Vladimir Putin

Russians have voted on a sweeping package of more than two hundred constitutional amendments, the most important of which exempts President Vladimir Putin from term limits and potentially allows him to rule until 2036. What does this change mean for the country’s future?

As Putin tries to manage Russia’s coronavirus outbreak, the national security bureaucracy faces challenges and opportunities of its own.

President Vladimir Putin planned to use this year to raise his stature as not only the face of Russian politics at home but also a dominant figure on the global stage. Then the new coronavirus intervened.

President Putin’s sweeping moves to shift government power reinforce his own claim to leadership beyond 2024, but also set in motion competition for influence throughout Russia.

Russian President Putin reiterated the importance of denuclearization during last week’s summit, but did not provide visible sanctions relief for North Korean leader Kim. 

A collapse of this Cold War–era arms treaty, which many believe has favored the United States, could unleash a new age of nuclear weapons competition.

The United States and Russia are at odds on so many issues that the upcoming summit could convince their two presidents to give up on better relations and accept estrangement.

This is a guest post by Sophia Lian, intern for Energy and Climate Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing and Moscow’s shared goal of reorienting the Western-dominated global order has led them to cooperate on many fronts, including energy infrastructure and institutional development.  Despite lingering mistrust, the two countries recognize their complementary strengths and have pushed forward in their opportunistic partnership. Much needed Chinese investment in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic will tap vast energy stores and provide institutional support in remote locales.  As Moscow keeps wary watch over increasing numbers of Chinese migrants in its backyard, Beijing is careful to alleviate concerns of encroachment by publicly deferring to Moscow’s leaders while highlighting regional benefits of Chinese investment. In securing a foothold in Russian territory through the eastern stretch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is laying the groundwork for future geopolitical plays.  Strategically consolidating Chinese influence through economic development in the Russian Far East, Central Asia, and the Arctic aligns with President Xi Jinping’s more activist brand of foreign policy.  Based on one’s perspective, Beijing has already been treading a fine line between Russian collaborator and competitor. Chinese Collaboration in Russia’s Backyard: Russian Far East, Central Asia, and the Arctic The Russian Far East is a region of strategic importance and historical sensitivities.  This icy region abounds with natural resources and is the site of Russia’s only warm water Pacific port (Vladivostok).  Russia’s coveted possession of a Pacific outpost was realized in the late 19th century when it successfully compelled a weak China to sign over control of the region whose loss China has not gotten over. Against this historical backdrop, Russia has closely guarded its sparsely-populated eastern hinterland, and has until recently rebuffed Chinese business forays into the region.  However, the collapse of its relationship with the West over Ukraine has left Russia little choice but to turn to Beijing for finance and economic development assistance, and Russia’s moment of weakness is opportune for an energy-hungry China eager to diversify its energy sources and enhance its strategic positioning. Economic development has been quick to come to the Russian Far East.  Chinese capital now accounts for 45 percent of the total foreign investment in the regional capital, Khabarovsk.  A little ways south in the port city of Vladivostok, Chinese money has transformed the area into a tourist center, when only a few years earlier both far eastern cities lagged far behind their European Russian brethren.  Similarly, China has taken an interest in Central Asia as a potential hub for expanding Eurasian trade flows and has secured energy development, transport, and infrastructure projects as part of its BRI.  China claims its collaboration in the Arctic will help develop the region’s untouched bounty of natural resources.  In undertaking these projects, however, Beijing contends with Russian territoriality as the Kremlin is weary of privileged Chinese access to areas that could ultimately jeopardize Russian sovereignty. Chinese Accelerating Arms Exports, Development of Traditional and Nuclear Power, and Ownership of Critical Infrastructure Arms Exports: China’s consolidation of geopolitical assets through infrastructure investment extends to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, which could challenge Russia’s traditional role as a major energy and arms supplier.  Russia’s economy and influence is highly dependent on its energy and arms exports, whose domain its southern “frenemy” has increasingly encroached upon.  While Russia has been developing new weapons systems, China is now poised to become a dominant arms exporter after decades of copying and appropriating Russian technology, and integrating such technology into both its defense and private tech industries.  Moscow’s economy is not as resilient in that its defense-driven economy cannot fall back on civilian demand like China’s economy can (through dual-use technologies).  China is gaining ground in countries with troubled human rights records and has recently been successful in arms sales to several African countries (e.g., Algeria, South Africa, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire) in addition to continued large sales to regional buyers Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Development of Traditional and Nuclear Power: The Kremlin has made clear its aims to become a dominant energy power in the Middle East and has recently inked several business deals in the region.  But China is close behind, staking out Mideast energy deals, especially in Iran and Iraq.  The recently acquired 80.1% stake of the South Pars gas field (taking up a 50.1% stake from French energy giant Total, which is withdrawing because of U.S. sanctions) will mean China could become a natural gas exporter in competition with Russian firms Gazprom and Novatek. The competition is direct since Russia views its energy exports as not only a means to needed petrodollars but also as a geopolitical tool to build spheres of energy dependence. China emulates the same ends via its BRI, and more recently through its planned expansion into the nuclear energy export market. China is playing the long game in this regard, and its patience has paid off as the UK has recently given the green light for the Hinkley Point C power station of which an important piece of infrastructure is Chinese.  This is hugely significant as no western country has opened up their strategic infrastructure to a non-ally in this way. Britain’s approval, which brought consternation from the U.S., could jumpstart China’s reach to the rest of the world. Beijing envisions building 30 nuclear plants along its BRI path by 2030, and though Beijing and Moscow collaborate in developing nuclear technology, Russia is sure to chafe at China’s ambitions.  Chinese activity in nuclear power directly competes with Russian natural gas sales to Europe, as do energy associated with other Chinese sources, including wind farms, exports of solar panels, and eventually battery storage. Ownership of Critical Infrastructure: China is also buying other critical infrastructure in eastern and southern Europe and Greenland, further extending its reach to the west.  Deals worth at least $255 billion across the European continent have resulted in almost 360 companies having been taken over and China also is now partially or wholly owning at least four airports, six seaports, wind farms in at least nine countries, and thirteen professional soccer teams.  Last but not least, long considered the world’s largest rare earth producer, China has a chokehold on cheap access to these essential elements, and recently concluded an agreement aligning uranium and rare earth mining activities between the Greenlandic and Chinese governments, giving China almost exclusive control of this domain. Outward Collaboration Over the previous decades, China’s influence has strengthened to the point where it can now challenge traditional hegemons like Russia -- but for now, a partnership is still preferred.  Though Moscow is wary of the myriad Chinese projects being undertaken and of the increasing numbers of Chinese migrants in its backyard, it is currently managing its insecurities quietly since it recognizes the need for Chinese capital and manufacturing expertise to tap undeveloped resources and to build needed infrastructure, partly to counter its souring relations with the West.  The two countries have thus found common cause on a number of issues, from mutual diplomatic support on the UN Security Council, to military reinforcements and economic collaboration.  Naval exercises in the Sea of Japan, South China and Baltic Seas showcase solidarity in areas of tension with Washington.  Of course, these displays are meant to project a united image that is not so sanguine under the surface.  China has, over the years, avoided inconvenient entanglements and has demonstrated its utility as a source of capital, infrastructure, and arms.  Now, stronger and under more expansionist leadership, China’s reach is set to expand much farther afield under its ambitious BRI. For now, China appears willing to refrain from overt challenges to Russia, as Beijing’s immediate need for imported raw materials and desire to focus on its BRI ambitions requires a cooperative Russia. Beijing has tried to ease Moscow’s insecurities about perceived Chinese encroachment by promising economic benefits, and staying relatively respectful of Moscow’s Eurasian security interests while it focuses on economic and industrial development.  So far, the arrangement has worked for both parties and has even led to an interesting turn of events, where Chinese troops were invited to participate in the massive 2018 Vostok war games -- Russian military exercises historically meant to prepare for border confrontations with China.  It is unlikely that Russia suddenly considers its long-time adversary an ally, but the two will continue to outwardly collaborate until it is no longer in either’s interest to do so. Future increases in energy export and investment competition in Europe and beyond could be the first signs of strain in the uneasy relationship.  

President Trump’s approach to summits is fueling, rather than mitigating, global instability.

The totality of President Donald Trump’s statements and actions against NATO makes clear that the United States cannot be relied on to come to the defense of its European allies.

There appears to be a list of conflicts and other kinds of issues that U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin touched upon during their meeting in Helsinki, and progress on any of them is bound to be slow. Oil made a headline during Putin’s remarks in the public session: Specifically, Putin reminded the U.S. president in front of the international media that “neither of us is interested in the plummeting of (oil) prices and the consumers will suffer as well” and called out oil as an area for collaboration, as expected. Whether it’s a threat or an offer is always hard to say with the Russian leader. But there are good reasons for U.S. officials to be cautious in the coming weeks and months about looking to Russia for “assistance” in the complicated geopolitics of oil and gas. Like many other conflicts and issues, Putin is promising all sides goods he likely cannot fully deliver. The United States should think longer and harder about what assistance Russia could actually provide to U.S. interests. My view is the bilateral dialogue should stick to more achievable priorities like arms control and improved bilateral lines of communications among top U.S. and Russian military brass to avoid accidental direct clashes. Unilaterally reducing vulnerability to the national security and cyber threats Russia can make against U.S. domestic targets should remain top priority, but oil perhaps belongs on the back burner. The reality is that Russia has made a policy of offering its assistance to national oil sectors under siege, including those who become targeted by U.S. sanctions. That policy has subjected Russian oil companies to all kinds of negative consequences that will hinder their balance sheets and make it more difficult for Russia to play a balancer role in the global oil market down the road. The United States needs to weigh any pledge of oil “cooperation” with America against Russia’s active involvement in troubled oil sectors as diverse as Venezuela and Iran. In the run up to the Helsinki summit, Iran’s senior advisor for international affairs Ali Akbar Velayati met with Putin last week and agreed to $50 billion in oil and gas sector investments. Russian giants Rosneft and Gazprom are in talks with the Iranian oil ministry about upstream investments. Earlier this year, Russia’s Zarubezhneft signed an oil field development deal with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to refurbish the Aban and West Paydar oil fields. Iran could believe that turning to Moscow will shield its oil and gas sector not only from attack by Arab separatists but also even (perhaps a little more far-fetched, but probably not in the minds of Iranian hardliners) Israel and the United States. The opposite could come to happen. If proxy wars escalate, Russian companies could get caught accidentally in the cross fire. In fact, both Tehran and Moscow alike could lose from deepening their collaborations in Iran’s domestic oil and gas sector. Iran may want to consider what happened to Turkmenistan, whose energy exports were forced into Russia at cheap domestic Russian prices to allow Russian companies to export more of their own gas at higher levels to European buyers. That is one reason many Central Asian countries eventually turned to China for assistance with energy and electricity as the conflict of interest and strings attached were less onerous. For its part, Russia could find that Russian oil workers will be in a vulnerable position to spontaneous local protests and attacks, both inside Iran and Iraq, regardless of the overall tone of high level, government to government interactions. The latest example is Iraq, where angry local protesters lashed out this week at a number of targets but notably gathered to threaten an oil field operated by Russian firm Lukoil. The event, which so far hasn’t resulted in major oil supply cutoff, is a reminder that Iran has the means to punish Moscow on the ground, not only via its proxies on the ground in Syria but also in Iraq, should Moscow cross a redline on any of Tehran’s regional interests.  Iran has threatened that the United States would be mistaken if it thinks Iran would be the “only” country unable to export its oil. Most analysts took that threat to be alluding to Saudi Arabia, which is involved in proxy wars with Iran in multiple locations and whose oil industry has been subject to cyber, drone, and sabotage attacks. But Iran may also want to make sure that Putin knows Iranian proxies can make trouble for Russia (in addition to Saudi Arabia) if Tehran feels double crossed. Moscow could be finding that its “partnership” with Iran is double-edged, constraining its freedom of movement on a host of critical issues ranging from its ongoing operations in Syria to its desire to remain the senior partner in oil market management with Saudi Arabia. From the U.S. point of view, this is highly material to U.S. and Israeli hopes that Russia can be an effective partner. Any Russian promises to help with Syria’s border areas or oil markets could become subject to Iranian backlash and therefore not reliable. In other words, U.S. policy makers could overestimate the value of collaboration with Moscow on Middle East conflict resolution. For Russian oil companies, operations in special assignment regions like Iraq, Venezuela, Libya, and Iran come with extremely difficult operating environments. Local conflicts are disrupting oil production, limiting payments in kind (e.g. oil exports) that were expected to reimburse Russian firms like Lukoil and Rosneft for its massive capital outlays and manpower. Money spent in oil and gas fields in these far-flung places is capital not available to make steady and possibly more reliable profits in Russia’s own domestic oil and gas fields, and it remains to be seen if Russian firms would be able to hold onto the barter style deals, should the governments change in any of the troubled locales. When all is said and done, it remains to be seen whether in the hindsight of history, Vladimir Putin’s deal making in oil over the past year or so will be viewed as triumphantly as it now might appear. In the glare of Europe’s response, the sudden cutoff of Russian natural gas supplies to Ukraine back in 2006 proved a misstep by giving impetus to not only the installation of several major liquefied natural gas receiving terminals in southern Europe and Poland but also giving added stimulus towards a major push towards renewable energy on the continent. Russia’s current moves into troubled states could similarly come back to bite its oil and gas industry, which was already struggling from high indebtedness, limited access to future financing, and the threat of additional U.S. sanctions.