China in Africa: February 2025

China-South Africa Alignment in Johannesburg: From February 20 to 21, South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola hosted the Group of Twenty (G20) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, the first of a series of working-group and ministerial-level meetings that South Africa will host over the course of 2025. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent were both absent from the meeting. South Africa’s G20 presidency, operating under the theme of solidarity, equality, and sustainability, will culminate in the G20’s twentieth Heads of State and Government Summit in November 2025 in Johannesburg.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended alongside Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, as well as European envoys including EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot, and British Foreign Secretary David Lammy. Wang remarked on the cohesiveness of the G20, stating that the theme was agreed upon by the entire group. “Under the different circumstances, it is particularly important to respond to the needs of developing countries,” he added. Wang reemphasized China’s support for cooperation in areas such as disaster reduction, debt sustainability, just energy transition, and critical minerals. Chinese Ambassador to South Africa Wu Peng held talks with Lamola to discuss the two nations’ bilateral relations, noting that trade between China and South Africa totaled $52.5 billion in 2024. Lamola welcomed continued Chinese investment in South Africa to further accelerate industrialization.

Economic Diplomacy: Here, There, Everywhere: Throughout February, economics was a through line in China-Africa diplomatic exchanges. According to Denys Denya, senior executive vice president of Africa Export-Import Bank, the then-hypothetical Trump-imposed 10 percent tariff on Chinese goods dominated conversations at the thirty-first Investing in African Mining Indaba Conference, which took place in Cape Town, South Africa, from February 3 to 6. On February 3, he discussed the potential fallout of U.S. tariffs on the African mining industry for Voice of America: “Because China sources lots of its minerals from Africa that go into its manufacturing which then gets exported, there’s a potential negative knock-on effect on African mining, if the demand is not there as a result of the tariff. But we are waiting to see what the impact will be. At the moment we can speculate, but we don’t really have the evidence.”

Elsewhere on the continent, diplomacy was focused on “peace, prosperity, and a brighter future,” which is exactly how Ghanaian President John Mahama described his country’s sixty-five-year relations with China at a Chinese lantern festival celebration. Similar rhetoric was heard at celebrations in Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, and beyond.

In Nigeria, private and public enterprises have been urged to attend the 137th Canton Fair to be held in China in April. A planning committee was appointed to organize the 2025 Nigeria-China Sustainable Trade, Investment, and Bilateral Relations Summit, which will showcase market-ready projects and foster partnership across key strategic sectors, such as agriculture, construction, mining, oil and gas, and power. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, a conference aimed at strengthening economic and trade cooperation between Ethiopia and China’s Jiangsu province was held. Earlier in Cairo, Deputy Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament Mohamed Abou El-Enein remarked on China’s ability to boost Egypt’s 2024–30 industrial strategy, in part by assisting Egypt in its localization of the automobile industry by opening in-country factories. Kenya continues to have a staunch ally in China, which was reaffirmed by Chinese Ambassador to Kenya Guo Haiyan. Not only does China “have Kenya’s back” amid the aid freeze coming from the United States, she noted, but it will also continue to explore market opportunities for Kenyan traders and products in China.

Going Green: China continues to support Africa’s green energy transition through public and private partnerships. A trilateral agreement between Samancor Chrome, one of South Africa’s largest minerals-processing companies; CGN Africa Energy, a Chinese company specializing in non-nuclear power generation; and the China-Africa Development Fund, a state-backed venture that supports Chinese investments in Africa, is aiming to develop a one-hundred-megawatt solar power project in South Africa’s Limpopo province to provide renewable energy to Samancor. In Nigeria’s Akwa Ibom state, a $7.9 billion green hydrogen project is underway. The shared efforts of the Nigerian federal government, APPL Hydrogen, Ltd., and China’s LONGi Green Energy Technology will produce 1.2 million tons of green hydrogen-based methanol per year for export, in addition to medical oxygen and food-grade CO2. In Algeria, state-owned oil and gas firm Sonatrach and China’s Sinopec signed a $850 million contract for hydrocarbon development and exploration.

Innovation That Excites (or Fails to): Certain Chinese-African innovative collaborations initiated in February were fruitful. Others were not. For example, in Ghana, Minister for Roads and Highways Kwame Agbodza held a bilateral meeting with H. E. Tong Defa, Chinese ambassador to Ghana, to strengthen cooperation on road infrastructure development. Areas for future collaboration were discussed, including smart highways and innovative construction technologies.

In Cairo, however, it has been revealed that a cutting-edge satellite lab previously believed to be Egyptian is really a recent advancement in China’s discreet overseas space program, as reported by Reuters. It is public knowledge that China provides space technology to African countries, including by donating satellites, space-monitoring telescopes, and ground stations. What Reuters appears to have uncovered, through six unidentified sources with direct knowledge of China’s space projects on the continent, is that China has access to data and imagery collected from the technology it donates, and that Chinese personnel maintain a permanent presence in the facilities it constructs in Africa. Liu Pengyu, spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., refrained from commenting on whether China is using space technology in Africa to conduct surveillance.

Chinese-North African Military Integration: Throughout February, several North African countries purchased or agreed to begin producing Chinese-origin military equipment as part of an effort to modernize their military capabilities and diversify their defense suppliers. In a maneuver that technologically upgraded its unmanned aerial vehicle fleet, Morocco acquired the TB-001K drone (“Twin-Tailed Scorpion”). Manufactured by Sichuan Tengden, the drone can carry up to 1.5 tons of munitions and exhibits a range of 8,000 kilometers with a continuous flight endurance of 40 hours, making it well suited for reconnaissance and attack missions. Straying from its historical reliance on American, French, and Russian aircraft, Egypt acquired its first batch of Chengdu J-10CE fighter jets (“Vigorous Dragons”) from China. The J-10CE is equipped with an active electronically scanned array radar system, which enhances its targeting and tracking capabilities, while its delta wing and canard configuration make it a more agile alternative to the American-made F-16 aircraft. The aircraft can carry up to 5.6 tons of munitions and has a combat radius of 550 kilometers. Unofficial reports from a Chinese military source have indicated that Sudan is also eyeing the J-10CE. The purchase is reportedly being considered in the context of the country’s relationship with Ethiopia, with whom Sudan disputes the al-Fashaga region and the construction of a dam that threatens its water supply. Meanwhile, the Algerian Ministry of Defense sidelined Russia when it announced a plan to both purchase and locally construct Chinese Type 056 corvettes rather than acquire Russian Project 22380 missile corvettes. Developed by Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding Group, one of the world’s leading shipbuilders, the Chinese corvette is among the most advanced naval vessels in Africa.

The Chagos Islands Debate: American and British politicians continue to debate the ceding of the Chagos Islands by the United Kingdom (UK) to China-friendly Mauritius.

In line with a 2019 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion, the UK agreed in October 2024 to cede the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, with the stipulation that Diego Garcia, the largest island that houses a joint U.S.-UK military base, would remain under U.S. and UK jurisdiction for at least the next ninety-nine years. The deal also prevents Mauritius from renting the nearby islands of Peros Banhos, Danger Island, and the Egmont Islands. Critics argue that UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer was under no obligation to respect the ICJ advisory opinion, however, and that the tactical error could give China greater insight into U.S.-UK activities on Diego Garcia.

Critical of the deal made by his predecessor Pravind Jugnauth, Mauritius Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam amended the deal’s demands to include lease payments of £90 million per year from the UK, rising with inflation for the full lease term. He has also reopened negotiations, which he announced mid-February would include representatives from the United States so as to “further strengthen the process.” Those negotiations had better proceed with haste, argues Stephen Doughty, a British foreign office minister. If the UK is not able to strike a deal with Mauritius before the Chagos Islands secure a binding judgment from the ICJ, he believes that the United States and the UK will likely be cut off from satellite communications by the Geneva-based International Telecommunication Union and lose control of its airspace following an intervention by the Montreal-based International Civil Aviation Organization. He also cautions that if the deal does not go through, the adversaries in question could plausibly establish “outposts” on the islands surrounding Diego Garcia, as the UK would not be able to legally remove them, which he believes could spark a confrontation as serious as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Though U.S. President Donald J. Trump has indicated that he is inclined to support the deal, members of his inner circle remain concerned about increased exposure to adversarial actors. On a trip to London, Trump ally Jim Risch (R-ID), chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stressed “the unneeded risk” ceding the Chagos Islands to Mauritius would pose to collective security. That follows past criticisms of the deal from U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and both Trump’s current and former national security advisors, Mike Waltz and H. R. McMaster. Risch continued, “We understand that the government has put measures in place to limit the Chinese navy’s ability to encroach upon Diego Garcia, but it isn’t just about the Chinese navy. We are equally worried about collection activities conducted by China’s commercial—so-called commercial—and oceanographic spy vessels.”