Syrian Civil War

  • Syria
    Welcome to Syria, President Trump: Years of Rational Policy Led to This Horror, and There’s No Easy Way Out
    If the war Obama and the Pentagon struggled to avoid is now upon us, it's likely to make a bad situation worse. 
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    The Syria Red Line, Three Years Later
    It was three years ago, Labor Day weekend in 2013, that President Obama reversed himself and refused to enforce his "red line" against use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. What’s the outcome of that decision? In July, 2016, former Obama administration official Derek Chollet wrote an article in Politico with this subtitle: "The offhand remark spurred a massive success in Syria. Why does the foreign policy establishment consider it a failure?" Well, here’s one answer: the fact that the Syrian regime continues to use chemical weapons. On August 25, the White House itself condemned the regime for doing so. "It is now impossible to deny that the Syrian regime has repeatedly used industrial chlorine as a weapon against its own people," a National Security Council spokesman said. So what exactly is that "massive success?" The Obama administration’s former point man for Syria, Fred Hof, today offered a better answer to Chollet’s question:   More than half of Syria’s pre-war population now falls into one of the following categories: dead; dying; disabled; tortured; terrorized; traumatized; sick; hungry; homeless. The regime of Bashar al-Assad is responsible for the bulk of this rampant, remorseless criminality. The administration of Barack Obama, if it stays on its present course, will make it through noon, January 20, 2017, without having defended a single Syrian civilian from the Assad-Russia-Iran onslaught.   If that is "massive success" one has to wonder what failure would look like. Hof concludes this way: "This thoroughly avoidable result may well serve to define Mr. Obama—accomplishments at home and abroad notwithstanding—as a failed president." Depends who’s asking, I guess, and who’s judging. One is reminded of Reinhold Niebuhr’s conclusion that nations, and individuals, must sometimes take morally hazardous actions because “the disavowal of the responsibilities of power can involve an individual or nation in even more grievous guilt.” President Obama has called Niebuhr his "favorite philosopher." One wonders if he has actually ever read what Niebuhr wrote about "grievous guilt."
  • Syrian Civil War
    Understanding the Battle for Aleppo
    The battle for Aleppo has taken a staggering civilian toll, and it is likely to escalate because both regime and opposition forces see the city as crucial to a political endgame, says expert Lina Khatib. 
  • Syria
    March 15: Five Years of Disaster in Syria
    Today, the Ides of March, marks the fifth anniversary of the rebellion in Syria against the Assad regime. These five years have brought an amazing humanitarian disaster: perhaps 350,000 dead, half the population driven from their homes, 4 million refugees. The  impact has been enormous: from destabilizing the politics and economics of Jordan and Lebanon, to increasing the Iranian role in the Arab Middle East greatly, to bringing Russia back into the region, to the destabilization of the European Union through massive refugee flows. Yesterday, the House of Representatives unanimously passed Rep. Jeff Fortenberry’s bill (H. Con. Res. 75) calling the treatment of Christians, Yezidis, and other minorities by ISIS a "genocide." The rise of ISIS is in large part a product of the civil war in Syria, where a regime tied to Iran slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Sunni civilians. When we look back on the Obama years, and despite the President’s boasts and self-satisfaction in his lengthy interview with The Atlantic, these deaths, the enormous humanitarian toll, and the disastrous impact on Europe will be a very large part of the Obama legacy. Like most leaders he has gone to the Holocaust Museum to intone "Never Again," but unlike most he has actually presided over a period when violence grew into genocide, when killings of civilians slowly crept up toward 400,000, and when millions were driven from their country. In April 2012, just about four years ago, President Obama said these words at the Holocaust Museum:   We must tell our children about how this evil was allowed to happen -- because so many people succumbed to their darkest instincts, and because so many others stood silent...We must tell our children. But more than that, we must teach them. Because remembrance without resolve is a hollow gesture. Awareness without action changes nothing. In this sense, "never again" is a challenge to us all -- to pause and to look within...And finally, "never again" is a challenge to nations. It’s a bitter truth -- too often, the world has failed to prevent the killing of innocents on a massive scale. And we are haunted by the atrocities that we did not stop and the lives we did not save.   Remembrance without resolve, awareness without action. Those words and the realities they describe should indeed haunt the reputation of the Obama administration and those who formed its policy for the last five years in Syria.
  • Syria
    The Syria "Cease Fire"
    The Syrian American Council last week distributed a memorandum, whose full text is below, about the new cease fire that has been negotiated between John Kerry, Sergei Lavrov, and other parties. The Council, speaking on behalf of a number of Syrian groups that oppose both jihadis and Assad, found the agreement wanting, and explained why. It’s worth a careful read, for it exposes what a bad deal we’ve signed, and what a benefit it is to the Assad regime, Iran, and Russia. At bottom, the agreement treats Russia like a peace partner, when in fact it is a partner of Assad’s in murdering hundreds of thousands of Syrians. And the agreement’s terms allow Russia and the regime plenty of room to go on attacking whomever they wish to attack, under cover of this "cease fire." Why would an American diplomat ever make this deal? There are two possible answers: he doesn’t quite understand what he’s doing, or he’s making the best of a hopeless situation created by President Obama’s refusal to act decisively in Syria. Either way, the deal is likely to fail-- and "success" in its written terms will help Russia, Iran, and the regime gain ever more ground. Ten or twenty years from now, documents like this will be studied in grad schools, just as they study agreements like the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed war in 1928. Agreements such as this are worse than doing nothing because they tend to legitimize the actions of our enemies. And meanwhile, the killing in Syria will go on. The Washington Post’s story on Syria today began thus:"Syria’s hard-won truce began to fray Sunday, with Russian warplanes resuming airstrikes on towns and villages in the north and fresh reports of artillery fire across several front lines." Here is the text of the memorandum:     The Higher Negotiations Committee for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces   Memorandum on the Joint Declaration by the United States of America and the Russian Federation Regarding a Cessation of Hostilities ("Temporary Ceasefire") The Higher Negotiations Committee affirms its earnest and sincere desire to work toward a political solution that achieves a political transition in Syria, starting with the creation of a Transitional Governing Body with full executive powers that excludes Bashar al-Assad and his clique as stipulated in the Geneva Communique of 2012, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013), United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015), and all other Resolutions to this effect. The Committee further affirms its full rejection of terrorism and extremism in all shapes and forms, including the practices of "Daesh"; Al-Qaeda; Hezbollah; the sectarian terrorist militias that have entered Syria from Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, and Afghanistan; the "Quds Force" militia of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; and all similar militias. We call upon the international community to carry out its legal responsibilities to protect the Syrian people from war criminals and war crimes, as stipulated in the United Nations charter and in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, and to carry out all its other legal obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law. The Committee has carefully reviewed the joint declaration released by the United States of America and the Russian Federation regarding a cessation of hostilities ("temporary ceasefire"). We value and view positively all efforts to stop the killing, especially in light of the ongoing bombardment of civilian areas, the manifold crimes being perpetrated by regime forces and their associated sectarian militias, and the continued indiscriminate targeting of civilians by Russian forces. The Committee believes that a temporary two-week cessation of hostilities is an important opportunity to test how serious our adversaries are about complying with the agreed-upon terms. As such, the Committee has put forth a set of observations that will gauge if the cessation of hostilities will be successful. Serious and effective efforts are necessary to protect Syrian civilians, and such efforts would foster conditions conducive to the initiation of a political process meeting Syrians’ aspirations for freedom as stipulated in the Geneva Communique of 2012. The Committee sees it as imperative that the following observations are addressed before any cessation of hostilities is enacted to ensure the participation of all sides and to increase the chances for implementation on the ground: 1. Given that Russia is a principle party to the conflict, the Committee finds it surprising that the Russian Federation is identified as a partner to the United States in ensuring the implementation of the cessation of hostilities, in verifying adherence with the terms of the declaration, and in enforcing compliance. It would be more proper for a committee comprised of the "Friends of Syria" countries to carry out such tasks and to ensure that Russia enters into the cessation of hostilities by pledging to stop its military and paramilitary operations on Syrian soil. 2. The declaration has also ignored the role of Russia and Iran in combat operations and in perpetrating violations against the Syrian people such as the shelling of populated areas, the use of starvation of civilians as a weapon of war, and the perpetration of forced displacements. For the cessation of hostilities to be effective and conducive to implementation, it must stipulate an end to all combat operations by foreign powers, and specifically those powers (Iran and Russia) that directly target the Syrian opposition. Those powers must be obliged by the cessation of hostilities to cease their combat operations, as they are principal parties to hostilities fighting on behalf of the regime. 3. The declaration legitimizes Russian operations in Syria by authorizing the Russian Federation to target "terrorist organizations," in the phrasing of the United Nations. Regime forces are granted the same status because they, too, are permitted to continue their operations against the aforementioned groups. Considering that both the regime and Russia have insisted on referring to all opposition forces as terrorist groups, the regime and Russia are left free to interpret the United Nations terrorism "classification" in the same misleading manner that they always have to target the opposition. Through this loophole, the regime and Russia will also be able to continue their criminal collaborations on aerial bombardments that have killed thousands of civilians and destroyed schools, hospitals, and other civilian targets. All such operations are outside of the framework of the cessation of hostilities. 4. The declaration does not grant opposition forces the advantages that are provided to the regime, which is described as a "legitimate force" permitted to continue military operations. The declaration ignores the opposition’s need to defend itself from attacks by terrorist groups that target the opposition more than the regime. It is preferable to forbid the regime from carrying out any combat operations in light of its track record of perpetrating war crimes. 5. The second provision of the first article of the declaration stipulates that the fighting groups should pledge to refrain from fighting the regime army or any force allied to it. This is a dangerous provision, since it grants Iran-affiliated terrorist groups the legitimacy that they lack and does not give the opposition the right to defend itself from these terrorist militias. The terrorist militias, which have been unlawfully present on Syrian soil, should not be granted legitimacy or guarantees in the text of a declaration with the force of law. 6. As a result of the above flaws, the mechanism through which the sectarian militias and mercenary groups tied to Iran more than the regime are to announce their adherence to the cessation of hostilities is not specified. It is essential that this announcement be made on time and in a clear fashion in order for the aforementioned groups to confirm their adherence to the cessation of hostilities. 7. The declaration does not include a clear demarcation of the territories excluded from the cessation of hostilities because they are controlled by organizations classified as terrorist according to United Nations Security Council resolutions. Instead, the matter is left to be defined by the United States and the Russian Federation, which is considered a supervisory power of the cessation of hostilities despite being the main party carrying out combat operations. The excluded territories should be clearly demarcated before any cessation of hostilities goes into effect, in order to ensure that Russian, Iranian and regime forces obey the declaration provisions and cease bombarding civilian areas under the guise of targeting "terrorist groups," as Russia has done since the start of its combat campaign. 8. The declaration offers no indication of any requirement to adhere to the principles of international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians, particularly the Geneva Conventions and the two additional Geneva Protocols. These principles apply even in the course of a war against terrorist organizations. It is vital to actualize the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants by declaring that any targeting of civilians will be considered a violation of the cessation of hostilities. 9. The Higher Negotiations Committee views the first paragraph of provisions 1 and 2 in the declaration annex as a clear requirement to immediately and unconditionally implement paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 of Resolution 2254 (2015). The Committee considers the non-implementation of these paragraphs at the start of the cessation of hostilities as a failure to abide by the declaration. 10. There must be a clearly-defined time frame for the passage or conclusion of the temporary cessation of hostilities. The Committee believes that the specification of a two-week, renewable time frame should be dependent on the success of the cessation of hostilities, the implementation of provisions 12, 13, and 14 of Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015), and forward movement in the political process. 11. A clear mechanism should be created and operationalized to enforce compliance and guarantee that Russia, Iran, regime forces, and regime-allied militias do not violate the declaration. 12. A clear, trustworthy, and neutral mechanism should be created and operationalized to delineate steps for observing and investigating whether all parties implement the provisions and requirements of the declaration. 13. An impartial, credible, and trusted actor must be present to identify those responsible for violations of the declaration provisions. 14. A clear mechanism must be created and operationalized to report violations by parties to the cessation of hostilities, along with a required time frame for addressing these violations. 15. The declaration did not define consequences should the regime, its allied militias, Russian forces, or Iranian forces violate their stipulated obligations as parties to the cessation of hostilities. On the other hand, such consequences are implied for opposition forces, since the declaration notes that violations will result in a loss of protection for the offending party. This means that the offending party will be excluded from the ceasefire proceedings, allowing that party to be targeted by Russian or regime forces under that pretense. There is no actor able to carry out similar operations if the regime or its allied militias commit a violation. 16. The locations of the respective forces and of mediators must be specified before the cessation of hostilities takes effect, but the declaration only uses the phrase "refrain from seeking to acquire territory." This phrase is meaningless on the level of legal obligations. The cessation of hostilities must include a clear requirement, beginning on the day the cessation of hostilities comes into effect, that forbids the regime to mobilize its forces or upgrade its firepower in areas under its control. 17. The declaration does not contain any provision preventing Russian forces, regime forces, and regime-allied militias from exploiting the premise of "fighting Daesh and Al-Qaeda" to strike the opposition forces. 18. Finally, the Higher Negotiations Committee affirms that in order to guarantee the success of the cessation of hostilities, the obligations imposed under it must be equal, total, and incumbent upon all sides, and that it must be implemented in a clear, well-defined fashion through operating mechanisms that can not be questioned later. The Committee further affirms that the rights of the Syrian people to defend themselves, in a legitimate fashion and in line with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, must be respected along with the rights of the opposition to fight all terrorist organizations. This should be explicitly specified in a provision that clearly guarantees Russian, regime, and allied air forces will not target the opposition either for defending itself or for fighting terrorist organizations. The Committee will remain in contact with its brothers and friends to better achieve conditions that will spare Syrians further killing and destruction, and that will fulfill Syrian aspirations to build a pluralistic, patriotic administration without Assad, his clique, and all who have their hands drenched with the blood of the Syrian people.  
  • Syria
    Syria: The Need for Diplomacy and De-escalation
    Introduction Of all the factors currently tearing the Middle East apart, none is more consequential than the war in Syria.  The war has left some 250,000 Syrians dead, seven million internally displaced, and three million forced to flee to neighboring states and Europe. The conflict is exacerbating an already large regional sectarian divide, as the Bashar al-Assad regime's violence against a primarily Sunni rebellion fuels the growing conflict between the region's Sunni-majority states and Shia-majority Iran. The violence also leads desperate, resentful Sunnis from across the world to support whatever groups are most willing to fight that regime, including the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The November 13 Paris attacks tragically demonstrated that the repercussions of the conflict are spreading well beyond the Middle East.    These developments, which are destabilizing U.S. allies and posing a direct threat to the security of Americans, put a greater premium than ever on de-escalating the war. Yet the policy the United States and its partners have been pursuing for four years is not likely to achieve that goal. The strategy has consisted of gradually increasing support for a "moderate" opposition that would compel the regime and its primary sponsors to sideline the Syrian dictator and hand power over to a transitional government. Instead of forcing the regime's capitulation, however, that approach has led to a counter-escalation by the regime and its sponsors. Further military escalation is unlikely to change this dynamic, as both Iran and Russia are committed to the regime's preservation. If taken to its logical conclusion, escalation could bring about a "catastrophic success" scenario, whereby the regime's overthrow is followed by all-out war among conflicting extremist factions and more killing, refugee flows, and regional instability. There are no good policy options in Syria. But considering the dire consequences of the status quo or military escalation, the United States should support a new course that consists of using the new diplomatic process in Vienna to de-escalate the conflict on the basis of a cease-fire between the regime and the opposition; devolving power to local representatives in areas the regime does not currently control; intensifying the campaign against the Islamic State; and establishing an internal political process that would ultimately determine Assad's fate but would not make the outcome of that process a prerequisite to ending the war. Even achieving this set of goals could take many months, and would leave some problems unresolved, but it is a far more realistic approach than the current one.  Why the Current Approach Will Not Work The current policy—gradually escalating the war in the hope of forcing a comprehensive political transition—is unlikely to succeed. As opposed to regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, where unpopular leaders quickly fell to opposition protests, Assad is backed not only by sizeable military forces and a considerable portion of his population but also—and perhaps most importantly—by major outside powers determined to prevent the collapse of his regime. Tehran sees its position in Syria as critical to its regional leverage and has thus supplied the regime with money, weapons, and direct military assistance, particularly through its proxies in Hezbollah. Russia is also determined to keep the regime in place. Moscow vehemently opposes the principle of regime change and worries that Assad's fall could lead to even greater chaos with no one in charge or extremists taking power. This explains why outside support for Assad's opposition, provided by the United States and others, has not accomplished its stated goals. Rather than forcing the regime to the table—essentially to negotiate its own demise—it has led only to a military stalemate that is benefiting the extreme elements of the opposition, including the Islamic State. The result has been a growing, open-ended conflict, with devastating humanitarian, strategic, and geopolitical consequences. Diplomacy and De-escalation To end the conflict in Syria, the United States should pursue a course of action consisting of the following steps: Institutionalize a diplomatic process with all parties involved. The October 30 and November 14 multilateral meetings in Vienna, for the first time including Iran and Saudi Arabia, were a useful first step. Participants agreed on basic principles, including preserving Syria's unity, independence, and territorial integrity, and on the need for a political process that would ultimately lead to a new constitution and elections. While influential countries remain deeply divided on the question of whether, how, or when to require Assad's departure, only by hammering out issues collectively and realizing the high costs of maximalist positions can the gaps be narrowed. When the Bosnia "Contact Group" was created as the war there raged in the early 1990s, the United States, Europe, and Russia were all far apart on key issues. They ultimately compromised, imposed a solution on recalcitrant local parties, and agreed on a settlement that has kept the peace in Bosnia for two decades. Initiate a bilateral U.S. back-channel process with Russia. Because no agreement on the most sensitive issues can be reached with nearly twenty participants around a table, the United States should pursue back-channel discussions with Russia at the highest levels. The objective would be a quid pro quo that assures Moscow that the Assad regime will not collapse in exchange for a cease-fire between the regime and the opposition, and joint focus on the Islamic State. If Russia continues to insist on propping up the regime and indiscriminately bombing all elements of the opposition, the United States and others will maintain their support for opposition fighters, the war will go on, and Russia will alienate the Sunni world and become a growing target for terrorists. The October 31 bombing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai and the November 24 downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey underscore the risks for Russia in the absence of a settlement. But if Moscow is willing to press for policy changes from Damascus—including support for a cease-fire, recognition of opposition autonomy in parts of the country, and a process for longer-term leadership changes—a diplomatic agreement might be possible. Pursue a cease-fire between the regime and the opposition. The goals of an agreement would include an end to both sides' offensive operations, including regime aerial attacks; devolution of power so that regions currently held by the opposition can govern themselves; the uninhibited provision of humanitarian assistance to both sides; and the adoption of a political process to determine political leaders and structures to govern an ultimately unified Syria. Given the extremely fragmented nature of the opposition, with no single authority in control and even moderate groups now fighting alongside extremists, it will be nearly impossible to prevent some violations of a cease-fire even if an agreement is reached. But if Russia and Iran were able to guarantee an end to the regime's attacks on the opposition and the provision of humanitarian aid, supporters of the opposition would be well placed to press their clients to accept a cease-fire by threatening to cut off assistance for those who refuse.  The Islamic State would not be party to the cease-fire and would continue to be targeted. International peacekeepers might be required to police the agreement, but the risks of deploying them would be significantly reduced if all the external powers were committed to the deal. Defer the question of Assad. There is no doubt that Assad is a brutal dictator who deserves to face justice. The question, however, is whether the pursuit of that elusive goal is worth the costs of an unending war or the consequences of the military escalation that would be necessary to end the war. The United States and others do not have to abandon their position that Assad has lost legitimacy and that Syria will not be fully stable—or accepted by the international community—as long as he is in place. And they could condition support for a cease-fire on a political process that would determine the country's eventual political structure and leadership. But they should not allow disagreement over Assad's fate to be the obstacle to reducing the violence, if other elements of an agreement could be reached. Those countries most determined to see Assad's departure—such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey—will resist such an outcome, but a clear U.S. position and clarity that the United States will not support military escalation could help bring about their acquiescence. Many weary Syrians, and a growing number of countries, even in the Arab world, would welcome an end to the fighting even if it was not accompanied by immediate regime change in Damascus. Continue the fight against the Islamic State. Even as they pursue a diplomatic agreement to de-escalate the conflict between the opposition and the regime, the United States and its partners should intensify the war on the Islamic State. This should include efforts to empower the Sunnis of Iraq, maintenance of the coalition's bombing campaign, greater intelligence sharing in Europe, the deployment of U.S. and other special forces, and the provision of military assistance to groups willing to target the Islamic State. If the regime and the opposition forces accepted cease-fires vis-à-vis each other on the basis of the current lines of control, they and their outside backers could focus their efforts on the common enemy—the Islamic State. Better Than the Alternatives Critics will be quick to point out the difficulty in making such an approach work, especially given the deep divisions among the outside actors, the inability of anyone to speak for or control an extraordinarily fractured opposition, and the determination of many in the opposition and the region to keep up the fight as long as Assad is in place. The difficulties are indeed considerable, but the primary alternative—military escalation in the form of the provision of more sophisticated weapons to the opposition, less strict vetting procedures for the recipients of U.S. and other allied military assistance to the opposition, or even direct U.S. strikes against the forces of the Assad regime—is even less likely to work and would in many ways make things worse. Escalation would not likely lead to Assad's replacement by "moderates" but only to more killing and destruction as Russia and Iran respond with more support for the regime. It could foment the growth of the Islamic State, which would take advantage of the intensified fighting to attract new recruits.  Reducing the violence on almost any terms would be better than that. Ultimately, were the United States prepared to confront Russia militarily and apply enough military power, it could eventually depose Assad, just as it was ultimately able to oust the Soviets and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. The result, however, is not likely the establishment of a moderate, inclusive Syrian regime but a political vacuum, an even greater refugee crisis as fearful Assad supporters flee the country, a struggle for power in Damascus that extremists might win, a further breakdown of order across the country, and other unwelcome or unintended consequences that would be the responsibility of the United States. Changing the regime in Damascus is a worthy objective given the crimes Assad has committed against his own people and the widespread opposition to his rule. The costs of pursuing that goal by escalating the war in Syria, however, far outweigh the benefits, especially given the low prospects for success and the growing humanitarian, strategic, and political consequences of the conflict. A diplomatic effort to de-escalate does not guarantee peace or decent governance in Syria, but it is a far better approach than the alternatives.
  • Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament
    Sarin
    Sarin, one of the world’s most lethal chemical weapons, has long been stockpiled but is rarely used by states or terrorists. Allegations of attacks on civilians in Syria, if substantiated, would represent a departure from long-standing international practice.