China

A decision to remove environmental impact assessment requirements for some Shanghai construction projects embodies a trend of sliding environmental standards as China's economy slows. It also draws questions about China's greater commitments to environmental protection.

Top Chinese AI firms added to export blacklist; Iranian hackers target 2020 campaigns; uncertain future for Libra cryptocurrency; U.S. companies confronted by Beijing’s censors on Hong Kong; and Twitter used user email addresses and phone numbers for advertising.

Each Friday, I look at what the presidential challengers are saying about foreign policy on the campaign trail.

The facts are not in dispute. On October 6, Houston Rockets General Manager Daryl Morey tweeted: “Fight for Freedom: Stand with Hong Kong,” igniting a political firestorm in Beijing. Other Rockets heavyweights soon weighed in. The owner of the team, Tilman Fertitta, quickly distanced himself from Morey’s tweet, and one of the team’s stars, James Harden asked forgiveness from China, stating, “We apologize. We love China.” Other opinions also crowded onto the court. Notably, Brooklyn Nets owner Joe Tsai published an open letter later that same night cautioning that “…there are certain topics that are third-rail issues in certain countries, societies and communities. Supporting a separatist movement in a Chinese territory is one of those third-rail issues, not only for the Chinese government, but also for all citizens in China.” Golden State Warriors coach Steve Kerr said he didn’t know enough to comment on the “bizarre international story.” The Chinese government, for its part, responded immediately by pulling all Chinese sponsorship of the Rockets (an NBA favorite in China and the home for nine years of China’s basketball commissioner Yao Ming). In addition, state-run China Central Television (CCTV) revoked plans to broadcast two highly anticipated exhibition games in Shanghai and Shenzhen between the Los Angeles Lakers and the Brooklyn Nets; and several events and a press conference around the Shanghai game were cancelled, including one to raise money for the Special Olympics. Despite this dispiriting turn of events, there is a bright spot. After a bit of fumbling, NBA Commissioner Adam Silver delivered an important set of remarks clarifying the association’s position and sending an important signal to all the parties involved: “Freedom of expression can engender very difficult conversations. But for those who question our motivation, this is about far more than growing our business. Values of equality, respect, and freedom of expression have long defined the NBA—and will continue to do so. As an American-based basketball league operating globally, among our greatest contributions are these values of the game… In fact, one of the enduring strengths of the NBA is our diversity—of views, backgrounds, ethnicities, genders and religions...with that diversity comes the belief that whatever our differences, we respect and value each other…”   Silver’s words matter at several levels. First, they make clear that all views, from Morey’s to Harden’s to Tsai’s (and including Kerr’s right not to comment) are welcome and should be expressed and understood with tolerance and civility. By championing the right to, and value of, such a diversity in viewpoints, Silver has elevated the NBA and delivered a much-needed reminder to all Americans about how to manage controversy in political discourse. Second, knowingly or not, Silver became one of the first heads of a major U.S. corporation to take on China in the latter’s efforts to use its market power to coerce international actors to comply with its political positions. The Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and Sweden have all faced politically motivated Chinese trade embargoes; virtually all multinationals are now under pressure to change the way they acknowledge Taiwan on their materials, websites, and even packaging to ensure that the island nation is not accorded status as an independent entity. And China has banned performers, including Richard Gere, Katy Perry, and Oasis, among others for their support of greater freedoms in Taiwan and Tibet. While a number of countries and individuals have refused to back down in the face of Beijing’s threats, many companies have elected to comply with Beijing’s demands in order to preserve access to the Chinese market. Yet the price of compliance is likely to get much higher. In its criticism of Morey’s tweet, China’s state-run broadcasting company CCTV stated, “We believe that any remarks that challenge national sovereignty and social stability are not within the scope of freedom of speech.” As I wrote recently, Beijing is increasingly seeking to force multinationals to align their political values and priorities with China’s. While Beijing’s traditional priority in this regard has been sovereignty issues, it is easy to imagine political obeisance required on other potentially sensitive topics, such as the Belt and Road initiative, human rights and religious practices, labor and employment, or Internet governance. Any issue can become one that seemingly threatens social stability. Finally, as the Trump administration seeks to navigate a new relationship with Beijing, the spirit of Silver’s remarks should serve as a reminder of the value of rooting an argument in American principles and law. The United States began the trade war, for example, from a similarly principled position (excluding the President’s focus on the bilateral trade deficit). It concentrated on holding China accountable for skirting or breaking international trade rules: stealing intellectual property, engaging in cyber economic espionage, coercing technology transfer, and putting in place non-market barriers to entry. Yet as the United States moves well beyond the parameters of righting trade and investment wrongs, it is losing both bargaining power with China and credibility globally. Commissioner Silver’s words merit attention not only because they are smart and right but also because they remind us more broadly of how Washington needs to conduct its relationships at home and abroad—with tolerance and respect and fundamentally rooted in American principles and values. It is hard to arrive at a clearer statement of not only what Silver wants the NBA to be but also what we all hope the United States can be. And perhaps there is one additional bright spot to be found. The Lakers-Nets game in Shanghai went on as planned. The stadium was full of Chinese fans who roared in anticipation every time LeBron James rolled down the court toward the hoop. Some things are truly universal.

The Indian government announced today that Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit India later this week for an “informal summit” with Prime Minister Narendra Modi beginning October 11. The leader-level meeting occurs against a backdrop of geopolitical tensions between the two countries, although ties have improved since their tense military standoff at Doklam during the summer of 2017. This week’s Modi-Xi summit will take place in a location renowned for its cultural heritage: Mamallapuram (or Mahabalipuram), located on the southeast coast of India in the state of Tamil Nadu. The monuments at Mamallapuram date back to the seventh and eighth centuries, and have been recognized as a UNESCO World Heritage Site [UNESCO video]. The southeast coast of India faces the Bay of Bengal, Southeast Asia, and the larger Indian Ocean region—given the history of trade between south India and Southeast Asia, perhaps Modi intends to signal India’s long seafaring history and outward links to underscore his “Act East” ambition. Writing for The Hindu, Suhasini Haidar reported that Indian officials planning the summit sought to emphasize Tamil Nadu’s historic connections to China, including earlier links of Buddhism and maritime trade.    The formal visit announcement provided general guidelines for their meeting agenda: “discussions on overarching issues of bilateral, regional and global importance and to exchange views on deepening India-China Closer Development Partnership.” While this allows for virtually any topic under the sun, we can expect attention to the following issues of concern: Regional security and terrorism:  India has long-standing concerns about terrorism emanating from Pakistan. China has not been particularly supportive of India on this issue, and in light of the decades-long China-Pakistan friendship, is not likely to change. India’s August revocation of the traditional autonomy afforded to Jammu and Kashmir has prompted Pakistani outrage. China, too, called the conversion of Ladakh, until now a part of the erstwhile state, into a separate territory under Delhi’s direct oversight “unacceptable.” (China claims parts of Ladakh.) While Modi will not likely seek to open up the question of Kashmir’s autonomy, or its bifurcation into two federally administered territories, he very well could express concerns about Pakistan-based terrorism and its deleterious effects on regional security. Modi and Xi could also discuss stability in Afghanistan, given shared concerns about the fragile state. (India and China more recently began joint training programs in Afghanistan.) Bilateral concerns:  India and China fought a border war in 1962, and have yet to resolve their continued border issues. More than twenty rounds of negotiations have not resulted in clarity about the actual delimitation. Moreover, in the summer of 2017, Indian troops defended Bhutan’s border against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s expansion of a road in what grew into a three-month standoff between India and China. While the “informal summit” will not resolve these concerns, the leaders could discuss the issue. Trade ties will almost certainly figure into the conversation; China is India’s largest trade partner in goods alone, and India has consistently—for years now—been displeased with the trade deficit (now reportedly around $57 billion) and the composition of trade. Over the past few years, India has continued to raise tariffs on electronic goods in part due to its trade deficit. Global and multilateral cooperation:  Despite the known border and trade tensions, the China-Pakistan relationship, and the growing geopolitical competition for influence in the Indian Ocean region, India and China do have a cooperation sweet spot: multilateral organizations and global issues. India’s objections to China’s Belt and Road Initiative notwithstanding, New Delhi supported Beijing on the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (India is the number two capital contributor, holds a vice presidency, and is the largest borrower at this point), and they worked together to develop the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) forum and its related New Development Bank. India and China have had similar complaints about representation in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). China and India have also expressed similar concerns about climate change and historical responsibility for carbon emissions. This is not to say that China and India are in lockstep on all multilateral concerns; China remains a holdout, for example, on India’s quest for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and in August, China helped elevate the matter of Kashmir’s autonomy for a private UN Security Council discussion. But the existence of closer cooperation on matters like infrastructure development, regional connectivity, and global governance complicates a narrative of geopolitical competition. The “India-China Closer Development Partnership” specifically listed in the formal announcement of the informal summit falls squarely in this category. Not likely to feature on the agenda: Tibet. India hosts the Central Tibetan Administration, the Tibetan government-in-exile, and of course has been home to the Dalai Lama for decades. Indian papers reported that eight Tibetan community activists had been detained in Tamil Nadu ahead of the “informal summit” in order to prevent protests during Xi’s visit. It’s a pity, because a peaceful expression of political views would have reinforced India’s strength as a democracy—a strength China lacks.

The newest episode of The President’s Inbox is live. I sat down with Charles Edel and John Lee, fellows at the University of Sydney’s United States Studies Centre, to talk about the future of the U.S.-Australia alliance. Charlie and John recently penned a report on the challenges facing U.S.-Australian relations as China rises as a global power. Americans and Aussies like to talk about their century of “mateship.” And the two countries share deep political, military, and cultural ties. But when it comes to trade, China is Australia’s number one partner, and it’s not even close. Last year, China’s two-way trade in goods and services totaled nearly AUD$215 billion. That’s nearly three times its two-way trade with the United States (AUD$79.3 billion), and the gap is growing. To be sure, U.S. companies, and Western firms more broadly, have invested far more in Australia than their Chinese counterparts do. Even so, Australians can already feel the gravitational pull of the Chinese economy. It’s only likely to get stronger in the future. Charlie and John worry that Canberra will increasingly find it harder to reconcile the competing demands of its main security partner, the United States, with those of its main economic partner, China. They note that proponents of strong U.S.-Australian ties have a lot of history and goodwill to fall back on. And Canberra has been pushing back against often ham-handed Chinese efforts to interfere in Australian politics. Just last year, Australia enacted “foreign interference laws” to criminalize efforts by foreign governments (think Beijing) to interfere in its politics. But history and goodwill can sustain relations for only so long. Interests matter as well. Whereas Australia’s economic ties with China are deepening, the Trump administration is pushing to de-link the U.S. and Chinese economies. That should give Washington greater freedom to press Beijing on a range of issues. The question is, would Canberra follow along, knowing that Beijing could retaliate economically, potentially plunging Australian firms into the red and costing ordinary Australians their jobs? Perhaps not. Late last month, for example, Australia’s finance minister acknowledged the legitimacy of U.S. complaints about the global trading system but called on the United States and China to compromise in their trade war. Charlie and John argue that keeping the U.S.-Australia alliance on track requires Washington and Canberra to acknowledge where their interests diverge and to be clear about their expectations for each other. That is probably good advice. But it’s easier given than followed. If you are interested in learning more about the debates down under over the U.S.-Australian alliance, you should read Hugh White’s How to Defend Australia, which builds on an earlier essay he wrote, Without America. (White, a professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, has written a synopsis of the book for readers who are pressed for time.) White has been arguing for a while that Australians need to recognize a fundamental fact: U.S. power in Asia is waning and China’s is growing. The trends are so powerful and consequential that Australians “have to accept that we can no longer simply assume that America will, 20 or 30 years from now, be there to prevent any major power from attacking us, or defend us if it did.” White’s book has caused a stir in Australia’s strategic circles. As you can see here, here, here, and here. Some American strategists have also weighed in on White’s general thesis, as you can see here, here, here, and here. Wherever you come down on White’s argument, the trends he points to aren’t going away. Margaret Gach assisted with the preparation of this post.

After months of large-scale protests in Hong Kong, the city’s future as a bridge between mainland China and the outside world is in serious jeopardy. Fortunately, all sides share an interest in pursuing more inclusive growth within the “one country, two systems” framework that has been critical to Hong Kong’s success.

ECJ rules GDPR "right to be forgotten" does not extend beyond EU; Chinese companies innovate without U.S. components; debate over cyber norms plays out at UN General Assembly; leaked documents implicate TikTok in Chinese censorship; and government-sponsored disinformation increases.

With China promoting a model of state-led capitalism and political illiberalism, and digital technology playing an increasingly central role in all aspects of society, the United States should work with its allies to promote core liberal values and provide a positive model of technological development and digital connectivity.

The Chinese Communist Party has used arbitrary detention to maintain power since the People’s Republic of China was founded seventy years ago.

The latest episode of The President’s Inbox is now up. My guest was Admiral William McRaven (Rtd.), a member of CFR’s Board of Directors and the co-chair of the recent CFR Independent Task Force on Innovation and National Security. We began by discussing the task force’s recent report, Innovation and National Security: Keeping Our Edge. We also spent some time discussing his terrific new book, Sea Stories: My Life in Special Operations. First, the task force report. It warns that the United States risks losing its global technological leadership to China. The reason is straightforward: Beijing is ramping up investment in research and development while Washington is ramping it down, as this video details. At the same time, Chinese students are flooding into STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) fields and American students aren’t. The difference is staggering:   The consequences of losing America’s technological lead are easy to spell out—a less competitive economy, slower economic growth, weaker job growth, and the erosion, and perhaps even disappearance, of the strategic advantages the U.S. military has held since the end of World War II. Admiral McRaven would like to see the United States repeat its “Sputnik moment,” recalling how the Soviet Union’s launch in October 1957 of the world’s first satellite spurred the federal government to invest massively in science and technology. He favors launching what the task force report calls “moonshot” efforts to support “innovation in foundational and general-purpose technologies, including AI and data science, advanced battery storage, advanced semiconductors, genomics and synthetic biology, 5G, quantum information systems, and robotics.” Admiral McRaven acknowledges that the United States also needs to do more to prevent Chinese theft of U.S. intellectual property and to curb its predatory economic practices. But he warns that fundamentally: This isn’t about China, it’s about the United States and about what we can do to, again, improve the [talent] pipeline, take a look at investing in basic research and investing in universities … It’s just that China provides us the impetus to look at the things we need to do across the spectrum in the United States to continue to stay ahead of China. On that score, Admiral McRaven, a former chancellor of the University of Texas system, is optimistic that the United States can do more to encourage U.S. students, and especially minority students, to pursue STEM careers. “The technology will invariably change over the next ten years,” he told me. “If we can develop the talent, the technology will come.” We closed our conversation by discussing a few of the experiences Admiral McRaven recounts in Sea Stories. What struck me most about the book and our chat was how quickly he acknowledged the contributions and accomplishments of others. So I asked him about it. His response was to the point: I hope what people take away from the book is that it’s not about me, it’s about the people that I worked with. It is about, again, these incredible soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines that were part of this story throughout my thirty-seven-year career, and their heroism and their sacrifice. If you want to read more about that heroism and sacrifice, you should check out Admiral McRaven’s other best-selling book, Make Your Bed: Little Things That Can Change Your Life…And Maybe the World. If you are interested in learning more about the future of innovation, consider reading Kenneth Gibbs’s piece in Scientific American on the importance of diversity in STEM education—one of the challenges the task force report stressed. Another informative piece is Lara Seligman’s discussion of the sometimes frosty relationship between Silicon Valley and the Department of Defense. And Elizabeth Howell has a primer on DARPA—the Defense Department agency that gave us the Internet among other technological innovations. Margaret Gach assisted in the preparation of this post.