaking process. In addition, the creation of the minister counselor position was essentially rammed through the lower house, worrying some MPs about the NLD’s commitment to seriously debating legislation. Since taking office roughly two weeks ago, the new Myanmar government has made some positive moves. It has released most of the country’s remaining political prisoners, or announced plans to pardon them, a critical symbol that the new government will further relax freedom of expression and protest. Yet other signs from the new government are more worrying, if perhaps predictable. The NLD’s economic and financial platform remains muddled, with party insiders suggesting that the senior leadership has no clear plan for how to continue Myanmar’s economic reforms while tweaking them to address the problem of growing inequality. What’s more, during the campaign season last year, Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders remained ominously quiet about the campaign of violence against Rohingya and other Muslims in Myanmar, a campaign that has decimated the Rohingya community. When Suu Kyi did talk to the press or the public about Buddhist-Muslim tensions, she tended to downplay them, telling reporters not to “exaggerate” the problems of the Rohingya. Shortly after the new government took office in late March, it announced that the spokesman for the former, Thein Sein government, Zaw Htay, would be retained and promoted. Zaw Htay is widely known in Myanmar for his inflammatory remarks about the Rohingya, including posting photos online that exacerbated tensions between Buddhists and Muslims, according to the Irrawaddy. Meanwhile, the new minister for religious affairs, Aung Ko (who does not come from the NLD), last week called Muslims “associate citizens,” implying that they did not deserve the same type of citizenship as Buddhists. Myanmar media also revealed that Aung Ko has held meetings with U Wirathu, the firebrand nationalist monk, who is infamous for his anti-Muslim rhetoric. Meanwhile, many other ministers in the new government appear unimpressive. In addition to concern about some ministers’ dubious degrees, many members of the Cabinet are close political allies of the former speaker of the lower house, Thura Shwe Mann. As the Irrawaddy has noted, many of these allies of Shwe Mann have alleged links with companies that, under the military regime, were close to the generals and accused of illegal activities like corruption and drug trafficking, among others.

Last week, Myanmar announced the first Cabinet proposed by its NLD-dominated government. Although a handful of important ministries, like defense, were reserved for the armed forces, the NLD took most of the other important posts. In fact, Suu Kyi herself decided to take four ministerial posts, including the foreign ministry. As is common in any country transitioning to democracy, the list of Cabinet members was a mixed bag---some clearly qualified politicians and experts with deep knowledge in their ministry’s areas combined with party loyalists with dubious qualifications. Certainly, several jobs went to highly qualified people. The proposed new Minister of Hotels and Tourism, for instance, will be Ohn Maung, a hotelier with some four decades of experience in the travel industry. His Inle Princess Resort has been recognized as one of the best-run and most socially responsible hotels in Myanmar. Nai Thet Lwin, the proposed new Ethnic Affairs minister, is a longtime leader of the Mon National Party and is well respected by many ethnic parties. However, the fact that Suu Kyi is taking four ministerial posts herself adds further weight to the idea that she intends to rule the NLD and the government---and thus Myanmar, even though she is constitutionally prohibited from taking the presidency. As a I noted in a previous post, it is too soon to determine whether new president Htin Kyaw will be a Suu Kyi puppet, as Suu Kyi clearly intends. Still, by amassing so much power within the Cabinet, Suu Kyi will have an even stronger hand to control the president and the party. The second critical takeaway from the list of proposed ministers is that the NLD does not seem to have effectively vetted many of its Cabinet picks. Perhaps this lack of vetting is unsurprising; the NLD is putting together its first cabinet in a country that last had a democratic government five decades ago. But the lack of vetting is troubling, especially for those who worry that the NLD’s inexperience in governing will hinder its ability to run the country in these critical next two or three years. According to reports in the New York Times and some Myanmar media, Kyaw Win, the proposed new finance minister, received his master’s degree and a doctorate from a “university” based in Pakistan that was actually a group of websites that provided fake diplomas. (Late last week, Kyaw Win admitted to local reporters that his degree in finance was indeed fake, although he still seems to be the leading contender for the ministerial post.) It seems likely that Kyaw Win was chosen for the job not for his credentials but because he had been a longtime NLD member and a trusted member of the NLD’s economic committee. His selection casts more doubt over the NLD’s direction on economic policy. Meanwhile, the man expected to be minister of commerce, Than Myint, has a degree from what the New York Times called an unaccredited correspondence school. Businesspeople in Myanmar cannot be reassured by fact that the NLD chose these men for Cabinet positions in areas as important as finance and commerce. The picks should give pause, in fact, to anyone following Myanmar’s bumpy transition.