It Is Not Too Late: A Case for Long-Range Strikes Against Russia

Douglas E. Lute is the former U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This Ukraine Policy Brief is part of the Council Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine's Future and the Wachenheim Program on Peace and Security.

With President-elect Donald Trump set to take office on January 20, little time remains to make a definitively positive impact on the war in Ukraine. The Joe Biden administration can accelerate authorized and appropriated military support over the next sixty days, reducing the backlog of promised capabilities. American contractors can be deployed to Ukraine to sustain U.S. systems. Yet with two months remaining, the oft-repeated line that there is no silver bullet for Biden to dramatically change the momentum of the war rings true—with one potential exception: a campaign of long-range strikes to isolate the Russian army occupying Ukraine.

The Situation

As the fighting in Ukraine grinds through its third year, the battlefield stands in rough stalemate. Both sides stagger from military force and materiel losses. Yet, the raw reality in this war of attrition gives an unmistakable advantage to Russia. Indeed, while recent events appear to signal a gradual shift in Russia’s favor, it remains true that tactical gains on the ground—in the Donbas for Russia and in Kursk for Ukraine—have not produced strategic momentum for anyone.

Over the course of the war, the United States and its fifty-nation coalition have kept Ukraine alive with historic levels of military assistance. But that Western support has consistently been an ongoing exercise in self-doubt. Incrementalism became the hallmark of Western support early on. At first, small arms and ammunition flowed in, followed by shoulder-fired anti-tank and anti-air missiles. Over time, more sophisticated air defense, artillery, armored vehicles, and, eventually, F-16 fighter aircraft made their way to the battlefield. But each decision to intensify materiel support to the Ukrainians came only after time-consuming bureaucratic discussions, options papers, and roundtable decision-making, followed by further delays in actually delivering systems to Ukrainian forces. Moreover, the West’s commitment to support Ukraine “as long as it takes” has often been too little, too late, providing just enough for Ukraine not to lose, but not enough for Ukraine to win.

The best opportunity for a decisive Ukrainian win on the battlefield to date was the counteroffensive Kyiv conducted in mid-2023. Yet, chiefly because of Western incrementalism, that chance was squandered. Russian occupiers had months to prepare defenses in depth, and Ukraine’s forces lacked sufficient combined-arms capabilities and training to exploit their gains. In one of the toughest battlefield tasks—deliberate assaults on prepared defenses—the Ukrainians failed to crack the Russian lines and regain significant ground. Since then, a bloody stalemate has set in.

Policy Concerns

Western leaders have explained their cautious incremental support in at least three ways. First, they wanted to avoid dramatically escalating the war, possibly provoking Russia to use nuclear weapons. Second, they had serious concerns regarding the Ukrainians’ ability to make effective use of the equipment they were being given. Third, they harbored doubts about the effects of those transfers on the readiness of their own forces.

Initially, escalation concerns dominated. The fear was that Russia could feel forced to escalate dramatically in response to Ukrainian gains, perhaps even crossing the nuclear threshold. After nearly three years of battlefield experience, however, it is now clear that Russia will stay conventional, using every means in its arsenal short of its nuclear weapons to strike Ukraine, even when declared red lines are crossed. Yes, after repeated battlefield setbacks, Russia has, in fact, responded with massive attacks on Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. Yet there has been no evidence of a move toward using nuclear weapons, despite humiliating losses by Russia in the early weeks around Kyiv, the 2022 collapse around Kharkiv, the withdrawal from Kherson, the defeat of the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, Ukrainian attacks on military targets inside Russia, and, most recently, the occupation by Ukrainian forces of Russian territory in Kursk. Putin has repeatedly mentioned Russia’s nuclear capabilities, announced revisions to Russian nuclear doctrine and used nuclear-capable missile systems with conventional payloads to attack Ukraine.  Nonetheless, nuclear deterrence appears still to work—likely due to a combination of the early American refreshing of the consequences of crossing the nuclear threshold combined with Chinese and Indian warnings to Russian President Vladimir Putin not to cross the nuclear red line.

The second repeated explanation for cautious incremental support has cited the limits of the Ukrainian ability to absorb increased assistance. Again, the experience of the past three years refutes this argument. Ukraine has repeatedly received, integrated, and crafted innovative adaptations of Western military systems at rates unknown even among the nations providing the systems. Perhaps the most compelling example is the integration of a wide array of air defense capabilities into a nation-wide system defending against Russian attacks on civilian targets—attacks that are unprecedented in scale, scope, and duration. In a literal fight for its life, Ukraine has repeatedly proven its ability to make effective use of every capability provided.

Third, Western leaders have paused in providing military assistance to Ukraine to consider the readiness of their own national forces. This issue applies most critically to “low density, high demand systems,” such as Patriot air defense and long-range precision-strike systems. Such concerns are legitimate, but risks to readiness can be mitigated, if not eliminated entirely. For example, the Biden administration reprioritized Patriot missile sales to third countries, placing Ukraine at the top of the list and deferring delivery to others, with no obviously adverse consequences to those third parties. Ultimately, decisions hinge on what risks to accept when weighed against giving Ukraine what it needs today.

Attacking Russia’s Weakness

Providing Ukraine significant quantity of long-range, precision-strike systems and permitting their use on military targets inside Russian can still make a significant difference. While Ukraine has struck targets inside Russia using its own systems, those efforts have been insufficient in scale and scope to have an operational impact. If accurate, reports that President Biden has removed some geographic restrictions on Ukraine’s use of U.S. systems is a step in the right direction. To be sure, a campaign of precision strikes inside Russia alone will not win the war, but it could shift the momentum on the battlefield in Ukraine’s favor, moving Kyiv and its supporters to a position of strength when meaningful negotiations can be set up.

The reason such a campaign holds promise has to do with the nature of the five hundred thousand Russian soldiers occupying Ukrainian sovereign territory. The Russian army reflects Russian society: top-down control, indiscipline, and corruption. The war in Ukraine reveals the futility of Putin’s ten-year investment program to modernize his army. Nothing has succeeded—not organizational reform, the introduction of new equipment, or enhanced training. The Russians have failed on every front. Almost three years after the February 2022 invasion Russia has suffered an estimated six hundred thousand casualties, and its occupying force either remains entrenched behind deep defensive belts or launches human-wave assaults that yield only tactical gains. Russia fields a large but low-grade force: poorly equipped, poorly trained, poorly led, motivated by coercion, and undisciplined in the extreme.

Moreover, the Russian army relies on resupply from Russia by way of a network of railroads. Rail-based logistics dominate because Russian military doctrine prioritizes mass, and supplies need to traverse the extended distances within Russia and beyond. Only railroads can fill the demand, and railroads are vulnerable to long-range strikes. Physical infrastructure—track, bridges, tunnels, switching stations, engine yards, diesel fuel depots—can be struck and restruck to isolate the occupying Russian army. The most obvious such target is the Kerch Strait bridge, connecting Russia to the occupied Crimean Peninsula. This bridge and rail constitute a key lifeline for the Russian forces occupying sovereign Ukrainian territory. Similarly, other rail lines supply the Russians occupying four provinces of mainland Ukraine.

Operational Benefits

Long-range strikes into Russia open several opportunities for Ukraine. The operational objective of a long-range strike campaign would be to isolate the Russian occupying army by attacking its low-quality force dependent on rail resupply while avoiding the strength of the dug-in Russian defenses along the frontline. Russia cannot mitigate its vulnerabilities in the near term. Degrading Russian logistics will take on an amplified significance as winter weather sets in and much of the infrastructure of the occupied territory has been destroyed. Isolation from logistics can lead to additional degradation of the Russian forces, potentially including desertions, revolts against leaders, and even a collapse of military forces, making continued occupation untenable. Of course, a potential Russian army collapse would severely challenge the Kremlin politically and serve to dramatically shift the momentum in favor of Ukraine, setting the stage for meaningful negotiations.

The Biden administration could set this campaign in motion now and the Trump administration could use it—or even the threat of it—to pursue the president-elect’s election campaign promise to end the war. The single most important resource to this end is the U.S. ATACMS—Army Tactical Missile System—a ballistic missile with a roughly two hundred–mile range that is already in the hands of the Ukrainian army but in insufficient quantity and with restrictions placed on its use against targets inside Russia. If the United States took the lead, other long-range missile systems from France and the United Kingdom that have been provided to Ukraine could contribute to the campaign. Germany, too, could be persuaded to join the effort by providing Ukraine its Taurus missile system.

A Window of Opportunity

Early concerns about potential Russian escalation if U.S. systems strike inside Russia are now less compelling given the experience of the past three years. Most recently, Ukrainian forces operated U.S. combat vehicles in the Kursk province of Russia without a change in Russian escalation. There can be no concern about Ukraine’s ability to absorb sophisticated capabilities as they already have employed ATACMS (albeit in limited numbers). The risk to U.S. military readiness remains a concern but several facts can help place this concern in perspective. More than 3,700 ATACMS have been produced over the past 30 years, yet only approximately 600 have ever been fired by U.S. forces in combat. Roughly five hundred new ATACMS are produced each year. Some missiles are now approaching obsolescence as they are replaced by newer models. Thus, it seems safe to estimate that the United States holds enough ATACMS to support Ukraine and still remain ready for other contingencies. Moreover, beyond the United States, eight other countries (including four NATO allies) also have the capability and six more countries are contracted to receive ATACMS (including three NATO allies and even forty missiles destined for Morocco). Concerns over degrading U.S. readiness can also be addressed if the United States were to authorize those nations with systems to provide them to Ukraine and by deciding that scheduled contract deliveries will be amended to prioritize Ukraine, as was done with Patriot missiles.

In sum, there is no silver bullet, no single military capability to ensure a positive outcome for Ukraine. War is not that simple. It is also true that war requires adaptation. There are viable campaign adaptations that could still change the momentum in Ukraine’s favor, even in the next two months, moving it away from a war of attrition that ultimately favors Russia and placing Ukraine in a position of greater strength when meaningful negotiations become a possibility. It is not too late to do the right thing and give Ukraine what it needs.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.