Afghanistan

This post is co-authored by Becky Allen, a research associate in the Women and Foreign Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations. On paper, the law is clear: men and women enjoy equal property rights under Afghanistan's 2004 constitution. But on-the-ground reality says otherwise as a combination of tradition and customary laws keep most Afghan women unaware of their land rights and far from owning property. As the Afghan Ministry of Justice estimates, 90 percent of Afghans decide land rights according to customary laws – regulations developed and instituted at the regional and tribal level. For this reason, few Afghan women are able to capitalize on their right to inherit and own property. While customary law varies throughout the country, it typically pressures a woman to relinquish her share of an inheritance to her brothers in order to ensure her social protection in case of divorce; demonstrate family loyalty; and avoid discrimination and shame at the hands of her community. The cultural expectation is that a woman's husband will become her economic provider and therefore she does not need her own land in her name. According to this view, it simply makes more economic sense for a woman to leave her share of land to her brothers, who will use it to provide for their families while her own husband looks after her. But this tradition ignores the good that comes from putting land in the hands of women. For one, with women's entrepreneurship on the rise in Afghanistan, land could act as collateral for women who need credit to grow their businesses – and in the process create jobs and boost their family's income. Second, owning land could help women working in agriculture increase their production rates by 20 to 30 percent, contributing to improved food security throughout the country. And third, land ownership by women has been linked to reduced violence against women, with some experts estimating that a woman who owns land is up to eight times less likely to experience domestic violence, a scourge found all across Afghanistan and affecting nearly nine out of ten women.   With evidence of the benefits of women's land ownership clear, the question is: how can the U.S. and Afghan governments, along with multilateral organizations, put laws on the books into action when the law is so often left in the hands of local tribal leaders? USAID tried to tackle this question with the Land Reform in Afghanistan (LARA) project, which ran from 2011 to 2014. The initiative established a Women’s Land Rights Task Force comprised of prominent Afghan men and women as well as civil society to advise project leaders on land rights affecting Afghan women. The project proposed strategies for bolstering women's land rights, but it is unclear how much women's access to their land has changed since. The U.S. Institute of Peace recommends addressing women's land rights within an Islamic law framework, especially given that the Quran and Hadith permit women to both own and inherit property. As such, including local religious leaders in awareness raising campaigns and educational programming on women's land rights could boost buy-in from communities.   What is clear is that Afghan women face much more work ahead. As the most recent Afghanistan Demographic and Health Survey noted, only 17 percent of Afghan women independently own a house, compared with approximately 50 percent of Afghan men. This issue is often seen as secondary to the conflict in the country and to the overall plight of Afghan women. But getting land rights right could help to address both the nation's stability and its prosperity. For all its citizens.

President Donald J. Trump outlined last night the much-anticipated strategy his administration will adopt in Afghanistan, now the United States’ longest war. Trump placed Afghanistan in the context of the larger U.S. fight against global terrorism and mentioned the rise of the Islamic State as the result of a political vacuum in Iraq after the American withdrawal. By placing his Afghanistan decision against the chaos that emerged in Iraq, Trump clarified why he had changed his mind from his initial “instinct,” as he put it, to simply pull out. He then offered three “pillars” that would characterize the “new” U.S. efforts, which would include the deployment of an unspecified number of additional troops. These new pillars include: the end of a time-bound commitment to Afghanistan and a pivot to a “conditions-based” evaluation instead; the integration of “diplomatic, economic, and military” approaches; and a changed approach to Pakistan, especially the continued problem of terrorist safe havens there. He then added that the growing U.S.-India strategic partnership would also be a “critical part” of the South Asia strategy, and welcomed greater Indian economic assistance for Afghanistan. These pillars are not so new, actually. To me they suggest a gear shift drawing upon trends already perceptible. While a conditions-based presence differs, for example, from former President Barack Obama’s earlier time-bound troop surge, the deterioration in Afghanistan’s security had already resulted in an Obama administration rethink on a complete withdrawal according to the previous timeline. Second, the integration of diplomatic, economic, and military efforts is decidedly not new—it simply recognizes the reality that military power is just one tool that has to be in support of some political goal. Trump’s indication that “perhaps it will be possible” to find a political solution between the Taliban and the Afghan government—coupled with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s more direct statement on a path to a political negotiation—again indicates continuity with the Obama administration’s approach. The combination of a more counterterrorism-focused approach in Afghanistan without a stated timeline for withdrawal could, theoretically, prevent the Taliban from just waiting the United States out and could help create conditions more conducive to a political negotiation. The president’s blunt remarks on Pakistan’s terrorist safe havens publicly affirmed a problem that has become increasingly unsustainable. Pakistan has been a victim of terrorism, but that fact does not absolve the country of its selective efforts to go after terrorists on its soil. In early August, for example, a Pakistan-based terrorist group under longstanding UN Security Council designation, active against India and Afghanistan, took steps to register itself as a political party without any previous indication of renouncing violence. Pakistan has not upheld its obligation to prevent all terrorist elements from operating on its soil. U.S. members of Congress and executive branch officials have already begun to call out Pakistan for its terrorist safe havens, and former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter as well as Secretary of Defense James Mattis have been unable to certify that Pakistan is making “sufficient” efforts to target the Haqqani network. So the Trump emphasis on tightening up on Pakistan marks a stepped-up continuation of a trajectory that has been driven by Pakistan’s choices. The elevation of India to a more prominent position as part of the larger U.S. strategy in the region marks to my mind the most significant departure from the past. But Trump stated up front the role that India has already been playing in Afghanistan—India is and has been the fifth-largest bilateral donor to the country, and has been a supportive partner to Afghanistan over the years. India has been deeply involved in building infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, and the Afghan parliament; training officials; providing food assistance; and contributing other forms of much-needed development support. We should be doing more with India to support Afghanistan, including helping to shore up its challenged government. Questions unanswered in the new Trump administration strategy: At what point, and how, will the diplomatic effort kick in to “support an Afghan peace process,” as Tillerson’s statement put it? How will the State Department, enfeebled by a lengthy restructuring and without a full complement of senior officials to run policy, let alone complex diplomacy, execute the responsibility? What role will the Trump administration see for all of “Afghanistan’s neighbors,” as Tillerson stated, in this peace process? These questions will need answers quickly or the “new” South Asia strategy will be left with a military component in search of its diplomatic partner. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

President Trump’s much-anticipated Afghan policy rightly avoids troop withdrawal timelines but offers little prospect for progress against the durable Taliban.

Nearly sixteen long years on, the United States still struggles with how to devise a strategy for success in Afghanistan. The Donald J. Trump administration’s ongoing strategic review, according to press accounts, remains in a cycle of developing new options. Those presented so far have not earned the president’s approval. It’s possible to deliberate for months over the right troop levels, clearly. It is also possible to deliberate over the appropriate mix of military strategy, diplomacy, and development, especially given the reduced weight the Trump administration appears to place on the latter two. But in all honesty, it’s hard to see what combination of troops, aid, and statecraft will overcome the continued problem of terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategic location has given it a vital role in the war in Afghanistan, despite the widespread recognition by U.S. officials that it remains insufficiently focused on addressing the many terrorist groups operating from its soil. During his visit to Islamabad in April of this year, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster said, “…we have hoped that Pakistani leaders will understand that it is in their interest to go after these groups less selectively than they have in the past and the best way to pursue their interests in Afghanistan and elsewhere is through diplomacy not through the use of proxies that engage in violence.” In July, Secretary of Defense James Mattis declined to certify that Pakistan had taken “sufficient action” against the Haqqani network operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Without the certification, Pakistan cannot receive additional coalition support funds from fiscal year 2016. Secretary Mattis’s action mirrors that of former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter last year, who declined to certify Pakistan’s “sufficient action” against the Haqqani network, thereby limiting the coalition support funds Pakistan could receive. In the White House, the top official on the National Security Council staff managing Afghanistan, Deputy Assistant to the President Lisa Curtis, has deep expertise on Pakistan and, prior to entering the Trump administration, published widely on the country’s terrorism problem. She coauthored a major report last year that argued for strengthening conditions on assistance to Pakistan to “more effectively contain, and eventually eliminate, the terrorist threats that continue to emanate from the country” that threaten vital U.S. interests, including stabilizing Afghanistan. A national security advisor, a secretary of defense, and a deputy assistant to the president with a clear-eyed view of the threat terrorists in Pakistan pose to U.S. interests—you would think officials and generals in Pakistan might take greater, more credible action against terrorists given the high-level concern from senior Washington policymakers. But earlier this week, news emerged from Pakistan that the organization headed by Hafiz Saeed, an individually-designated terrorist on UN sanctions lists, has registered as a political party with the name Milli Muslim League. This group, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, has been under UN terrorist designation since 2005. In 2012, the United States issued a $10 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Saeed, the “suspected mastermind” of the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, for which not one single accused has been brought to justice in Pakistan. (Trials have been continually delayed since 2009.) The group is active in Afghanistan—President Ashraf Ghani has named it among the terrorist groups fighting against his government. The fact that despite these designations, Saeed and compatriots continue to operate unfettered in Pakistan is well known. He is presently under house arrest, but that does not seem to have curtailed his group’s activities and ambition. How can a designated terrorist group register itself as a political party and declare ambition to contest in Pakistan’s 2018 national election? The idea that a UN- and U.S.-designated terrorist group long under international sanctions could suddenly march over to the Election Commission of Pakistan and morph into a political party is ludicrous. The Pakistani government cannot expect that anyone will believe claims that it is sufficiently countering terrorism in their country if terrorists under well-known, longstanding international sanctions not only escape justice but shift out of the shadows to the political arena. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

In May 2016, President Barack Obama authorized a U.S. military drone strike that killed Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour. A year later, we can judge whether this leadership “decapitation” strike achieved its intended political objectives.

National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster will head to Afghanistan, and reportedly Pakistan and India as well, this weekend. In the wake of Thursday’s Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb drop in Afghanistan, targeting Islamic State cave-and-tunnel hideouts on the border with Pakistan, McMaster will have much to discuss with his Afghan interlocutors on the security front. The Donald J. Trump administration will need to reach a decision soon about the size of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Worrying trends in Afghanistan, like the fall of Sangin to the Taliban just weeks ago, underscore the need for a reassessment. The presence in Pakistan of internationally-proscribed terrorist groups like the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network undermine efforts to secure Afghanistan. Challenges to political stability, governance, and economic growth make it harder for Afghanistan to deliver opportunities for its citizens. The country could use assistance from all its partners on its economic growth and prosperity agenda. Once he arrives in New Delhi, McMaster should have in-depth discussions with his Indian interlocutors on regional stability. He will likely find that Indian officials view the situation very similarly to American officials, but may have different prescriptions due to their regional position and difficulties with neighbor Pakistan. He should use the opportunity to discuss how India—the fifth-largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, and a power with deep expertise on governance, development, infrastructure, and commerce—could be a larger part of the international efforts to assist Afghanistan. I have argued previously that India can bring to the table some special strengths in addition to the infrastructure work it has carried out in Afghanistan. India could play a more active diplomatic role with the politically-delicate Afghan government—a unity government that the International Crisis Group has called “shaky.” International observers worry that the possible collapse of the Afghan government could risk its progress on security and development. New Delhi has an opportunity to use its good offices and ties with both President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah to help. As the region’s economic vortex, India and its successful private sector companies can continue to assist Afghan enterprises with markets for their goods and training to manage their businesses. India’s chambers of commerce have been active on this front for years.  Last summer’s Made in Afghanistan trade fair in New Delhi marks just one example. Of course, enabling trade across the South Asian region would bring a commercial boon to Afghan producers, and here Pakistan has a chance to take advantage of its location and enable region-wide trade, not block it as it has continued to do. India’s expertise in the arena of civilian security has been largely overlooked, but the country has capabilities—especially in training and skill development—which could be helpful to Afghanistan. Greater budget support for the Afghan National Security Forces would be welcome. In addition, the kind of training capacity on issues like countering improvised explosive devices, or security support functions like literacy training, logistics and supply-chain management, or military medicine, to name just a few, present possibilities for Indian expertise to help the Afghan security forces. For a more detailed description of how India could help Afghanistan in the civilian security areas, take a look at my Policy Innovation Memorandum on the subject, published in 2015 but (sadly) still relevant to the region today. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).    

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Larry Hong, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. India kicks off state elections. Political contests in five Indian states over the next two months will offer insight into citizens’ attitudes toward Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s agenda. Last weekend, voters took to the polls in Goa and Punjab. Turnouts in the two states were unusually high with roughly 83 percent of eligible voters taking part in Goa, and 75 percent in Punjab. The relatively new Aam Aadmi party, which focuses on fighting corruption, is expected to excel in Punjab. Voting in Uttar Pradesh, which boasts a whopping 138 million registered voters, begins this weekend and will take place over the course of seven days this month and next. Elections are also being held in the states of Uttarakhand and Manipur. Among the hot campaign topics are unemployment rates and demonetization. The Modi government’s decision to ban 86 percent of all bills in circulation as part of  an effort to fight corruption produced considerable turmoil this fall, and could be a decisive issue for voters, particularly those in rural areas. Major wins for Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will demonstrate popular support for his initiatives, while losses could weaken the BJP government. The election results for all five states will be announced in March; until then expect a flurry of campaign rhetoric. 2. South Korean companies feel pinch over THAAD. Chinese displeasure with South Korea’s decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system has manifested recently in economic troubles for South Korean companies. While South Korean Finance Minister Yoo Il Ho has stated that China has not taken any retaliatory measures over THAAD that warrant official state action, companies like Hyundai are experiencing fallout from Beijing’s dissatisfaction. Hyundai Motor Company recently announced the deferment of the Chinese launch of its Sonata plug-in hybrid due to a recent revision of Chinese qualifications for government subsidies, which now conveniently exclude the Hyundai Sonata hybrid. Lotte’s construction on a theme park in Shenyang, China has also been postponed after Beijing took issue with procedural matters following a fire inspection. The company has also been subject to an increasing number of regulatory probes in China. South Korea’s popular culture and tourism sectors are also feeling the THAAD backlash; music concerts and other performances by South Korean artists have been mysteriously cancelled or postponed, while reports of increasing restrictions on Chinese tourism to South Korea during peak travel seasons have led to a slump in stocks reliant on Chinese tourism. 3. Six Red Cross workers killed in Afghanistan. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported on Wednesday that six of its employees were killed and two went missing in northern Afghanistan’s Jowzjan province while they were en route to deliver livestock materials to remote communities hit by avalanches. Lutfallah Azizi, the provincial governor, said that “unknown gunmen” carried out the attack and claimed they were affiliates of the Islamic State. Although the Taliban has carried out the greatest proportion of the violence in Afghanistan’s fifteen-year war, the group swiftly denied involvement in this particular incident. Peter Maurer, the president of ICRC, tweeted that he was “devastated by this news out of #Afghanistan. My deepest condolences to the families of those killed – and those still unaccounted for.” 4. Booming Chinese overseas deals still face obstacles. In 2016, Chinese acquisitions of foreign companies—about 16 percent of the worldwide total of cross-border deals—skyrocketed to more than twice their 2015 volume. But according to new figures, the amount in cancelled deals grew even faster. In the United States and Europe alone, overseas acquisitions worth $75 billion were scrapped because of regulatory issues, a sevenfold increase from 2015. Because of increased capital outflow controls that can block Chinese companies from making investments abroad, as well as regulatory scrutiny from government actors such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), thirty Chinese deals fell through. Some important acquisitions are still on the table for 2017, despite the opposition: Midea just completed its purchase of Kuka, a German robotics company, for $5 billion, and ChemChina will likely take over Swiss agribusiness giant Syngenta for $43 billion later this year. Despite the hurdles for Chinese investors, the sheer volume of their deal-making is an achievement in itself, given that a decade ago it amounted to less than $3 billion a year. 5. New terms for U.S. studios in China. Hollywood will soon be able to renegotiate the terms of agreement on film releases in China, amidst a slowdown in China’s box office growth. The current agreement was announced in February 2012, during a tour of the United States by Xi Jinping, then China’s vice president and now its president. The agreement raised the number of blockbusters permitted in the Chinese market and allowed foreign filmmakers to receive a larger share of box office revenues. The two countries also decided to renegotiate the agreement in five years. Hollywood has a high stake in seeking better business terms in the new negotiations as China is on track to surpass the United States as the world’s largest movie market. According to several executives, U.S. studios’ top priority in the talks is increasing their share of Chinese box-office receipts from the current 25 percent. While there have been some preliminary negotiations, many observers worry that President Donald J. Trump’s harsh rhetoric on China’s trade practices will have an adverse effect on future discussions. Geetha Ranganathan, an analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence, says that the Trump administration is “making everybody very, very nervous"; the renegotiation “could be a casualty if he really wants to come down hard on it.” It remains unclear whether President Trump’s phone call with President Xi will help smooth the process for these negotiations and others. Bonus: Abe tees off a new era of golf-course diplomacy. After visiting Washington, DC, this Friday, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will hitch a ride on Air Force One to spend an overnight at Mar a Lago, President Trump’s luxurious Florida resort. There, the two leaders will share meals and engage in a classic test of strategy and skill—the game of golf. At their first meeting, in November, Abe and Trump established their common interest in the game through an exchange of golf-themed gifts. This weekend’s encounter will echo an earlier moment in golf-course diplomacy, when, in 1957, then Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, Abe’s grandfather, played a round with then U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Trump has praised the game as a diplomatic tool, and once said that former U.S. President Barack Obama “should play with people who can help the country... if he played more with maybe foreign leaders, it would be a wonderful thing.” Will Chinese President Xi Jinping be next on the green?

Today, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General John “Mic” Nicholson, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Though it remains the longest war in American history, the ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan received little attention during the presidential race and even less since President Trump entered office. You may recall that in December 2009, President Obama authorized the deployment of 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total to 97,000. The vast majority of those troops have returned home; there are 8,400 troops in country now (plus 26,000 military contractors, 9,474 of whom are U.S. citizens). Since Obama’s Afghan surge, the security situation has deteriorated markedly. Nearly 1,700 U.S. troops were killed while serving there, the annual number of civilians casualties (the majority of whom were killed or injured by the Taliban) increased from 7,162 (in 2010) to 11,418 (in 2016), the number of jihadist groups grew (including the creation of a satellite Islamic State outpost)—all while the Taliban expanded its control and influence over more territory than at any other point since 9/11. That last metric is especially revealing, given Obama’s vow that the additional forces would “reverse the Taliban’s momentum.” This has not happened. During today’s hearing, SASC Chairman John McCain asked Nicholson outright, “In your assessment, are we winning or losing?” Nicholson replied, “We’re in a stalemate.” Nicholson added that his command’s objective was to “destroy al-Qaeda” in Afghanistan, and that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were doing most of the direct fighting to accomplish this. However, he noted that he was a “few thousand” troops short of what was needed to adequately train and advise the ANSF. Though Nicholson did not say so explicitly, the implication was that just a few more troops could turn the tide. But it is hard to imagine how these additional forces would improve the security situation in any lasting way. The most telling moment in the SASC hearing came when Nicholson remarked that plans were being developed to “find success” in Afghanistan within the next four years. That would mark a full twenty years of direct U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. Since the first Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary teams entered Afghanistan in November 2001, 2,350 servicemembers have given their lives and almost $900 billion in taxpayers’ money has been spent. Meanwhile, the country is less politically stable and less secure from all forms of insurgent and criminal predation. No one can say how or when this largely forgotten war will end, but “finding success” certainly should begin with some realism, honesty, and a corresponding adjustment in U.S. expectations and objectives.

This blog post was coauthored with my research associate, Jennifer Wilson.  [Note: This post was updated to reflect an additional strike in Yemen in 2016, announced by U.S. Central Command on January 12, 2017.] As President Obama enters the final weeks of his presidency, there will be ample assessments of his foreign military approach, which has focused on reducing U.S. ground combat troops (with the notable exception of the Afghanistan surge), supporting local security partners, and authorizing the expansive use of air power. Whether this strategy “works”—i.e. reduces the threat posed by extremists operating from those countries and improves overall security and governance on the ground—is highly contested. Yet, for better or worse, these are the central tenets of the Obama doctrine. In President Obama’s last year in office, the United States dropped 26,172 bombs in seven countries. This estimate is undoubtedly low, considering reliable data is only available for airstrikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya, and a single "strike," according to the Pentagon’s definition, can involve multiple bombs or munitions. In 2016, the United States dropped 3,028 more bombs—and in one more country, Libya—than in 2015. Most (24,287) were dropped in Iraq and Syria. This number is based on the percentage of total coalition airstrikes carried out in 2016 by the United States in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the counter-Islamic State campaign. The Pentagon publishes a running count of bombs dropped by the United States and its partners, and we found data for 2016 using OIR public strike releases and this handy tool.* Using this data, we found that in 2016, the United States conducted about 79 percent (5,904) of the coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, which together total 7,473. Of the total 30,743 bombs that the coalition dropped, then, the United States dropped 24,287 (79 percent of 30,743). To determine how many U.S. bombs were dropped on each Iraq and Syria, we looked at the percentage of total U.S. OIR airstrikes conducted in each country. They were nearly evenly split, with 49.8 percent (or 2,941 airstrikes) carried out in Iraq, and 50.2 percent (or 2,963 airstrikes) in Syria. Therefore, the number of bombs dropped were also nearly the same in the two countries (12,095 in Iraq; 12,192 in Syria). Last year, the United States conducted approximately 67 percent of airstrikes in Iraq in 2016, and 96 percent of those in Syria.   Sources: Estimate based upon Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2011-2016 Airpower Statistics; CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve Public Affairs Office strike release, December 31, 2016; New America (NA); Long War Journal (LWJ); The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ); Department of Defense press release; and U.S. Africa Command press release.   *Our data is based on OIR totals between January 10, 2016 and December 31, 2016

Donald J. Trump will assume the U.S. presidency at a time of flux in South Asia. Afghanistan appears at risk of greater instability, Pakistan continues to harbor terrorists that attack its neighbors, India-Pakistan tensions have increased, and India’s growth story has hit a speed bump. China has escalated its involvement in the region, with extensive infrastructure development plans for Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The Trump administration’s national security and international economic teams will enter office with both near-term tactical as well as long-term strategic decisions to make about how to approach the region. At the top of the list, given the U.S. troop presence there, will be Afghanistan. Afghanistan figured little during the presidential campaign, so a Trump policy for Afghanistan has yet to be articulated. He can make a virtue of this fresh approach by calling for an immediate review of U.S. interests there. First on the list: a consideration of the size and scope of the U.S. military deployment in Afghanistan—scheduled earlier for a drawdown to around 5,500 troops by the end of this year, but now stabilized at around 8,400 troops to advise the Afghan army now facing a resurgent Taliban that has made territorial gains. The Trump team, like the Obama team and the Bush team before it, will need to reach its own conclusion on U.S. national interests in Afghanistan, and develop its approach to counterterrorism and development there. With the benefit of greater hindsight on our longest war, and a more jaundiced sense of what a U.S. presence can achieve, they will most likely focus on what role U.S. forces can continue to play in providing advice, training, and counterterrorism support for Afghans. Trump has spoken frequently of defeating the Islamic State as a top national security priority, and the rise of pockets of the Islamic State in Afghanistan suggest additional security focus on the country. How he will work with NATO—which maintains a train, advise, and assist presence in Afghanistan, and which Trump disparaged on the campaign trail as “obsolete”—remains an open question. In Kabul, the Afghan National Unity Government’s uneasy truce—a brokered marriage of rivals—has also grown brittle. Trump’s national security team will need to determine how they will approach diplomatic efforts to assist the fragile government in Kabul. And if that weren’t enough to worry about, the revival of Taliban attacks does not suggest readiness to engage in reconciliation negotiations toward a political solution. The interlocking puzzle piece next confronting the Trump team will be Pakistan. Trump’s occasional campaign comments about the country suggested his awareness of the challenge. Pakistan’s endless civil-military tensions continue to plague its development, but a newly-appointed chief of army staff allows Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif some scope to attempt once again to better ties with Afghanistan and with India. The Trump team should take advantage of this change in Pakistan by focusing early diplomacy on impressing upon Pakistani civilian and military leaders how Washington has tired of Pakistan’s games. Fifteen years after 9/11, Pakistan continues to openly harbor UN- and U.S.-designated terrorists who, through attacks on Afghanistan and on India, instigate problems in the region and create the possibility of military escalation. The Trump administration should spell out to Pakistan the potential costs to its ties with the United States from its refusal to adequately address terrorism—and be prepared to start making changes. India-Pakistan ties are at a low point, precisely due to the problem of Pakistan’s unwillingness to curb terrorist groups. Despite the efforts of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif to create a better working relationship, terrorist attacks in a series of locations in India (Gurdaspur, Udhampur, Pathankot, and Uri, to name a few) pushed India to a new kind of response this past September. Following a terrorist attack on an Indian army outpost in Uri, in Kashmir, about a week later the Indian army carried out ground-based “surgical strikes” against what they called terrorist “launching pads” along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. This more heightened situation of tension is cause for concern, given that both countries possess nuclear weapons. But the regularity of the pattern has one common thread: each cycle of violence and escalation begins with a terrorist attack on India mounted from Pakistan. Breaking the cycle requires tackling the terrorism problem at its source. These policy concerns will confront the Trump administration immediately, because of the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, and the interrelated problem that Pakistan poses for Afghanistan’s success and for peace in South Asia. But the long-term strategic bet for the United States will involve our growing relationship with a rising India. The U.S.-India relationship has grown significantly over the past two U.S. administrations, and the Trump administration should pick up the baton to carry things forward. Strategic ties have advanced dramatically, with a shared view of the world and a shared sense that Asia should not be dominated by any single power. Counterterrorism cooperation has grown closer. Defense ties have ramped up dramatically over the past four years, and should continue to grow with an uptick in joint exercises, new agreements permitting closer cooperation, and a joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. The arena with some remaining challenges has been trade and economic ties, and a Trump economic team should be able to identify some positive incentives (such as membership in international economic organizations like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, or APEC) to discuss with New Delhi. As India rises on the world stage, it has increasingly sought a larger voice in global institutions. The Indian government will be looking for a clear statement of support on these matters from the Trump team, particularly regarding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Trump should support this bid, as did the Obama administration, but he could take more active steps on UN reform to make this statement more than just words. Finally, a Trump administration can cast a fresh look at the shape of U.S. diplomacy across the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, and Indian Ocean region. China’s growing economic statecraft efforts—through its “One Belt, One Road” efforts and additional bilateral initiatives with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—indicate expansive ambition. Its work shoring up alternative financial institutions and regional organizations which are not led by the United States or the West has given it other arenas of influence. With the demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), China has doubled down on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), another Asia-wide trade negotiation which also includes India. (The TPP by contrast did not include either India or China.) The Trump administration should take a look at evolving economic and diplomatic patterns across Asia, a region of central long-term importance to U.S. interests, and step up U.S. involvement to ensure that American influence is not eclipsed. New Delhi will be a good partner for such a discussion, and the Trump administration should consult India actively on larger Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean questions. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa). Read more about how the Trump administration should approach U.S. policy toward China (here and here), Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. South Korean president makes second public apology. On Friday, President Park Geun-hye of South Korea made a second public apology amidst rising domestic turmoil surrounding allegations that her close friend, Choi Soon-sil, acted as a kind of “shadow president” and improperly profited from her relationship with the president. In addition to apologizing, Park recently replaced her closest aides, including the prime minister, in a bid to pacify criticism. Large protests against Park, which roiled Seoul last weekend, are expected to be surpassed by turnout at protests scheduled for this weekend. Park’s approval rating has fallen to just 5 percent, according to a Gallup Korea poll, which is the lowest since Park took office in 2013, and the lowest for any Korean president at any moment since 1948. Another poll found that 70 percent of respondents wanted her to resign or be impeached. In her apology, Park stated she would cut ties with Choi, flatly denied any involvement in the cult started by Choi’s father, and pledged to cooperate with any investigations. Choi, who fled to Germany in September when news of the scandal first broke but later returned home, was taken into custody recently under a South Korean law allowing "emergency detention" of suspects if authorities have reasonable grounds to believe the crime may warrant the death penalty or a life sentence, and believe the suspect is a flight risk who may also attempt to destroy evidence. 2. Malaysia to buy four Chinese naval ships. During a visit to Beijing this week, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak signed fourteen agreements worth approximately $34.4 billion. The deals included the purchase of four Chinese littoral mission ships, which are used mainly for coastal patrol and surveillance. Half of these ships will be built in Malaysia and half in China. During the trip, leaders from the two nations also discussed the South China Sea. Prior to his visit, Najib praised China "as a true friend and a strategic partner”. Following on the heels of Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte’s warm reception in Beijing last month, Najib’s trip provoked concern in some circles about closer ties between China and Southeast Asia.  However, others argue that the course of Sino-Malaysian relations has not shifted dramatically and the new agreements relate more to Malaysia’s domestic economic needs than changing geopolitics. 3. Abe promises $7.7 billion for Myanmar’s development. This Wednesday, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would provide 800 billion yen over five years in development aid to Southeast Asia’s fledgling democracy. The funds will come as a combination of official development assistance and private-sector capital, and go primarily toward building industrial capacity and infrastructure. 40 billion yen has been earmarked for supporting development in regions home to ethnic minority groups. Abe’s aid commitment coincides with a visit to Japan by Burmese State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been traveling widely in recent months to strengthen bilateral ties with a number of countries, including China, India, and the United States. However, Japan’s investment promise this week is nothing new: over the past few years, Japanese business operations, language courses, and investment dollars in Myanmar have all increased. So Abe’s generosity signals more of a continued pledge rather than a new chapter in the two countries’ relations. 4. Afghan returnee children make bricks in bondage.  According to the United Nations, roughly 7,400 Afghans are crossing the border each day to return from Pakistan, whose government has imposed a deadline of March 15, 2017, for “voluntary return and repatriation.” The Pakistani government has placed greater emphasis on the return process in response to the spread of terrorism, the presence of ISIS, and deepening ties between Afghanistan and India. The nearly half a million impoverished Afghan returnees from both Pakistan and Iraq are straining the finances of the cash-strapped government and aid organizations, who are attempting to provide humanitarian assistance as winter approaches. Each returning family receives just fifty dollars per household member in assistance, assuming they have proper registration. Many families with young children have settled into brick factories, where they work by day and sleep in the factories at night since their villages of origin have been destroyed amidst the ongoing violence. These bonded laborers, many of whom do not receive the aid promised to them in returnee “incentive packages” by the government, are working for unlivable wages as their kiln bosses profit tremendously. Although Afghan law officially prohibits child labor, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least one quarter of the country’s children ages five through fourteen participate in the labor force. 5. An assertive China hung GSK out to dry. A New York Times report published this week, based on confidential documents and reports, rehashes the sordid bribery and corruption scandal that rocked the British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in China a few years ago, which resulted in a $500 million fine and prosecuted foreign management. Since the case, Chinese prosecutors have targeted a range of foreign businesses in anti-monopoly and anti-corruption cases, including Qualcomm (a record $975 million fine), shipping companies, and automobile manufacturers. And many American business leaders operating in China have simultaneously expressed concerns over rising distrust toward foreign businesses in the country. But the Times report also exposes how a foreign multinational can misstep under China’s increased regulatory assertiveness: in combating initial bribery accusations, GSK followed “the old playbook” and tried to downplay wrongdoing, discredit a whistleblower, and bribe regulators. The tactics backfired, and ended up implicating more executives and private investigators employed by the company. Whether or not Chinese regulators are in fact targeting foreign firms is an open question, but they are certainly not pulling any punches. Bonus: When pigs fly... Alibaba’s decision to rename its travel site Alitrip to Flying Pig, or Fliggy, provoked an unexpected controversy. In response to the change, Uighur snack entrepreneur Adil Memettur posted on Weibo criticizing the name as offensive to Muslims and said he would no longer use the service. Netizens responded with their own critiques of Memettur and Uighurs in general. Memettur later apologized on Weibo. Alibaba also clarified the rationale behind their rebranding, which was an effort to appeal to younger customers, who comprise over 80 percent of their users. But after the recent dust-up it remains to be seen whether the name Fliggy will fly.