Asia

Afghanistan

Afghanistan
America’s Withdrawal of Choice

Article by Richard Haass

The swift fall of Kabul recalls the ignominious fall of Saigon in 1975. Beyond the local consequences—widespread reprisals, harsh repression of women and girls, and massive refugee flows—America’s strategic and moral failure in Afghanistan will reinforce questions about US reliability among friends and foes alike.
Aug 15, 2021
The swift fall of Kabul recalls the ignominious fall of Saigon in 1975. Beyond the local consequences—widespread reprisals, harsh repression of women and girls, and massive refugee flows—America’s strategic and moral failure in Afghanistan will reinforce questions about US reliability among friends and foes alike.
Aug 15, 2021
Global Conflict Tracker: War in Afghanistan
Afghan forces continue to face significant challenges in holding territory and defending population centers, while the Taliban continues to contest districts and carry out suicide attacks in major cities.

by Center for Preventive Action Aug 18, 2021

The U.S. War in Afghanistan
The Taliban surged back to power two decades after U.S.-led forces toppled their regime in what led to the United States’ longest war.

Timeline by Zachary Laub and Lindsay Maizland Sep 27, 2022

The Taliban in Afghanistan
The Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, twenty years after their ouster by U.S. troops. Under their harsh rule, they have cracked down on women’s rights and neglected basic services.

Backgrounder by Lindsay Maizland Jan 19, 2023

  • Americas
    This Week in Markets and Democracy: Study on Factory Labor, Thai Anticorruption Court, Afghanistan Aid
    Why Trade Deals Matter for Workers Everywhere The shift of low-skilled manufacturing jobs from industrialized to emerging economies helped lift millions out of poverty over the past few decades (even as it displaced Western workers). But a new study of Ethiopia’s growing manufacturing sector shows that while factory jobs raise wages throughout the economy, the benefits for workers are mixed. Compared to a control group of self-employed and informal sector workers, those employed in the new factories did not earn more and faced significantly higher health and safety risks—exposed to chemicals and injuries from unsafe working conditions. These findings show why trade agreements matter. By incorporating labor and environmental standards and mechanisms to enforce these rules, they can improve the livelihood of workers in all places. Thailand Opens Anticorruption Court Inaugurating a new anticorruption court on Monday, Thailand’s junta leader, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, reaffirmed his promise to eradicate corruption over the next twenty years. Yet studies show that separate anticorruption courts are not always effective. These bodies often suffer from the same limits as regular courts, including lack of judicial independence, few qualified staff, and long backlogs. And specialized or not, prosecutors or judges are often reluctant to go after elites, leading mostly to convictions of low-level officials. More important for rooting out corruption are making government procurement more transparent, and partnering with international organizations that have the resources and clout to tackle large-scale grand corruption. Despite Corruption, Afghan Government Asks for More Aid The deep-seated corruption plaguing Afghanistan overshadows the Ashraf Ghani government’s recent appeal to the United States and other donors for fresh funds. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), a U.S. watchdog agency, estimates that billions of aid dollars have disappeared over the past fifteen years. The United States contributed to this graft by failing to monitor how donations were spent, funding NGOs and contractors that accepted bribes and pocketed funds. This time, the U.S. government says it will make assistance dependent on anticorruption reforms. President Ghani claims his administration has already taken steps to root out graft—Ghani himself became the first senior official to comply with a U.S.-backed effort to disclose public officials’ assets, and his administration has fired hundreds of judges and prosecutors, many on corruption charges.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil October 7, 2016 Development Channel
  • Global
    The World Next Week: Afghanistan's Political Deadline, a U.S. Presidential Debate, Driverless Cars Move Forward, and More
    Podcast
    Afghanistan's power-sharing agreement expires, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump debate, and U.S. regulations on semi-autonomous and driverless vehicles move forward. 
    Podcast with James M. Lindsay and Robert McMahon September 23, 2016 The World Next Week
  • Afghanistan
    Afghanistan at an Inflection Point
    Afghanistan’s unity government has made progress on reform but remains dogged by endemic corruption and a resilient insurgency.
    Interview with Christopher D. Kolenda and Zachary Laub September 22, 2016
  • Afghanistan
    A Conversation With Salahuddin Rabbani
    Play
    Salahuddin Rabbani discusses the challenges and opportunities facing Afghanistan's national unity government.
    Event with Salahuddin Rabbani and Mary McInnis Boies September 20, 2016
  • Afghanistan
    Guest Post: Preventing a Strategic Reversal in Afghanistan
    Jared Wright is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. President Barack Obama’s recent announcement that 8,400 U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan at the end of his administration, nearly 3,000 more troops than his previous timeline, reflects the tenuous stability that Afghanistan has achieved after nearly fifteen years of U.S. involvement. A resurgent Taliban and the appearance of self-proclaimed Islamic State forces have tested the ability of the increasingly fragile central government to provide security and political stability and demonstrated the limits of U.S. training and support. Meanwhile, economic and political frustrations across all levels of Afghan society have gone largely unaddressed by the National Unity Government (NUG). The security situation in Afghanistan could worsen, which would threaten U.S. interests in the region. A new Contingency Planning Memorandum released by the Center for Preventive Action, “Strategic Reversal in Afghanistan,” assesses the growing risks of strategic reversals in Afghanistan. Author Seth G. Jones, Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND, recommends steps the United States can take to mitigate or prevent such risks. The report highlights the shortcomings of the NUG and the challenges that the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police—which both face rising attrition rates, low morale, and a climbing death toll—are forced to confront in providing for Afghanistan’s security. Jones identifies two principle contingencies to watch over the next twelve to eighteen months: the collapse of the NUG—which is plagued by widespread corruption, deteriorating economic conditions, and competition among Afghan elites—and major gains in urban areas by the Taliban, who now control more territory than at any other point since December 2001. Both outcomes are not mutually exclusive, as one contingency would ultimately magnify the potential for the other. U.S. interests would be harmed if either contingency happens. U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are clear: to target al-Qaeda and other extremist elements in order to prevent future attacks against the United States, and to enable Afghan forces to provide security for the country. A government collapse or the seizure of one or more major cities by the Taliban would severely diminish the likelihood of achieving either objective, while simultaneously rolling back gains made over the last decade. These contingencies could also lead to an increase in extremist groups operating in Afghanistan; introduce regional instability involving India, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia; and possibly signal to other countries that the United States is not a reliable ally, further complicating regional power dynamics. To prevent these contingencies from occurring, Jones recommends the United States leverage its relationship with Afghanistan, focusing on building greater political consensus, encouraging regional powers to support Kabul, pursuing reconciliation with the Taliban, and strengthening Afghan security forces so that they can manage internal security challenges with limited outside involvement. To achieve those aims, the U.S. should:                           Focus diplomatic efforts on resolving acute political challenges, prioritizing electoral reforms and building consensus between the Afghan government and political elites. Address economic grievances that could undermine the political legitimacy of the government. Sustain the current number and type of U.S. military forces through the end of the Obama administration. Decrease constraints on U.S. forces in Afghanistan and grant the military authority to strike the Taliban and Haqqani network. Sustain U.S. support for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.   For a more in-depth analysis on how the situation in Afghanistan might result in a strategic reversal and what the United States can do to prevent that from happening or mitigate the consequences, read “Strategic Reversal in Afghanistan.”
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Micah Zenko July 8, 2016 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
  • Afghanistan
    Strategic Reversal in Afghanistan
    Introduction Since 2001, the United States and its international partners have expended substantial resources to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan. Recent developments, however, indicate that progress toward these strategic goals is slipping. The Taliban has seized swaths of rural Afghanistan in such provinces as Helmand, Uruzgan, Nangarhar, and Kunduz. Over the past year, Taliban forces have also conducted several offensives against district and provincial capitals. In September 2015, for example, the northern city of Kunduz temporarily fell to the Taliban before being retaken by government forces. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the National Unity Government continues to be undermined by poor governance and internal friction between President Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah, and their supporters. A significant worsening of the political and security situations in Afghanistan over the next twelve to eighteen months is therefore plausible. More specifically, there is a growing risk that the current National Unity Government in Kabul could collapse because of a defection by Abdullah, a severe economic crisis, the establishment of a parallel government, or a coup d’état. There is also a growing possibility that the Taliban could gain substantial territory in one or more cities. These contingencies would amount to a strategic reversal for the United States, since Washington was instrumental in helping create the National Unity Government in 2014. These developments would also likely increase the presence of Islamic extremist groups, including al-Qaeda, and intensify security competition between such regional powers as nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The Contingencies The two most concerning contingencies in the next twelve to eighteen months—the collapse of the Afghan government and major battlefield gains by the Taliban—are not mutually exclusive. The former could have a significant impact on the operational effectiveness of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, while a successful offensive by the Taliban could weaken an already fragile government. Both could lead to a significant contraction of government control in Afghanistan. The National Unity Government collapses. Significant problems continue to plague the National Unity Government: poor governance, deteriorating economic conditions, widespread corruption, disagreements over reconciliation with the Taliban, and competition for power among political elites. President Ghani has clashed with the Afghan Parliament on numerous issues and failed to secure appointments for some critical positions, such as the minister of defense. Several major political issues also remain unresolved. The political agreement brokered by the United States that created the National Unity Government required the Afghan government to hold parliamentary and district council elections. Yet the elections are likely to be postponed at least until 2017. The agreement also stipulated that Afghanistan convene a grand assembly of elders, or a loya jirga, from across the country to amend the Afghan Constitution and formally establish the position of prime minister. But Afghan political elites disagree about the timing of the elections and electoral reform. Some elites argue that the current election commission lacks legitimacy because of its flawed handling of the 2014 elections. They contend that elections cannot be held until the election process and the Independent Election Commission are reformed. These and other disagreements could trigger a collapse of the National Unity Government. Such a contingency would seriously weaken the long-standing effort to build a functioning Afghan government, undercut the loyalty and cohesion of Afghan national and local forces, and provide an opportunity for the Taliban and various warlords to seize important areas of the country. During the early 1990s, for example, the collapse of Mohammad Najibullah’s government contributed to a substantial proliferation of well-armed militia forces. The collapse of the government could happen in one of several ways, with some possibilities more likely than others. One is that Abdullah quits as CEO and Ghani fails to quickly appoint a successor, plunging Kabul into political paralysis. This possibility could trigger widespread discontent, protests, and the defection of important government allies. Several aggrieved national, provincial, and district officials, like Balkh Governor Atta Muhammad Nur, have been publicly critical of Ghani but unwilling to leave their posts. A second possibility would be a severe deterioration of the government’s legitimacy due to economic troubles—such as skyrocketing unemployment or a prolonged energy crisis—that trigger mass protests. Grievances already exist among the Afghan population. According to a 2015 Asia Foundation poll, 57 percent of Afghans said their country was moving in the wrong direction, citing insecurity, unemployment, corruption, bad government, and other factors. A third possibility would be a decision by several powerful Afghan elites to form a parallel government or, alternatively, to hold a loya jirga that chooses other leaders. In 2014, some Afghan elites, including some supporters of Abdullah, threatened to form a parallel government rather than accept one led by President Ghani. Many Afghan political elites—including former President Hamid Karzai, parliament member Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, former National Directorate of Security chief Amrullah Saleh, and former Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan Mohammad Omar Daudzai—have been deeply critical of the government. A fourth possibility would be a coup d’état led by powerful political elites, with some support from within the government. The Taliban take control of one or more major cities. Although the Taliban has failed to capture and hold a major urban area, that could change over the next twelve to eighteen months. The Taliban has already threatened several urban centers. Before the September 2015 Taliban blitzkrieg into Kunduz city, which freed hundreds of prisoners—including many of the Taliban’s own fighters—from the main prison, the Taliban had earlier attacked the Chara Dara district in Kunduz in May 2015 and seized it from government forces. In June 2015, the Taliban took over Dasht Archi district in Kunduz, recruiting supporters, collecting taxes, training forces, and planning military expansion. The Taliban used bases in these districts and other locations as staging areas to position fighters, weapons, and other material for the eventual push into Kunduz. The death in May 2016 of Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and replacement by Haibatullah Akhundzada is unlikely to substantially alter Taliban military strategy, operations, or tactics in the short term. Based on current Taliban strategy and operations, several provincial capitals, such as Lashkar Gah, Pul-e Khumri, Qalat, and even Kunduz, are suitable for a military offensive. Other possibilities include Farah, Maimanah, Asadabad, and Ghazni. The Taliban has already threatened—or tried to threaten—many of these provincial capitals by attacking static positions in outlying areas, attempting to cut off lines of communication, and conducting assassinations and improvised explosive device attacks. The Taliban also controls several districts around such cities as Laskhar Gah and Kunduz, increasing the possibility of an offensive. While Taliban control of one city would be challenging, a simultaneous Taliban offensive against several urban areas, including provincial capitals, could overwhelm Afghan security forces and government leaders. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are already overextended and many units suffer from poor logistics, inconsistent battlefield leadership, and a shortage of combat “enablers” like air support. Some units, such as the Afghan National Army’s 215th Corps based in Helmand Province, have struggled to clear and hold territory in areas such as Sangin District. To compound these challenges, the Afghan National Security Council could be paralyzed as it was during the early stages of the Kunduz crisis, and fail to respond quickly with a clear, unified plan. Multiple Taliban offensives under “Operation Omari,” which the Taliban campaign announced in April 2016, would compound these problems. Warning Indicators Several indicators would suggest an increase in the likelihood of these contingencies. They can be divided into two sections, one for each contingency. The following warning indicators might signal a growing possibility of a National Unity Government collapse:  Public threats by Abdullah to quit. Abdullah and his advisors have complained publicly about a range of issues, including reconciliation, Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan, and parliamentary and district council elections. In January 2016, Javid Faisal, a spokesman for Abdullah, objected to the Afghan election commission’s decision to hold elections in October 2016, stating: “Reforming the election process is a precondition to any election, and a part of the larger reform is the changing of current commission officials.” But Abdullah has not publicly threatened to quit. Credible threats by Abdullah or his chief advisors to defect from the government could signal a growing political crisis. Growing public protests. Deteriorating economic conditions, corruption, or government ineffectiveness could all trigger public protests. Specific examples might include a poor harvest, rising unemployment, ethnic discrimination, or severe and prolonged energy shortages. The unrest might range from contained, nonviolent protests to bloody riots that spread to other cities, districts, and provinces. There have been riots in cities like Kabul and Kandahar over the past decade, but most have been in response to actions by foreign governments, such as the 2012 burning of Qurans at Bagram Air Base. In May 2016, however, thousands marched in Kabul to protest the proposed construction of an electricity transmission line, temporarily bringing the city to a standstill. Provincial or local government officials might begin flouting Kabul’s authority. President Ghani has significant power to appoint and replace a range of national, provincial, and district officials. A provincial governor, police chief, or other appointed official who publicly refuses to be replaced, flouts Kabul, or acts independently could signal a weakening of the government. In addition, a substantial growth in the number, size, and capability of substate militias, which begin to outpace the size and strength of the ANDSF, would also be cause for concern.  The following warning indicators might signal the growing possibility of a Taliban military offensive:  Taliban forces might capture one or more district centers or large villages near urban areas. The Taliban would likely conduct more localized operations to control strategic lines of communications like Highway 1, overrun security checkpoints and other static positions, and conduct propaganda campaigns in urban areas that include shabnamah (Taliban letters and leaflets posted on doors or in public locations, often at night, that threaten individuals who cooperate with the government). In addition, a substantial exodus of civilians fleeing urban areas, who fear imminent fighting, might also indicate an imminent Taliban offensive. The assassination of a top Afghan government leader. The killing of one or more important Afghan government security officials, such as Lieutenant General Abdul Raziq, the powerful police chief of Kandahar, would seriously undermine the morale and effectiveness of Afghan national and local forces. Raziq has been critical in preventing major Taliban advances in Kandahar Province because of his relationship with local tribes and subtribes, leadership skills, and fighting effectiveness. A significant increase in attrition rates among Afghan security forces. The ANDSF has faced intense fighting over the past year and experienced unprecedented casualty levels. Taliban forces have also faced high attrition and casualty rates. Afghan national and local forces suffer from insufficient and untimely pay, difficulties accessing pay, limited food, constant combat deployments with little or no leave or training rotations, poor casualty care, and inadequate living and working conditions. These challenges have increased attrition rates and will likely continue as the ANDSF executes its 2016 campaign plan, Operation Shafaq. But a major rise in attrition rates, including those absent without leave, could severely undermine the effectiveness of Afghan forces and increase the prospects of Taliban success. Implications for U.S. Interests As President Barack Obama and other U.S. officials outlined in early 2013 and at various international conferences, U.S. objectives in Afghanistan include targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda and other groups, particularly ISIL-Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP), so that they cannot launch attacks against the U.S. homeland; and training, assisting, and advising Afghan forces so that Afghanistan can provide for its own security. To accomplish these objectives, U.S. policy has focused on strengthening the ANDSF; building a stronger political and security partnership with Afghanistan; supporting an Afghan peace process; enhancing regional cooperation; and fostering economic growth. These objectives remain important. A collapse of the National Unity Government or a Taliban takeover of one or more urban areas would harm U.S. interests in several ways. First, both contingencies could lead to an increase in the number of extremist Islamic groups operating in Afghanistan. Although al-Qaeda’s core leadership has been severely weakened by persistent U.S. strikes, al-Qaeda’s local branch, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, has increased its presence in Afghanistan in such areas as the south and east. U.S. and Afghan forces conducted raids against al-Qaeda camps in Kandahar Province in October 2015, but al-Qaeda continues to operate in such provinces as Kandahar, Konar, Nangarhar, Helmand, Ghazni, and Logar. A successful Taliban-led advance would likely allow al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Haqqani network, ISIL-KP, and Lashkar-e-Taiba to increase their presence in Afghanistan. ISIL-KP, led by Hafiz Saeed Khan and deputy leader Abu Bakr, enjoys a stronghold in Nangarhar Province. Second, a collapsing National Unity Government and a burgeoning war could increase regional instability as India, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia support a mix of Afghan central government forces, substate militias, and insurgent groups. This would likely further fracture Afghanistan’s national and local forces. Growing Taliban control of Afghanistan and an increase in militant groups could also increase regional friction, including between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Growing conflict and radicalization in Pakistan, in turn, also raises concerns about the security of its nuclear stockpile. In addition, these contingencies would almost certainly increase refugee flows out of the region. Afghan refugees are currently the second-largest refugee population in Europe, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Third, a Taliban takeover of strategic areas could foster a perception among some countries and organizations, however misplaced, that the United States is not a reliable ally. Islamic extremists would likely view Taliban advances as another defeat for the West amid resurgent Salafi-jihadist activity in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Although some U.S. officials might prefer that U.S. allies and Afghanistan’s neighbors take the lead in stabilizing Afghanistan, there are few viable prospects. Most European allies have indicated that they would likely withdraw their military forces in the event of an American exit, leaving behind regional powers with conflicting interests. Preventive Options The United States has several options to prevent these contingencies from occurring.  Options for reducing the possibility of a government collapse. The United States could focus diplomatic efforts on helping to resolve Afghanistan’s most critical political challenges, particularly by holding parliamentary and district council elections and convening a loya jirga. U.S. diplomats and White House officials were instrumental in negotiating the political agreement that led to the National Unity Government. One of the most divisive issues is electoral reform, including the role and makeup of the Independent Election Commission. U.S. diplomats could play an important role in helping broker a compromise on electoral reform and providing financial aid and technical support so that elections can eventually occur. U.S. diplomatic efforts thus far have fallen short of successfully negotiating an agreement. A related option is helping the Afghan government and organizations such as the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) organize elections. Second, U.S. diplomats could consider working more urgently with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and major financial contributors to better address acute economic and governance challenges. Rather than focusing on a broad array of economic issues, U.S. diplomats might concentrate on those outcomes—such as a poor agricultural harvest, rising unemployment, and a prolonged energy shortage—that could severely exacerbate public opposition to the government. An electricity blackout, like the one that occurred in Kabul in January 2016 following the Taliban sabotage of Kabul’s main power supply, could decrease morale and increase popular grievances against the government, particularly if it was prolonged. A third set of options includes additional coordination with regional countries on such issues as decreasing outside aid to insurgent groups, encouraging greater support for Kabul, and increasing reconciliation efforts. The United States could also withhold a significant portion of reimbursements and support that is authorized for Pakistan under the National Defense Authorization Act until the secretary of defense certifies to Congress that Pakistan has taken such steps as arresting senior Taliban and Haqqani officials in Pakistan. On reconciliation, the United States could play a more active role in reconciliation discussions, particularly since China’s increased involvement in the reconciliation process has had limited results. In coordination with Kabul, the United States might consider including Taliban members in a future loya jirga.  Options for decreasing the likelihood that the Taliban seizes and holds one or more urban areas. The United States could halt further reductions—or even increase—the number and type of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. These forces can train, advise, assist, and accompany Afghan forces and conduct direct-action missions; supplement Afghan forces with more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enablers; and increase close air support. The United States could also broaden U.S. counterterrorism legal authorities to proactively target the Taliban and Haqqani network. At the moment, U.S. forces can only target al-Qaeda and ISIL-KP operatives in Afghanistan, except in situations where extremists are plotting attacks against U.S. or other international forces or during in extremis cases where the Afghan government requests U.S. aid. The United States could also increase the authority for U.S. forces, particularly conventional forces, to train Afghans below the corps level. The United States could sustain—or even increase—international financial support to the ANDSF to help improve retention initiative packages and prevent a drop in salaries. The decrease in international support and low gross domestic product growth have undermined morale and the ability of Afghan forces to achieve their authorized force strength. The Afghan National Army is currently authorized for a strength of 187,000 personnel; the Afghan National Police for 157,000 personnel; General Command of Police Special Units for 6,000 personnel; Afghan Local Police for 45,000 personnel; and Afghan Air Force for 8,000 personnel. Additionally, the United States could encourage other countries—such as India, Russia, or European states—to provide more security assistance to the ANDSF. Finally, the United States could be more aggressive in encouraging fissures within the Taliban movement by conducting a range of information operations and, in coordination with the Afghan government, contacting disillusioned Taliban leaders. One opportunity is greater interaction with—and possibly even support to—groups like the Islamic Emirate High Council. Led by Mullah Mohammad Rasool, the Islamic Emirate High Council is composed of former Taliban members and emerged in late 2015 as a Taliban opposition group. Mitigating Options The United States could take several steps to mitigate the consequences of a government collapse or a Taliban takeover of one or more urban areas.  Options if the government collapses. Depending on the type of government collapse, senior U.S. officials could conduct emergency diplomatic intervention to broker an agreement between President Ghani, CEO Abdullah, and influential political elites. It would also be important to consult regional powers—such as China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia—and leading countries participating in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission to find a workable solution to government collapse. Depending on the scenario, U.S. policymakers could support patching up the government, identifying a successor to Abdullah as CEO, or even encouraging Afghans to choose a new leader through presidential elections. In a situation where Afghanistan faced an acute economic challenge that threatened government legitimacy, the United States could work with relevant international organizations (such as the IMF and World Bank) and states (such as EU members) to provide an emergency financial package.  Options if the Taliban seizes and holds one or more urban areas. To stem the Taliban advances, the United States could provide emergency aid via U.S. special operations forces, limited numbers of conventional forces, and air power to take back Taliban-controlled areas; increase deployment of U.S. fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters; and increase U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and other enablers. The United States could also pressure NATO and other allies operating under the Resolute Support Mission to augment their forces (including advisors and trainers) and equipment. In order to avoid becoming more directly involved in the fighting, the United States could provide material support to Afghan national and local forces, instead of increasing U.S. and allied deployments. This could involve providing the Afghan air force with additional ground attack aircraft, light attack aircraft, and light attack helicopters. Finally, the United States could punish Pakistan for supporting the Taliban and its allies, such as the Haqqani network, by cutting off all or most U.S. aid. The U.S. Congress could, for example, help by inserting waiver-free conditions in some U.S. military aid, requiring evidence that Pakistan is targeting militant groups based in Pakistan that are operating in Afghanistan, including through law enforcement and judicial proceedings. Because the United States has other important goals in Pakistan—such as supporting the fight against terrorist groups such as the Pakistani Taliban—aid and reimbursements for those activities and for civilian development programs should remain exempt from these conditions. Recommendations The United States is the most important external actor in Afghanistan, based on its military capabilities, wealth, and international influence. In general, U.S. policy should aim to build greater political consensus within Afghanistan, foster reconciliation with the Taliban, encourage regional powers to support Kabul, and build up Afghan security forces so that they can handle internal threats with limited outside involvement. To advance these goals, U.S. policymakers should take the following steps:  Focus U.S. diplomatic efforts on resolving acute political challenges. Washington’s most important political priority should be to focus U.S. diplomatic efforts on working with the Afghan government and political elites to reach a consensus on contentious issues such as electoral reform. The United States should concentrate on helping Kabul and UNAMA to issue new voter identification cards, clarify district centers, train polling staff, and provide security for future elections. It makes little sense to hold elections until there is electoral reform, and Afghanistan should not hold a loya jirga until there is a broader consensus on its ultimate purpose. Poorly organized parliamentary and district council elections marred by corruption and a contentious loya jirga would be more destabilizing than helpful and could expedite strategic reversal. In addition, Washington should continue to encourage regional diplomatic efforts to reconcile with the Taliban, including exploring the possibility of inviting the Taliban to participate in a future loya jirga. Address economic grievances that could trigger violent unrest. The United States should also work with the World Bank, IMF, and major financial contributors to tackle acute economic grievances that could severely undermine the political legitimacy of the government, such as unemployment, agricultural failure, an electricity crisis, or bank failure. Sustain the current number and type of U.S. military forces through the end of the Obama administration. The United States has approximately ten thousand forces in Afghanistan, along with six thousand forces under the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission. President Obama should refrain from cutting the number of U.S. forces to 5,500, as he promised to do by the end of his presidency. Although this would involve changing course from his October 2015 statement, sustaining the current number of ten thousand forces is crucial to decrease the likelihood of a Taliban advance. Obama could argue that a sustained U.S. presence in Afghanistan is important for counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Afghanistan could be conceptualized as one of several “lily pads” in a global campaign against violent extremists. Unlike several other Islamic countries, Afghan leaders want U.S. forces to stay. Cutting the U.S. presence to 5,500 forces would essentially end the U.S. capability to train, advise, assist, and accompany Afghan national and local forces. The Obama administration should sustain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enablers and close air support into 2017. Depending on how conditions in Afghanistan develop over the rest of 2016, the next administration can then reassess the number, type, posture, authorities, and priorities of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. The United States should also work closely with countries participating in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission to sustain their current numbers and roles. Current regional leads include Italy in the west with roughly eight hundred troops, Germany in the north with approximately eight hundred forces, and Turkey in the capital region with five hundred forces. A sustained U.S. and NATO-led security role is important, since a larger military role for several of Afghanistan’s neighbors would be either infeasible (Afghans continue to harbor animosity against the Russians for their invasion in the 1980s), increase regional security competition (a larger Indian security role would likely increase friction with Pakistan), or undermine American interests (a more robust Iranian security role would likely be counterproductive for Washington). Decrease constraints on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. U.S. forces are hamstrung by legal authorities that prevent them from targeting Taliban and Haqqani leaders except under extraordinary circumstances. President Obama should grant the military new authorities to strike the Taliban and Haqqani network, as he did with ISIL-KP in January 2016. Obama should also loosen the restrictions on U.S. forces, particularly conventional forces, to train Afghans below the corps level. Sustain U.S. support for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Over the past several decades, no Afghan government has been able to sustain itself without support from outside powers. This has been particularly true of Afghan forces when the country faced a serious security threat, as it does now. It is much cheaper for the United States and its allies to support Afghan security forces than it is to deploy large numbers of U.S. and other NATO soldiers. The United States provided $4.1 billion to the ANDSF in fiscal year 2015 and another $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2016. Assuming there is a democratically elected government in Afghanistan, the United States should commit to providing at least $3.8 billion per year for the next five years to help sustain the Ministry of Defense’s and Interior’s costs, improve retention initiative packages, and prevent a drop in salaries. One example should be a rapid buildup of the Afghan Air Force, which is plagued by low operational readiness, maintenance problems, and a lack of trained aircrew. In the long run, the air force can play a crucial role by conducting close air support missions and airlifts. The United States should provide additional training to the air force, additional light attack aircraft such as the A-29 Super Tucano, and light attack helicopters such as the MD-350.
    Contingency Planning Memorandum by Seth G. Jones June 20, 2016 Center for Preventive Action
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of June 17, 2016
    Lincoln Davidson, Bochen Han, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, Ayumi Teraoka, and James West look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Prominent Chinese lawyer facing possibility of lifetime imprisonment. The Chinese police have recommended prosecution on a charge of “subverting state power” for Zhou Shifeng, director of the Beijing Fengrui Law Firm whose arrest last summer invigorated a campaign to discredit and dismantle networks of rights-focused defense lawyers who have attempted to challenge the government. Zhou’s law firm took on many contentious cases about legal rights, representing the likes of dissident artist Ai Weiwei and Uighur academic Ilham Tohti. The charge of “subverting state power” can carry a sentence of up to life in prison. In comparison, Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo was sentenced to 11 years for “inciting subversion of state power”, which is generally regarded as a lesser offense. Prosecutors now have up to a month and a half to decide whether or not take Zhou to court on the subversion charge. While it’s possible that the charge will be lightened, Zhou’s legal peers say that prosecutors are more inclined to stick with the more serious charge so as to set an example for other lawyers under investigation. China’s crackdown on lawyers is part of a comprehensive tightening of civil society under President Xi Jinping, in line with recent moves to restrict activity of foreign NGOs in China and reform the legal profession qualification system. 2. Obama meets the Dalai Lama. U.S. President Barack Obama met privately with the fourteenth Dalai Lama on Wednesday despite China’s firm opposition. The meeting—the fourth between the president and the spiritual leader—took place in the residence instead of in the Oval Office, which is traditionally reserved for heads of state. The White House reiterated that the personal meeting does not symbolize a shift in U.S. policy toward Tibet, which Washington considers part of China. However, President Obama encourages the Dalai Lama and his representatives to work directly with the Chinese government to resolve their differences. Beijing considers the Dalai Lama an anti-China separatist and has urged foreign governments not to host him. The Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasized that Tibet is part of China’s internal affairs, and that Washington risks jeopardizing relations with Beijing with the meeting. The meeting comes amidst increasing tensions between the two countries in the East and South China Seas. Just last week, the U.S. military accused a Chinese fighter jet for conducting an “unsafe” intercept of a U.S. reconnaissance plane that was operating in international airspace over the East China Sea. 3. Hyderabad on “high alert” for potential polio outbreak. Officials announced on Wednesday that a strain of active, vaccine-derived type 2 polio virus had been found in the water at a sewage treatment plant in Hyderabad, the capital of Telangana state in southern India that is home to over seven million people. Twenty-four sections of the city have been declared “most-sensitive areas” for a future outbreak. This discovery has prompted a precautionary vaccination drive that will begin Monday and reach 300,000 children, according to a statement from India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Thanks to collaboration between federal and state governments, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and non-profit organizations, India detected its last case of polio in West Bengal in 2011 and was declared polio-free in 2012. Despite this success story, experts such as regional health officer Rajesh Singh have expressed mounting concern: “When the vaccine is given through the mouth, the liquid that gets dissolved and passed on in the form of stool accumulates in the sewage system. The virus in that vaccine becomes a stronger and more resistant strain.” 4. Tokyo governor finally resigns. Tokyo Metropolitan Governor Yoichi Masuzoe resigned on Wednesday after admitting to an inappropriate use of political funds to pay for personal travel and entertainment, including manga comic books and a Chinese-made silk calligrapher’s robe. The election for a new governor will occur on July 31, only three weeks after the House of Councillors election. Masuzoe had long refused to resign, even warning that he might dissolve the assembly if his non-confidence vote passed. He finally agreed to resign when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Komeito, which backed him in the February 2014 election, started urging him to step down, cautioning against the damage he might cause to the upcoming Upper House election. Political parties are now quickly searching for candidates to back, and so far two women have been mentioned: Yuriko Koike, former defense minister for the LDP, and Renho, acting president of the main opposition Democratic Party. While Masuzoe set off the public’s furor over his expenses, the resulting Tokyo gubernatorial election is expected to cost about 5 billion yen ($50 million). It is critical that the Tokyo residents vote based on candidates’ ability to successfully run the metropolitan city without undermining public confidence. Only voting for famous names will only lead to another gubernatorial election. 5. Afghanistan and Pakistan exchange heavy fire along border. Last Sunday, Afghan and Pakistani forces exchanged heavy gunfire at the Torkham border crossing—the busiest official border crossing between the two countries—resulting in five dead and dozens injured. The fighting forced the closing of the border crossing for the second time in the past month, and tensions continued to escalate as a Pakistani Army officer was killed in the fighting on Tuesday. Each side has accused the other of unprovoked firing. In a dispute over the construction of a border gate by Pakistani forces, Pakistan claims the gate is on their side of the border and is designed to curtail the movement of militants, while Afghan officials say the construction violates an agreement on building new installations along the shared border that requires mutual discussion and agreement. Various ceasefires have been violated throughout the week with both sides reportedly deploying additional troops and weaponry to the border and summoning respective ambassadors to lodge formal complaints. As of Friday, construction had resumed on the Pakistani side despite a ceasefire requiring work to be halted, and the crossing remained closed, stranding thousands. The dispute comes after months of increasing tensions between the two countries over the ongoing war against that Afghan Taliban. Bonus: Jack Ma says fakes better than original products. Ma, the founder and chairman of Alibaba, the largest e-commerce company in the world, said this week that “fake products today, they make better quality, better prices than the real products, the real names,” adding fuel to perceptions that the company profits from counterfeiting. Fake products, often produced by the same factories that make brand-name items, have long been widespread on Alibaba’s platforms, and critics have accused the company of not doing enough to combat counterfeiting. Earlier this year an anti-counterfeiting industry group suspended Alibaba’s membership. Ma may be on to something: there will always be consumers who are unwilling or unable to pay the premium charged by brand name products. But growing Chinese demand for foreign-produced goods suggests that many consumers are hoping to avoid knock-offs.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound June 17, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • Afghanistan
    New Commander, New Rules
    Harry Oppenheimer is a research associate for national security at the Council on Foreign Relations. The U.S. military mission in Afghanistan has been subject to restrictive rules of engagement that prohibited targeting the Taliban directly unless they posed a threat to U.S. personnel, or an extreme threat to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Reportedly, this has changed. The recent news was the first major policy change for the Afghan War since General John Nicholson took over command exactly one hundred days before the announcement on March 2, 2016. Combined with today’s story that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bases will remain open in Afghanistan into 2017, Nicholson has latitude that would be the envy of his predecessors. Flexibility over war plans is something that General John F. Campbell, Nicholson’s predecessor, called for publically in Senate hearings but could never achieve. After leaving Afghanistan, reports leaked that Campbell wanted to strike the Taliban directly and created enemies within the Department of Defense (DoD) in the process. Last week’s news makes such direct action possible. But there is a larger story as well—the White House appears to be responding to the concerns of the commander on the ground. When the then–lieutenant general Nicholson testified at his confirmation hearings in January he reiterated the importance of coalition close air support (CAS) and logistical and intelligence enablers for the ANDSF. His written testimony outlined his understanding entering the position: “Although their capabilities continue to grow as DoD fields additional planned aviation and intelligence, security, and reconnaissance (ISR) enablers to the ANDSF, I’ve been informed that there are still many requests for coalition enablers.” However, he added, “in the near term, as their CAS capability grows with the fielding of the A29 and additional rotary wing assets, I expect those requests to diminish. Over the long term, the most important capability we can provide them are the systems and procedures we put in place to ensure their sustainability.” This preliminary view came with a promise that in the first three months in command he would undertake a comprehensive review of the situation in Afghanistan and report back to senior leaders. This assessment would come, “after I have had the opportunity to get first hand insight on the situation in Afghanistan.” Regrettably, the Taliban have been encouraged by a highly successful 2015 that saw them control more territory than they ever have since the 2001 U.S. invasion. Recently, they have had numerous victories in southern Afghanistan. The day before the announcement of the expanded U.S. role, the special inspector general for Afghan reconstruction warned that Taliban gains jeopardized the efforts of the United States in the past decade. Now President Barack Obama has eased the restrictions on airstrikes in direct support of ANDSF, something that he has been loathed to do despite numerous suggestions from former military leaders and national security experts. ABC News reports that Nicholson, “will now be allowed to determine when American forces should advise and assist conventional Afghan Army units, something that until now had only been allowed for American special operations forces working with Afghan special operations forces.” News that NATO bases will remain open despite planned troop reductions will give Nicholson further flexibility to gauge force size and placement. While we cannot see Nicholson’s report to the president, many have speculated as to its contents. It is unlikely a coincidence that these policy changes come exactly one hundred days into his command. Here the proof may be in the pudding—Nicholson has seen the state of the Afghan military and the reduction of direct support he expected in March is clearly unrealistic. That is the only assessment one can imagine would push the administration to relax restrictions on a war it wanted over long ago. Hopefully this is a sign of good things to come—the best military advice, in this case from the vastly experienced Nicholson on the ground, translating directly into policy changes authorized by the White House. Maybe Nicholson learned from his predecessor and went about advocating for new authority with greater political acumen. The upside is that is the influence he could have over the direction of the Afghan War and the trust he has been given by civilian leadership.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Micah Zenko June 15, 2016 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of June 10, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Poisoned Vietnamese fish fuel popular discontent. A massive die-off of fish has occurred along 120 miles of coastline in Vietnam, where hundreds of residents in traditional fishing villages have fallen ill from eating the poisoned catch. This could have a devastating impact on the nation’s fishing industry that earned $6.6 billion from seafood exports last year alone. Most suspect the immediate cause of the die-off to be the release of toxic waste from a steel plant owned by Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics Group, which invested $10 billion in the enterprise. Despite Vietnamese officials’ statement that they failed to find evidence linking the fish kill to the factory’s activities, hundreds across the country have demonstrated against the communist government’s prioritization of foreign direct investment and industrialization over the protection of population public health. The Vietnamese prime minister has promised to investigate any agency, organization, or individual in violation of environmental regulations. 2. Japan aims to counter aging population with foreign workers. The Japanese government announced last week that it will seek to reduce barriers to permanent residency for skilled foreigners who wish to work in Japan. It also hopes to increase the proportion of foreign students who remain in Japan following their graduation from Japanese universities. Aging and shrinking populations are leading contributors to slow economic growth throughout East Asia’s developed economies. Japan’s predicament is particularly severe: its population has declined by more than one million since 2008 and a third of the population is above the age of sixty. Analysts are skeptical of the new immigration proposals’ ability to counter these trends, however. To maintain its current population level, Japan would need nearly 400,000 immigrants annually for the next thirty-five years; it has received only 300,000, on average, over the last several years. To get to that number, and truly jump-start the economy, some argue that the country needs to allow in not just skilled foreigners, but also blue collar workers. 3. Corruption tarnishes the Afghan gem trade. While Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, estimated to be worth up to $1 trillion in 2010, could be a major source of government revenue, instead it appears to be helping fund militias and the Taliban. A Global Witness report released this week focused on corruption surrounding the lapis lazuli trade in Badakhshan, a province in northeastern Afghanistan. In 2013, the Lajwardeen Mining Company secured the rights to a major lapis mine, but less than a month later, a local militia took it over. Rather than opposing this usurpation of mining rights, the Afghan National Security Council actually ordered the contract’s termination. Corruption also runs rampant in the marble trade in the southern Afghan province of Helmand, much of which remains under Taliban rule. According to the United Nations, the Taliban earned approximately $10 million from the marble trade, including taxes paid by private firms selling marble to the government. Other estimates place the amount as high as $18 million per year. Overall, minerals are believed to be the Taliban’s second largest source of income. 4. United States accuses Chinese fighter jet of “unsafe” interception. The U.S. military accused a Chinese fighter jet for conducting an “unsafe” intercept of a U.S. reconnaissance plane that was operating in international airspace over the East China Sea. The U.S. Pacific Command stated that the Chinese jet was flying too fast and too close to the U.S. aircraft, calling it a case of “improper airmanship.” Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei emphasized that Chinese pilots act in accordance with laws and regulations, and that crux of the problem is continuous U.S. reconnaissance activities in China’s coastal areas. The interception occurred as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was in Beijing for the eighth session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In May, two Chinese fighter jets flew within fifty feet of a U.S. aircraft over the South China Sea, an act that the U.S. Department of Defense deemed to have violated a previous agreement between the two governments. Both incidents are considered the latest signs of increasing tension in the East and South China Seas between China and the United States and its allies. 5. Seoul plans $9.5 billion infusion for beleaguered shipping sector. In recent years, weak global trade has hit South Korea’s shipping industry hard. The country’s three largest shipbuilders, for example, which once controlled almost 70 percent of the global market, lost a combined $4.9 billion during last year alone. Hyundai Merchant, one of South Korea’s main container operators, recently managed to renegotiate debts in order to avoid bankruptcy. The heavy losses pose a risk not only to the 200,000 people employed by the shipping industry, but also to banks, which hold over $40 billion in loans to top shipping firms. To help stave off financial ruin, the South Korean government and the Bank of Korea will establish a nearly $9.5 billion fund to buy bonds issued by two policy lenders that have helped shippers stay afloat. In another glimmer of hope for the flagging industry, Iranian companies have recently reached deals with South Korean shipyards, valued at around $2.4 billion, to facilitate trade between the two countries. Bonus: Creation story, not creationism, sparks outrage in China. In America, debates over teaching the book of Genesis creation story in schools usually revolve around the science classroom. In China, at least in recent weeks, the same story has sparked a very different kind of controversy: not over the validity of Darwinism, but over why the story was included in a middle-school literature textbook. Netizens and officials alike criticized the book for including the story, representative of Western values and religion, in place of a more traditional Chinese passage. Last year, China’s education minister called to “never let textbooks promoting western values enter into our classes,” or at least those ideas that “defame the leadership of the party or smear socialism.” But one Global Times op-ed contrarily called for more restraint in hasty public criticism, and argued that including such passages would expand students’ perspectives. “Is it a myth or is it religion?,” one article asked. “The key is perspective.”
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound June 10, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of June 3, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. China releases ambitious plan to clean up polluted soil. In 2014, the Chinese government disclosed that approximately 20 percent of its arable land was contaminated, primarily with heavy metals and agricultural chemicals from industry and farming. This Tuesday, the central government released a long-awaited action plan as a first major step to control and remedy the widespread problem, known as the last of the “three big campaigns” in Chinese environmental protection along with air and water pollution. The plan aims to stabilize and improve soil quality so that 90 percent of contaminated sites are safe for use by 2020, and 95 percent by 2030. It also includes provisions for improving the transparency of soil quality data and emphasizes more severe penalties for polluters. One Greenpeace expert praised the proposal as “pragmatic,” in that it would take steps to ensure that soil pollution would not “lead to major problems” for the millions affected. Since the cost of cleaning up all of China’s polluted soil will top $1 trillion, the plan may prove to be a lucrative opportunity for companies offering soil remediation services in the coming years. 2. Malaysia’s hudud law sparks controversy. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak backed a bill originally put forth by the Parti Islam se-Malaysia to strengthen Islamic courts and introduce hudud, a system of punishment under Islamic law. The punishments included under hudud can be severe including stoning and amputation, although the prime minster said that Malaysia will not permit anything that will draw blood or cause injury. While the new punishments would apply just in the nation’s syariah courts, which are only for Muslims, the proposal has nonetheless launched considerable debate. Members of parties such as the Malaysian Indian Congress have said the bill violates Malaysia’s constitution and notions of a secular government. Additionally, two non-Muslim ministers in the cabinet, Liow Tiong Lai and Mah Siew Keong, announced they will resign if the bill passes after debate in October. Two east Malaysian states, Sarawak and Sabah, have also threatened to split with the rest of the country over the bill. Some speculate that the prime minister, who is tainted by the 1MDB corruption scandal, views the bill as a way to firm up support among Muslim voters before upcoming by-elections. A proposal that is already sowing discord among members of the ruling coalition and that threatens to inflame ethnic tension hardly seems like the path to success though. 3. Death of environmentalist sparks reflection on police brutality in China. Beijing city authorities are investigating the death of a young environmental official in police custody last month. The man, Lei Yang, was arrested by plainclothes police outside of a Beijing massage parlor on the evening of May 7 on suspicion of soliciting prostitutes. Less than an hour later, police took him to a hospital, claiming he had suffered a heart attack and died. The story is disputed by Lei’s family and friends, who say there is no history of heart disease in his family, claim he was on his way to the airport to receive relatives, and question why police took several hours to notify his family of his death and deleted messages from his phone. In response to these claims, police took to the press, trying to clarify their story, only to have public opinion flare up in anger against them after netizens began questioning inconsistencies in the official report of the incident. The debate over Lei’s death has raised questions about how commonly individuals die in police custody in China and if this incident would have gotten a full investigation if Lei had not been young, a new father, and a graduate of one of China’s best universities. 4. Number of internally displaced Afghans on the rise. Amnesty International reported on Tuesday at a press conference in Kabul that the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Afghanistan has doubled since 2013 to roughly 1.2 million.  Despite the fact that these are people living in camps lacking sufficient health, food, or water facilities, the financial resources allocated to the fifteen-year crisis are at their lowest point since 2009. The United Nations requested $393 million in humanitarian funding for 2016, but, as of May, has only been able to raise a quarter of this request. The majority of civilians have fled their communities in recent years due to a flagging economy with only 1.9 percent growth and continuing violence carried out by the Taliban. In fact, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan has said that 2015 “was the most dangerous year on record for civilians since 2009” with at least eleven thousand casualties, one-fourth of whom were children. Although the Afghan government endorsed the "National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons" in 2014, corruption-ridden institutions and a state lacking capacity and expertise have been unable to deliver on promises made to IDPs and forced evictions are a daily threat. 5. Bangladesh conducts first census of Rohingya. The census, which began this week, will not only allow the Bangladeshi government to gain a more accurate count of how many Rohingya  live both inside and outside of refugee camps, but will also give greater insight into the group’s economic circumstances. Estimates of the number of Rohingya in the country range from three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand. A significant number of Rohingya began fleeing from Myanmar to Bangladesh beginning in 2012, and have continued with renewed cycles of violence. While Myanmar agreed to repatriate 2,415 people from Bangladesh in 2014, this has not yet occurred. Some expressed concern that the current census, conducted with assistance from the International Organization for Migration, would serve as preparation to deport Rohingya from Bangladesh. Censuses have proved difficult for the Rohingya in the past; during the 2014 census in Myanmar, the government did not allow individuals to identify as Rohingya and said they should register as Bengali instead. Bonus: North Korea says “Vote Trump, not that dull Hilary.” Presumptive Republican nominee Donald Trump’s latest endorsement came from a surprising source: North Korea. Two weeks after Trump’s speech, during which he declared he would have “no problem speaking to [Kim Jong-un],” a North Korean state media published an op-ed praising Trump as a wise and far-sighted presidential candidate. This is not the first time Trump has expressed unconventional ideas related to U.S. foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula. In a previous interview, Trump stated that he would be willing to withdraw U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea unless they pay more for U.S. military presence. He also suggested that it might not “be a bad thing for [the United States]” for Japan to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Though a senior North Korean official has called Trump’s willingness to engage with Kim merely an insincere gesture for the presidential election, U.S. allies are increasingly worried about Trump’s “America first” agenda.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound June 3, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • Global
    The World Next Week: May 26, 2016
    Podcast
    The U.S. Transportation Security Administration braces for a summer of challenges and a new leader takes control of the Afghan Taliban.
    Podcast with James M. Lindsay and Robert McMahon May 26, 2016 The World Next Week
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of April 29, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, Gabriel Walker, and Pei-Yu Wei look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Afghan female athletes forced to the sidelines. Despite annual donations to the tune of $1.5 million from the American government and other Western donors to women’s sports in Afghanistan, these programs have proven to be an abject failure in the promotion of women’s empowerment and equal participation. The efforts have been riddled by corruption; the cricket program “consist[s] of little more than a young woman with a business card and a desk” and the women’s soccer team has not played an international match in years. The most corruption has been in women’s cycling. The cycling program was originally hailed as a model for women’s sports in the Middle East defying prevailing gender norms. However, the National Olympic Committee terminated its coach and manager, Haji Abdul Sediq, once it was revealed that he had married and divorced three young athletes during his tenure. Another rampant problem is growing violence against women in a conservative, patriarchal culture where many women do not feel safe to publicly train and instead often leave the country to pursue their athletic ambitions. Shamila Kohestani, an Afghan soccer star who aspired to return to Kabul to coach, commented that Afghan officials’ support for women’s sports programs was motivated more by their popularity with donors than a belief in female athletes. 2. U.S. Justice Department asserts its oversight over espionage cases. In a private letter to federal prosecutors around the country, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates wrote that all cases relating to U.S. national security would require “coordination and oversight in Washington.” Although that procedure had always been intended, the explicitness of Yates’ letter was likely due to a growing number of botched espionage cases against Chinese-Americans over the past two years. Among the most prominent were cases—all of which were later dismissed—against two pharmaceutical scientists accused of leaking proprietary information to a Chinese drug manufacturer, a hydrologist accused of stealing national dam data, and a physics professor accused of sharing U.S. superconductor technology with China. But at the same time, there have also been real cases of recent espionage against the United States by Chinese nationals, including Su Bin, who tried to steal information on the F-22 and F-35 jets, and Mo Hailong, who conspired to steal corn seeds engineered by DuPont Pioneer and Monsanto from an Iowa field. Just yesterday, a Chinese businesswoman was indicted for procuring underwater drone equipment for the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Hopefully, increased Washington oversight means fewer legal mistakes for cases that may be driven more by suspicion than actual facts. 3. China reasserts control over web. As China’s National People’s Congress passed a law restricting the activities of non-governmental organizations in China, the Chinese government also reasserted its control of the Internet. On April 19, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping convened a meeting with top officials and heads of technology companies, where he said that “the fact that core technology is controlled by others is our greatest hidden danger.” Chinese leaders have long expressed fears that the United States uses technology companies to spy on the rest of the world. According to the Wall Street Journal, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s chief Internet regulator, put forward a proposal this week that the government take a financial stake in major domestic technology companies and be given a seat on the companies’ governing boards. Meanwhile, CAC Director Lu Wei met with his Russian counterpart at the first China-Russia Cyberspace Development and Security Forum in Moscow. At the meeting, Igor Shchegolev, Russia’s top Internet regulator, echoed the Chinese position on technology, reportedly saying that to protect national interests, Russia “can’t rely on transnational IT firms.” As the two governments come together to promote a norm of “cyber sovereignty” in opposition to the norm of openness online promoted by the United States, it remains to be seen if other countries will join them. 4. Papua New Guinea shuts down asylum detention center. Australia’s asylum processing system faced new challenges this week following a ruling by Papua New Guinea’s Supreme Court to close the Manus Island detention center hosted for Australia. Papua New Guinea’s prime minister confirmed the decision, creating a dilemma for Australia over whether to relocate the approximately eight hundred and fifty asylum seekers held on the island. Australia operates a much-criticized policy of “offshore processing” for refugees in which prospective asylum seekers are sent to small Pacific islands. The government argues that this deters migrants from embarking on perilous ocean journeys to Australia.  The Australian and Papua New Guinean governments are currently debating who has responsibility in the case. One option would be for Australia to relocate asylum seekers to other detention sites at Christmas Island or Nauru. Troubles also exist on the latter island, however, which hosts over four hundred and fifty asylum seekers in an open camp. A twenty-three year-old Iranian man detained on Nauru died today after setting himself on fire in protest of camp conditions. These two incidents may force Australia to rethink its immigration policies. 5. Party organizers receive jail time in Taiwan.  The organizer of a “Color Play Party” that caused a fire at a Taiwanese water park last June was sentenced to four years and ten months in prison. The party, which took place at Formosa Water Park in New Taipei City, featured colored powders  sprayed into an audience of roughly one thousand guests. A subsequent explosion killed fifteen and injured more than four hundred party goers. Some victims sustained burns to over 80 percent of their bodies. Lu Chung-Chi, owner of Color Play Asia, which organized the party, was found guilty on April 26 of negligence causing death. The families of the victims and many members of the public thought that the sentence was too light, but prosecutors said that under Taiwanese law the maximum prison sentence for workplace negligence is five years and so four years and ten months is comparatively harsh. Relatives of the deceased were also angry that Lu was the only person indicted over the fire and eight other park executives were not charged due to lack of evidence. Some family members protested outside the courthouse on Tuesday. Taiwan’s high prosecutor’s office has ordered the case to be reopened and for the district prosecutors to reexamine the culpability of other suspects in the tragedy. Bonus: Movie studios “whitewash” Asian characters. Upcoming movie adaptations of books have drawn ire in recent weeks following announcements that characters who are Asian in the books will be played by white actresses. Major Motoko Kusanagi, the main character of the Japanese manga, TV show, and animated movie series Ghost in the Shell, will be played by Scarlett Johansson in the show’s live-action adaptation. Marvel Studios’ movie adaptation of the Doctor Strange comics will likewise feature a character who is a Tibetan man in the original being played by Tilda Swinton, a white woman. Critics have accused the studios of continuing the Hollywood tradition of reducing the role of Asian characters in film. Producers of both films argue the casting decision is a business imperative. Ghost in the Shell screenwriter Max Landis defended Johansson’s casting with the argument that “there are no A-list female Asian celebrities right now on an international level.” And Doctor Strange writer Robert Cargill suggested that casting a Tibetan would be too sensitive for the Chinese market.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound April 29, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of April 8, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, Gabriel Walker, and Pei-Yu Wei look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Corruption and combat thwart counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The first poppy harvest of the year is just beginning in Helmand, Afghanistan—by far the largest source of opium and heroin in the world—and very little can be done about it. Since 2002 the United States has spent over $8 billion on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, including eradicating over six thousand acres of poppy fields in Helmand alone over the past two years, but this year there will be no effort to do so. According to Maj. Rahmatullah Alokozai, the security chief of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Counternarcotics, now that the Taliban completely controls more than half of Helmand it is too dangerous to attempt eradication efforts. Some believe that Maj. Alokozai’s unwillingness to try is a sign that he stands to profit from poppy revenues, as many other Afghan government officials have in some way in the past, by canceling this year’s eradication. Maj. Gen. Abdul Jabar Qahraman, Afghani President Ashraf Ghani’s envoy for Helmand, stated that the situation there is so difficult because all the combatants have a vested interest in the success of the drug trade: “The war and the fighting in Helmand is a tool for everybody—they’re making millions off it.” 2. Bangladesh experiences “largest mass poisoning of a population in history”: A new report released by Human Rights Watch on Wednesday reveals that 20 million Bangladeshis have been poisoned by arsenic in their drinking water. According to the organization’s findings, 43,000 people die annually from arsenic-related illnesses, including liver, kidney, bladder, and skin cancer, as well as heart disease, developmental defects, and diabetes. In fact, “between 1 and 5 million of the 90 million children estimated to be born between 2000 and 2030 will eventually die” from arsenic exposure. Arsenic is a naturally occurring chemical in groundwater, and is found in large quantities in countries throughout the Asian continent. Arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh was first discovered in 1995 by researchers who found that millions of tubewells provided by international donors in the 1970s and 1980s as safe substitutes to bacteria-infested surface water were harboring the poison. Today, there are an estimated 10 million shallow tubewells located throughout the country intended to provide clean water to the country’s roughly 66 percent rural population suffering from poor human development outcomes. The Bangladeshi government is facing harsh criticism for its irresponsiveness to the crisis, where “nepotism and neglect by Bangladeshi officials” are to blame and new, non-contaminated wells are only being dug in convenient locations for family, friends, and political supporters, rather than those most impacted by arsenic. 3. Relatives of top Chinese officials identified in Panama Papers. Among the 14,153 individuals connected to Mossack Fonseca, the Panamanian law firm known for helping clients establish offshore accounts, relatives of at least eight former or current members of China’s elite Politburo Standing Committee have been identified. These individuals include Chinese President Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law, Deng Jiagui; Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli’s son-in-law, Lee Shing Put; and propaganda head Liu Yunshan’s daughter-in-law, Jia Liqing. Deng’s offshore accounts had been closed or dormant by the time Xi took office. Relatives of officials are far from the only Chinese citizens to hold offshore accounts. Mossack Fonseca’s largest number of offices in any country worldwide were in China and its most active office was in Hong Kong. Approximately 29 percent of the firm’s companies came from the greater China region. While offshore accounts are not illegal in China, the number of political elites who hold such accounts may speak to a mounting sense of domestic political or economic insecurity. Key words linking the Panama Papers to the Chinese leadership were quickly censored, and it seems unlikely that these new revelations will significantly affect Xi’s ongoing anticorruption campaign. 4. Abe government says Article 9 does not prohibit ownership of nuclear weapons. The administration of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that the Japanese constitution does not explicitly prohibit the country from possessing nuclear weapons. The position of the government was made clear in a written response last Friday to inquiries from two members of Diet, the Japanese parliament. The inquiry stems from a statement made by Cabinet member and the director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Yusuke Yokobatake, on March 18 this year at a House of Councilors’ Budget Committee meeting, in response to a question asked by the opposition Democratic Party of Japan. Yokobatake noted that the administration does not think that “the use of all kinds of nuclear weapons is prohibited under the Constitution.” The government’s position on nuclear weapons is in line with that of previous prime ministers. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda said in 1978 that the constitution does not “absolutely prohibit” Japan’s having nuclear weapons. However, he also emphasized that Japan should abide by the three non-nuclear principles raised in the 1960s by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. Similarly, in the written response, the administration highlighted its firm commitment to the same principles. 5. Chinese media take a new approach. The Paper, a trendy online Chinese media outlet, launched a new English-language news site called Sixth Tone this week. Sixth Tone promises to cover stories that other outlets—whether foreign or state-owned—miss, mimicking The Paper, which has gained millions of readers since it launched in 2014, most of them among China’s “post-90s” generation. Both papers are a far cry from traditional state media outlets, whose articles range from boring to pointless to blatantly propagandist. In both its tone and the topics they choose to write about, The Paper has been willing to skirt much closer to lines the Chinese government does not permit news outlets to cross. The website has won accolades for deep investigations into corruption and official malpractice. Most recently, a story The Paper broke last month on tens of millions of dollars’ worth of improperly stored vaccines has spurred public debate in China. However, there are some topics The Paper (and presumably Sixth Tone) won’t touch. Shanghai United Media Group, which owns Sixth Tone and The Paper, is owned by the propaganda department of the Shanghai Communist Party Committee. At the end of the day, he who pays the piper calls the tune. Bonus: Viral ad about China’s “leftover women” tugs at netizens’ heartstrings. This week, a four-minute, documentary-style video entitled the “Marriage Market Takeover” sent emotional ripples throughout the Chinese web. Commissioned by the Japanese skin care company SK-II and part of a “a global campaign to inspire and empower women to shape their destiny,” the video focuses on the plight of so-called leftover women in China, or women over twenty-seven who may face intense social and familial pressure to get married. Leta Hong Fincher, the author of a book on China’s leftover women, stated that single Chinese women are at a “turning point,” and beginning to push back against the social stigma of being single and traditional conceptions of marriage. Though some on the Chinese web poke fun at the family pressure that young women face, for others, like one twenty-seven-year-old woman who attempted suicide last month because of marriage pressure, it is deadly serious.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound April 8, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of March 18, 2016
    Ashlyn Anderson, Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Ariella Rotenberg, Gabriel Walker, and Pei-Yu Wei look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Bangladeshi bank chief resigns after $101 million cyber theft. The governor of Bangladesh’s central bank stepped down in the wake of a financial heist involving hackers, casinos, and multiple Asian nations. In early February, $81 million were transferred electronically from Bangladesh’s Federal Reserve Bank of New York account to the Philippines, mainly to accounts at the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The funds were eventually laundered through casinos, which are not required to adhere to some of the nation’s money-laundering regulations. Hackers also attempted other transactions, including one to Sri Lanka for $20 million, which was stopped after a typo in the transfer request raised alarms. The crime has sparked a debate between officials in Bangladesh and at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York over culpability, with Bangladesh threatening to sue the New York Fed to get the money back, since the Fed did not confirm transfers made with the Bangladeshi central bank’s SWIFT codes. The Fed has maintained that it followed appropriate procedures and that its systems remain secure. 2. Another district falls to the Taliban in Afghanistan. A district of Afghanistan’s southern Helmand Province fell the Taliban this past Tuesday, making an important addition to the insurgent-controlled area. Government forces fled the government center in Khan Deshin after a firefight that lasted from Monday night until five in the morning on Tuesday. After Tuesday, the Taliban has overthrown the government centers in five of fourteen districts in Helmand Province. At least two additional districts have large areas of under Taliban control, while government forces are still in those government centers. In at least four other districts, the Taliban is considered to be very active. By many calculations, more than half of the province is now under insurgent control. 3. There’s money to be made in China’s aging. That’s the bet that Bain Capital is making, at least. The company announced this week that it had purchased a controlling stake in Asia Pacific Medical Group, a medical-services provider that operates seven hospitals and twenty-two clinics throughout China and Southeast Asia, according to the company’s website. China is aging rapidly—by 2050, the country’s median age will be forty-nine and 26 percent of the population will be over the age of sixty-five—compounding its already challenging demographic problems. The Chinese government is struggling to respond. In October 2015, the government ended the one-child policy. And late last month, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced it would release a plan next year to raise the retirement age by 2022, likely to counteract a looming funding shortage for the state’s pension commitments. 4. Trump sparks alarm in Japan. As polls opened this Tuesday for primaries in five states, the Japanese government is faced with the possibility of its closest trading partner and security ally electing Donald Trump as president. Having criticized Japan on his campaign trail for manipulating the yen and hurting U.S. employment, and for “playing unfairly” on defense, Trump’s remarks have led to analysts noting that due to the public sentiment he has stirred up, Japan-U.S. ties could suffer even if Trump were not nominated or elected. Japanese media have become increasingly critical of Trump, with one column proclaiming, “Trump’s Japan-bashing shows why he’s unfit to lead America.” Originally entertained by Trump’s campaign, Japanese officials now find themselves facing the challenge of identifying the right moment to step in and correct the misunderstandings caused by Trump’s statements, as they fear that rushed correction of Trump’s statements may backfire. Japan is not the only country that has started to hit back. China, another country that Trump has often targeted, ran an opinion piece in the state-owned Global Times newspaper this week that labeled Trump as “big-mouthed” and a “clown,” and compared his rise to those of Mussolini and Hitler. 5. Argentine coast guard sinks Chinese fishing boat. On Wednesday, in coastal waters around 750 miles south of Buenos Aires, Argentina’s coast guard sank a Chinese fishing boat operating illegally in the country’s exclusive economic zone. According to reports, the Chinese trawler responded to initial warning shots by shutting off its lights and trying to ram the Argentine ship, prompting the latter to fire defensive shots and sink the Chinese vessel. Four crew members were detained, and twenty-eight more were rescued by nearby Chinese ships. The confrontation was a rare occurrence, as Chinese fishing vessels are typically cooperative with the Argentine coast guard. China has subsequently demanded an investigation into the dispute to ensure the safety and rights of Chinese fishermen if similar incidents should ever occur in the future. China has the world’s largest fishing fleet, with nearly 2,500 “distant-water” vessels operating around the world far from Chinese coastal waters. Bonus: A transplanted Afghan bazaar offers artisans a receptive audience in Washington, D.C. Potters, carpenters, rug weavers, jewelers, and a host of other Afghan artisans are setting up shop at the Smithsonian Institution for the next eleven months. Afghan artisans will have the opportunity to share their work in a recreated bazaar environment as part of the Turquoise Mountain: Artists Transforming Afghanistan exhibit. Turquoise Mountains is a break from traditional museum exhibits and intended to be an all-sensory experience based on the “IPOP” exhibit elements—ideas, people, objects, and physical. In addition to offering a unique museum experience, the exhibit also provides a platform for the artisans to renew global interest in the old traditions of the Silk Road.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound March 18, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • Afghanistan
    HBO What To Do About Afghanistan
    Play
    Experts assess the current situation in Afghanistan, analyze U.S. involvement, and offer policy options moving forward.
    Event with James B. Cunningham, Mary Beth Long, John R. Allen and Marc Grossman February 29, 2016 What to Do About...