Kurds

Daniel P. Serwer, who served as executive director of the Baker-Hamilton Commission on Iraq, says the "serious" crisis between Kurdistan and the central Iraqi government "needs to be resolved" to some degree before the U.S. troops leave."

This publication is now archived. What role will Kurds play in Iraq’s future government? Kurds are expected to play a kingmaker role in forming Iraq’s new coalition government. Kurdish parties look likely to win around fifty-five seats in the 275-member parliament, making them vital players in Iraqi politics. No political bloc won the two-thirds majority required to form a government. Hence, Shiite and Sunni Arabs have courted Kurdish leaders to form a governing coalition. Some experts suggest that Kurds, most of them secular, may partner up with secular Shiite and Sunni parties to prevent Iraq from becoming too Islamist. But most experts expect the Kurds to align themselves again with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), Iraq’s ruling Shiite bloc, which is expected to win around 130 seats. In general, Kurdish leaders have provided a moderate influence on Iraqi politics, arbitrating between Iraq’s more polarized Sunni and Shiite leaders. Kurds have also pushed for further decentralization of Iraq’s government and to exert greater regional autonomy, including issuing visas, establishing a foreign ministry, and negotiating exploration deals with foreign oil firms. Iraq’s Sunni leadership has accused Kurds, who have enjoyed near autonomy since 1991, of trying to split up Iraq. But most experts say Kurds are within their constitutional rights in their demands for self-government in Kurdistan. “All they’re doing is institutionalizing the authorities they already had, which are included in the constitution,” says Peter Galbraith, a former ambassador to Croatia and senior diplomatic fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. What do the Kurds want from a political standpoint? The biggest issue for Iraq’s 4 million-plus Kurds is federalism. Since 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan, a mountainous area in northern Iraq, has enjoyed “special status” as a semiautonomous region protected as a U.S.-enforced no-fly zone. Kurdistan has its own regional parliament, judicial system, and security forces—the 100,000-strong peshmerga. Kurds do not want to cede control of these institutions to Baghdad. “The federalism concept is non-negotiable for the Kurds,” said Qubad Talabani, Washington representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and son of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, in a May 2005 Council on Foreign Relations meeting. A poll taken last year indicates the majority of Iraqi Kurds prefer outright independence to federalism. Kurdish leaders, however, have been more moderate with their demands, experts say. “They would prefer a world in which they were independent but their deal under the constitution gives them substantial autonomy,” says Brendan O’Leary, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and former constitutional adviser to Kurdistan’s government. Kurds also want to incorporate Kirkuk, an oil-rich and ethnically diverse city 150 miles north of Baghdad, into Iraqi Kurdistan. Many of the city’s Kurds were forcibly removed under Saddam Hussein as part of his “Arabization” program to alter the city’s demographics and bring in more Arabs. Thousands of Kurds have repatriated the city since Saddam’s ouster and have assumed control of many of its municipal institutions. Kurds are looking to 2007, when a referendum will be held to decide Kirkuk’s status. For Kurds, “Kirkuk is not about oil,” says Tanya Gilly-Khailany, director of democracy programs at the Washington-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. “It’s the place of their ancestors that they want to go back to. It has sentimental value.” Some Kurds have called the city “our Jerusalem.” Regardless of the referendum’s outcome, which is expected to go in the Kurds’ favor (the issue of Kirkuk’s future boundaries is less certain), O’Leary says some form of power-sharing arrangement will be required to make room politically for the city’s diverse population of Turkmen, Christians, and Arabs. Which Kurds will remain influential in Iraqi politics? Jalal Talabani, Iraq’s current president, may keep his position, experts say. “He has the natural charisma and legacy of being an overall unifier,” says Howar Ziad, the Iraqi ambassador to Canada. Talabani had threatened to withdraw his candidacy unless given more powers, partly to counterbalance the growing influence of the UIA. The Kurds say they are not involved with the UIA’s selection process for prime minister, but experts say they favor Adel Abdul Mahdi, Iraq ’s finance minister and member of the Shiite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), over current Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who heads the UIA’s Dawa Party and has had testy relations with Talabani. Under the constitution, most executive powers go to the prime minister. While Ziad does not predict this constitutional rule will be formally amended, he foresees a “gentlemen’s agreement” to transfer more authority to the president. What rights did Kurds win under the constitution? Kurds voted overwhelmingly in favor of Iraq’s constitution in October’s referendum. That is because of the number of concessions Kurds won during the drafting process. For example, they were able to secure Kurdish, in addition to Arabic, as Iraq’s official language. Phrases on Iraq’s Arab identity were watered down (Kurds, though predominantly Muslim, are not Arabs), as was the role of religion (most Kurds are secular). Other important concessions include: Stronger regional authority. The constitution gives the federal government authority over foreign affairs, finance, trade, and other issues. All other powers go to regional governments. Whenever a dispute between local and federal law arises, the constitution gives priority to regional authorities. Sunnis have sought to overturn this clause of the constitution, but with both Shiites and Kurds behind it, experts say the issue of federalism will not likely be amended. Rights to future oilfields. Although “oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi people,” experts say this applies only to existing oilfields. Revenues from future oilfields would ostensibly be collected by regional authorities. Sunnis, many of whom reside in Iraq’s oil-scarce center, have protested, fearing they may fall behind economically. Galbraith says their claims are overblown because of Iraq’s uneven development. “In terms of revenues, the north and south have been vastly underdeveloped compared to the center,” he says, “so these regions will be catching up.” The constitution further provides some form of compensation for regions “unjustly deprived” of oil revenues under Saddam Hussein’s rule, which includesKurdistan. Recognition of Kurdistan’s existing laws. Laws passed byKurdistan ’s regional government since 1992, including all contracts and court decisions, are recognized. Kurds say this includes production sharing agreements (PSAs) signed between Kurdistan’s government and outside oil firms. Sunni Arabs disagree, claiming the constitution does not validate all Kurdish laws and agreements. What steps have Kurds taken toward asserting greater autonomy? Much to the chagrin of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, Kurds have made a number of recent moves to assert greater autonomy in the north. These include issuing visas, establishing a ministry of foreign affairs, and circumventing the Ministry of Oil by negotiating directly with foreign energy firms. Jonathan Morrow, legal adviser with the United States Institute of Peace, says these actions are nothing new and are allowed under Iraq’s constitution. Kurds “have made no secret of maintaining their own relations with foreign governments, and it’s not as if Kurds are suddenly entering talks with oil companies.” O’Leary says Kurds are not allowed a ministry of foreign affairs, per se, but can constitutionally operate a ministry of external relations and have Kurdish representatives in Iraq’s embassies and missions abroad. Why do Iraq’s Kurds want more autonomy? Because of their sense of victimization, experts say. “Kurdish identity is born out of a century of betrayal, brutality, and disappointment,” wrote former CFR Fellow David Phillips in a June 2004 Wall Street Journal op-ed. In Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which recognizes self-determination, Kurds were promised regional autonomy, but they never won their rights. Later, under Saddam, Kurds were killed and displaced en masse from their homes. As many as 1.5 million Kurds were emptied out of Kurdish villages during the so-called Anfal campaign of the late 1980s. At Halabja, thousands were killed by chemical weapons in 1988. Proponents of federalism say this strategy of self-rule will defend against future discrimination of Kurds. “The danger has been eighty years of centralized dictatorship,” Galbraith says. “ Iraq has been a scene of great violence as Sunni Arabs have sought to hold it together by force.” What is Turkey’s stance on a semiautonomous Kurdistan in Iraq? Generally, Ankara has discouraged Kurds in the region from pushing for greater autonomy as it might encourage Turkey’s 6 million-plus restive Kurds to rise up and demand independence. That position has shifted in recent years, experts say. According to Qubad Talabani, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent a letter last year to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani supporting for the first time the concept of federalism. For one, Turkish businesses have close ties to Kurdistan. Turkey has actively promoted oil firms to negotiate production-sharing agreements with Iraq’s Kurds, while other Turkish firms have built two new airfields and are involved in a number of public-works projects in the region. Also, Turkey realizes that “a de facto independent Kurdistan” in Iraq no longer poses a security threat to Turkey, Galbraith says. If anything, Turkey supports a buffer zone toIraq, which has grown less stable. On the other hand, some Turkish nationalists may protest if Iraqi Kurdistan incorporates Kirkuk, a city ruled by Turkey until 1923. What will be the role of Kurdistan’s armed forces in the new government? Kurdistan’s local ministry of interior will retain control over the regional peshmerga forces. There is a law, supported by Iraq’s constitution, which bans the deployment of Iraq’s army on Kurdistan. A small number of Kurdish battalions will be incorporated into Iraq’s security forces but will be stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan. Most experts envision Kurdish forces policing Iraq’s north, Shiite forces policing the south, and a mixed force in the middle.

This publication is now archived. What do the Kurds of Iraq want? Kurdish leaders on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) are pushing for an autonomous federal state in the new Iraqi nation. Kurds, who make up some 20 percent of Iraq’s population of 25 million, have a lengthy history of often-violent campaigns for independence. Since 1991, they have enjoyed virtual autonomy in northern Iraq, which they call Iraqi Kurdistan. Experts say the Kurds are trying to lock in their special status before the scheduled transfer of authority from the U.S.-led coalition to an Iraqi government on June 30, 2004. Objections from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s senior Shiite cleric, may interfere with that timetable. Does the Kurdish proposal differ from Coalition Provisional Authority Yes. The CPA and IGC are currently debating different proposals, one of which would organize Iraq into 18 provinces based on the governing system used by Saddam Hussein’s regime, experts say. Howar Ziad, the United Nations representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the two main Kurdish parties, says another idea on the table, proposed by members of the IGC, would create provinces for Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds based on where each group has historically resided. The CPA and most members of the IGC generally agree, experts say, on some issues: all private militias in the country should be banned and disarmed, and the central government will have authority over national policy decisions on budgets, foreign policy, national security, natural resources, and monetary policy. They point out, however, that debate continues on these issues and the Kurds’ status. How have non-Kurdish Iraqis reacted? Many experts say Sunni and Shiite Iraqis strongly oppose the Kurdish proposal. It is not clear who was responsible for suicide bomb attacks on February 1 that killed 67 at the headquarters of two Kurdish political parties or whether the attacks were related to the autonomy plan. Still, many Shiites and Sunnis fear the Kurds’ plan will inflame ethnic tensions and jeopardize the unity of a new democratic state of Iraq. Saddam Hussein was a Sunni and favored members of this branch of Islam. Sunnis now resent their loss of influence and don’t want it to pass to the Kurds, experts say. Shiites, an estimated 60 percent of the population, suffered under Saddam Hussein and now want proportionate influence in the new nation. It is unlikely that either group will give in to Kurdish demands, and that, some experts say, explains why the Kurds are pressing their case while the Americans are still in charge. What are the details of the Kurdish plan? The five Kurdish members of the IGC envision a federal Iraq with regions for Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, Ziad says. Their proposal would expand the existing area of Iraqi Kurdistan and give the Kurds control over northern Iraq’s oil, estimated at 40 percent of the nation’s total reserves. The Kurds also want some control over their peshmerga, or resistance fighters—who would be integrated into the Iraq National Army but serve in regional commands in Kurdish areas—and over Iraqi troop movements in their region. A Council of Kurdish Ministers, with the power to approve decisions made by the central government in Baghdad, would also be created under the proposal. What is the most controversial part of the Kurdish proposal? The issue that generates the most heated debate is the status of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in the north of Iraq. The Kurdish proposal would add Kirkuk and its environs to Duhok, Erbil, and Suleimaniyah, the provinces currently under Kurdish control. Areas in the ethnically mixed provinces of Nineveh and Diyala would also be annexed to Iraqi Kurdistan. Are the areas to be annexed predominantly Kurdish? Many of them were historically Kurdish, experts say, but Saddam Hussein’s regime altered their ethnic makeup. It ethnically cleansed Kurdish villages in the 1980s, experts say, and instituted an "Arabization" policy that moved Arabs and other groups into the area in a bid to eradicate Kurdish cultural identity. The Kirkuk region has residents of Arab, Turkomen, Assyrian, Chaldean, Jewish, and Christian descent, many of whom resist the plan for Kurdish autonomy. Thousands of Arabs and Turkomen marched in the streets of Kirkuk on December 31 to protest the plan; four people were killed. What concessions will the Kurds make for their plan? In return for their demands, Kurdish leaders promise to equitably share oil revenues from Kirkuk with the central government and give up agitating for an independent Kurdistan, which would unite the approximately 25 million Kurds in the region and include Kurdish-populated areas of Turkey, Syria, and Iran. What are the chances the Kurdish plan will be implemented? Observers disagree. Michael Amitay, executive director of the advocacy group Washington Kurdish Institute, says it’s "inevitable" that Iraq’s Kurds will win autonomy, though probably not by June 30. "The only other alternative is civil war," he says. "The United States cannot force the Kurds to accept less freedom than they [currently] have." But Roberta Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, says the outcome is by no means assured. The governing council faces complex negotiations, she says, about balancing the Kurds’ demands against the desires of other Iraqi groups. "The Shiites and Sunnis don’t like the idea of an ethnically based federal system, because it would cut into their power," she says. Do all Kurds in Iraq agree on the new proposal? Many do, say experts, who stress that the Kurds’ urgent focus on negotiating a favorable position for themselves in the new Iraq has superseded even the bitterest of old rivalries. Massoud Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, were deadly enemies for many years. What is the history of the rivalry between the two main Kurdish leaders? Talabani was once a friend and ally of revered independence leader Mustafa Barzani, the founder of the KDP and father of current KDP leader Massoud Barzani. However, the two men clashed, and in 1975 Talabani left the KDP to start the rival PUK. In Iraqi Kurdistan’s first elections in 1992, the two parties split the vote evenly. A bitter turf war followed, and Talabani invited Iranian forces to support his campaign to wipe out the KDP. In return, Massoud Barzani allied with Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army. A U.S.-brokered cease-fire ended the violence in 1998, and the two leaders (who sit on the Iraq Governing Council together) have put their former enmity behind them. How were Kurds treated in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? In 1968, when the Baathist government was established, its resistance to Kurdish demands for a unified and autonomous Kurdistan led to extended warfare between peshmerga fighters--led by Mustafa Barzani--and Iraqi troops. The fighting continued throughout the ’70s and ’80s. Saddam Hussein attacked the Kurds many times during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), when Kurdish leaders, with Iranian backing, rebelled against his rule. Iraqi forces used poison gas against Kurdish villages, including the town of Halabja, and systematically executed Kurdish men to put down resistance. Human Rights Watch estimates that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed in these campaigns. Saddam Hussein brutally crushed another attempted Kurdish uprising that was encouraged by the United States after the Gulf War in 1991. Some 1.5 million Kurdish refugees fled to Turkey and Iran. Many returned after the United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 688 in April 1991, which authorized humanitarian efforts to help the Kurds and led to a no-fly zone over northern Iraq patrolled by U.S. and British fighter planes. Elections were held in 1992. Do the Kurds have experience governing their own society? Yes. Protected from Saddam Hussein’s forces by the no-fly zone, the Kurds established an "autonomous region" in 1992. The KDP and the PUK split the vote and eventually divided control of the region between them. Each party governed its section of Iraqi Kurdistan; they are now in the process of unifying the separate governments. "The Kurds are much better prepared to [govern themselves] than either of the other groups [i.e., Shiites or Sunnis]," says Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. Army officer and author of "Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World." "They’ve had the training wheels on the bicycle for a while." How would an autonomous Kurdish area in Iraq affect the region’s security? Many experts worry that a strong, unified Iraqi Kurdistan, with control over oil and peshmerga fighters, could ignite Kurdish separatist passions in neighboring Turkey, Iran, and Syria. There are roughly 13 million Kurds in Turkey, 5 million in Iran, and 2 million in Syria. The United States and those nations oppose any talk of secession by Iraqi Kurdistan, which some experts say could doom the vision of a unified, democratic Iraq. "Clearly the Kurds wish, in some way, to preserve their historic identity and to link it in some way to geography," U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said on January 6. "But I think it’s absolutely clear that part of Iraq must remain part of Iraq." What are Turkey’s concerns? Turkey fought a 15-year guerrilla war against Kurdish separatists concentrated in the country’s impoverished southeast. Experts say Turkey fears that giving Iraqi Kurdistan too much power will stir separatist longings among Turkey’s Kurdish minority and spark renewed violence. Turkey also fears that Iraqi Kurdistan could become a U.S. favorite in the region, reducing Ankara’s strategic significance. "During the war, when the Turks failed [to assist American military efforts], the Kurds stepped up to aid the United States," says David L. Phillips, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations.