U.S. Foreign Policy

  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    Understanding Gender Equality in Foreign Policy: What the United States Can Do
    A new report by Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein offers a comprehensive overview of how countries around the world are integrating gender equality as a foreign policy priority, and how the United States can advance security and economic growth by drawing on the benefits of women’s empowerment globally.
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    Understanding Gender Equality in Foreign Policy
    Incorporating lessons from the approaches pursued by other countries, the U.S. government should take a more systematic and well-resourced approach to promoting gender equality in foreign policy.
  • United States
    TWE Remembers: Truman’s Decision to Intervene in Korea
    Seventy years ago today, President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. military to aid South Korea in repulsing an invasion from North Korea. The decision had geopolitical consequences that are still felt to this day. The decision was equally momentous for its impact on America’s constitutional practice. Truman acted without seeking congressional authorization either in advance or in retrospect. He instead justified his decision on his authority as commander in chief. The move dramatically expanded presidential power at the expense of Congress, which eagerly cooperated in the sacrifice of its constitutional prerogatives. Truman’s decision hardly fit the framers’ vision of how the war power would be exercised. When Pierce Butler of South Carolina proposed at the Constitutional Convention to vest the war power with the president, no one seconded the motion and a fellow delegate exclaimed that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.” James Wilson, a leading voice at the convention, assured the Pennsylvania state ratifying convention that the new Constitution “will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress.” Alexander Hamilton offered similar reassurances in Federalist 69. The president’s role as commander in chief “would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces” while Congress would possess the powers of “DECLARING of war and…RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies.”  The framers’ restricted vision of presidential war-making powers carried over into practice. In 1810, James Madison, a man who knew something about original intent, dismissed as unconstitutional a Senate-passed bill that would have delegated to him the authority to order the Navy to protect American merchant ships against attacks from British and French raiders. His reasoning? Only Congress could take the country from peace to war. Nearly forty years later, President James Buchanan wrote that “without the authority of Congress the President can not fire a hostile gun in any case except to repel the attacks of an enemy.” Just nine years before Truman unilaterally decided to defend Korea, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on Japan even though the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor—an attack that clearly met Buchanan’s (and the framers’) standard of when a president could act without soliciting congressional approval. Truman clearly believed that time was essence, and with the memory of Munich hovering in the background, that the United States had to counter communist aggression. But he couldn’t argue he didn’t have time to go to Congress or that Congress couldn’t act quickly. Congress was in session when North Korea invaded and almost certainly would have endorsed his decision. And Truman knew from experience that Congress could act swiftly. FDR asked for a declaration of war against Japan the day after Pearl Harbor. Congress provided it within hours. Truman also couldn’t argue that he hadn’t been reminded that the Constitution gave the war power to Congress. Sen. Robert A. Taft of Ohio, one of the leading Republicans on Capitol Hill at the time, took to the Senate floor on June 28 to argue that “there is no legal authority for what he [Truman] has done.” Nor could Truman argue that the Korean conflict didn’t constitute war in a constitutional sense, even if he did downplay the significance of his decision. (At a press conference on June 29, Truman denied the country was at war, prompting a journalist to ask, “would it be correct…to call this a police action?” Truman answered simply, “Yes.”) The framers understood the difference between full-scale and limited wars—or what they would have called “perfect” versus “imperfect” wars. Over the years, Congress had authorized many small-scale conflicts. The Supreme Court had even ruled that Congress’s war power encompassed both large and small-scale conflicts and that when Congress authorized limited wars the president could not go beyond what Congress permitted. And, of course, the Korean War was “limited” only in the sense that it was smaller in scope than the two world wars. Truman would argue that he was obligated to act because the UN Security Council had called on UN members to repel the attack and that his decision was in keeping with past practice. He in fact had decided to intervene in Korea before the UN Security Council voted, and he couldn’t assume the Council would vote as it did. (Had the Soviets not boycotted the meeting for unrelated reasons, they would have blocked action.) More important, he was not legally obligated or empowered to respond to the UN’s call. The Senate’s approval of the UN Charter and Congress’s subsequent passage of the UN Participation Act of 1945 were explicitly predicated on agreement that UN membership did not override Congress’s war power. (Precisely that fear had helped torpedo Senate approval of the Treaty of Versailles a quarter century before.) The list of supposed precedents of unilateral presidential actions, which were presumed somehow to have put a “gloss” on constitutional meaning, was unimpressive. As a leading legal scholar at the time noted, the list consisted of “fights with pirates, landings of small naval contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts, the dispatch of small bodies of troops to chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican border and the like.” Truman in the end acted because he believed, contrary to what the framers envisioned and the historical record showed, that as commander-in-chief he had the authority to order U.S. troops into combat. Indeed, when asked after he left office whether he still would have intervened in Korea had the UN Security Council failed to approve a response, he answered: “No question about it.”   Truman was able to establish the precedent that presidents can take the country to war,  though, because members of Congress were unwilling, Taft’s complaints notwithstanding, to defend their constitutional power from executive encroachment. Truman met with fourteen leading members of Congress on Tuesday, June 27, shortly after he ordered the U.S. military to move toward combat status. According to Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s telling, lawmakers responded to the news that the United States would come to the aid of South Korea with a “general chorus of approval” while saying nothing about taking the issue to Capitol Hill. When Truman met with congressional leaders again three days later, moments after he committed U.S. ground troops to the war, Senate Minority Leader Kenneth Wherry (R-NE), who had not attended the first meeting, argued that Truman should have gone to Congress. Senator Alexander Smith (R-NJ) then suggested, but didn’t insist, that the president still seek congressional approval. Truman promised to consider the request. As the meeting ended, Representative Dewey Short (R-MO), the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, endorsed Truman’s decision to act unilaterally. Acheson subsequently recommended that Congress pass a resolution to “commend”—but not “authorize”—the action the United States—not the president—had taken in Korea. However, Acheson argued that Congress, rather than the president, should initiate the process. Truman raised Acheson’s recommendation and a draft resolution the State Department had prepared with Senator Scott Lucas (D-IL) in a meeting on July 3. The Senate Democratic leader had no appetite to take up any resolution. He argued that “that the president had very properly done what he had to do without consulting the Congress” and that “many members of Congress had suggested to him that the president should keep away from Congress and avoid debate.” Truman gladly followed the advice. The refusal of Lucas and other lawmakers to force a vote was hardly the first time that Congress sacrificed its constitutional prerogatives in the service of immediate political needs. In doing so, however, it helped greatly expand the boundary of presidential power. To be sure, Truman’s immediate successors were more impressed by how the Korean War consumed his presidency than by the authority he asserted in entering it. Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson both saw Truman’s experience showing the need, as the saying went, to get Congress in on the takeoffs in foreign policy if they wanted it around for the crash landings. So whether it was the crises over Dien Bien Phu and Formosa, or the Gulf of Tonkin incident, their initial instincts were to turn to Congress for resolutions to bless their authority to act. (After his experience in Vietnam, Johnson lamented that he had “failed to reckon on one thing: the parachute: I got them on the takeoff, but a lot of them bailed out before the end of the flight.”) The fears that drove Eisenhower and LBJ eventually receded. What remained—particularly in the legal briefs prepared over the years by White House lawyers for Democratic and Republican presidents alike—was the contention that Truman showed that presidents can go to war on their own initiative. Members of Congress have long to sought to put that genie back in the box. They have largely failed, as the Kosovo War, the Libyan intervention, and the Yemen War all attest. Powers easily given away are exceedingly difficult to reclaim. Noah Mulligan and Anna Shortridge contributed to the preparation of this post.      
  • United States
    Five Foreign-Policy Satires Worth Watching
    Each Friday this summer, we suggest foreign-policy-themed movies worth watching. This week: classic satires.
  • Demonstrations and Protests
    The World Is Watching Us
    Podcast
    The killing of George Floyd, the anti-racism protest movement that followed, and the Donald J. Trump administration’s response have shaken the United States and captivated the world. Why It Matters speaks with two foreign correspondents to understand how the protests are being understood abroad.
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    The Changing Landscape of Domestic Terrorism, With Bruce Hoffman
    Podcast
    Bruce Hoffman, CFR’s Shelby Cullom and Kathryn W. Davis senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss domestic terrorist entities, groups, and movements.
  • North Korea
    The Illusion of Peace and the Failure of U.S.-North Korea Summitry
    On June 12, North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Son-gwon issued a highly unusual commemorative statement to mark the second anniversary of the first-ever meeting of U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un. The statement laid bare North Korea’s disappointments, rejected Trump’s declarations of success in his diplomacy with North Korea, and predicted an enduring confrontation backed by North Korea’s nuclear development as the main pillar of deterrence against U.S. hostility. The statement reiterated months of North Korean expressions of frustration and underscored the fragility of the U.S.-North Korea relationship and the risks that a renewed escalation of tensions could bring.  Ri’s statement echoes the change in direction North Korea first announced last December: that the strengthening its nuclear development to deter the U.S. nuclear threat would be its main strategy for dealing with the United States. Kim Jong Un reinforced that message last month at an expanded meeting of North Korea’s Central Military Commission when he pledged to bolster his country’s nuclear deterrence capabilities in response to an undiminished nuclear threat from the United States. Two years after the drama of a diplomatic reality TV moment in U.S.-North Korea relations, the fundamental conflict between the United States and North Korea over denuclearization remains as intractable as ever. The global security risk posed by a nuclear North Korea has not diminished, and the task of dealing with a North Korea that has redoubled its commitment to nuclear deterrence remains a potential flashpoint for escalation between nuclear-capable adversaries. In a new CFR Contingency Planning Memorandum, I discuss the risk that a renewed escalation of tensions in the U.S.-North Korea relationship could bring and provide recommendations for how the United States can rebuild international consensus in opposition to North Korea’s nuclear development. Following the presidential elections in November, either President Trump or Vice President Biden will face an even more difficult challenge posed by the growing entrenchment of North Korea’s continued nuclear development. U.S. leaders should start by revitalizing the role of the UN, improving sanctions implementation, restoring U.S. and allied military exercises to the 2018 pre-Singapore summit exercise schedules, and updating preparations for instability in North Korea. This article was originally published by Forbes.
  • North Korea
    The Illusion of Peace and the Failure of U.S.-North Korea Summitry
    On June 12, North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Son-gwon issued a highly unusual commemorative statement to mark the second anniversary of the first-ever meeting of U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un. The statement laid bare North Korea’s disappointments, rejected Trump’s declarations of success in his diplomacy with North Korea, and predicted an enduring confrontation backed by North Korea’s nuclear development as the main pillar of deterrence against U.S. hostility. The statement reiterated months of North Korean expressions of frustration and underscored the fragility of the U.S.-North Korea relationship and the risks that a renewed escalation of tensions could bring.  Ri’s statement echoes the change in direction North Korea first announced last December: that the strengthening its nuclear development to deter the U.S. nuclear threat would be its main strategy for dealing with the United States. Kim Jong Un reinforced that message last month at an expanded meeting of North Korea’s Central Military Commission when he pledged to bolster his country’s nuclear deterrence capabilities in response to an undiminished nuclear threat from the United States. Two years after the drama of a diplomatic reality TV moment in U.S.-North Korea relations, the fundamental conflict between the United States and North Korea over denuclearization remains as intractable as ever. The global security risk posed by a nuclear North Korea has not diminished, and the task of dealing with a North Korea that has redoubled its commitment to nuclear deterrence remains a potential flashpoint for escalation between nuclear-capable adversaries. In a new CFR Contingency Planning Memorandum, I discuss the risk that a renewed escalation of tensions in the U.S.-North Korea relationship could bring and provide recommendations for how the United States can rebuild international consensus in opposition to North Korea’s nuclear development. Following the presidential elections in November, either President Trump or Vice President Biden will face an even more difficult challenge posed by the growing entrenchment of North Korea’s continued nuclear development. U.S. leaders should start by revitalizing the role of the UN, improving sanctions implementation, restoring U.S. and allied military exercises to the 2018 pre-Singapore summit exercise schedules, and updating preparations for instability in North Korea. This article was originally published by Forbes.
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    TWNW Special: What to Read, Watch, and Listen to This Summer
    Podcast
    In this special episode of The World Next Week, James M. Lindsay and Robert McMahon are joined by Gabrielle Sierra, CFR podcast producer and host of Why It Matters, to discuss their favorite quarantine reads, beloved documentaries and television series, podcasts, and more entertainment they’re looking forward to enjoying this summer. Read more about Jim, Bob, and Gabrielle’s picks on Jim’s blog, The Water’s Edge.
  • Security Alliances
    The Future of American Alliances, With Mira Rapp-Hooper
    Podcast
    Mira Rapp-Hooper, Stephen A. Schwarzman senior fellow for Asia studies at CFR and senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss whether America’s military alliances still serve national interests. Rapp-Hooper’s book, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, is available today.
  • United Kingdom
    The State of the Special Relationship, With Ambassador Dame Karen Pierce DCMG
    Podcast
    Dame Karen Pierce DCMG, the British ambassador to the United States, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss U.S.-UK relations, Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy, and the merits of multilateralism.
  • South China Sea
    Rising Tensions in the South China Sea
    The risk of a military confrontation between the United States and China in the South China Sea is growing. In a new Center for Preventive Action report, Oriana Skylar Mastro details how the United States could prevent a clash, or take steps to de-escalate if one should occur.
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    Under Trump, the United States Has Become an Irresponsible Stakeholder
    U.S. President Donald J. Trump's disdain for multilateral cooperation has cost the United States its credibility as a responsible stakeholder in the international system.
  • Election 2020
    Banning Covert Foreign Election Interference
    The United States is one of the countries that is most susceptible to foreign election interference. To safeguard the U.S. elections in November, Robert K. Knake argues that the United States and other democracies should agree to not interfere in foreign elections.
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy
    The United States should respond to the COVID-19 reordering moment and stop deterioration in the balance of power with China, bolster relations with India and Europe, and reform the way it deals with allies and partners.