Japan

For the third time since he returned to power in 2012, Shinzo Abe has reshuffled his cabinet. This time, however, far more depends on his personnel choices. Support for Abe in media polls dropped precipitously over the past several months, the result of alleged misconduct and a painful loss in Tokyo metropolitan elections. For the first time, even Abe supporters began to seem disillusioned with their prime minister. The new cabinet has been composed of a broad array of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) talent in an effort to refresh the Abe government’s image and restore confidence in Abe’s leadership. Three aspects of this new cabinet are noteworthy. First, this is an “all-LDP” line-up, representing the varied strengths of the party – even Abe’s critics. Abe retained his close allies, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, ensuring stability where it matters. Aso recently expanded his faction with the LDP, making it second only to Abe’s in clout. If Aso anchors the political foundation of the cabinet, Suga has been the lynchpin of its governing success. As chief cabinet secretary, he has been the political figure behind the scenes ensuring the loyalty of the bureaucracy, setting priorities for critical government legislation, and taking care of any political problems on the horizon. Stability of governance continues to define the Abe cabinet even as it seeks to restore its balance. Second, there is a notable dose of policy talent in the new entrants to the cabinet. This cabinet brings in a number of up-and-coming LDP leaders who are not necessarily aligned with the prime minister’s agenda but who are experienced in government and respected for their public service. Seiko Noda is one of only two women appointed to the cabinet. She will hold two portfolios: Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications as well as Minister for Women’s Empowerment. Noda has been elected to the Diet eight times, as has the prime minister, and as such is one of the cabinet’s senior LDP members. She has experience in governing, having served in three previous cabinets, most notably as Japan’s first minister for consumer affairs. Perhaps more important, Noda has also been a contender for LDP presidency and will likely stand against him in next year’s party leadership race. Like Kono, she has been a more compassionate advocate of resolving tensions in the Japan-Korea relationship in a party that has largely been seen hardening its stance on defense and foreign policy issues. Noda has also been a conspicuous advocate for women in Japan on issues ranging from social welfare support for children to recognition of and support for working mothers. Another addition to the Abe cabinet is Taro Kono, who emerged as a surprise pick for Japan’s foreign minister, replacing Fumio Kishida, who had served in that post since Abe returned to power in 2012. Kono is a past contender for party leadership, described widely as a maverick within the LDP who called on his party after its 2009 ouster from office to shape its identity around a set of conservative principles rather than simply rest on its laurels as a ruling party. He is also someone with an outstanding reputation at home and abroad for his policy interests in nuclear and security issues. Like Abe, Kono is the son of a former foreign minister and party leader of the 1990s. He is fluent in English, educated at Georgetown University, and is well known in the United States and elsewhere as one of the party’s leading globalists. Noteworthy also in this reshuffle is the effort to recover from the mistakes of previous ministers. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology has suffered from its decision-making on the schools that are at the heart of recent scandals and accusations of preferential treatment by the Abe cabinet. Yoshimasa Hayashi, who has served as defense and agriculture minister, is being brought in to refresh the image of this beleaguered ministry previously led by Hirokazu Matsuno. A second ministry in trouble is the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Just last week, after a four month long investigation [PDF] of an alleged cover up involving the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) mission to South Sudan, three leaders of the ministry abruptly resigned. The minister, Tomomi Inada, had long been seen as a troubled leader, running into difficulty explaining the ministry’s policy in Diet deliberations and seeming to be unaware of the details of her brief. But she was not the only policymaker under investigation. The Ground Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff Toshiya Okabe and MOD’s senior civilian bureaucrat, Vice Minister of Defense Tetsuro Kuroe also stepped down under criticism for their lack of transparency in managing the logs from the South Sudan mission. Stepping in to restore the Defense Ministry’s credibility is Itsunori Onodera, who previously served as defense minister from 2012-2014. Onodera is well respected as one of the LDP’s defense experts and has headed up the party’s Research Commission on Security since leaving the cabinet in 2015. As head of the committee’s policy study on Japan’s missile defenses [PDF], he also brings back to the ministry critical political backing for its upcoming five-year defense plan, which will include an upgrade to missile defenses and, potentially, consideration of a proposal to add a retaliatory strike capability to Japan’s arsenal. North Korea’s accelerated missile capabilities and its multiple missile tests off Japan’s coast have raised the stakes for Japan’s defense forces. Onodera will push for greater strategic planning with the United States and will be a political ally within the cabinet to those who want to take a serious look at the country’s changing military needs. Finally, this cabinet brings back into balance the liberal and conservative voices within the LDP. Japan’s conservatives have always had their internal differences, especially when it comes to foreign policy priorities. First and foremost has been the constitution, and particularly Article Nine. The party has had revision at the center of its platform since the Liberal Party and Democratic Party merged to form the LDP in 1955, a promise to the Japanese people that someday the Japanese themselves would rewrite the document written under U.S. occupation. Under Abe, the LDP has come close to making revision a reality, with pro-revision politicians gaining the requisite two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament needed to draft a proposal that could be put to national referendum. This new cabinet will most likely focus on the economy, as Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga repeated yet again today, rather than on the prime minister’s hope for constitutional revision. Earlier this year, the prime minister called on his party’s constitutional revision committee to prepare its proposal for amending the “no war” clause, but there has been some dissension within the party as many see other concerns such as economic growth and social welfare as being far more important to the party’s fate. Next year is a big year for the LDP. Politically, the party will have to decide whether to endorse an extension of Abe’s leadership or opt for a fresh face. A lower house election must be held before the end of 2018, and while many in Japan have expected that Abe will remain in power until the Tokyo Olympics of 2020, this is no longer taken as given. The new cabinet line-up is designed to shore up support for Abe, but the murkiness of the government response to the school scandal and the severity of popular blowback in the Tokyo elections have damaged the prime minister’s reputation.   A year is a long time in politics, however. Hitting the refresh button with a new cabinet is the first step in restoring public confidence. Ahead are some important policy bumps, decisions on the economy and social welfare (including next year’s consumption tax hike), and on Japan’s defense preparedness, which could affect public approval of the prime minister. Kishida’s selection as head of the LDP Policy Research Council offers him a prime opportunity to define and set future policy priorities and to build a political base from which to lead. This new refreshed cabinet has less of an “Abe color” and more of a traditional LDP feel. The next generation of potential party leadership is on display, with all of its competing ideas and problem-solving talent brought to the table.  

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Rachel Brown, Ashley Feng, Douglas Mo, and Gabriel Walker look at the top stories in Asia this week.

Scott Snyder ([email protected]), senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Brad Glosserman ([email protected]), executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, are coauthors of The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States (Columbia University Press, 2015). South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in, has a long list of priorities. Topping the list is restoring faith and credibility in his country’s political system and getting the struggling economy on its feet. In foreign policy, chief concerns include ensuring that the alliance with the United States remains strong, getting China to ease up on its campaign of economic intimidation and ending the freeze in North-South relations and imparting momentum into diplomacy to reduce tensions and remove the North Korean nuclear threat. Another critical issue Moon must manage is relations with Japan. That task will be complicated by his campaign platform pledges to unwind the December 2015 comfort woman agreement negotiated by his discredited predecessor, Park Geun-hye. In his first conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Moon noted that his fellow South Koreans could not emotionally accept all the items in the agreement. At the same time, and to his credit, he also appears to have made space for Japan-South Korea relations, noting that they should not be contingent on the resolution of the comfort woman issue. This “two-track” formula could help him avoid the box that Park created for herself over the issue when she took office in 2013. President Moon is likely to find that a strong relationship with Tokyo will pay important dividends and help him deal with other grave geopolitical challenges. Relations between South Korea and Japan have long been fraught: a tangled history, imperial conquest, territorial disputes, and the residues of Japanese occupation have poisoned the bilateral relationship for more than seventy years after the end of World War II. After several years of ambivalence, President Park tried to set a floor on the relationship by striking a deal on comfort women and approving a long-delayed agreement on information sharing between the militaries of Japan and South Korea. At U.S. prodding, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have moved forward on greater trilateral cooperation to address the North Korean threat. Yet cooperation remains controversial and contingent. Worse, Park’s impeachment has tainted the measures she adopted to improve relations. While Moon has said that the December 2015 comfort women agreement will not be the starting point for relations with Japan, he said during the campaign that “both the agreement and the negotiation process were wrong,” and that the agreement “must be renegotiated [in accordance with] the will of the majority of the public.” This approach risks stalemate with Japanese counterparts who negotiated with the Park administration in good faith. Moon’s top national security challenge is North Korea. To do that effectively, he needs the support of both China and the United States. Beijing offers Seoul important leverage in dealing with Pyongyang. But China’s relations with the South have been troubled in recent months. The primary problem is Seoul’s decision to ignore Beijing’s objections and proceed with deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile defense system that is intended to counter the North Korean missile threat. China is convinced that the system threatens its own nuclear deterrent and has responded to Seoul’s indifference to Chinese concerns with fury, boycotting Korean cultural exports, shutting down Chinese tourism to Korea, and closing 90 percent of the Lotte stores in China (punished because it swapped the land the South Korean government is using for the THAAD deployment). China’s 8.1 million visitors accounted for about half of South Korea’s tourists last year, and 70 percent of duty-free operators’ annual revenue of 8.6 trillion won ($7.59 billion) according to the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO); that number is estimated to plunge 50 percent in 2017. Korea Development Bank forecasts $20 billion in potential losses in trade with China, should the diplomatic spat continue, more than half of which are in the tourism and duty-free sectors. For its part, the United States provides security guarantees to South Korea against the North Korean threat, and gives Seoul credibility in the eyes of Beijing. Astute South Korean policy-makers concede that China would not take them seriously if they did not have the United States behind them. In addition, Pyongyang ultimately wants a deal with Washington, and Moon needs a good relationship with the United States to prevent the North from negotiating behind his back. In this context, a deal with Tokyo gives Moon breathing room. A strong relationship with Japan also gives South Korea more credibility with China; without a partner, South Korea is susceptible to the type of pressure that China has brought to bear in the wake of the THAAD controversy. While the United States should continue to provide that protection, there is greater uncertainty and less assurance in South Korea about U.S. positions in the Donald Trump administration. Regardless of whether the United States is encouraging good Japan-South Korea relations or appears more untrustworthy from the vantage point of Tokyo and Seoul, a stable Japan-South Korea relationship provides both governments with a measure of assurance in an increasingly volatile security environment. Moreover, a strong Japan-South Korea relationship would prevent Beijing and Tokyo from coming to agreement on interests in East Asia in ways that prejudice South Korean interests. In other words, a durable Japan-South Korea relationship is an insurance policy for Seoul. Building that relationship will take time. It will be incremental. It could begin with Moon’s personal affirmation of a future-oriented relationship, followed by outreach to Abe to construct a larger and more enduring bilateral relationship. Abe should respond with an offer of assistance (in the appropriate form) to mitigate the damage being done to South Korean economic interests by China. A resumption of the expired currency swap agreement would also be a nice gesture. While the Japanese government is likely to resist formal renegotiation of the 2015 comfort woman agreement, it is undeniable that Japan-South Korea relations will be constrained without broader Korean public acceptance of Japan’s efforts to address the past. Both leaders will have to do more to change the situation. The challenge for Moon is to show that South Korea’s public grievances toward Japan can be satisfied, while Abe will need to make greater efforts to win over South Korean public support. Over time, Japan-South Korea cooperation should evolve into a genuine framework of reconciliation. In many ways, Moon is the most appropriate leader for such a deal. The real tensions in the Japan-South Korea relationship are generated by the right in Japan and the left in South Korea, both of which are struggling with the political status quo in their own countries. Moon, a progressive, and Abe, a conservative, are the leaders best able to deliver the constituencies that would make reconciliation between the two countries meaningful. Both short- and long-term considerations should impel them to get started now.

Shinto priests walk in a line to attend a ritual to usher in the upcoming New Year at the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo, Japan on December 31, 2016 (REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon).  

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Sheen Seong-ho is professor of international security and East Asia at Seoul National University. Most Koreans are against Japan’s constitutional reform and consider it a sign of Japan’s revert back to militarism. Personally, I do not agree with such an interpretation. I doubt that Japan has any desire to return to militarism, as its people feel that they are the greatest victims of such a past. Besides, it is unlikely that the current Japanese nation, with a super-aging population and a shrinking economy, has the capacity to become an expansionist power even if it wanted to. Moreover, Japan’s revision efforts are partly aimed at augmenting the U.S.-Japan alliance, as the Americans have long demanded for a more active role by the Japanese military to adjust what they regard as an unbalanced alliance. Considering the rapidly widening economic and military gap with China, Japan has to inevitably rely on the United States for its security protection. However, my understanding belongs to the minority opinion among both the educated intellectuals and the commoners in South Korea. The decision on whether to revise their constitution is ultimately up to the Japanese society and its political leadership. Yet, the potential deterioration in Japan’s relationship with China and South Korea—two of its closest and most powerful neighbors—that could result from the revision cannot be ignored. Angry protests on the streets of Beijing and Seoul are highly possible if the revision actually occurs. The Japanese leaders may feel futileness of trying to convince these two countries of Japan’s security interests, but should make sincere efforts in this regard. It is unclear, however, whether Japan would make such efforts, since its relations with China and South Korea have been aggravated over historical interpretations and territory issues. Japan should endeavor to improve its relations with its two neighbors, because its being perceived as a new emerging threat could destabilize East Asia. Either by misunderstanding or misled public opinion, most Koreans and Chinese consider Japan’s constitutional revision a march back to its military past. If the revision goes as planned, it could provoke or provide excuse for a new round of arms race in the region. Such a consequence will be against Japan’s national interest, so Japan should make it clear that its commitment to the spirit of the Peace Constitution remains steadfast. It should be obvious to everyone that the revision is a defensive measure and an attempt to fulfill its alliance duties with the United States. The efforts that Japan should make will undoubtedly be difficult. As for Japan’s relationship with South Korea, historical disputes on textbooks, territories, and comfort women have strained the relationship. Former President Park Geun-hye had refused to have a summit meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for more than three and half years since her inauguration in 2012. The two leaders finally met in Seoul in November 2015 which was followed by a historical agreement over the comfort women issue between the two governments in December. This was possible because Abe accepted South Korea’s longstanding demand to acknowledge Japan’s responsibility toward the Korean comfort women at the government level. Park also exercised pragmatic leadership to move on for the sake of bilateral partnership with Japan. Despite the breakthrough between the two governments, public opinions of the two countries toward each other largely remain negative, according to the most recent poll by EAI-Genron NPO for the fiftieth anniversary of Japan-Korea normalization in 2015. 72.5 percent of Koreans had negative images of Japan while only 15.7 percent had positive ones. This was mutually exhibited, as only 23.8 percent Japanese considered Koreans positively, while 52.4 percent expressed negative views. In addition, according to Yomiuri-Hankuk Daily polls, 85 percent of Koreans and 73 percent of Japanese did not trust each other. Nevertheless, both felt such an ice cold relations is undesirable, as 67.2 percent of Koreans and 67.8 percent of Japanese said that they are concerned with and want improvements to the situation. Fortunately, since the December 2015 agreement on the comfort women, the two governments have dealt with each other more prudently, avoiding provocations over historical issues. Also, despite widely shared criticism among civic groups, progressive liberals, and nationalist right wings of Korean society toward Japan’s allegedly half-hearted apology and compensation, there was no incident of mass protest or violence that was rampant during the previous government’s free trade agreement negotiations or beef imports agreement with the United States. Instead, North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and long range missile launch in early 2016 dominated news coverage of the South Korean media. During the commemoration ceremony of the March 1st mass protest against Japanese colonial rule, Park devoted most of her speech to denouncing Pyongyang for the nuclear provocation. Historical issues with Japan were barely mentioned. Since then the two countries have worked closely in their common objective to punish North Korea’s nuclear provocation with other international partners. Indeed, South Korea has enough incentives to endorse Japan’s revision in light of the aforementioned indications of positive change in the relationship between the two countries. It is ironic that Korea perceives Japan, with whom it shares same liberal democratic values, as a larger threat than China who has different values and a much larger defense budget. Although South Korea has a similar skepticism about the revision to that of China, the two countries have formed a vastly different relationship with the United States. The strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance could be a challenge to China’s national security but an insurance against Japanese militarism for Korea. In fact, Seoul wishes to seek partnership in the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system, of which Japan is already an important part, while China fiercely opposes the system. Consequently, Japan and South Korea might come eye to eye on what presents the real threat to their national security, opening up greater opportunities for collaborations to achieve regional peace and stability. Japan’s more forthcoming effort to deal with its troubled past with South Korea would greatly facilitate such a process.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Gui Yongtao is associate professor at the School of International Studies and assistant president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University. Japan’s constitution is facing unprecedented challenges in its seventy years of history as lawmakers supporting its revision have reached two thirds majority in both the Lower and the Upper Houses of the Diet, the threshold for proposing constitutional revision. Prime Minster Shinzo Abe has clearly stated that he would like to fulfil his longstanding goal of revising the constitution within his term. This could be the single most important legacy he wants to leave behind. Since his first term as a prime minister, Abe has been pushing forward his political agenda of “breaking away from the postwar regime,” which essentially means to break away from Article Nine of the constitution domestically and depart from the postwar world system internationally. Although he later toned down the slogan by emphasizing that it is merely about reforms of domestic systems and has nothing to do with foreign policies, he has already changed Japan’s international security posture by reinterpreting the constitution and ramming through security bills through the Diet so as to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense. This move has effectively hollowed out Article Nine, the symbol of postwar Japan’s pacifism. Not surprisingly, many scholars and most opposition parties in Japan have been arguing the unconstitutionality of the new security laws, and a majority of the public opposes the laws. Despite such strong criticism, Abe is still determined to push ahead with his agenda on constitutional revision. Underlying Abe’s persistence is his belief that the current constitution was imposed upon Japan by the Americans during their occupation of his country and that Japan must draw up a constitution on its own. It is never a secret that Abe is a nationalist. In his first term from 2006 to 2007 his obsession with ideological campaign cost him popularity among the voters. He then learned a lesson and followed a pragmatic course after being reelected in 2012. Recognizing the difficulty to immediately revise the constitution, he shifted to the alternative of reinterpreting it. Yet he seems not content with the changes he has already made, and is pursuing the ultimate goal of drawing a new constitution for Japan. The question is what kind of new constitution Abe aims to draw. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced a new draft constitution in 2012 [PDF], which not only prescribes that Japan shall have its National Defense Forces, a full army, but also prioritizes the so-called public order or public interests over individual rights. In the same year Abe campaigned under the slogan “take back Japan” in the election that brought the LDP back to power. In this context it is not difficult to understand that what Abe wants to “take back” is the state and the army that he believes has been taken away by the American occupation forces and Japan’s liberals in the postwar years. This is really alarming because it challenges the very liberal order that the Japanese people have embraced for the past seven decades. Opinion polls indicate that a majority of Japanese people want to maintain the current constitution, worrying that revising it under the Abe administration could degenerate Japan’s pacifism. In a survey conducted by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun and TV Tokyo last May, views against constitutional revision reached 5o percent, the highest figure recorded since the survey started. In another poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun this month, 46 percent of the respondents think that Article Nine of the constitution should not be revised, while only 30 percent think it should be. Even within the LDP, many are not supportive of revising the constitution for the moment for fear that the move could further alienate a public that feels insecurity after the enforcement of the new laws that allow the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. Against such backdrop the LDP is trying to refocus the debate by placing emphasis on adding a national emergency article and environmental rights to the constitution so as to gain approvals from other parties and the public. Such tactics, however, will not blur the nature of the issue, which has always been whether Japan will maintain its pacifism. The future of Japan’s peace constitution also has significant implications for the China-Japan relationship. When the two governments mended their soured relations and committed themselves to promote a “strategic relationship of mutual benefit” in 2008, China made it clear in the joint statement that it “takes a positive view of Japan pursuing a path of a nation striving for peace and making contribution to world peace and stability through peaceful means over the past sixty years since the end of World War II.” This evaluation of Japan’s past connotes the Chinese hope that Japan continues to pursue the path of a peaceful country in the future. Such hope is indeed a critical element in determining China’s overall assessment of Japan, since average Chinese still have deeply rooted apprehensions about Japan repeating its militarist mistakes. As public opinion plays an increasingly larger role in shaping China’s foreign policy, Chinese people’s trust in Japan’s adherence to pacifism becomes essential for any improvement of the bilateral relationship. The risk is that Abe may be tempted to exaggerate China’s threat so as to justify his policy and prevail in domestic debates. In other words, he will have little incentive to improve relations with China as long as he focuses his political agenda on constitutional revision. This will deepen the mistrust between the two countries and create new obstacles to regional cooperation.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Adam P. Liff is assistant professor of East Asian international relations at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies and associate-in-research at Harvard University’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Last week, Japan’s massive helicopter carrier Izumodeparted Yokosuka naval base to escort a U.S. Navy supply ship. Deceptively banal, this low-risk “asset protection” (asetto no bogo) deployment off the Pacific coast of Japan in fact carries historic significance. It is the first Self-Defense Force (JSDF) deployment of its kind since such operations were legalized under a major package of security legislation passed by Japan’s Diet in 2015. Defined in the 2015 U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation [PDF] as “mutual protection of each other’s assets…if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan,” the nascent legality of such asset protection operations helps clarify longstanding ambiguities concerning the specific conditions under which JSDF can defend U.S. military forces. Significantly, it allows for peacetime protection missions, such as during bilateral exercises or training. Put another way, an “armed attack” is not a precondition. As with most changes in Japan’s security posture over the past seventy years, associated policy shifts are usually deeply contentious domestically. Despite Article Nine’s never-revised text, its effective interpretation is ever-evolving yet continues to be subject to significant constraints. Defending the controversial 2015 security legislation at the time, Abe referred directly to its implication for a “much stronger” U.S.-Japan alliance, stating boldly: “we can defend each other from now on.” The political and deterrent signal sent by an asset protection such as that conducted last week was undoubtedly on his mind. Yet, the precise circumstances under which Japan would actually use kinetic force in defense of U.S. forces is a bit more complicated, and hardly predetermined. Even with the new legislation and a July 2014 cabinet resolution

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. David S. Law is professor of law and professor of political science at Washington University in St. Louis and, effective May 2016, the Sir Y.K. Pao chair in public law at the University of Hong Kong. He is the author of Nihon no saikosai wo kaibou suru [The Japanese Supreme Court and Judicial Review] (Gendaijinbunsha, 2013) and was a 2008 Hitachi Fellow and visiting associate professor at Keio University. Efforts by Japanese conservatives to amend Japan’s post-war constitution, especially the strict commitment to pacifism found in Article Nine, are as old as the constitution itself. As part of its ongoing campaign to build support for constitutional revision, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has sought to popularize three misconceptions about Nihonkoku Kenpō, Japan's constitution that was promulgated in 1946 and came into effect a year later. The first is that it is too difficult to amend. The second is that it is obsolete and therefore in need of amendment. The third is that it was imposed by foreign occupiers and therefore illegitimate. None of these arguments withstand close scrutiny. (1) The Japanese constitution is not too difficult to amend. It is true that no existing constitution in the world has lasted longer without amendment than the Japanese constitution of 1946. But there is a perfectly good reason why it has remained entirely intact for so long: on the whole, the Japanese people have preferred not to tamper with a document that laid the foundation for decades of peace and prosperity. The LDP deems amendment too difficult because it is unable to secure the amendments that it wants. But in a democratic country, the real test of whether constitutional amendment is excessively difficult is whether the people are unable to change the constitution if that is what they want. That has never been the case in Japan. There have been no reliable indications of majority support for amending the constitution. The public has consistently shown little appetite for the kinds of constitutional changes long sought by the LDP: opinion polls suggest, for example, that only one-quarter to one-third of the Japanese public favors revision of Article Nine. The fact that Article Ninety-six requires popular ratification of constitutional amendments has stymied the LDP for decades. And this is as it should be. Constitutional amendment should not be so easy that the government can push through unpopular changes. (2) The Japanese constitution is not obsolete. By global standards, the 1946 Constitution has lasted a long time. The average constitution lasts only nineteen years and has a roughly one-in-three chance of being amended in any given year. That does not mean, however, that Japan’s constitution is obsolete. On the contrary, it was well ahead of its time when it was drafted and embodies an approach to constitution-writing that has become increasingly popular, if not dominant, in the decades since World War II. In embracing universal human rights and the nonviolent settlement of international disputes, the 1946 Constitution epitomizes the deep commitment to international norms and international law that has become the norm for respectable constitutions today. Its drafters studied a wide range of foreign examples in order to devise a progressive document that anticipated a variety of global trends, especially in the area of human rights. For example, even though it was adopted nearly seven decades ago, the Japanese constitution nevertheless contains nineteen of the twenty most common constitutional rights in the world. (The U.S. constitution, by comparison, contains only twelve of them.) The irony of the LDP’s argument that the constitution is obsolete is that many of the constitutional changes sought by the LDP—such as deemphasizing individual rights and raising the standing of the emperor—would actually turn back the clock and go against the global mainstream of constitution-writing. The current government’s efforts to amend or reinterpret the constitution are aimed at precisely those universalistic, post-nationalistic aspects of the 1946 Constitution that made it so innovative and progressive by international and historical standards. (3) The Japanese Constitution was not “imposed” on the Japanese people. It is not difficult to see why the misconception that the constitution was “imposed” by foreign occupiers is widespread even among many relatively sophisticated legal scholars. The document was initially drafted by a small group of Americans working in total secrecy under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, and the Japanese government was never at liberty to reject the basic principles of the document, such as demilitarization, popular sovereignty rather than imperial rule, and respect for human rights. But that is not the whole story. The key to the longevity of Japan’s supposedly “imposed” constitution is that the American drafters—unlike Japan’s own leaders­—were willing to give the Japanese people what they wanted in a constitution. A leaked version of the cabinet’s own draft of a constitution, the so-called Matsumoto draft, met with overwhelmingly negative reaction from the Japanese public. In the aftermath of a devastating war that had thoroughly discredited the existing system, the Japanese people understandably wanted fundamental reform. Yet the Matsumoto draft proposed little more than superficial changes to the old Meiji Constitution. Only after the initial Japanese draft proved to be a debacle did MacArthur’s group intervene to produce what the Shidehara cabinet had spectacularly failed to do—namely, produce a constitution that the Japanese people would embrace. Polls conducted both before and after the adoption of the constitution showed popular support for constitutional reforms such as reduction of the emperor to a purely symbolic role, expansion of the powers of the Diet, abolition or reform of the House of Peers, greater government responsiveness to the will of the people, and greater protection for individual rights and freedoms. None of these reforms were to be found in the Matsumoto draft. All of them found their way into the American draft. That was no accident. The Americans made a conscious effort to draft a constitution that would appeal to the Japanese people­—a greater effort, it would seem, than Japan’s own political leaders did. While MacArthur was prepared to run roughshod over the Japanese government on the question of constitutional revision, he showed great respect for the wishes of the Japanese people. He knew that the new constitution had their support, and the Japanese government knew it too. When MacArthur raised the prospect of a referendum on the constitution shortly after its adoption, it was the Japanese government that rejected the idea. According to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, there was no point in conducting a referendum because Japanese public opinion was “diametrically opposed” to any revision of the new constitution. Therein lies one of the great ironies of Japan’s post-war constitution. When it came to writing a new constitution, American occupying forces proved more responsive to the wishes of the Japanese people than Japan’s own leaders. And it is thanks to American insistence upon a popular ratification requirement for constitutional amendments that the Japanese people remain capable of preventing their leaders from turning back the clock.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. May 3rd was Constitution Day in Japan, or kenpō kinenbi, a holiday to celebrate Japan’s postwar democracy. It has been seventy years since Japan’s constitution was promulgated, and no change in the document has yet been made. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, however, wants to change that. He presented his plan on Wednesday in a video message to a Public Forum on Japan’s Constitution, or kōkai kenpō fōramu, cosponsored by the Citizens’ Association for Creating a Constitution for a Beautiful Japan, Utsukushii Nihon no Kenpo wo Tsukuru Kokumin no kai, and the Private-Sector Study Group on Constitution, Minkan Kenpō Rinchō. Abe promised that before the end of his time in office, the document adopted under U.S. occupation that changed the balance between the state and Japanese society as well as the trajectory of Japan’s relations with the world would be amended. Abe set the date for 2020, the same year that Japan will host the Olympics. Like the Tokyo Olympics of 1964, the prime minister argued, the upcoming Olympics will be a time of rebirth for Japan, and he has linked this prospect of a renaissance for Japan with constitutional revision. Surprising many, even within his own party, Abe also took aim at Article Nine, the cherished “no war” clause, saying he wanted to add reference to the constitutionality of the nation’s Self Defense Force. Needless to say, Abe’s forthright statement of his intent set off a flurry of reaction in Japan. Opposition political parties decried his focus on the nation’s military, while leading members of his own party publicly noted that there was no consensus within the party on Abe’s objective. Last summer, we introduced a series of essays on Japan’s constitutional debate written by those within Japan who seek to shape their nation’s debate. The full series can be found here. Article Ninety-six of the constitution sets forth the revision process. Both houses of the Diet must agree on a proposal and pass it with a two-thirds majority. Thus our series begins with the politicians who will lead the debate, and representatives of Japan’s leading political parties share their thoughts with us. The second step will be a national referendum. Thus we look at existing polling on public opinion to gain insight into how the Japanese people feel about their constitution and how those attitudes evolved over time. Finally, we turned to a variety of advocates and experts within Japan who are active in the public debate. These Japanese voices reveal a complex array of aspirations for Japan, and deep passions about the constitution’s influence on Japanese society. In honor of Constitution Day, we have five additional essays to share by scholars of Japan from the United States, South Korea, and China. Professor Helen Hardacre of Harvard University observes how religious groups in Japan are reorganizing around the prospect of revising the constitution. Professor David Law of Washington University in St. Louis compares the way Japan has approached revision with other constitutional democracies. Professor Adam Liff of Indiana University shares his thoughts on the way Abe’s reinterpretation of the Article Nine to allow for collective self-defense has affected the operations of Japan’s military. Professor Yongtao Gui of Peking University offers a perspective on how Chinese might react to the Abe cabinet’s proposal for constitutional revision, especially related to Article Nine.  Professor Seong-ho Sheen of Seoul National University reflects on Japan’s constitutional debate and how it is likely to be viewed within South Korea. To conclude our series, I will highlight some of the themes likely to emerge now that Japan’s prime minister has set his sights on accomplishing revision in the next several years. The prospect of constitutional revision in Japan is now upon us, and over the next three years, the Japanese people will embrace one of the most significant political conversations in generations. For those of us outside of the country, it may offer an unprecedented window on how multiple generations of Japanese understand their society, its accomplishments and limitations, and its future needs.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Larry Hong, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. At last, Myanmar–China pipeline opens for business. This Tuesday, the first drops of crude oil began their slow northward crawl through a new pipeline connecting the Burmese coast to the southern Chinese city of Kunming. After nearly three years of remaining empty, the 480-mile-long, $1.5-billion pipeline will carry up to 260,000 barrels’ worth of crude a day to a refinery owned by the state-owned PetroChina, China’s largest oil producer. The pipeline will also help China address its “Malacca dilemma,” the fact that the country’s oil imports come primarily through the Malacca Strait and disputed South China Sea. The new Myanmar pipeline has the capacity to supply nearly 6 percent of China’s daily crude, and should allow PetroChina to boost exports of refined products over the coming years. One analyst argues that while the benefits Myanmar enjoys from the project will likely be minimal in the short term—mostly revenues from tariff fees—the experience of building and operating a large-scale energy project with China could help develop Myanmar’s domestic capacity for similar infrastructure development in the future. Local residents, on the other hand, are less thrilled with the project: activists in both Kunming and Myanmar have challenged the refinery and pipeline, respectively. 2. Disappearances disturb in Malaysia. Widely circulated CCTV footage of what appears to be the abduction of a Malaysian pastor, Raymond Koh, as well as subsequent revelations of other disappearances in the country, is unnerving many citizens and rights groups. Mr. Koh, who runs a nongovernmental organization called Harapan Komuniti, or “Hope Community,” in Kuala Lumpur, has been missing since the morning of February 13. Unlike a normal abduction, however, no ransom amount or information was offered, even though the Mr. Koh’s family offered a RM100,000 (around $23,000) reward. This unusual incident led the pastor’s son to fear the worst: that his father had been murdered. Following the highly publicized disappearance of pastor Koh, several other cases of disappearances surfaced. They include social activist and former Petaling Jaya City Councillor Peter Chong, Pastor Joshua Hilmy and his wife, and social activist and the founder of a nongovernmental organization Amri Che Mat. In the absence of a clear rationale for what some called “unprecedented” disappearances and the apparent lack of official efforts in locating these missing individuals, the Malaysian Bar says that there are “alarming doubts on the adequacy of the safety and security measures of the country” and even speculates that these missing cases might be “forced disappearances,” a politically charged term used to describe the disappearance of individuals by or with the acquiescence of state officials. In response to the allegations, Malaysia’s police force has denied any connections between these five individuals and cautioned the public against “unverified rumors.” 3. Japan’s population poised to take a steep dive. The Japanese National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR), which updates its country-wide figures every five years, has reported this week that Japan’s population is expected to fall from over 127 million today to merely 88 million people by 2065, and 51 million by 2115. This potentially drastic drop-off is based on decades of declining birth rates dating back to the 1960s. However, the population decline is not as rapid as previously anticipated, as a growing number of women in their thirties are choosing to have children. That said, this particular demographic bump will not bring about a substantial change, as NIPSSR argues that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will need to implement better national policies to enhance child care, improve work-life balance, and integrate the elderly into the economy, as well as those to promote mass immigration. As of right now, immigrants are primarily short-term students and guest workers. Japan is struggling with an aging demographic in which adults aged sixty-five and over currently comprise roughly 30 percent of the population, reducing the country’s workforce and creating a heavy demand for pension funds. 4. Duterte walks back assertive Spratly statements. On April 6, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte stated his intent to order troops to occupy and fortify islands and reefs within the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea, along with his intent to personally visit Pagasa island to plant a Philippine flag on June 12, Philippine independence day. The comments, made during a press briefing after a military camp visit in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, the province on the front lines of the maritime dispute with China, appeared to be directed at Chinese encroachment in the Philippine Pacific coast. The Philippines and China possess competing claims to islands and features within the South China Sea; Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Vietnam also have claims within the South China Sea. On April 10, Duterte sought to allay concerns over his remarks by clarifying that he had “ordered the occupation of the ten or nine islands that are just near our shores” and also stating that no offensive weapons would be placed on those islands. Additionally, on an April 13 speech in Saudi Arabia, he retracted his vow to personally raise a Philippine flag on Pagasa “because of our friendship with China.” Mr. Duterte’s initial statements perplexed many, as he has generally sought to bring the Philippines closer to Beijing in contrast to the approach of previous Philippine administrations. 5. New data transfer rules proposed in China. The Cyberspace Administration of China, the country’s top internet regulator, put forth Measures for the Security Assessment of Outbound Transmission of Personal Information and Critical Data this week. The measures stipulate that foreign companies operating online networks in China will need to apply for permission and undergo a security assessment before exporting data that either relates to more than 500,000 individuals, is tied to key national scientific projects or infrastructure, or exceeds one terabyte in size. The Chinese government will then decide whether to allow the transfer based on potential harm to the country’s economic development, political system, or national security. These regulations are consistent with previous restrictions on the Chinese internet including the 2016 Cybersecurity Law, but are notable for expanding the application of data localization rules beyond companies in “critical infrastructure” to encompass all operators. While some have hailed the new regulations as a means to counter security threats and protect digital rights, most observers are more skeptical and see them as further step in the government’s promotion of “internet sovereignty” and efforts to restrict foreign technology companies. The draft regulation remains open for public comment through May 11, 2017. In the past, some Chinese cybersecurity regulations have been watered down in response to criticism during this public comment period. Internet service providers and technology companies will no doubt be waiting anxiously to see if that pattern will repeat this time. Bonus: Indonesian artist sneaks political message into X-Men. The creators behind X-Men: Gold, a 2017 reboot of Marvel’s well-known comic series, were touted as an “all-star creative team.” But the illustrator of the series’ first issue, Reddit users revealed this week, had more in mind than crafting action-packed panels. Ardian Syaf, a freelance Indonesian artist for Marvel, inserted at least two politically and religiously charged cryptic messages into the comic: one that referenced a Quran passage that hardline Indonesian Islamists use to defend their views of non-Muslims, and another that referenced a protest in Jakarta against the city’s Christian governor. After becoming aware of the hidden messaging, Marvel confirmed that the references would be erased in future editions of the comic and immediately terminated Syaf’s contract. Though Syaf denied any anti-Christian or anti-Semitic sentiment on Facebook, photos of him meeting with the leader of a controversial hardline Islamist group also surfaced online. Another illustrator, who has worked on Marvel artwork before, stated that sneaking political opinions into comics was nothing new, but “this episode definitely did not fit into Marvel’s storytelling.”