Asia

Bangladesh

  • Women and Women's Rights
    Family Law Reform and Women’s Rights
    Podcast
    Around the world, family law and criminal codes are rife with provisions that undermine women’s rights, safety, and economic opportunity. Rangita de Silva de Alwis, an advisor to the European Union on strategies to combat early and forced marriage, and Farahnaz Ispahani, a former member of the Pakistani parliament who championed legislation to address acid crimes, discuss legal reform for women as it relates to child marriage and acid attacks.   Transcript VOGELSTEIN: All right. Good afternoon. Good afternoon, everyone. We’re going to go ahead and formally convene. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. My name is Rachel Vogelstein. I lead the Women and Foreign Policy Program here at CFR, which analyzes how elevating the status of women and girls advances U.S. foreign policy objectives. Today’s meeting will focus on family law reform and the status of women. As we know, around the world civil and criminal codes are rife with provisions that undermine women’s human rights, their safety, and the economic health of families, communities, and entire nations. Nowhere is this more true than with respect to two of the harmful traditional practices that we will discuss today—the scourge of child marriage, which affects one in six adolescent girls globally and acid crimes against women, which are on the rise in parts of South Asia and today actually take place around the world. Since the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, we have seen the legal movements to reform civil and criminal does to protect women grow in strength. And today the sustainable development agenda now includes a target to eliminate all discrimination against women, including legal discrimination, by the year 2030. But we know, from the experts who are here today, that progress has not been linear in nations around the world. And there is much to learn by examining where legal reform has succeeded, where it has failed, and which foreign policy approaches are most effective in promote women’s social, cultural, economic, and political participation globally. So we are very privileged this afternoon to host two experts who have really been at the frontlines of legal reform for women, who will help illuminate lessons learned and share perspectives on the path forward. First, we are very pleased to welcome, to my left, Rangita de Silva de Alwis, who is an advisor to the European Union on strategies to combat early and forced marriage. She is the associate dean of international affairs at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where she founded the Global Women’s Leadership Project under the auspices of U.N. Women to help map laws that regulate the status of women in the family. She also serves on the U.N. Women high-level group on justice for women and as a global advisor to the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals Fund. Previously, she was the inaugural director of the Global Women’s Leadership Initiative and the Women in Public Service Project. And her work on women’s rights has brought her to more than twenty-five countries around the world. To her left we are also very fortunate to host Farahnaz Ispahani, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, a senior fellow at the Religious Freedom Institute, and author of Purifying the Land of the Pure: A History of Pakistan’s Religious Minorities. In 2015, she served as a scholar at the National Endowment for Democracy, where she researched women of the self-proclaimed Islamic State. She’s a former Pakistani politician and served as a member of parliament and as an advisor to the president of Pakistan from 2008 to 2012. And with her active support, the Pakistani parliament enacted legislation relating to women’s harassment in the workplace, and also to make acid-throwing attacks illegal. We’re very fortunate to have both of you here. Welcome to the Council. I will begin with just a few opening questions for each of our speakers, and then we will open the discussion to all of you. So, Rangita, let’s start by talking about legal reform as it relates to the practice of child marriage, which you’ve worked on quite a bit. You’ve recently published a book of case studies on legal reform, which you look at in particular the approach to child marriage taken in Bangladesh and compare that to the situation in Zimbabwe. Can you tell us more about the lessons that we can learn from those two countries about how to best conclude laws that regulate the practice of child marriage? ALWIS: Thank you, Rachel, for hosting us. And thank you most of all for being at the forefront of law reform in areas of child marriage and other harmful practices. You’ve really been an inspiration to all of us. So thank you, Rachel. And I want to acknowledge this group of women leaders and experts who are really my tribe. And because I don’t have the time to acknowledge each and every one of you, I’m going to acknowledge Jane McAuliffe, the former president of Bryn Mawr College, who helped to found the women in public service project under the auspices of Secretary Hillary Clinton. So thank you, Jane, for being really one of the role models in everything that we do and being really an inspiration throughout my life. Thank you, Jane. To go back to your question, I think I would want to take a step back and set the stage for that conversation. In 2000, UNICEF asked me to write a report for them on the laws on the statute books around the world that still enshrine legitimate discrimination against the girl child, including child marriage. And what that opened my eyes to was that although law has an enormously powerful constitutive role to play in addressing discrimination, there are times the law itself can be complicit in legitimizing discrimination against girls and women. And the ways in which the law is manipulated by political leaders in reinforcing discrimination was really one of the most egregious ways in which the hierarchy of was had been misused and misinterpreted. So looking back, at the two reformist initiatives that I think are high-water marks of 2017 in terms of child marriage—and look at Bangladesh and Zimbabwe and I compare and contrast the two, because they’ve come to the reform through completely different lenses but using the same—the same philosophy of the best interest of the child. As many of us here who are lawyers and advocates know, the best interest of the child principle is one of the most sacred principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and animates the Convention on the Rights of the Child. So, when I first looked at Zimbabwe’s law reform initiative, I saw that although the constitution itself prohibited child marriage, the children’s law still allowed child marriage. And two major cases, two strategic litigation cases were used to reform the child marriage laws that becomes aligned with the constitutional of equal protection provisions. So although the law was reformed, what I saw was that it was the women’s movements, the women’s groups that really led the search for law reform. And was the force behind the law reform initiative. And what was interesting was that the two judges of the high court in Zimbabwe, who ruled on this case, used the best interest of the child principle in the way it was meant to be used. In the best interest of the child in the context of the full range of rights that are enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. So the fact situation of the case was—were ones where two older men in their 60s had raped two young girls, and then taken them as their brides in order to sanctify their crime. When this case was brought to the law court, the judge ruled against the two men and annulled the marriage. But the sentence that was given really trivialized the crime. It was less than six months imprisonment. So the high court said it is not—these are the words—it is not in the best interest of the child to trivialize the heinous crime of child marriage and that the punishment must fit the crime. So the use of the best interest of the child was employed in the way in which the framers of the Convention of the Rights of the Child meant it to be used. So that is a good-practice example of the usage of the best interest of the child principle. In Bangladesh, the same year, in 2017, harnessing the promise that Sheikh Hasina, the prime minister of Bangladesh, had made at the girls summit in 2014, where she pledged to end the scourge of child marriage by 2030, kept to her promise by drafting revisions to the child marriage law in Bangladesh. But this is, again, an illustration of the way in which there’s a gap between what is promised and political will. In the revisions, although the severity of the punishment for child marriage was increased—and that was a good step—there was a clause in article two of the child marriage law which allowed for an exception to the age of majority, of age eighteen, where the language of the law says: In the best interest of the child—in the best interest of the child, a guardian or a parent could ask the court for the child to be married, given particular circumstances. The circumstances are not spelled out. So it’s left to the capricious and arbitrary considerations of the judge, the parent, and the guardian. But what I most critique is the way in which the term “best interest of the child” is manipulated in the interest of political will. So this is one—going one step forward and two steps back and using the language of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to whitewash this complicity in the law that allows and legitimizes, in the name of the law, a crime against the girl child. Now, general recommendation—general comment fourteen of the Convention on the Rights of the Child forces the ways in which governments and political leaders can misuse the best interest of the child principle, and states in general comment that the best interest of the child cannot be undermined by misinterpretations or misuses of that principle, and must be seen in line with all of the rights enshrined in the convention, including the right to education, the right to health, the right to leisure, the right to agency—which is undermined by article two of the Bangladesh law. So these are two reformist initiatives that really use the same principle of the best interest of the rights of the child to do—to come to two different positions. And in Bangladesh, the women’s rights movement, the women’s rights groups have been mobilized and galvanized around this to protect this particular provision of the law. But the minister for women—the minister for women says—and I want to read this out to you because I think it important for us to understand the way in which politicians tend to whitewash and window-dress their positions. “Our rural society is very cruel. They will point their finger at the pregnant girl. She will be an outcast in school and elsewhere. People will say nasty things to the girl’s parents. And that is why we need this exception to the law. And that is why it is in the best interest of the child.” So I understand that there is still a stigma connected to pregnancy, stigma connected to—and there are cultural issues to a girl child’s association with a male member. But to use the law to undermine the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to violate the rights of the child is not in the best interests of the child. And I want to end my intervention in response to your question by quoting to you something that I was—I bore witness to when I worked for the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association on this bill, when one of the women—a mother said, when the Kazi, who is the Muslim marriage registrar, saw that my daughter’s age on her birth certificate said that she was thirteen, he refused to do the marriage. But then, after my husband spoke to him, he took it to the local government chairman and got it changed to eighteen, and then did the marriage. (Laughter.) My husband paid him 100 taka, $1.30, to the chairman and to the marriage registrar to change the birth certificate. So once this law comes into force, you don’t even have to pay that money because the law allows you—allows you that exception, to marry your child if you can prove that it is in her best interest. Q: Could I ask a question right up front? VOGELSTEIN: Please. Q: What is defined as a child? And what age are we talking about? Is it a universal age across these countries, or it is quite varied? Who is a child? ALWIS: Right. So that’s a good question. So the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines age of majority as the age of eighteen. Q: Eighteen. ALWIS: As the age of eighteen. Now, there again you see that laws around the world provide different definitions as to the age of eighteen. So Nigeria, for example, the children’s rights law in 2004 prohibited early marriage before the age of majority, but defined majority as the time of puberty. Q: Wow. ALWIS: So you can see these loopholes in the law really undermine the intention and the spirit of the law, if there ever was an intention. VOGELSTEIN: And I would commend to all of you the work of my colleague, Dr. Jody Heymann who was at the Council not too long ago talking about this very issue, who has put together a comprehensive catalogue of not only laws related to child marriage—minimum age of marriage around the world—but has actually gone the additional step to look at the exceptions that Rangita was talking about, which in many cases undermine the role, whether it’s an exception for parental or judicial consent, an exception under religious or customary law. And when one looks at that constellation of laws with those exceptions included, the number of countries that permit marriage under the age of eighteen grows substantially. ALWIS: Including the United States because, you know, we are under the illusion that this happens only in the global south. Thirty-seven states in the United States still allow exceptions to child marriage. Delaware was the first state to take out all exceptions, followed by New Jersey. But thirty-five other states still allow for exceptions. And that is why, you know, although I admire and respect the work of IFC on women, business and the law, and it’s such an important piece of work, I look at the seven indicators that they use and look at—look at the absence of child marriage in their indicators. So, you know, the seven indicators, the last indicator has violence against women. But it does not articulate child marriage as a form of violence against women. The first indicator cause for adopting measures to be adopted by states to modify social and cultural patterns and stereotypes but, again, it doesn’t cause the child marriage. And we know that child marriage had enormous both human as well as economic consequences. And the economic consequences are great. IFC’s work itself, the World Bank’s work itself, calculates up to $4 trillion saved in the global south if child marriage can be addressed. So given the fact that it’s not only human cost but economic cost, and the Sustainable Development Goals, in Goal 5.3, you talked about the goals—the goal calling for addressing discrimination against women. But Goal 5.3 calls for addressing cultural and social practices that undermine women’s rights and girls’ rights, including child marriage. So it is really one of the ways in which we can advance sustainable development and sustainable growth. And so addressing child marriage is about human agency. It is a public health issue. It is a women’s rights issue. It is a way in which we address violence against women. But it’s also an important economic issue. VOGELSTEIN: Rangita, you talked about reform efforts at the national level—Bangladesh and Zimbabwe, and you mentioned some other countries as well. You’ve also served as an advisor to the European Union and thought a lot about how to best deploy foreign policy and development cooperation in order to improve the law on this issue—including through the creation of an EU policy directive. So I wonder if you could tell us a little more about that directive. What does it require? And what steps do you recommend that governments take through their foreign policy apparatus to address gender inequalities in the law, including in the area of child marriage? ALWIS: Thank you, Rachel. One of the reasons why I think CFR is such a great forum and platform to have this conversation is because of your own work on foreign policy. And women’s rights is integral to foreign policy. So when I was asked by the EU to revise their draft directive and speak to them about some of the recommendations with the draft directive, I was just so thrilled to see the ways in which the EU saw foreign policy and its development cooperation policy as a powerful tool to address child marriage, and the ways in which child marriage—and issues that are so powerfully integral to women’s lives—are such important policy tools for the EU. So Article 8 of the directive calls on the European Union, in the context of its foreign policy and its development cooperation policy, to offer a strategic path to its partners. And to that end, to require that—and it goes on—all its partner countries prohibit early and forced marriage. This prohibition is respected in practice once the law has entered into force. It also acknowledges the fact that in times of crisis—political crisis, in times of migration—that child marriage tends to be exacerbated, that there’s a spike in child marriage. So there is that context within which the EU directive operates. And I like the way in which it balances families that have engaged in child marriage, and the protection that needs to be given to those families while preventing and prohibiting child marriage. So this is not in any way punitive. It’s not a directive meant to punish families or the girls who have been victimized or survived child marriage. But I found that they have a couple of issues that were absent from this directive. And that was where I intervened with the European Parliament’s—the committee that was charged with developing this directive, was that a directive alone cannot create change unless this directive connects with the local and the national and the grassroots groups that are deeply engaged in addressing child marriage. This cannot be simply imposed as a foreign policy directive. It can do more harm than good if it is seen as a Western project that is being somehow used for an end that is not deeply organic to the community. So that engagement with groups that are already working domestically is very important. Secondly, it has to be connected to other preventative methods. This is not a punitive element. It is about preventing child marriage. And as we all know here, that one of the most powerful vaccines against child marriage is mandatory education for the girl child. So we need to see—so we cannot have these abstract, you know, prevention of child marriage laws without making sure that all of the other provisions that help to prevent child marriage are also put in place. Then there are other creative ways where women have been used and employed in this—in this war against child marriage. And that is the ways in which, you know, food for education policies—the Bolsa Familia programs in Latin America and other regions have been very, very powerful to—in combatting child marriage. And at a time where there is a war against the girl child’s education, there has to be a war that is waged on behalf of the girl child’s access to education. And that has to go hand-in-hand with child marriage. And we also have to see this as part of some of the CBE and PBE strategies. Q: Can I ask you about the education piece? ALWIS: Yes. Q: You mentioned a key part of combatting this is educating girls on the issue, writ large. I guess it’s a two-part question. Has there ever been an instance of two children being forced to marry each other—a boy and a girl, both under the age of eighteen? And I ask that question because I would think a key part of that education is also educating boys, right? Hey, as you grow up, this is not OK, and here’s why. Is that—I imagine that’s part of the strategy too? Or—and if it’s not, can you talk to that? ALWIS: So that’s—yes. So that is a very good question. So I’ve done a mapping for Girls not Brides. It’s a very powerful organization that has a website with a map of all of the laws that still have child marriage in their statute books. And you look at—what you see is that most of these laws operate on a term of what I call, you know, gender duality. There is almost, like, a hypocrisy in these laws. So that a girl—a girl’s age of marriage is lower than the boy’s age of marriage. And to some extent, that is also the duality that renders—but that is shaped by the devaluation of the girl child, that somehow a girl’s value lies in her marriage, right? So that is one part of it. Second, it’s a way of protecting the girl from alleged or imagined harmful threats of sexual abuse, of honor crimes. And I think, you know, you’re going to be touching upon that too. This is all part of that continuum of a girl’s honor is owned by her family. And therefore, at the earliest instance she needs to be given in marriage, in order to protect her as well as to protect the family. And thirdly, she’s a commodity. You know, there’s a commodification of a girl. By giving her in marriage and being either—you know, getting a bride price or getting rid of her—you know, giving her away to another family. And then finally, in times of war, we see, whether it is with Al-Shabaab or with Boko Haram, girls’ bodies become the sites of violence. So that, again—so these—so there are these four, five reasons that really need to be addressed as root causes of child marriage. VOGELSTEIN: Rangita, thank you. I want to turn from child marriage to the horrific crime of acid attacks, which particularly affects women in countries across South Asia, including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma. Some reports suggest that incidents is actually increasing in this part of the world. Why is that? ISPAHANI: Well, the first reason is—and only Bangladesh has addressed it in their law which was earlier in the 2002s and has been the most effective. The Indian law and the two Pakistani laws that have come since have not had the teeth. They have not addressed the purchase and sale of acid. Now, acid is something which is very, very, very cheap in South Asia. It’s used in jewelry production. It’s used all over for agricultural purposes, for cotton seed. And it’s used for rubber production, et cetera. So any farmer, any farm hand, anyone who works in a factory making any kind of jewelry, can get their hands on acid. And a whole gallon of acid will cost less than a dollar. Now, what—part of what Rangita was talking about, right, about child marriage, for me why acid violence is so important and why it has—does not interest enough people, I feel, in the West, is because it has not really hit any of your lives in any way that you can see it. Like child marriage, you talk about from Massachusetts to, you know, Delaware, et cetera. It’s something in your lives. It’s something you see across the globe. Acid violence is if a child is not given in marriage, that child could be dosed in acid and destroyed for life. They always go for the face and the neck, which means blindness and disfiguration. People who can afford it can have ten to thirty surgeries, and still never, ever be seen to be employable again. They never have the confidence to leave the home again. They’re destroyed. So this happens if you don’t give your girl in marriage to a more powerful person, or an older person. This happens in Pakistan with forced conversion, when an older Muslim man wants to marry a young Christian girl or Hindu girl working in fields close by. If the families or the girl refuse, acid is used on her. And I don’t know if any of you have seen this movie called Saving Face, which won an Oscar, by one of my fellow seven sisters, five sister graduate, Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, which shows this—it documents the fate of the life of this one particular acid victim. And it also shows the Pakistani parliament, including myself, passing the first law. But when you start seeing, as you said, conversion rape, child marriage, all of these things in all of these cases throughout South Asia, you see the use of acid going up exponentially. And that is terrifying. People are feeling that their values are being attacked. You see, even if something is not Islamic or Hindu or Christian, in today’s age religion has become something I know a lot of liberals feel uncomfortable talking about. But I work on freedom of religion and belief, because it’s a major, major human rights topic—whether it’s today in America or anywhere in the world. So acid violence is used in all of these kinds of cases. As I said right in the beginning, because the Bangladesh law in 2002 was drafted so cleverly, they put in the condition—the law, basically. They wrote in that you had to—the people who purchased acid without any license, the people who sold acid without any particular acid, those people too—not just the person, the perpetrator of the attack. And neither India nor Pakistan did that, even though the laws are much more recent. And because of that, no matter what your official figures tell you, acid violence is probably the fastest growing attack on girls and women. It also happens to little boys and sometimes to men in blood feuds. But primarily it’s girls and women. So my role and why I came to work on this was I was one of four political advisors to President Zardari in Pakistan. I worked for his wife, Benazir Bhutto. She was killed in the run-up to the elections. And largely because of a public stand against the terrorists, the culture, their thoughts on women, society—a whole range of things, including education. And so, from my seat in the presidency and then from my seat on parliament, there was a big movement because for the first time we created a women’s caucus, which was very, very, very significant. Melanne Verveer and people like that who were aware, who traveled with Secretary Clinton or worked with her on these issues, knows that the women’s caucus in Pakistan worked across all party lines, which means from the women in full niqab, from the Jamiat, or the JUI, to the most liberal, you know, which would be probably me and a couple of my colleagues—(laughter)—we’re the most progressive. But across the aisle, the women in that caucus worked on this bill and the women’s harassment in the workplace. And it was not a treasury bill either. It was someone from the opposition who brought the acid violence—anti-acid violence bill to the floor. And all of us from the treasury benches, the orthodox religious Muslim parties—all of us fought for it, which is the only way both these laws passed. My role was not as the writer of a law. Because I serve the president, I couldn’t write law. But my—what I used to do primarily was try to dodge. In Pakistan, we have a saying, someone can be—a man can be clean-shaved, but he has a beard in his stomach. (Laughter.) So we figured out very quickly that our law minister was one of those men. (Laughter.) He was educating his daughters at the best private schools, and all of that. And when I went to him to talk about these two bills, he said to me: What is the need for this? The Koran and Sharia give you all the rights you need. Do you think God’s law needs to be amended? All women’s rights are spelled out. So I said, yes, sir, but this is a democratic government. And the people’s voice needs to be heard. And X percentage of women voted. And this is the people’s party of Benazir Bhutto. And this was on her agenda. Nothing. He would not lay the bill in the house. So the ways you got about this are—this is politics. Not the politics, you know, in Wolf Blitzer’s studio—(laughter)—but, I mean, as all of you know, it’s always behind the scenes politics. So I had to go to the chairman’s senate and get him to get some of his members on board and, you know, bring the law in a different way. Get the president to quietly win over members who were in alliance with us in the coalition. And no one talked about it publicly. But we got it laid in the house. And then we had the votes. So it was a—this was a moment of great celebration. Of course, that law as not perfect. There’s been a subsequent law—which Rangita knows as much about as I do. And I’m not a lawyer, so I don’t speak in legal terms. But still, the point is at first there’s a euphoria because some law, even if it’s partially good, is better than no law, right? But what we’re finding now is that if the police are not trained or sympathetic to hear these cases, if the hospitals are not trained to take photographs and write down in detail what has been done to the woman, the child, the boy, the man, if the justice system leaves these cases pending for ten and fifteen and twenty years, the amount of women who have been attacked with acid, the suicide rate is the highest—absolute highest. They are women, as I said earlier, who have had five, ten, fifteen, twenty, thirty surgeries. And they’ll never look the way they did. And what it is, is every day when they look at themselves they realized they have no power. See, it burns you down. Your bones melt away. You are not who you were. And yet, you’re not dead. So it’s like being—it’s like being part of the living dead. I mean, you talk to these women and you work with them. And it—so, for me, this is a very, very integral conversation, which I don’t think is happening. From foreign policy—from a foreign policy point of view, today in countries like the United Kingdom—England, as it soon will be—you are seeing acid crimes more and more every year. Why is that? Because immigrants from countries in South Asia who knew this crime, when their daughters want to marry outside of their choice—now, these young women are born in the U.K., educated in the U.K. But if they’re trying to marry against the choice of the family, they try to get a job and move away from home, if, God forbid, they have a boyfriend, these same acid crimes are taking place in the United Kingdom. So wherever these populations may go—and it’s not just South Asia today. In fact, now besides Pakistan and the U.K., Colombia—this is how far afield it is—Italy, Uganda, Cambodia, Nepal, India and Bangladesh. So in every continent basically now you have a country where this is widespread. So I’m just going to read you one tiny amount. I mean, people talk about these—you know, India had 1,000 acid attacks in 2016. Pakistan had 400. Bangladesh had 300. But I’m going to read you a quote from an incredible admirable woman talking about just the area of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the federal capital area—imagine D.C., without too many of its suburbs. Women’s rights activists warn against depending on official statistics in the matter. Shahnaz Bokhari, chief coordinator and clinical psychologist of the Progressive Women’s Association in Rawalpindi, points out that her organization has counted 8,000 victims burnt by acid as well as kerosene and stoves since 1994 just from the 200-mile radius around Pakistan’s capital. Now, this a much more significant number, and this is all she has from that very small and limited space. So that’s just to give you a little bit of an idea. Now, my ideas on foreign policy may not always agree with everyone else’s, but having worked for a foreign government and then, obviously, living in the States for many, many years, at this point with this administration I honestly see less than zero interest to do with women unless they’re white Evangelical women who voted for Trump. So when you see someone like Kavanaugh, I mean, the assault on women in this country today is so targeted an appeal that I know it’s very hard to think about women acid survivors in another part of the world. But it’s extremely important, and a way to get to it is this government, and therefore the State Department and DRL, et cetera— VOGELSTEIN: (To be ?). (Laughter.) ISPAHANI: Yes. VOGELSTEIN: The former. ISPAHANI: Yes. VOGELSTEIN: (To be or something, as we are ?). ISPAHANI: Is now working on a lot of freedom of religion and belief projects, and they’re funding a great deal of them across the world. So on crimes against women, if you bring in, for example, something like the forced coercion of marriage into another religion, OK, converting Christians to Islam or—that is a very—to me, a very good way to then get into—on crimes. And I sort of have been around these people a little bit because I have very funny and interesting people I work with. I mean, I’m probably the funniest, but—(laughter). So these are the ways that I see where we have to look at a hopeless situation and find what they’re doing where, even though it seems like it’s serving their self-interest actually we can use it to (serve ?), you know. So I won’t go into anything too much more. If anyone— VOGELSTEIN: Could I— ISPAHANI: Of course. VOGELSTEIN: Please. Please, Farahnaz, thank you for that. Rangita, please weigh in. And then, of course, we will open to a discussion with all of you. Please raise your placards and we’ll get to as many comments as we can. Rangita. DE ALWIS: So very quickly, to respond to your comment on the part of foreign policy, one of the provisions that I want to share with you from the EU foreign policy directive is this. So the language of the provision states the level of public development aid is made dependent on the recipient country’s commitment to complying with the requirements in the fight against early and forced marriage. So tying this to development aid and cooperation is a genius stroke, right? So you are—it’s a carrot-and-stick approach. But my fear is that this might have a backlash unless it’s used in very sensitive ways in connection, in partnership with women’s groups, and the right women’s groups. And with that in mind, I want to share with you a story from Indonesia, which is like—which is the juxtaposition of the Zimbabwe and the Bangladesh case study. So, in 2017, the same year as the Bangladesh and Zimbabwe case study, female Islamic clerics in Indonesia met together with their counterparts, female clerics from other countries, including from Kenya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, and they issued a fatwa—a fatwa against child marriage. This is the first instance where I’ve seen a positive fatwa—(laughter)—where a fatwa has been used as a positive tool. And although this fatwa is not legally binding, it is groundbreaking and it was issued after a three-day congress of high-level female clerics. And this did have impact, because in 2018, just two months ago, the Indonesian leadership came up with a new draft outlawing child marriage. So this fatwa did have an impact. So knowing with whom to work with, what groups to work with, what women’s groups are the important partners, is an important part of that foreign policy provisions. And then, finally, about the law. And as a lawyer who is deeply engaged in the part of the law to advance in really mining the constitutive tool, it is—it has enormous normative value. Everything starts with the law. And so forgive me if I am making—if I’m an apologist for the law. And despite the law’s potential to do harm, it can do good. ISPAHANI: Oh, of course. DE ALWIS: As you said, you know, a law is the kind of founding principles. ISPAHANI: Without a law you can’t—no, there’s no moving forward without that. That’s—yeah, absolutely. Yes. DE ALWIS: And it is standard-setting principles. But what is problematic is when there are loopholes in the laws, which then keep getting, you know, broadened and the frontiers are being pushed, and then that undermines the law. But what we have to remember is that it does also, unfortunately, have the power to construct standards of honor, shame, and even what I would say obedience in the law. And child marriage is really about the power and the control to control of women’s agency and her position in society. It is about obedience. It is about ensuring a girl child’s and a woman’s obedience to patriarchy. ISPAHANI: Rangita, I’m just going to jump in there if you don’t mind, Rachel. VOGELSTEIN: Please. ISPAHANI: You know, the EU is fantastic. It’s positive. It believes in all the right things. They have, you know, more or less a common standard of principles which they hold to. We are sitting in a very different place. So if you’re talking about U.S. foreign policy, we have to think of how we’re going to survive till the next election, how we’re going to win the next election, and still not—we can’t stop doing this work. So we have to find partners within the administration or State or DOD, and there are a lot of professional people, to still find little bits of funding and still use these opportunities to work, because you can’t just give up. So I believe—maybe I am— Q: Well, I don’t want to interrupt you, but I totally hear your point about how to work within this climate. And you mentioned Evangelical women. Now, they were very high on human trafficking issues. The whole Evangelical movement was very excited about human trafficking. I can’t imagine they wouldn’t also—and you mentioned your coalition in Pakistan. The same kind of support might be found among the Evangelical community here. ISPAHANI: Absolutely. And I am— Q: I don’t know who’s going to make that outreach, but it’s very ripe, I think. ISPAHANI: This is—this is, in fact a conversation that we have been having right now. Q: Right, exactly. ISPAHANI: Because anywhere that—what Evangelicals have learned globally is where there’s Christian persecution, right, there are other women or other people also being persecuted. For example, ISIS. I did some work on the women of ISIS: the subjugation, the rape, the absolute—I mean, the conditions that women were in, especially the slave women, under the caliphate. So you had Christians, you had Shia Muslims, you had animists like Yazidis. So, you know, there ended up being commonality, which then you could go and find partners to work with. So that’s why I say you can never give up. And you’re absolutely right, you just have to find the right person, the right people, the right vehicle, the right work, basically, something that speaks to the other side. So that’s really the distinction because it’s so much more complicated here than Europe in terms of these laws. Q: Plural marriage might not be so appealing to them. They may like that. (Laughs.) But the—but the acid thing is. ISPAHANI: Yeah. VOGELSTEIN: A lot of strategic considerations. So why don’t we come here to Manhaz (ph), please? Q: Thank you, Rachel. And thank you so much, Farahnaz and Rangita. We partnered together at the beginning of this conversation that ended up so efficiently (in a book ?) in such a short time. But I wanted to say that even though it’s fascinating what you’ve been presenting and it’s lovely to have, you know, you eyes on these issues, which are so vital, our conversation I have hoped—and, unfortunately, we don’t have time—to be broader about family law reform, which these are the most egregious aspects. But the overview, basically, the status of women in the family, is to our thinking—and actually, that will be my organization and Jen’s (sp) organization here—is doing 11 case studies that are coming up in an anthology next month. And what we are hoping to do, with your support and everyone here’s support, is to bring out the idea that the status of women in the family is where it all starts; that is, the hierarchy of patriarchy, which reflects itself in education, in schools, in politics, in economics, in everything that concerns our lives starts in the family. And it starts not just with men oppressing women—in fact, with men and women together having created that particular structure, but at one point it made sense: when women were pregnant most of their lives; when they needed eight kids, four of whom would survive who would help them with the economy; et cetera; et cetera. And everything else supported that. But now it’s been a long time since that has not been reality, it has not worked. But if we want to change all of the things that trouble us—creation of a democracy, which we have failed in; creation of understanding between religions; of inclusiveness; all of that—we need to begin in the family, to restructure the architecture of human relationships right there. And Rangita and Farahnaz both have a lot to say to that. And I’m hoping that we will talk about that, because just as this is the worst of times for us as women and as democrats, it is also the best of times, because for the first time the global consciousness has raised so high that although it reflects itself in extremism and reaction, it also reflects itself in the passion to change. So I think I would love to have more comments from everybody, and especially from the two speakers on the idea of the family and family laws, which concerns everybody, you know, and the status of women in the family more generally. Thank you. VOGELSTEIN: Manhaz (ph), thank you for that. To make sure we get as many voices as possible, I’m going to come down—Beverly, please chime in—and then we’ll give our speakers an opportunity to respond. Q: Thank you for your comments. And the comment and question is for both of you, and I’ll be very succinct. But particularly, Rangita, because you’re at the University of Pennsylvania, one of the major Ivy League and public school universities in the country, and you’ve worked, of course, in parliament and elsewhere. There is a need for outreach. So what other kind of roles in universities do you see, because people need to have the knowledge, the skills, et cetera? And universities, particularly doctoral universities, not community colleges, emphasize research. So what other kind of practical roles do you see universities playing? And is there some way to, Farahnaz, that the kind of endeavors she’s mentioning can link more with universities, because universities also have the resources? DE ALWIS: Do you want to— VOGELSTEIN: Why don’t we—why don’t we take— Q: Jill. VOGELSTEIN: Jill, please chime in, and then we’ll come down to one more just so we get as many as possible in the interest of time. Q: Sure. I was curious as to how the media is portraying both of these issues, acid attacks and child marriage locally, whether or not there is a sympathetic spin to the victims or whether more it’s like women are—women need to stay in their place and this wouldn’t happen to them. So I was just curious as to how that’s—what the narrative is. VOGELSTEIN: Thank you for that. Darin (ph), please. Q: Just a comment and then a question. I spent this morning with a State Department visitor group from mostly Muslim-majority countries, but some of them were Christian, and just was struck that they had almost no idea about the issue. The two that really fired them were corruption and child marriage. But they have this argument, which I’ve heard in four places now, that women used to mature more quickly; and therefore, it was—and no concept of maternal mortality. So I have a sense of a huge information challenge, which brings me to my question. One of the efforts is the antislavery movement at the moment. And this year, a lot of the data now includes forced and child marriage. So I’m curious as to what was the background of that. It’s counted as fifteen million out of forty, I think. And is that significant? And is having this be part of modern slavery and that particular group of advocates confuses it a bit with sex trafficking which is also part of it? What is the significance there? VOGELSTEIN: Why don’t we finish here and then we’ll give an opportunity to respond. Please. Q: My name is Adeola Olagunju. I work at Facebook. And I was just curious if there was any technological aspects to these issues that you guys see as challenges. VOGELSTEIN: Thank you for that question. Please. Q: Just a general comment. I know I’ve asked one question already. So I love what Manhaz (ph) has said. My comment—and I’ll frame it as a comment—is the broader issues at play here. You talked about the best-interest factors. And certainly acid throwing, those are all very serious issues. For me, I run a nonprofit in Virginia that focuses on family law reform domestically here. We come across a lot of the same challenges that you mentioned internationally: best-interest factors, a legal interpretation of them, judicial accountability issues, of which there are—there is none. Right? Judges have broad authority in how he or she interprets the law. And a lot of that is tied to what we call this 1950s Mad Men mentality that no, you know, you are a woman, you clearly don’t want a career, you just want to stay home and raise kids and have more of them. That’s it. And as a man, you don’t want to have anything to do with your kids, you just want to work all the time and smoke cigars and drink bourbon on Friday nights because that’s what you do. None of that is true. None of that applies to modern realities and modern families. So that’s what we’re trying to change. We have brought men and women together around this issue. And so I’d really, for subsequent conversations, I want to emphasize the need to talk about, again, judicial accountability and requiring judges to explain their rulings in writing so that they see the light of day, and for men and women to work together on this. Because that’s the only way we’ve been able to succeed in Virginia. Our national executive director is a woman, actually. So it’s really groundbreaking. In the U.S. we’re fortunate in that we don’t have some of the other issues that international women face. But that kind of cohesion is critical. DE ALWIS: So I’m— VOGELSTEIN: So a full agenda. DE ALWIS: Yes. So I’m going to answer just two of the questions posed, Manhaz (ph) and yours, because I think it brings together the aspect of this within the broader context of family law reform and then the role that academic institutions can play in that endeavor. So I came to family law reform as a young academic coming of age in Sri Lanka over twenty-five years ago when Radhika Coomaraswamy, who at that time was the U.N. special rapporteur on violence against women, gave me a copy of the case of Shah Bano in India. And this is such a pivotal case. It was an inflection point in personal laws in India. Shah Bano was a sixty-five-year-old woman who was divorced by her husband, who had been married to her for over forty-five years, through the talaq divorce, by clapping his hand three times. And she was rendered destitute in this byzantine town of Maharashtra. And she sued. She went to the supreme court using the vagrancy law, asking for support. And the Indian supreme court asked her wealthy lawyer husband to provide her a $5 support that would allow her to have the most meager, but above the poverty line, existence twenty-five years ago. And this completely divided not only the Hindu and the Muslim communities, but the Muslim community itself and said this is against the Muslim law—the Muslim law allows the talaq divorce and does not allow for maintenance of either widows or divorcees—and called upon the then Rajiv Gandhi government to overturn the supreme court ruling that called for a $5 support system for Shah Bano. And so Radhika gave me this case and said your generation needs to work on this case, on the reform of personal laws, the reform of family laws. And then a couple of months later, I came as a graduate student, a twenty-three-year-old graduate student to Harvard Law School where my supervisor, who then went on to become the dean of the law school, Martha Minow, gave me her article on Forming Underneath Everything That Grows—family law—Towards a History of Family Law. And in that, she argues that family law grows underneath every legal field. And she says it is about rules, about the roles and duties between men and women, parents and children, families and strangers, historically and conceptually, that underly other rules about employment and commerce, education and welfare and perhaps the very governance of the state. So, Manhaz (ph), you are absolutely right. Family law shapes and informs the very governance of the state because it is about the way in which it regulates the status of women in their private lives in the family laws and that impacts the status of their public role. So family law is really at the heart of gender equality. And it is a litmus test to measure the gender equality in any state. So as for your question about what do—what can academic institutions—what is the role that academic institutions play, so, you know, women like Martha Minow, who is now the three-hundredth anniversary professor at Harvard University, she really is looking at family law reform from that kind of good-governance lens, that it is not only about family law reform, but it has enormous implications to the way in which a state governs itself. And then at Penn Law, we have started in partnership with Phumzile at U.N. Women the family law mapping. And, Manhaz (ph), it is at a modest stage yet. But we have—we are looking at it not only from the lens of family laws, but all laws that regulate the status of women in their family. So it’s not just that narrow understanding of what is family laws, but property laws, inheritance laws, custody laws, guardianship laws, banking laws, financial laws, all of which impact a woman’s role in their families, and mapping that in terms of, you know, what are the gaps in the laws and what are the loopholes in the laws. VOGELSTEIN: Farahnaz, the last word. ISPAHANI: OK. I’m just going to respond to the media question because I was a journalist for a great many years. What you see on the ground mostly throughout South Asia is the English-speaking English press, whether it’s television or print or work-based, et cetera. We tend to have more coverage on issues like, you know, crimes against women, children and all of the—the whole gamut of human rights issues basically. What you see in the vernacular press is something very different. It’s either completely silent, ignores these things because they’re not even important enough to be mentioned, or if there’s a case where a woman has been lucky enough to get a good attorney, who’s holding press conferences, who’s getting some attention to the case, it’s usually derogatory towards a woman in some way. So you see this marked difference between the elite English-language press and the vernacular. Now, the mediums are also different. Television, like television everywhere, impacts some. For example, with rape victims, they—over and over again, we show photographs or video of the face of the woman and violating her in every single day, including her security and protection. So these conversations keep going on between rights activists and lawmakers and, you know, women’s groups and media houses that, you know, you must not show the face. But, you know, it’s that one second of a little spike of showing a crying woman, a distraught woman, a victim or whatever it is. So over and over again, they break these rules of giving these women the only time they pay attention on television is in a way which is harmful to women who’ve already been hurt badly. So that’s in a nutshell. DE ALWIS: One very quickly to say that thirty-seven years after Shah Bano went before the Indian supreme court and the Rajiv Gandhi government annulled that ruling, overturned that ruling—just last year, the Indian supreme court held that talaq divorce was illegal. So change happens. It takes time, but it’s because of advocates and leaders like Rachel and all of you here in the U.S. as well as on the ground, in the field, in the grassroots working on these issues relentlessly that change happens, slowly but surely. VOGELSTEIN: Well, on that incredibly optimistic note and after a tremendous insight into the ways in which we can make progress, please join me in thanking both of our speakers for an incredibly important—(applause). Thank you all so much. (END)
  • Bangladesh
    Bangladesh’s Democratic Erosion: How Democracy Assistance Can Help
    Steve Cima is resident program director for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and Geoffrey Macdonald is principal researcher for democracy and governance at the International Republican Institute. Bangladesh has drawn global attention as it struggles to manage the ongoing humanitarian crisis caused by nearly one million forcibly displaced Rohingya who have fled to escape violence in neighboring Myanmar. While international organizations and other countries have focused on how they can further support the Bangladeshi government’s response to the crisis, they have paid less attention to the country’s growing political dysfunction. Bangladesh’s widely noted weakening democracy imperils its historically pluralistic political culture and recent economic progress. As Bangladesh enters an election cycle that could be the tipping point between renewed multiparty competition and cemented one-party rule, international attention should focus on a crisis equally pressing to the Rohingya issue: Bangladesh’s declining democratic character. The U.S. Department of State’s most recent human rights report documents the increasingly harsh political tactics of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her ruling Awami League since coming to power in 2008. The Awami League is accused of silencing critics using repressive measures such as attacking media outlets, co-opting the judiciary, and jailing political opponents. The primary opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), is also accused of coordinating large-scale violence during its general election boycott in 2013–2014 that killed scores. These political rivalries have undermined fair electoral competition. In February, BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia was sentenced to five years in prison on corruption charges in a case the opposition considered partisan. The verdict could bar Zia from competing in the upcoming elections as the country’s constitution disqualifies a person sentenced to more than two years’ imprisonment from standing. The conviction could also lead the BNP to boycott the elections expected before January 2019, as it had five years ago. Bangladesh’s democratic system is subject to additional pressures including corruption, weak governance, poverty, demographic and environmental stress, and Islamist militancy. According to public opinion research conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI), despite a growing economy, Bangladeshis continue to face severe hardships. Bangladeshi citizens complain of high unemployment, rising prices, and various other economic challenges. They also say bribes and other forms of corruption limit access to jobs, rule of law, healthcare, education, and other public goods. Furthermore, personal security is poor. Bangladeshi women, in particular, report living in fear of sexual assault with little recourse for justice. Citizens identify corruption, political violence, and nontransparent elections as key grievances. Yet despite a negative view of the quality of democracy and political parties in their country, Bangladeshis retain a positive view of democracy as a system. The Awami League and the BNP have an opportunity this election cycle to renew Bangladesh’s democracy, serving as effective, responsible, and responsive governing and opposition parties. However, this will require the parties to realign their priorities and build institutional capacity. International democracy assistance can help. Democracy assistance—a sector of international development—aids political parties, civil society, and other pro-democracy actors in new and struggling democracies. In Bangladesh, IRI is one of several organizations that has implemented democracy assistance programs over the years. Now is the time to expand these efforts. Here are a few ideas: Create space for productive political dialogue. Responding to a 2017 IRI poll that showed 66 percent of Bangladeshis wanted the Awami League to seek input from other parties, IRI has conducted a series of dialogues with the major political parties designed to build trust and facilitate conversations on key political and security issues as well as find areas of commonality. IRI’s interparty dialogue program has received significant support from senior-level politicians despite the hostile rivalries that exist among the political parties. Engage youth in nonpartisan political activity. Over the coming year, IRI will expand the scope of its political dialogue program to youth, holding a series of seminars on university campuses to encourage young people to discuss political issues in a nonpartisan and constructive manner. Support the integrity of the electoral process. During past elections, IRI has led international election observation missions, trained and supported domestic election observers, and conducted civic and voter education. Having informed and watchful international and domestic actors can deter election fraud and violence. Develop the capacity of civil society and media. In the past, IRI has worked with civil society and the media to strengthen their ability to monitor and build public awareness of political and electoral corruption before, during, and after elections. Help build the capacity of state institutions. An ineffective or partisan security sector and election commission can undermine trust in election outcomes and spur election violence. International actors can work to enhance capacity in these institutions with training and advice on best practices. Ultimately, only Bangladeshis themselves can repair the country’s flailing democracy. And with only six months before elections, international aid alone will not transform Bangladesh’s political and electoral system. But if properly targeted and funded, it can help keep open enough political space to allow for a substantive debate between and among citizens and parties on the serious issues that affect the country. This would be progress.
  • Rohingya
    The Rohingya Crisis and the Meaning of Genocide
    Despite evidence of systematic violence against the Rohingya, countries remain reluctant to classify the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State as genocide.
  • Myanmar
    Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh Could Face Further Suffering
    Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face serious risk during upcoming monsoon season, warns the UN Refugee Agency. 
  • Rohingya
    The Top Ten South Asia Stories of 2017
    As 2017 comes to an end, it’s time to assess which stories from South Asia had the most impact. By this I mean which events or ongoing developments shaped a country or the South Asian region, or had an outsized effect on the world. This year, a number of stories from the region drew global headlines, including from countries that do not always make front page news. Here are my top ten South Asia stories of the year: 1. The Rohingya Flee to Bangladesh The Rohingya Muslim minority has faced ethno-religious discrimination in Myanmar for decades. In August, this persecution descended into widely-acknowledged ethnic cleansing, with horrific violence perpetrated by the Myanmar military on Rohingya men, women, and children that has shocked the world. More than 655,000 Rohingya have fled the country since August, adding to the more than 210,000 Rohingya already living in Bangladesh as refugees. The International Rescue Committee has called this the “fastest-growing humanitarian crisis in the world.” The problems inside the refugee camps in Bangladesh have attracted less media attention than the stories of brutal violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, and the tragic indifference of Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi to the suffering. But with nearly 870,000 Rohingya refugees in legal limbo, and surviving under rudimentary conditions in Bangladesh’s Teknaf Peninsula, attention should shift urgently to funding the relief operations there, supporting Bangladesh financially so this lower-income country does not have to shoulder the responsibility for the refugees on its own, and identifying a path forward for the Rohingya to find permanent residency in hospitable third countries. (Myanmar will not be able to guarantee their safety, and Bangladesh is not equipped to handle such a large refugee burden.) I place this story at the top of my list due to the depth of the atrocities committed and the scale of the tragedy. This crisis will last well into 2018. 2. India and China Go Eyeball to Eyeball in Doklam, Bhutan In most years, an event in the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan wouldn’t rise to near the top of a list of the year’s most important regional developments. But this year, the border between Bhutan and China found itself the site of a military standoff between the armies of the world’s two giants (in terms of population), China and India. In mid-June, following the move of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to extend a road in the Doklam Plateau area of territory disputed between Bhutan and China, the Indian Army stepped in to defend Bhutan’s territory and prevent forward territorial seizure by the PLA. The two armies remained in a tense stalemate for almost three months. The situation was resolved only at the end of August on the eve of the BRICS Summit—hosted by China in Xiamen. (The last-minute agreement ensured that the standoff would not mar the summit.) The standoff showed that India will not hesitate to stand up to China when New Delhi perceives that its vital interests are at stake. We have not heard the last of the Doklam dispute: as of mid-December, press reports continue to emerge regarding a Chinese troop buildup in the same general location. 3. India Implements an Ambitious Goods and Services Tax (GST) It took five years to pass a law introducing a national goods and services tax in India. The national tax replaces a plethora of levies and effectively stitches all of India’s states and federally administered union territories into a single market for the first time in the country’s history. As you would imagine with an exercise of this magnitude, progress was tortuous. The 2011 introduction of a GST bill in parliament during the Indian National Congress–led United Progressive Alliance government did not gain sufficient support, and lapsed with the end of the government’s term in 2014. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government introduced a different GST bill, which eventually secured sufficient parliamentary support to pass into law in 2016, and subsequently received ratification by more than half of India’s states, required in order to bring this constitutional amendment into force. On July 1 this year, marked by a special midnight session of parliament, this hard-fought GST finally rolled out nationwide. It was a complicated debut, with multiple tax bands and a bewildering, non-intuitive assignment of goods and services across them. The complexity dented economic activity as businesses struggled to adjust—but as India irons out the wrinkles, it ought to realize the benefits of a unified domestic market with reduced red tape. In its November note upgrading India’s sovereign rating to Baa2 from Baa3, the first upgrade in fourteen years, Moody’s noted the implementation of GST as the first “key element” of India’s “wide-ranging program of economic and institutional reforms.” Consolidating the world’s seventh-largest economy into a single market bodes well for India’s economic growth. 4. Trump Unveils a New South Asia Strategy for Afghanistan In August, U.S. President Donald J. Trump announced the results of a long-awaited South Asia strategy review. Most notably, the administration shifted to a “conditions-based” rather than a “time-based” approach to the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, and approved a slight increase in troop numbers—but without disclosing the actual number. The administration also bluntly called for an end to the ongoing presence of terrorist groups and sanctuary for them in Pakistan. Finally, the president publicly praised India’s economic and infrastructure support to Afghanistan, and asked for more. Each of these elements represented an incremental rather than quantum change in Washington’s approach to the United States’ longest-running war. But they could nonetheless have important consequences. 5. Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port Reveals the True Costs of the Belt and Road In July, the Sri Lankan government reached an agreement with the Chinese government to essentially hand over operations of the new Hambantota port to a Chinese state-owned enterprise on a ninety-nine year lease deal that gives the Chinese 70 percent of the equity in the operating company, worth more than $1 billion. The port—built in a strategic but commercially unviable location under the terms of a loan agreement from China inked in 2007—has not been profitable, and the handover at Hambantota marked a debt-for-equity swap designed to reduce Sri Lanka’s debt to China. External observers saw the swap as a sign of what Belt and Road infrastructure development deals extract from countries in the long term. These are not freebies. They come at a significant cost to smaller economies. 6. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Is Disqualified From Office  In July, a chain of events that began with the Panama Papers (private documents of a secretive legal firm that helped hide offshore wealth, provided to a consortium of newspapers by an anonymous source) reached a political conclusion in Pakistan: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was deemed ineligible to serve in parliament as he could not be certified “honest” and “truthful” given revelations about an income source he had failed to disclose earlier. Pakistan’s Supreme Court rendered this verdict after receiving the findings of a special “Joint Investigation Team” appointed by the court and which included two members of military intelligence agencies. Sharif resigned. His departure from the top office appeared to observers as one more step toward the consolidation of power for Pakistan’s military. Just four years back, with Nawaz Sharif’s election Pakistan could rightly boast of its first successful transition of power from one elected civilian government to another—an important milestone for the country given its history of military rule. Sharif’s efforts to make peace with India, and assert civilian authority, did not succeed. Pakistanis will again head to the polls to elect another national government in 2018, so expect this storyline to remain relevant. But for now Pakistan’s democracy looks shaky as the country’s generals reassert their power over elected politicians. 7. Islamist Protestors Cow the Government of Pakistan Part two in the existential question of where Pakistan is headed involves the continued rise of Islamic extremists. In late November, after weeks of street protests in Islamabad, the government of Pakistan caved to the demands of a few thousand Islamist protestors, and the country’s law minister resigned. The Islamists had accused him of blasphemy following proposed changes (quickly reversed) to the oath of office taken in Pakistan; the Islamists also accused the minister of being a member of the persecuted Ahmadi minority faith as they viewed the proposed change to the oath as beneficial to Ahmadis. Blasphemy is an explosive charge in Pakistan—those accused of it often face vigilante violence, and the offense itself carries a potential death penalty if convicted. In the end, the army negotiated a “truce” with the protestors. The government climbdown illustrated the level of ineffectiveness of the civilian government, the more visible street power of Islamist extremists, and the army’s willingness to side with the extremists even at the cost of discrediting the Pakistani state. 8. Yogi Adityanath Becomes Chief Minister of India’s Most Populous State  In March, after India’s BJP swept state-level assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, the party’s selection for chief minister gave an indication of where they plan to pivot: to religious nationalism. Adityanath is a five-time member of parliament from Gorakhpur, where he is a monk and head of the influential Gorakhnath temple. Adityanath is also the founder of the Hindu Yuva Vahini, or “Hindu Youth Brigade,” best known for its vigilante street power, and his public oratory has featured tough talk against Muslims, India’s largest religious minority. The BJP’s election campaign in Uttar Pradesh did not project Adityanath as a potential chief minister, so his appointment came as a surprise to many. Observers see his selection as a sign that, in the absence of faster economic growth and much more robust job creation, the BJP has shifted its emphasis from the development-and-governance mantra of 2014 toward hardline Hindu nationalism.   9. Maldives Signs a Free Trade Agreement With China  In early December, the tiny island nation of the Maldives (population: 417,000) signed a free trade agreement with China, becoming the second country in South Asia after Pakistan to do so. (The Maldives’ major export is fish, which the country hopes to send more of to China, and Chinese tourists are the single largest source of visitors to Maldivian resorts.) The agreement surprised New Delhi, and has sparked yet another round of soul searching in India about its regional influence—and China’s growing visibility across the entire Indian Ocean region. (See Hambantota above, and Nepal below). 10. Communists Return to Power in Nepal Nepal held elections in late November and early December, its first under a new constitution ratified in 2015. When all the votes were counted in mid-December, it became clear that a coalition of two Communist parties (one Maoist, and the other Marxist-Leninist) would oust the centrist Nepali Congress from power. Since emerging from a violent insurgency in 2006, Nepal has had a tumultuous time politically—it has had ten prime ministers since 2008—affecting its governance and its ability to deliver services to citizens, including the still-incomplete rebuilding work from the catastrophic earthquake of 2015. The return of a Communist government in Kathmandu will likely mean a further strengthening of ties with Beijing—yet another arena for concern in New Delhi. A pro-China Communist government in Nepal will likely also be less receptive to the Tibetan refugee community living in Nepal. Alyssa Ayres is senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. Her book about India’s rise, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, will be published in January by Oxford University Press.
  • Southeast Asia
    Reflecting on Pope Francis’s Trip to Myanmar and Bangladesh
    There was no way that Pope Francis’s trip to Myanmar and Bangladesh last week was going to be uneventful. The trip came in the midst of a massive spasm of violence in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State—one that the UN’s human rights chief, many rights organizations, and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have all called ethnic cleansing. The pope has built a reputation as a defender of the poor, of the powerless, and of refugees and migrants, and so it seemed natural that, in Myanmar and Bangladesh, he would speak out on behalf of the Rohingya. Not only have over 600,000 Rohingya fled into Bangladesh since August, but conditions in the refugee camps inside Bangladesh are increasingly dire. In a recent report by the Inter-Sector Coordination Group on conditions inside Bangladesh for the Rohingya refugees, it noted that: One of the camps [where Rohingya are living] has become the largest and fastest growing refugee camp in the world, where approximately half a million people are living extremely close to each other without access to basic services such as toilets or clinics. The pope also reportedly was pressured, before the trip, by Catholic leaders in Myanmar not to openly criticize the Myanmar government’s handling of Rakhine State or even use the word Rohingya. They may have done so for fear that, if the pope did criticize the country’s military and civilian leaders for their roles in the ethnic cleansing, Catholics in Myanmar would be targeted for violence because of the pope’s words. In addition, some Catholic leaders may have feared that anything the pope did to upset Myanmar leaders could threaten relations between the Vatican and Naypyidaw; the two sides only established diplomatic relations last May. Pope Francis is politically savvy, but this was always going to be a very delicate trip. Pope Francis ultimately did not issue any open criticism of the Myanmar government, or even use the word Rohingya, until he had left Myanmar for Bangladesh to meet Rohingya refugees and discuss the crisis with Bangladesh leaders. (Myanmar military and civilian leaders refuse to even use the word “Rohingya,” as a means of denying the existence of targeting the Rohingya as supposed outsiders in Myanmar.) Amidst international criticism, the pope then defended his approach to the trip on his way back to Rome and suggested to reporters that he was frank in private with Myanmar leaders about the nature of the Rakhine crisis and their responsibility for it. He further suggested to some reporters that he did indeed use the word Rohingya in private discussions with Myanmar leaders. He may well have been frank in private. Surely, in dealing with civilian, military, and even some religious leaders in Myanmar, the pope must have faced the biggest obstacle all foreign leaders, rights activists, and diplomats address in addressing the Rakhine crisis: the vast majority of Myanmar people either seem to support the government’s approach to Rakhine or are untroubled by it. This is not a reason for outsiders, including the pope, to avoid criticism of Myanmar for the crisis in Rakhine or sanctions for leaders abetting ethnic cleansing. But, the fact that a majority of Myanmar citizens seem to support the brutal campaign that has driven as much as two-thirds of the Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh means that outsiders’ words and actions seem to be pushing most Myanmar leaders and citizens into a bunker mentality. Increasingly, Myanmar citizens seem to be supporting the Myanmar military, no matter how abusively it acts in Rakhine State. Many Rohingya already seem to accept that they have been ethnically cleansed, and have no future in Myanmar, even if Naypyidaw and Dhaka eventually forge some real agreement on repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar. (Dhaka and Naypyidaw reportedly have agreed on a memorandum of understanding about some kind of repatriation, but it is hard to imagine repatriation going forward while conditions for Rohingya inside Rakhine State are still so dire.) “The Rohingya are finished in our country,” Kyaw Min, a Rohingya man living in Yangon, told the New York Times in a story published over the weekend. “Soon we will all be dead or gone.” In addition, although Pope Francis has said that he is a strong supporter of Myanmar’s democratic transition—and there is no reason to doubt that he indeed supports the transition—his decision to go along with commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing’s demand that the pontiff meet the top general before meeting civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi is not helpful to the democratic process. (In the meeting, the general reportedly told the pope that there is “no religious discrimination” in Myanmar.) Min Aung Hlaing already has been bolstering his power, and the military’s popularity, through a series of high-profile visits to foreign countries and through the brutal campaign in Rakhine State. Getting the pope to meet him first sends another signal to the Myanmar populace that Min Aung Hlaing wields the power in Myanmar, and that foreign leaders should treat him as the country’s real ruler. To be sure, on his return to Rome, the pope indicated to reporters that he did not see his meeting with the top Myanmar general as akin to his meeting with de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he had sought out and who he actually wanted to meet. In response to a question on his plane about his meeting with the top general, the pope noted: I would distinguish between the two meetings, two types of meetings. Those meetings during which I went to meet people [i.e, with Suu Kyi] and those in which I received people. This general asked me to speak. And I received him. I never close the door. Yet, few people in Myanmar will have read this press conference transcript, while many will have read or heard about Pope Francis meeting with Min Aung Hlaing and then, only later, with Aung San Suu Kyi. The pope was his usual forthright self again with Rohingya refugees he met in Bangladesh. Again, he showed his humble, human touch by apologizing to the refugees for the “indifference of the world” to their plight and appearing to hold back tears hearing their stories.
  • Rohingya
    The World’s Fastest-Growing Humanitarian Crisis
    By now the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State has resulted in more than 625,000 Rohingya refugees fleeing into Bangladesh just since August 25. Last week, I wrote about Pope Francis’s visit to Bangladesh, and his public interaction with eighteen Rohingya refugees, which helped focus attention on their plight, if briefly. This week I want to provide a sense of how challenging the state of affairs is for the Rohingya refugees. Bangladesh has opened its border to them, and they at least have a literal place of refuge. But the scale of the influx in such a compressed period of time has overwhelmed relief agencies. As of December 3, the Inter Sector Coordination Group reports that with the new influx of refugees since August, the total number of Rohingya refugees now in Bangladesh is more than 838,000. Crowding and poor sanitation create the perfect storm for waterborne disease outbreaks. Reuters reported contamination of 60 percent of the camps’ water supply. The head of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies told Agence France-Presse in November that the risk of cholera was a “ticking bomb.” To prevent the worst, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) began a mass cholera immunization drive in October, targeting some 900,000 people. The UNICEF representative in Bangladesh called it the “second largest largest oral vaccination campaign in the world after Haiti in 2016.” The WHO indicates that the available oral cholera vaccines can provide around 65 percent protection—clearly helpful, but not an impenetrable shield. Just three weeks back, the World Food Program warned of “high malnutrition rates among Rohingya refugees.” Its news release stated that “one in four Rohingya children” are malnourished. The International Rescue Committee (IRC), in a November call to action, expressed concern that another influx of Rohingya “new arrivals” could be coming, which would push the total to more than 1 million refugees in Bangladesh. (This is already one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with more than 160 million people packed into an area roughly the size of Iowa.) The IRC termed the present situation an “unimaginable humanitarian crisis.” On top of all this, the refugees, who fled Rakhine State to escape brutal violence, remain vulnerable in the refugee camps. The International Organization for Migration has warned of “human trafficking, labor exploitation, and sexual abuse.” Children separated from their families are particularly at risk. Reports of child labor and forced child marriages are emerging. So are reports of sex trafficking and sexual slavery. Against this backdrop of human suffering, the funds needed to continue providing nutrition, better sanitation and housing, and continued health care and vigilance against infectious disease—not to mention ongoing protection and education for children—remain utterly inadequate. To date, the fundraising appeal remains just under 35 percent of its goal of $434 million.  No wonder the IRC called this the “world’s fastest growing humanitarian crisis.”  My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
  • Rohingya
    In Bangladesh, the Pope Has Balm for Rohingya Refugees But No Answers
    Earlier this week, Pope Francis visited Myanmar. During his visit there, he did not mention the word “Rohingya” publicly, despite the fact that since August 25, world attention has been focused on the Myanmar military’s ethnic cleansing of more than 600,000 Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State. That’s why, when the pope mentioned the Rohingya by name today in Bangladesh, it captured attention. Pope Francis—arriving at a cathedral in an open cycle rickshaw, totally unlike the bulletproof “popemobiles” of his predecessors—participated in an interfaith gathering in Dhaka, and then interacted with sixteen Rohingya refugees who had been brought to Dhaka from refugee camps near the border with Myanmar. As the BBC reported, Pope Francis said in a remark departing from his planned speech that “the presence of God today is also called Rohingya.” He asked for their forgiveness “in the name of all those who have persecuted you.” Recognition from the pope does help raise global awareness of the continued humanitarian catastrophe the Rohingya have experienced, but it unfortunately does very little to address the big questions about their future. With much fanfare, Bangladesh and Myanmar reached an agreement on the repatriation of the Rohingya on November 23. As my colleague Josh Kurlantzick wrote on Monday, there are some big questions to ask about how this agreement would work in practice. Specifically, Josh asks: how would repatriation occur with ongoing violence still in Rakhine State? Where would the Rohingya live in Rakhine State—would they be forced into camps? What rights would they have, if not citizenship rights? And how can their safety be guaranteed? The questions Josh poses are some big ones, and they illustrate how difficult it will be to effect an actual repatriation of any scale. Is this agreement actually implementable? Despite a relatively successful repatriation effort in the 1990s, I am personally doubtful, and would like to be proved wrong. It is entirely possible to imagine this agreement running aground if, for example, Rohingya refugees are refused entry to Rakhine based on a lack of identity documents, or they are told they will have to live in camps once again, or there is no way to guarantee their safety in the end. Meanwhile, what of the present situation and the immediate future for the Rohingya refugees? To date, the total number of Rohingya arrivals to Bangladesh since August 25 has increased to 625,000. The UN mounted a humanitarian funding appeal to support the extensive needs of such a large refugee population in Bangladesh, and the total appeal amount through February 2018 is $434 million. According to the most recently available figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, only 34.8 percent of that total has been funded so far. The financial shortfall will obviously affect the ability of aid organizations to deliver relief. And the Bangladesh government, which should be commended for its open door to the refugees in this terrible moment, has begun taking steps to move refugees from the Teknaf Peninsula to an island in the middle of the Bay of Bengal. Reuters reported that the Bangladesh government this week approved a plan to develop this island, known as Thengar Char or Bhasan Char, so refugees could be shifted there. The island, as Reuters notes, is “two hours by boat from the nearest settlement…has no roads or buildings and it regularly floods during the rough seas of the June-September rainy season.” So, despite the good news of an agreement to repatriate the Rohingya, it strikes me that bigger questions still remain about what will happen to them in the next several months. I am afraid all the mercy Pope Francis can muster will not help with the answers. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
  • Myanmar
    The Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar
    Play
    Eric Schwartz recounts his recent visit to Bangladesh and discusses what humanitarian organizations and international governments can do to address this crisis. 
  • Rohingya
    Repatriating "Verified" Rohingya—Don't Hold Your Breath
    The Bangladesh press highlighted yesterday that Myanmar once again has declared willingness to repatriate Rohingya refugees who have fled to Bangladesh—after a “verification” process. According to the Daily Star, the verification should be “in accordance to Joint Statement of April 1992,” a statement issued by the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar concerning procedures for Rohingya refugees to return to Myanmar in the 1990s. (As I wrote earlier, the exodus of Rohingya from Rakhine State during September is one more chapter in a long-running tragedy.) A copy of the original Joint Statement is available via the Forced Migration Online digital library. The central problem with the Joint Statement can be easily seen on item iv on page four, which states that Myanmar will be willing to: …repatriate in batches all persons inter-alia: carrying Myanmar Citizenship Identity Cards/National Registration Cards; those able to present any other documents issued by relevant Myanmar authorities and; all those persons able to furnish evidence of their residence in Myanmar, such as addresses or any other relevant particulars. As countless press reports illustrate, the more than 500,000 Rohingya who have fled violence in Myanmar to safety in Bangladesh over the past month—carrying whatever little they could—in all likelihood do not possess extensive formal documents. Indeed, the Daily Star goes on to note that, “If any refugee is stripped of documents prior to crossing over, as is the case common to majority of the 507,000 refugees, he or she will lose eligibility to return back to Myanmar.” Reuters, reporting from Cox’s Bazar, found Rohingya refugees “skeptical” about ever returning home. One interviewee explained, “I don’t believe the government. Every time the government agrees we can go back, then we’re there and they break their promise.” As I noted on September 20, it is true that in the late 1990s a repatriation of Rohingya refugees occurred. But thousands of Rohingya have remained officially in refugee camps and unofficially in makeshift settlements in Bangladesh. Another wave of refugees in 2012 raised the issue again, as more Rohingya escaped violence into stressed Bangladesh without any clear future. In 2014, Human Rights Watch and others raised concerns about the Myanmar government’s process for “citizenship assessment” of the Rohingya. The census carried out by the Myanmar government in 2014 did not allow Rohingya to identify themselves as Rohingya. Denied citizenship in Myanmar, chased out by violence that UN representatives have termed “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and that “may amount to crimes against humanity,” and with Bangladesh overwhelmed and unwilling to offer a pathway to permanent residency, the next question central to this humanitarian crisis will be how to find a future for the refugees. Where will they go? Bangladeshi authorities have developed a plan to resettle some Rohingya on an island in the Bay of Bengal. The island, named Thengar Char or Bhasan Char, is subject to regular flooding, the vagaries of monsoons, and unclear effects of climate change. It’s hardly a viable solution for hundreds of thousands of the world’s most vulnerable people. And it’s worth noting as well that over in India, a case before the Supreme Court concerns whether 40,000 Rohingya refugees already in India should be deported. The Indian government has said they are “illegals” and should return to Myanmar. That the Donald J. Trump administration proposes to cut by around half the number of refugees the United States will accept does not help, and sets a poor example at a time when the question of refugee resettlement has become a global humanitarian emergency. For the moment, Bangladesh should not have to bear the burden of this crisis without greater support. The United Nations issued an urgent fundraising appeal yesterday for a Humanitarian Response Plan, for an overarching amount of $434 million to cover shelter, food, relief sites, water and sanitation, health, education, logistics, and other emergency operations through February 2018. The amount reflects efforts underway by several UN agencies as well as national and international relief organizations working in Bangladesh. Bangladesh needs the help. The Myanmar government’s signals about allowing “verified” Rohingya to return to their homes seem unlikely to help more than a few refugees, based on recent patterns. It will take concerted political negotiation after the emergency phase ends to resolve the question of what comes next for the Rohingya. But don’t hold your breath for a solution from Myanmar. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
  • Rohingya
    Bangladesh: Poor, Stressed, but Last Place of Refuge for Rohingya
    Although the tragedy of the Rohingya people has been unfolding for decades, the latest exodus of refugees to Bangladesh, fleeing violence in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, has become front-page news due to the sheer scale of the trauma. The UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM) puts the figure at 415,000 Rohingya who have fled their homes for Bangladesh in just the past three weeks. While struggling with its own development needs, Bangladesh is providing the last place of refuge for a stateless people often called “the most persecuted minority” in the world. To put the past month’s developments into historical perspective, Bangladesh—in the southernmost tip of the country, south of a port city named Cox’s Bazaar—began hosting Rohingya refugees in the 1970s. The first wave of around 200,000 refugees came in 1978. A second wave of around 250,000 fled Myanmar for Bangladesh in 1991–92. Although the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and international aid groups provided assistance for the refugees, Bangladesh long sought for the refugees to repatriate to Myanmar, rather than become permanent residents. A repatriation phase in the late 1990s saw some 230,000 Rohingya return to Myanmar. But in the summer of 2012, renewed religious violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine state resulted in another influx to Bangladesh. Some Rohingya also attempted to reach Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand that summer, tragically, by boat. Bangladesh is a poor country by any measure. Using International Monetary Fund gross domestic product per capita data (purchasing power parity), it ranks among the poorest fifty countries in the world, illustrated by this chart. For this reason, Dhaka for years feared that the existence of refugee camps and settlements served as a “pull factor,” bringing more Rohingya to already-stressed Bangladesh. In the summer of 2012, Bangladesh prohibited three international aid organizations from assisting Rohingya who were not officially registered as refugees. In other words, Bangladesh has not always been a welcoming host. The problem has always been that however bad conditions may be in Bangladeshi refugee camps or makeshift settlements, the Rohingya are running from worse, often forced to leave whatever they possess behind, likely forever, and trudge for miles through mud and across a river to reach refuge in Bangladesh. That’s the backdrop for the events since August 25. According to the latest figures tracked by the Inter-Sector Coordination Group (a coalition of humanitarian agencies assisting with Rohingya relief in the Cox's Bazar area), a total of more than 197,000 “undocumented Myanmar nationals” had been resident in refugee camps, “makeshift settlements,” and “host communities” in this region of Bangladesh prior to August 25, 2017. Since that date, more than 420,000 have arrived in these same refugee camps, makeshift settlements, and host communities—with at least six new “spontaneous settlements” now housing more than 200,000 of this enormous population now totaling nearly 620,000. It is a tripling of the total number of refugees now in Bangladesh in under one month, all of whom need emergency medical attention and basic sustenance. Yesterday, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina gave an interview to Al Jazeera in which she said, “We have 160 million people in a small geographical land. But if we can feed 160 million people, another 500 or 700,000 people—we can do it.” But she has also clearly called for Myanmar to take back the Rohingya, consistent with Bangladesh’s longstanding position. As this tragedy continues, short of a sea change in Myanmar’s willingness to accept the Rohingya as their own citizens, the situation is unlikely to improve. That will mean continued existence as refugees, with the great bulk of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. And the refugees will continue to need international assistance to meet the most basic medical care and food security needs. The IOM just issued a fundraising appeal for $26 million to cover the coming three months. This crisis can only be solved through a political solution. But one appears nowhere in sight. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    Trump to Cut Foreign Aid Budgets, Opening South and Central Asia's Door to Chinese Influence
    It looks like U.S. President Donald J. Trump's plan to reduce the foreign aid budget will come at a cost to his administration's other aims in South and Central Asia. Some of the cuts come as no surprise as they target programs, like climate change, that the president came into office determined to roll back. But others will undermine stated administration priorities, such as regional counterterrorism and cooperation with India. The proposed budget will end funding completely for four strategically located countries in this region, and shrink health funding by half region-wide. The proposed budget will also eliminate two categories of aid, one known as Development Assistance and one called Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA), instead using the Economic Support Fund (ESF) category as a preferred vehicle for the countries in which U.S. aid will continue. As Foreign Policy noted in its initial assessment of the changes, the shift toward ESF has caused concern that Trump will be “more interested in using foreign assistance to achieve short-term political objectives than his predecessors” since this category of foreign aid has often been less-linked to actual development outcomes. Still, a closer examination of the proposed fiscal year 2018 (FY18) assistance levels for the countries of South and Central Asia, based on the FY18 Control Levels document obtained by Foreign Policy, shows that these proposed changes could paradoxically undermine the United States’ ability to shape objectives in the region. Moreover, at a time of massive Chinese assistance flooding the region, savings achieved through scrounging comparatively small levels of assistance will leave Washington with a shrunken profile and a shallower footprint. Impact on Central Asia In Central Asia, the proposed budget will change the category through which assistance flows by ending the AEECA budgets entirely for all five countries. In and of itself, the end of the AEECA account is not necessarily a problem. This legacy assistance account covers post-Cold War assistance to Eastern Europe and Eurasia (and appears slated to end for all the European countries as well.) As the Center for Global Development noted back in 2012, in many ways these programs have “outlived their purpose.” It is also challenging to manage the overall picture of U.S. foreign assistance with such a kaleidoscope of different funding sources, so consolidation could make U.S. foreign aid easier to administer. The Barack Obama administration, incidentally, proposed to end this category during FY13. But what will happen instead? Aid to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will end, full stop. Kazakhstan, an upper middle-income country according to World Bank data, was receiving limited U.S. aid, on the order of $6 million. Turkmenistan, also an upper middle-income country with an authoritarian leader—a place the Guardian recently called the world’s second-most isolated state after North Korea—will see the closure of its miniscule $3.9 million aid package. Assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan will continue—but under the ESF account, and with smaller budgets shrunk by about half. Assistance to Uzbekistan will increase slightly. Consider the Tradeoffs It’s worth thinking about the tradeoffs here in ceasing and shrinking these relatively small programs in Central Asia. As Nisha Desai Biswal—who served as assistant administrator for Asia at the U.S. Agency for International Development before becoming assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia during the Obama administration—puts it, “limited foreign assistance is playing a crucial role.” She notes that across Central Asia, U.S. aid is focused on “priorities like combatting terrorism, promoting economic connectivity and advancing human rights and democratic governance.” Promoting democracy and human rights are longstanding U.S. priorities. Economic connectivity across Central Asia with linkages to Afghanistan, of course, will offer long-term stability for the Afghan economy, something that has been and should continue to be a strategic priority for the United States. Putting the U.S. on the Back Foot At a strategic level, the reduction in funds across all of Central Asia will put the United States on the back foot at a time when China is rapidly increasing its assistance across the region—by orders of magnitude greater than the United States, and for visible infrastructure projects. China’s One Belt, One Road initiative has delivered new train lines that run through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and roads to China via the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. In plain terms, China is eating our lunch when it comes to assistance outreach across Central Asia. Those small projects carried out with each have kept Washington in the game, and kept doors open in these countries with which U.S. ties have not always been smooth. Cuts to Health Funding South Asia is less prosperous than Central Asia, much more populous, and facing an array of development challenges from agriculture to health to economic reform to democracy and governance. U.S. assistance has played an important role in this region over the decades, including in the health field, where American aid has helped deliver innovations like oral rehydration salts to combat cholera. The Trump budget axes global health funding across the board. Because health aid programs are more extensive to begin with in South Asia, major cuts bring a disproportionate loss. (In Central Asia, by contrast, health programs were only in three countries and at levels no higher than $7.7 million in any of them.) In South Asia the global health funding in previous years has been in the tens of millions—in FY16, $79 million for Bangladesh, $53 million for India, $41 million for Nepal, and $22 million for Pakistan. The Trump budget slashes each of these by around half. Global health cuts in this region, unfortunately, will affect the ability to support work combating pandemics, improving maternal and child health, improving nutrition, fighting tuberculosis, fighting HIV/AIDS, and supporting reproductive health and family planning—all challenges at scale in South Asia. Sadly, the cuts to the global health account do not come as a surprise. The Global Health Initiative was a signature foreign assistance priority of the Obama administration—in fact, it was called a “presidential initiative”—and the cuts are in keeping with President Trump’s desire to undo many of the Obama administration’s undertakings. No Assistance for the Maldives or Sri Lanka The Trump budget will end assistance completely to Maldives and Sri Lanka. The Maldives is an upper middle-income country facing challenges to democracy as well as rising extremism among its 100 percent Sunni Muslim population—a blogger was just killed in cold blood. As a nation comprised of islands in the Indian Ocean, it also faces a threat to its existence from rising sea levels. Its tiny $2 million U.S. assistance budget is slated to close. Aid to Maldives for the past several years had addressed peace and security along with climate. The Trump administration’s opposition to climate change funding is well-known, however misguided, but eliminating such a small amount of assistance in the peace and security category for a nation facing the threat of extremism does not align with the administration’s own counterterrorism priority. Indeed, Biswal observes that ending the limited funding to Maldives will “undermine our own security” since it will cut the counterterrorism programs our assistance supported. Sri Lanka, a lower middle-income country that emerged from a thirty-year-long brutal internal conflict only in 2009, with a relatively new government that displaced its earlier strongman in a surprise election result in 2015, will see the end of its $38 million aid package, which had focused in previous years on democracy, human rights, and governance; peace and security; and economic development. Like the countries of Central Asia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives both lie in a geostrategically important location: the Indian Ocean. As China seeks to expand its reach and influence across the Indian Ocean, it has increased its assistance relationships with each, and has become a major diplomatic and economic partner to both. Losing Out on a Collaboration with India India, with more than a billion people, already had relatively small assistance levels given its scale. The preponderance of aid to India supports health programs, 65 percent of the FY17 $76 million budget, for example. It’s worth noting here that between FY12 and FY13, assistance to India dropped from levels of over $100 million down to around $80 million. The proposed Trump aid budget will entirely end the categories of Development Assistance as well as ESF for India, leaving only support for health programs at half of their prior levels. This means that the Trump administration plans for U.S. assistance to India to continue solely in the health field. The tradeoff here will be significant: in recent years, in light of India’s rapid economic growth and its emergence as a major donor itself, U.S. foreign aid budgets had been designed to provide a basis for which Washington and New Delhi could partner, such as with shared innovation initiatives, or shared development projects with third countries. Biswal comments that India has become a “development lab” with innovative approaches to corporate social responsibility and impact investing, and the loss of the funding lines that had enabled U.S.-India development cooperation will “close ourselves to the collaboration and the learning that is going on there.” Support Preserved for Bangladesh In Bangladesh, $91 million aid from the Development Assistance account will end, but the ESF account will go from zero to $95 million. This fortunately preserves a substantial line of support in a country that is economically oriented (now the second-largest ready-made garment exporter in the world, after China), and struggling to counter terrorism. The shift here to an ESF emphasis will be positive for many U.S. priorities with Bangladesh. But it will likely also, as Biswal explained to me, reduce the type of programming that has produced such positive outcomes in Bangladesh through traditional development programs addressing education, health, and food security—a “crucial vector for stability” at a time when Bangladesh, too, confronts threats from extremism and terrorism. And Nepal, with thirty million people and a per capita income nearly the lowest in the region (only Afghanistan is poorer), will see a reduction of more than half of its ESF and its health budgets. This is hard to explain, especially in light of the country’s slow and long-delayed reconstruction following the devastation of the 2015 earthquake, as well as its ongoing governance problems for which U.S. assistance can provide helpful training. The country’s fledgling democracy, the result of a long process that developed a new constitution following a bloody Maoist insurgency, needs help with the basics of democratic governance. To what extent the Trump administration will continue such programs under greatly reduced budgets remains unknown. The special cases of Afghanistan and Pakistan Afghanistan and Pakistan represent special cases in the region given the ongoing war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s close involvement. Both have large ESF budgets, especially compared to the rest of the region, and the proposed budget does not subject either to account shifts. Afghanistan will see a 20 percent reduction to its ESF, slated for $650 million, and Pakistan’s will stay stable at $200 million. (Security assistance figures are not part of the FY18 Control Levels document.) At the moment it is hard to assess how the specific reduction in ESF to Afghanistan will affect U.S. efforts there, beyond noting that as the poorest country in the region and one in the midst of a war, every dollar going toward a stronger and more resilient economy helps build a source of stability for the country. Making cuts there before the completion of the administration’s military strategy review seems strange, as any overall strategy requires military, diplomatic, and development components to work in tandem. Misalignment of Priorities The larger message the Trump assistance budget signals appears to be that Washington plans to reduce the kinds of foreign aid that have underwritten a focus on U.S. values like democracy, governance, and human rights. We will back ourselves out of influence in Central Asia just as China is investing in roads and trains at a furious pace; we will curtail support to strategically located Maldives and Sri Lanka at a time we should be focused on specific counterterrorism and governance objectives there; we will close the funding support for collaboration with rising power India on development innovation; we will shift emphasis in Bangladesh with unclear impact on the highly successful programs on education, food security, and others; we will cut by half our assistance to troubled Nepal, the second-poorest country across South and Central Asia; and we will shrink our ability to promote sustainable economic activity in Afghanistan even before the larger strategy review for U.S. involvement there has been concluded. When administrations change, policies do as well—but these changes don’t even appear to align with Trump administration priorities. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook or Instagram. My book on India's rise, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, is forthcoming from Oxford University Press. This post originally appeared on Forbes.com.  
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Bangladesh and Global Terror
    News continues to emerge about the terrorist threat in Bangladesh, a majority-Muslim country of 160 million, and it is alarming for two reasons: one, the apparent international dimension, more significant than previously imagined, and two, the profile of the terrorists themselves. Ever since the pace of targeted assassinations began a slow crescendo in 2015, with the murders of foreign aid workers last fall claimed by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), the Bangladeshi government has continually denied that IS has a toehold in the country. With the July 1 siege of the Holey Artisan bakery café—in the heart of one of Dhaka’s best-protected neighborhoods—IS-linked media released images of the attack in real time, almost serving as a broadcast link for the terrorists. IS-linked media later released photos of the Bangladeshi attackers posing, smiling before IS flags, in the hours before they began their assault. Whether the terrorists had direction from IS leaders in Iraq or Syria, or whether they self-affiliated to adopt a global jihad persona for whatever reason, the linkage has been made. But the Bangladesh government continues to focus on terrorism as a domestic problem. Bangladesh certainly has homegrown terrorist groups to worry about, such as the Jama’at ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) or the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), but there’s no reason these groups cannot be both Bangladeshi and establish ties with global jihadists at the same time. The JMB is widely seen as an IS affiliate, and the ABT as having al Qaeda links. Indeed, international reporting continues to uncover links to global terrorism that should give the Bangladeshi government pause. The latest expose from the New York Times’s terrorism reporter Rukmini Callimachi detailed a secretive cell within IS that focused on developing “a global network of killers” for the group’s jihad in a few select countries, including, unfortunately Bangladesh. It is a chilling must-read. The former IS operative interviewed described a purposeful  strategy to prepare “a global portfolio of terrorists…to fill holes in their international network,” and most jarringly, recalled efforts “to build an infrastructure in Bangladesh.” It appears they have made quite a start. The second alarming aspect of recent terrorism in Bangladesh concerns the profiles of the terrorists themselves. All but one of the Holey Artisan attackers, as was well-documented shortly after the siege, turned out to be from privileged backgrounds and had attended college. One had studied in Malaysia. Following the attack, Bangladeshi police announced their interest in a suspect missing from his professorship in Japan; the Bangladesh-born professor had first studied and then taught business in Kyoto, but had been missing in January, and might have been a facilitator for international terrorist groups. At the end of July, a raid on a hideout in Dhaka resulted in the death of nine suspected terrorists—including a young U.S. citizen, who had been pursuing an MBA at Dhaka’s North South University. On July 30, the Bangladeshi police named a Bangladeshi-Canadian as the “mastermind” of the Dhaka attack. Newspaper reports have described this suspect as a JMB member and an IS member, or the link between both. On August 4, Bangladeshi authorities announced that they had arrested two men, one a UK citizen, and the other a Bangladeshi citizen who was studying at the University of Toronto, on suspicion of involvement in the July 1 attack. (The two had been taken hostage in the Holey Artisan siege, but following the release of the hostages by police, had remained missing. With the news of their arrest, it seemed likely that they had been in detention all this time—a concern human rights groups have raised.) Putting this all together, these twin strands suggest that much more investigative focus should be placed on the international ties to terror in Bangladesh, both to better understand how global influences link back to Bangladeshi groups, but also to try to disrupt networks as and where they form. Compared to many other troubled countries, Bangladesh had done a fairly successful job fighting terrorism over the past decade. But as events of the past two years illustrate, the nature of the challenge has shifted. Bangladesh has been such a promising country, one that just six years ago was touted by investment banks as a “next emerging market” or a “next 11” given its growth rates and positive development achievements. It would be a tragedy to see that potential squandered. Follow me on Twitter @AyresAlyssa or like me on Facebook: fb.me/ayresalyssa
  • Bangladesh
    The Struggle Over Bangladesh’s Future
    The recent rise in Islamist violence in Bangladesh is caught up in a polarizing political debate over the country’s identity.
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of June 3, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. China releases ambitious plan to clean up polluted soil. In 2014, the Chinese government disclosed that approximately 20 percent of its arable land was contaminated, primarily with heavy metals and agricultural chemicals from industry and farming. This Tuesday, the central government released a long-awaited action plan as a first major step to control and remedy the widespread problem, known as the last of the “three big campaigns” in Chinese environmental protection along with air and water pollution. The plan aims to stabilize and improve soil quality so that 90 percent of contaminated sites are safe for use by 2020, and 95 percent by 2030. It also includes provisions for improving the transparency of soil quality data and emphasizes more severe penalties for polluters. One Greenpeace expert praised the proposal as “pragmatic,” in that it would take steps to ensure that soil pollution would not “lead to major problems” for the millions affected. Since the cost of cleaning up all of China’s polluted soil will top $1 trillion, the plan may prove to be a lucrative opportunity for companies offering soil remediation services in the coming years. 2. Malaysia’s hudud law sparks controversy. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak backed a bill originally put forth by the Parti Islam se-Malaysia to strengthen Islamic courts and introduce hudud, a system of punishment under Islamic law. The punishments included under hudud can be severe including stoning and amputation, although the prime minster said that Malaysia will not permit anything that will draw blood or cause injury. While the new punishments would apply just in the nation’s syariah courts, which are only for Muslims, the proposal has nonetheless launched considerable debate. Members of parties such as the Malaysian Indian Congress have said the bill violates Malaysia’s constitution and notions of a secular government. Additionally, two non-Muslim ministers in the cabinet, Liow Tiong Lai and Mah Siew Keong, announced they will resign if the bill passes after debate in October. Two east Malaysian states, Sarawak and Sabah, have also threatened to split with the rest of the country over the bill. Some speculate that the prime minister, who is tainted by the 1MDB corruption scandal, views the bill as a way to firm up support among Muslim voters before upcoming by-elections. A proposal that is already sowing discord among members of the ruling coalition and that threatens to inflame ethnic tension hardly seems like the path to success though. 3. Death of environmentalist sparks reflection on police brutality in China. Beijing city authorities are investigating the death of a young environmental official in police custody last month. The man, Lei Yang, was arrested by plainclothes police outside of a Beijing massage parlor on the evening of May 7 on suspicion of soliciting prostitutes. Less than an hour later, police took him to a hospital, claiming he had suffered a heart attack and died. The story is disputed by Lei’s family and friends, who say there is no history of heart disease in his family, claim he was on his way to the airport to receive relatives, and question why police took several hours to notify his family of his death and deleted messages from his phone. In response to these claims, police took to the press, trying to clarify their story, only to have public opinion flare up in anger against them after netizens began questioning inconsistencies in the official report of the incident. The debate over Lei’s death has raised questions about how commonly individuals die in police custody in China and if this incident would have gotten a full investigation if Lei had not been young, a new father, and a graduate of one of China’s best universities. 4. Number of internally displaced Afghans on the rise. Amnesty International reported on Tuesday at a press conference in Kabul that the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Afghanistan has doubled since 2013 to roughly 1.2 million.  Despite the fact that these are people living in camps lacking sufficient health, food, or water facilities, the financial resources allocated to the fifteen-year crisis are at their lowest point since 2009. The United Nations requested $393 million in humanitarian funding for 2016, but, as of May, has only been able to raise a quarter of this request. The majority of civilians have fled their communities in recent years due to a flagging economy with only 1.9 percent growth and continuing violence carried out by the Taliban. In fact, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan has said that 2015 “was the most dangerous year on record for civilians since 2009” with at least eleven thousand casualties, one-fourth of whom were children. Although the Afghan government endorsed the "National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons" in 2014, corruption-ridden institutions and a state lacking capacity and expertise have been unable to deliver on promises made to IDPs and forced evictions are a daily threat. 5. Bangladesh conducts first census of Rohingya. The census, which began this week, will not only allow the Bangladeshi government to gain a more accurate count of how many Rohingya  live both inside and outside of refugee camps, but will also give greater insight into the group’s economic circumstances. Estimates of the number of Rohingya in the country range from three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand. A significant number of Rohingya began fleeing from Myanmar to Bangladesh beginning in 2012, and have continued with renewed cycles of violence. While Myanmar agreed to repatriate 2,415 people from Bangladesh in 2014, this has not yet occurred. Some expressed concern that the current census, conducted with assistance from the International Organization for Migration, would serve as preparation to deport Rohingya from Bangladesh. Censuses have proved difficult for the Rohingya in the past; during the 2014 census in Myanmar, the government did not allow individuals to identify as Rohingya and said they should register as Bengali instead. Bonus: North Korea says “Vote Trump, not that dull Hilary.” Presumptive Republican nominee Donald Trump’s latest endorsement came from a surprising source: North Korea. Two weeks after Trump’s speech, during which he declared he would have “no problem speaking to [Kim Jong-un],” a North Korean state media published an op-ed praising Trump as a wise and far-sighted presidential candidate. This is not the first time Trump has expressed unconventional ideas related to U.S. foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula. In a previous interview, Trump stated that he would be willing to withdraw U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea unless they pay more for U.S. military presence. He also suggested that it might not “be a bad thing for [the United States]” for Japan to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Though a senior North Korean official has called Trump’s willingness to engage with Kim merely an insincere gesture for the presidential election, U.S. allies are increasingly worried about Trump’s “America first” agenda.