Brazil

The following is a guest post by Robert Muggah and Misha Glenny. Brazil has embraced the digital age with more gusto than most. It is one of the top users of social media and recently signed-off on a bill of rights for the Internet, the Marco Civil. The country is also a leader in the development of online banking with more than 43 percent of web users engaging such services, and can be proud of a thriving software industry, including some world class companies. But as computer users around the world are beginning to grasp, the spread of the digital world has its dark side. Alongside all the great things the Internet offers, not least new forms of political and economic empowerment, it brings some very serious threats. Brazilians are waking up to the reality of online scams, hacking, espionage and digital surveillance. And while the government is taking cyber malfeasance seriously, it may have seriously misinterpreted the nature and significance of those threats and, as a consequence, the best way to tackle them. For political reasons, Brasilia has outsourced most responsibility for the country’s cybersecurity to the military. While the armed forces has enthusiastically embraced this new role, placing them in charge of overall cybersecurity for both civilian and military networks is a mismatch that could have damaging consequences the country’s security. Not all cyber threats are equal. Perhaps the most egregious one is economically-motivated cyber crime—the targeting of private banks, firms and individuals. Others are posed by domestic and international hacktivist groups intent on disrupting government services and corporate websites. Brazil’s popular protests of June-August 2013, for example, coincided with a sharp rise in hacktivist activity. Edward Snowden’s revelations have ratcheted-up Brazil’s concern with cybersecurity. The U.S. National Security Agency was routinely spying on state and commercial networks, including listening on Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s phone conversations. Brazil is friendly to the United States at a time of rising anti-Americanism in Latin America. But it, too, harbors a historical skepticism toward US intentions and Washington should not underestimate the reputational damage that its global surveillance strategy has inflicted. Cyber espionage and perhaps, further down the line, cyber warfare are now threats that are being taken very seriously. Notwithstanding the growing angst in Brasilia, and indeed many capitals across the Americas, comparatively little is actually known about what real dangers are lurking in cyberspace. There is virtually no public debate or research into those responsible for launching attacks, what their interests and motivations might be, how they operate, or if and how they might be connected to criminal and political organizations. There are only a few experts evaluating public and private sector responses to these threats which appear to have increased exponentially in number and sophistication in the last three years. While operating to a large extent in the dark, the Brazilian government has nevertheless rapidly constructed a sprawling cybersecurity and defense infrastructure. Its response is narrowly focused on just one or two dimensions of these threats—especially foreign ones. At the center of the state’s response is the Brazilian Army’s Center for Cyber Defense (CDCiber), one of the only such entities in South America. Yet the emphasis on a military response may be incommensurate with the real (as opposed to existential) threats facing the country. Despite allegations of Hezbollah smuggling weapons to Brazilian gangs (these rumors have been circulating for decades), the country has comparatively few external cyber threats from foreign governments or terrorist groups. This represents a mismatch with the real and emerging threats in cyberspace. Instead of focusing on international and domestic cyber-criminality, which constitutes by far the gravest risk, the state is doubling down on strengthening cyber war-fighting and anti-terrorism capabilities. This is not to suggest that cyberterrorism and cyber warfare are not real threats. Rather the government is overemphasizing broader issues of national security rather than addressing the most pressing challenges confronting citizens—that is cyber crime. Although less than half of all Brazilians have bank accounts, the security of the country’s online banking infrastructure has always been more advanced that its American counterpart. Brazilian banks introduced double and even triple verification years before most other countries and biometric security is now the norm for most ATMs. Security in other online sectors, however, is far behind global standards and public or government sites are easily hacked. The military approach to cyber insecurity in Brazil is consistent with a broader effort to find a role for the Brazilian armed forces in the twenty-first century. On the one hand, they are strengthening border control and anti-drug activities in the Amazon and the so-called tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. On the other, the military is seeking to expand its reach and influence in cyberspace. All of this has profound consequences for individual rights and public spending. The outsized military response risks compromising citizens’ fundamental rights owing to, among other things, the temptation to undertake surveillance and censorship. For instance, CDCiber and Brazil’s central intelligence agency (ABIN) created social media monitoring platforms in the aftermath of the 2013 protests. Meanwhile, other public institutions such as the Federal Police are less generously resourced and supported. These developments are partly inspired by Brazil’s desire to enhance its geopolitical reach and relevance. As a rising power, the Brazilian government is mobilizing the country’s nascent cybersecurity architecture to project soft power in bilateral relations and multilateral arenas. For example, in 2013 the President requested that the UN develop a new global legal system to govern the Internet. Brazil’s own Internet architecture is still work in progress. While there have been some important developments, there are conflicting lines of accountability among institutions, distorted funding priorities, confused public debate, contradictory legislative measures and the importation of outside solutions for local challenges. In the meantime, the military has “captured” resources for cyberdefense, with potentially dangerous implications for civil liberties more generally. What is more, the comparatively limited engagement of civil society in cybersecurity debates in Brazil means that the armed forces have free reign to advance their interests. What is urgently needed is a balanced cyber security strategy, one that accurately gauges evolving threats to understand where future vulnerabilities reside. First, the government should encourage people to talk. There is a now a lively conversation in Brazil about the many positive developments related to e-governance, smart cities, digital sovereignty and other new information technologies. Curiously, there is a silence on issues related to cybersecurity and cyberdefense. Where debated at all, conversations tend to be reserved to the highest levels of government, the armed forces, law enforcement agencies and a narrow group of businesses, though there are signs this may be starting to change. The second step is to put in place measured and efficient strategies to engage cyber threats. Since the budgets allocated for cyber-related issues are hard to predict, there is considerable bureaucratic competition over funds. Military, law enforcement and civilian entities may exaggerate risks in order to increase their likely access to resources. If Brazil is to build a cybersecurity system fit for purpose, an informed debate is imperative. At a minimum, Brazilians need to better understand the dynamics of cyber crime groups, and the ways in which traditional crime is migrating online. It also needs to monitor how security forces are adapting new surveillance technologies. Above all, the government should encourage a broader debate with a clear communications strategy about the need for cybersecurity and what forms this might take. Robert Muggah is research director of the Igarapé Institute and also director of policy and research at the SecDev Group. Misha Glenny is author of McMafia and Dark Markets. The authors would also like to give credit to Gustavo Diniz, a former researcher at the Igarapé Institute. This article is based on a new Strategic Paper by the Igarapé Institute—Deconstructing Cyber Security in Brazil: Threats and Responses—released in December 2014. An earlier version of this article was posted on OpenDemocracy. 

Alisha Sud is an intern for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In October, Baidu, China’s top search engine, bought Peixe Urbano, Brazil’s largest internet marketplace for local commerce. According to the Peixe Urbano website, the deal “represents one of the most important acquisitions to date in the Brazilian internet and technology sector.” Earlier in July, Baidu even launched a Portuguese version of the site. The goal is to capitalize on the increasing number of internet users in Brazil; it is projected that upwards of 43 million Brazilians will be online within the next three years. Baidu is just one example of a company growing China’s presence in a Brazilian market and providing access to capital and technological expertise. The acquisition is also illustrative of China’s trade and investment strategy shifting from a focus on natural resources to include the industrial and service sectors. China’s efforts to ramp up economic ties are due to Brazil’s growing consumer base. The country’s middle class now includes 55 percent of the population, and the number of Brazilians living in poverty has declined from 26 percent in 2002 to 10 percent in 2012. Chinese companies see it as an opportune time to increase the supply of manufactured goods and services. In addition, weak manufacturing capacity in Brazil makes Chinese products more competitive for Brazilians with newfound, yet still limited, purchasing power. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has strongly supported expanding economic activity with China, and before her recent reelection, she signed more than fifty energy, finance, and industry accords with Chinese President Xi Jinping. When China pledged more than US$8.6 billion in investments and loans in Brazil this past July, Rousseff stated that the accords “consolidated China as a great partner in Brazil’s development.” Since 2009, China has been the country’s largest trading partner. President Rousseff’s enthusiasm notwithstanding, challenges to the economic relationship have also emerged. The China-Brazil investment gap continues to widen as deals between Rousseff and Chinese President Xi Jinping have led to three of China’s biggest state-owned banks lending billions of reais for infrastructure development. In 2012, Brazil also had roughly a $19 billion trade deficit with China. In addition, there are also concerns that Chinese products will replace those produced domestically. Demand for solar technology, for example, is on the rise in Brazil, but homegrown companies have lost out to Chinese company Yingli Solar, which has come to dominate the market after its sponsorship of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Rio de Janeiro. Also, the recent launch of a Chinese Chery Automobile plant in Sao Paolo has allowed the company to avoid high government taxes on imported vehicles, a measure that had been intended to support the domestic car industry. Marcos Troyjo, codirector of the BRICLab at Columbia University, points out that the relationship with China is putting Brazil at an enormous disadvantage, no matter how bullish Rousseff might be. He argues, “One ton of Brazilian exports to China are worth about US$200. One ton of Chinese exports to Brazil are worth more than US$3,000. One would have a hard time calling that a ‘partnership.’” Roberto Giannetti da Fonseca of the Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo State similarly believes “the relationship with China is important for Brazil, but from the point of view of industry, it’s abysmal.” While Chinese companies reap the benefits of a significant presence in Brazil’s domestic market, the risk of public outcry runs high. Demonstrations have already occurred: in 2013, the Chinese acquisition of Brazil’s largest oil field sparked violent protests in Rio de Janeiro. That same year, Brazilian textile workers protested in Sao Paulo over the loss of manufacturing jobs to China; one sign read “In defense of national industry and our jobs.” Friction will continue to grow as China expands investment in additional facets of the Brazilian economy. While Rousseff shows no sign of diminishing support for Chinese investment and trade, public concern may cause the government to review its policies. Back in 2011, in the face of China’s growing interest in large-scale land acquisition, Brazil sought to tighten up laws that impose limits on farmland purchases by foreigners. Allowing Chinese companies free reign to invest now might come with the immediate benefit of increased access to capital, but it will make it that much harder to win back control when, and if, Brazilian leadership feels that China has overextended its welcome.

Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff won the first–round of the 2014 presidential election yesterday with almost 42 percent of the vote. The real surprise of the contest, however, came in Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) nominee Aecio Neves’s impressive second place finish, capturing a third of voters and surpassing Marina Silva of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). Although Neves’s polling numbers had risen in the election lead–up, few expected such a strong showing. Neves and Rousseff now turn to the October 26 runoff. For the next three weeks Neves will enjoy equal air time for government–regulated TV and radio advertisements, almost tripling his exposure from before the first round. The domestic and international business communities have already thrown their support behind him, and many hope that Silva will formally endorse him and bring many of her voters (21 percent) into his camp. This is particularly important in the southeast—home to 62 million potential voters (43 percent of all citizens of voting age)—where Silva won 24 percent compared to Neves’s 39.4 percent. A strong showing there could outweigh Rousseff’s strength in the north and northeast of the nation. Still, as James Bosworth has pointed out, only two incumbents in the last thirty years in Latin America have lost their reelection bids, the last being a decade ago in the Dominican Republic. The next president will face substantial economic challenges. Foreign currency holdings, investment, and growth are all down. Inflation and interest rates are up. More structurally, Brazil’s economy is bifurcated between a modern, productive part linked to the world alongside a stagnant, sheltered side (not unlike other emerging economies, including Mexico). Under Rousseff, Brazil has slowed rather than increased in its connections with the world. Trade is down in the face of falling commodity prices and targeted protections. The country has yet to complete its decade–long negotiations with the EU, even as other Latin American nations have signed some thirty free trade agreements since Rousseff entered office in January of 2011. Brazil also stands outside the two largest and most dynamic free trade negotiations involving the region today—the Pacific Alliance and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). A recent McKinsey report estimates that opening the economy could increase GDP by 1.25 percent per year—four times 2014 projections. This would come primarily from greater pressure to innovate and invest. For Brazil to leverage its many advantages—its natural resources, sizable domestic market, strong banking system, numerous entrepreneurs, and globally competitive companies—it needs to embrace trade globalization. And whether the election run–off brings a Rousseff or a Neves administration, trade should be put at the forefront of the agenda.

The economic rise of the developing south is one of the biggest trends of the last decade, accelerated by the 2008 global economic downturn. Since 2001 trade between these countries has grown 18 percent a year on average, outpacing global trade growth of 11 percent. Nearly half of all exports worldwide now originate in emerging markets—predominantly Asia. A recent Inter-American Development Bank report lays out how Latin America is faring with these global shifts. Overall the region has not kept pace. Trade flows have lagged GDP growth, up 1.1 percent and 3 percent respectively in 2012. In part this reflects Latin America’s strong links to mature rather than developing economies—the United States and the European Union remain the region’s largest trading partners. Mexico, Latin America’s largest exporter by far, leads this trend, fully integrated with the United States (and to a lesser extent Canada). Central American and Caribbean countries generally follow, sending the majority of their exports north. IDB, “After the Boom: Prospects for Latin America and the Caribbean in South-South Trade,” 2013. In contrast, many South American nations have made the shift, sending two-thirds or more of their exports to other emerging markets. For Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, China is already their largest export destination, and according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle Kingdom will edge out the European Union as the region’s number two trading partner by the end of the decade. Yet this growing dependence has been double-edged more recently, as China’s growth slows. Still, bright spots exist for Latin America.  Exports to their neighbors are robust, accounting for more than half of total South-South trade. Intra-industry trade is an important component, and more likely to involve intermediary and manufactured goods. Economists show that these exchanges are more likely to bring benefits in terms of productivity, competitiveness, and innovation. And there are still advantages to Latin America’s geographic and historical trade flows with the United States: these exports are more diverse and provide more value added than those with China. As Latin American nations diversify their export destinations, the challenge will be to do the same with their products.  While still far from building the robust supply chains that dominate Asia, growing intra-industry trade in the region hints at the possibility that in some industries and sectors an actual “Latin American factory” could emerge.

With the World Cup over, Brazilians are turning to their next big event—October’s presidential elections. While President Dilma Rousseff still leads in the polls, her margins continue to shrink. A recent Datafolha poll puts Rousseff and Aecio Neves—her leading challenger—as statistically tied in a hypothetical second round. Potentially adding to Rousseff’s vulnerabilities is Brazil’s electricity sector, which, though opened to private investment in the 1990s, remains dominated by the state through its stake in Electrobras. The combination of weather dependent sourcing, underinvestment, and rising demand has led the system to the brink of capacity. And political history shows that disruptions aren’t looked upon kindly by voters—as José Serra surely remembers, when power rationing helped Rousseff’s predecessor Lula finally get to Planalto. The current shortages are a result of several factors. One is the lack of rainfall. Two-thirds of Brazil’s power depends on hydro. After a disappointing December-March rainy season, reservoirs are at near-record lows. A second problem is the lack of connections. New power line construction has been repeatedly delayed. As a result, many plants and wind farms stand idle, unconnected to the grid. Other generating and transmission projects are also behind schedule. These supply constraints are also exacerbated by growing demand. In 2013, consumption rose over 5 percent compared to the previous year, and electric power consumption shows no signs of abating in the near future. This reflects increasing wealth—as incomes rise, so too does electricity use. It is also spurred by government policies—electorally friendly 20 percent residential price cuts in 2012 boosted usage (Electrobras’ share price plunged in the wake of the announcement). The government has tried to compensate by importing natural gas to fuel existing power plants and diversifying its mix away from hydro through new fossil fuel plants. Still, the current lack of spare capacity—estimated at just 2 percent—has led to power outages. Last February, as many as 6 million consumers and industrial users in eleven states lost power. In addition, several companies have struggled since the outage, including those serving Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.  And studies by Rio de Janeiro-based energy consultancy PSR puts the risk of further blackouts at roughly 20 percent. But even if the lights stay on through the October election, the next administration will face difficult choices. The sector’s current high costs will likely require both government financial support and consumer price hikes, feeding inflation. Shortages will dissuade investment in energy intensive industries—including steel and petrochemicals—and hinder economic growth more broadly. And the problem of increasing supply to keep pace with demand will only continue. While 2014 may bring more rain, what Brazil really needs is vast investments in electricity infrastructure to underpin a more promising economic future.

Lauren Dickey is a research associate for U.S. foreign policy and Sharone Tobias is a research associate for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Chinese president Xi Jinping began his week-long visit to Latin America today on the heels of a number of major events. Brazil is central in the minds of many as the World Cup wraps up and Rio de Janeiro prepares to host the Olympics, initially darkened by protests. Argentina is facing a new unhappy chapter in its battle against debt. China’s ideological allies, Cuba and Venezuela, remain prone to domestic instability amid economic reform. These four countries are planning to roll out the red carpet for President Xi as his visit coincides with the sixth BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) summit. While it will still be a long time before China can challenge Washington’s role in the region, recent events, particularly in Argentina and Brazil, may have cracked open a door for closer relationships between China and several nations. Xi’s trip will begin with the BRICS summit in Brazil on July 15-16. The BRICS member nations have agreed to accelerate the creation of a new development bank that will focus on lending to developing countries at lower rates and with less preconditions than the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The BRICS Development Bank, likely to be based in Shanghai, is expected to have a maximum value of $100 billion, with China contributing $41 billion; Brazil, Russia, and India contributing $18 billion each; and South Africa giving $5 billion. Some experts posit that the New Development Bank, as it will be called, could bypass the IMF and the World Bank, fostering South-South lending and much-needed investment in the developing world. Beyond the BRICS summit, China is also planning to invest in Brazil’s infrastructure and domestic industries. With a sluggish GDP and a desperate need for investment in infrastructure, Brazilian officials have high hopes for China’s visit. Chinese officials are expected to announce investments in the country’s food, transportation, and energy sectors during Xi’s stay. China is already Brazil’s biggest trading partner, buying mostly iron ore and soybeans, but Brazil hopes to expand the relationship to processed goods and other more advanced exports, not just raw commodities. They have already achieved a small success in one area: Brazil’s Embraer aerospace and defense company is planning to announce a contract to sell twenty-five airplanes to Chinese airlines during Xi’s visit. Xi has another potential talking point with Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff: Internet governance and sovereignty. Brazil has been infuriated with the United States since Edward Snowden’s revelations about U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) activities showed extensive surveillance in Brazil---including of Brazilian energy company Petrobras while it was negotiating deals for contracts. China shares a strong concern for U.S. surveillance abilities, as well as a desire for greater autonomy and control over the Internet within its borders. Xi and Rousseff are likely to discuss their opinions on cybersecurity and Internet governance during his stay. After Brazil, Xi will continue on to Venezuela. The Sino-Venezuelan economic relationship centers around two things: oil (exported from Venezuela, an OPEC country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves) and arms (sold to Venezuela by China, with at least two Chinese-made systems used by Venezuela’s National Guard to crack down on protesters earlier this year). Under President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela worked to diversify its oil exports away from the United States, and increased cooperation with China. PetroChina signed a deal with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) in 2011 to build an oil refinery, and last year the two countries announced $28 billion in energy-related deals. Xi and his entourage will travel to Argentina next, where China is well-positioned to increase its influence with the financially unsteady country. It would hardly be surprising if China strikes a deal with Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to fight off the country’s debt problems. After a decade-long battle in U.S. courts, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled last month that Argentina owes U.S. bondholders $1.3 billion in debt repayments. The government has little capacity with which to pay creditors; in fact, many experts argue that the ruling threatens to impact the entire trans-Atlantic financial system. Beijing may well come to the rescue of Buenos Aires, using the thirty-day grace period for late bond payments to help Argentina swap its main class of bonds into securities issued beyond the reach of Washington. Beijing may also be interested in the potential to exploit Argentina’s Vaca Muerta shale formation in Patagonia. President Xi’s visit provides an opportunity for Beijing to reassert its commitment to developing shale in Argentina and provide the foreign investment necessary to develop the world’s second-largest shale gas reserves, likely by building upon the existing China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Argentinian Bridas Corporation partnership. Chinese companies are also slated to firm up investments in Patagonian hydroelectric projects as well as regional railway links. President Xi will conclude with an obligatory visit to Cuba, which should offer few surprises. Beyond a symbolic communist bond, as China’s largest Caribbean trading partner, cooperation in renewable energy and agriculture is likely to continue. Indeed, China’s pragmatic involvement in Cuba is designed to support the island’s development and market reforms. To this end, additional loans, oil exploration projects, or infrastructure deals inked during Xi’s brief visit are all par for the course. While China is still far from approaching U.S. influence in the region, recent events---Brazilian anger at the Snowden revelations about NSA spying, the Supreme Court’s ruling on Argentinian debt, and the BRICS’ planned development bank---have the potential to open doors for increased Chinese presence in the region in ways that may run counter to U.S. interests. Xi’s visit this week will provide valuable insight into China’s intentions for America’s backyard.

In 2013, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America reached $185 billion according to the latest ECLAC report, continuing the slight upward trend of the last three years. Brazil maintained its number one position as the largest FDI destination, raking in $64 billion (over one third of all regional FDI). Mexico came in second, with some $38 billion (boosted by the $13 billion purchase of the rest of Modelo by Belgian based Anheuser-Busch InBev, a company run by Brazilians). Mexico’s Pacific Alliance partners—Chile, Colombia, Peru—also had a fruitful year, with a combined $47 billion in investment. And despite its economic woes, Argentina garnered $9 billion. Regionally, more than 38 percent of the total flow went to the service sector—including finance, telecommunications, and electricity. Manufacturing ranked a close second with over a third of the inflows, and the remainder going to natural resource production (26 percent). These flows varied by country. For example, 70 percent of FDI in Mexico went into manufacturing, while in South America, excluding Brazil, most of the flows targeted natural resources. For those hoping FDI will drive employment, productivity, and improve well-being more generally, the “quality” of FDI matters as much as the quantity. Investments in natural resources have fewer economy wide benefits when compared to those in manufacturing, technology, or some services. For instance, a 2012 study by ECLAC estimates that construction, commerce, and certain types of manufacturing create some seven jobs on average for every US$1 million invested, while mining and petroleum FDI generate just one job for every US$2 million invested. On this front, the news is somewhat positive. Within the manufacturing sector, FDI for medium level technology projects grew–comprising roughly 84 percent of total investment (flows into low-tech areas shrunk, while those into high-tech remained relatively flat). ECLAC also measured the accumulated foreign direct investment. Here Latin America fares well vis-à-vis other emerging markets, with its 32 percent of GDP average besting Russia (25 percent), India (12 percent), and China (10 percent). Chile tops this list, with its FDI stock totaling 77 percent of GDP. This deep foreign investment base also means that outward flows of profits are significant. In 2013 they averaged 81 percent of the value of FDI inflows–meaning transnational corporations with operations in the region have gotten back almost as much in profits as they invested. Perhaps one of the most striking trends in Latin America in recent years has been the amount of investment among neighbors. In 2013, Ecuador’s largest outside investments came from Uruguay, while El Salvador’s emanated in Panama. Mexico was among the top four countries investing in Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. While the majority of Latin America’s FDI still comes from the United States and Europe, of the top twenty mergers or acquisitions in the region, seven of the buyers were from Latin American countries. ECLAC, "Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean," 2013. This trend reflects the growing influence and power of Latin American countries upon their neighbors’ economies. Historically, analysts have looked to the United States, Europe, and more recently China for needed funds in Latin America, in part due to lackluster domestic savings rates near 18 percent (versus 52 percent in China). But as these trends show, it is increasingly Latin American nations that may shape the direction of jobs and ultimately growth in the region.

This guest post was coauthored by Emily Mellgard, research associate, and Amanda Roth, volunteer intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Even with their immense diversity, nearly all Africans love soccer. There is a cultural obsession with the sport similar to that of Americans for football, and it has, in the past, caused riots between fans of rival teams. Most of the time however, Africans’ passion for soccer is a constructive social pastime, and national teams can be a focus of unity and identity. Soccer is a point of national pride for many nations. Hosting the highly successful 2010 World Cup tournament in some ways marked South Africa’s re-emergence as a continental power. Ghana rationed electricity from their hydroelectric dam on the Volta River and imported fifty thousand extra megawatts of electricity to ensure that all Ghanaians could watch this year’s June 16 match against the United States. Yet, the crowds watching the 2014 World Cup tournament at public viewing centers and gathered around communal televisions, in some places represent a unique security concern. The World Cup opened in Brazil on Thursday, June 12; on June 17, a suicide bomber set off an explosion in Nigeria’s northern Yobe state capital Damaturu. At least twenty-one people who had gathered around a public screen to watch the Brazil vs. Mexico match died. The bomber is suspected to be a Boko Haram member, though no one has yet claimed responsibility. Public viewing centers, which are popular venues to watch soccer, are currently banned in Yobe state precisely because of the potential for such an attack. There are conflicting accounts about whether those killed were at a clandestine viewing center or if they had simply gathered around a communal screen. In Nigeria’s Adamawa state, some establishments that normally screen the World Cup matches came together to organize an informal security cooperative with local vigilantes in an attempt to mitigate the security risks. Nevertheless, some fans said they will not risk going to the public centers during this World Cup. However, others stated that even with the risks, they were unwilling to forego the atmosphere and excitement and would still watch the matches in public. On Sunday June 15, more than fifty people were killed in Kenya’s coastal town Mpeketoni as they watched a match in a public viewing hall. Somalia’s militant Islamist group al Shabaab claimed credit for the attack, though some have claimed it was instead carried out by internal Kenyan actors. During the previous World Cup in 2010, al Shabaab claimed credit for twin blasts in Uganda’s capital Kampala that targeted World Cup viewers. It was their first successful international attack. The Kenyan government has strongly urged people to watch the matches from their homes. Bars, cinemas, restaurants, and other venues with communal screens have been advised to implement extra security measures during matches. These attacks represent a disturbing trend. The crowds who gather to watch the 2014 World Cup present a security threat that militant groups have proven willing to exploit. The so-called “beautiful game” should be a time of national pride and celebration—and not carry the risk of death.