Syrian Civil War

Panelists discuss Turkey’s domestic politics, its recent actions in northern Syria, and the shifting nature of U.S.-Turkish relations in the three years since the attempted July 2016 coup. LAIPSON: Good afternoon, everyone. I want to welcome you all to today’s meeting on U.S.-Turkish relations, “The Shifting Nature of Two NATO Allies.” I’m Ellen Laipson, and I’m currently the director of the International Security Program at George Mason University. And it’s a great pleasure to preside over today’s discussion on a topic that I think is particularly compelling. So in our topsy-turvy world where we write love letters to authoritarians and we publicly disparage our allies, it’s kind of interesting to think where does the U.S.-Turkish relations fit in that sort of spectrum from how we treat allies and authoritarians. It seems to fit into every category or maybe none, and maybe we’re going to try to figure out today how special is the case of U.S.-Turkish relations. It’s, of course, often been a tumultuous relationship, one where the executive branch and Congress don’t always see eye to eye. Is it fundamentally a security partnership, or do we have a stake in Turkey’s democratic standing? And if Turkey is questioning its NATO membership and its evolving—in its evolving relationship with Moscow, what should the United States do? And this is without even mentioning the incursion into northern Syria and the decision by the United States to withdraw our troops from northern Syria. So there’s just a lot going on in the U.S.-Turkish relationship, and I’m delighted that we have three such excellent speakers today to join us and try to make sense of this. Henri Barkey is a professor of international relations at Lehigh University, where he also served for over a decade as chairman of the IR Department. He’s an adjunct senior fellow here in Middle East Studies at the Council. He served on the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff, and he currently is an active member of the Board of Trustees of the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani. Naz Durakoglu is currently a senior policy advisor to Senator Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, but she’s moved back and forth between both the Hill and the executive branch. She served in the European Bureau at the Department of State and spent some time on the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, a very interesting project that looks at the digital dimensions of international relations. And Gönül Tol, to my immediate right, is the founding director of the Middle East program at the—the Turkish program at the Middle East Institute, and is also an adjunct professor at GW. So we decided to start with all three of our speakers giving their topline analysis of whither U.S.-Turkish relations. What’s the current state of play? Is it different than it’s been in the past? And where do they see it heading? So they’ll each speak for about two to three minutes on that very broad opening question, and I think we’ll start—Naz, would you like to go first? DURAKOGLU: Sure. Thank you, Ellen. So thank you again for having me. You know, I know what’s probably on everyone’s minds right now is the current crisis and how our own government is going to deal with this. What I can say is I’m coming from the legislative branch, and for many years the legislative branch has been pushing for some creative thinking, some new thinking on U.S.-Turkey relations. Obviously, there are a number of different perspectives in Congress, both on the House—in the House and in the Senate, but a lot of what you’re seeing now is driven by a sense of frustration among senators and congressmen who felt—who feel that for many years we’ve been turning a blind eye to what they refer to as Turkish bad behavior. Much of it, obviously, is focused on Turkish President Erdoğan. I think from a little bit going back to my time two years ago in the executive branch, I have to say I don’t think those in the executive branch do not feel that frustration. I think they’re very well aware of it, too. But there is more of a long-term thinking to what’s going on with Turkey. And, obviously, there is this constant fear that if you push Turkey or President Erdoğan too far in a certain direction, they will actually go in that direction. I guess the main difference between Congress and the executive branch on this—on this issue is that the legislative branch in particular feels as though Turkey is already there—Turkey is already in the clutches of Russia, it’s an authoritarian state, and for the most part we can’t do much wile Turkish President Erdoğan is there to actually bring Turkey back. So they’re looking at what sort of example does this set in terms of our own relations with Turkey and Turkey’s relations with Europe. And so this is what’s actually driving some of what you’re hearing now when it comes to the sanctions debate. So it’s not solely focused on the incursion in Syria. This is actually a much broader conversation that’s been—that’s been had for the last few years over some of the steps that Turkey has taken. I will say there is something fundamentally different about the conversation that’s taking place right now. Even though I think the legislative and executive branches have not always seen eye to eye on how to respond to Turkey, I do think for the most part the legislative branch did defer to the executive branch for many years in terms of how to go about this relationship, how we should kind of deal with Turkey and President Erdoğan. I think since October 6 there has been a tangible change. And I do think that what you’re going to see is both Republicans and Democrats take a very stern turn and look at their own authorities to address some of the issues that they feel are not being addressed by the administration now. And then added into this dynamic is—and Democrats are a little bit more forward on this issue than Republicans are—but just extreme frustration with our own president, and not being able to really decipher what President Trump is trying to do with his relationships not just with President Erdoğan, but with other leaders who have a bit of an authoritarian bent. So part of the discussion about sanctions and the response to Turkey is also related to how do we respond to President Trump. And what members of Congress feel is just these open-ended relationships with authoritarians don’t really tie back into the U.S. interest. So they’re trying to use what leverage they have. And quite frankly, in the legislative branch we have limited options, and sanctions happen to be one of those options. LAIPSON: So I think we’ll return to sanctions later. DURAKOGLU: Sure. LAIPSON: But why don’t we continue with the kind of topline, big picture. Gönül? TOL: Well, Naz just talked about the frustration on the Hill, and I think there is something to be said about the nature of the current crisis. This partnership survived many crises in the past, but I think this is certainly the most turbulent period in the history of Turkish-American relations. And there’s something different, and I would like to talk about several factors that make it—that make the relationship between these two countries conflict-prone and make it difficult for them to solve problems. And I think the number-one problem here is a centralization and personalization of power in Turkey. So the last decade we’ve seen a transformation of Turkey from an institutional democratic state into a highly personalized one. All foreign and security policymaking is very centralized in the presidential palace. So in the past the United States—the U.S. policy sought to weather the storm during turbulent times by investing in institutions or through regular government contacts, but these things are not there anymore. Erdoğan is the—is the key, key figure. And you would think that this should make things easier because you are dealing with one man, but Turkey is not Saudi Arabia. Turkey is not Egypt. Despite the centralization of power and authoritarianism, public opinion and elections still matter in Turkey. And you’re dealing with a public that is deeply anti-American, that thinks that the U.S. is in decline and has become even irrelevant. So this is a—so you combine that very anti-American public opinion with a very personalized system in which there is no one that can put the brakes on Erdoğan’s worst instincts, so you get a Turkey where Erdoğan’s worldview and his domestic electoral considerations become decisive in foreign policymaking. And the second thing that I want to talk about is the change in Turkish military. Historically, the Turkish military has been an asset in this relationship. It’s been—despite the very marginal pro-Russia cliques within the military, it’s always been very pro-NATO, very pro-United States, and it was this very strong actor that pulled the relationship from the brink during difficult times. But now that military has become very ideological. Just recently I saw Turkish soldiers on their way to Syria. They were flashing far-right—Turkish far-right party sign, and some of them said that they were going to the lands where the sun of Islam rose. And this is something that you would never see before. So Turkish military has become very ideological. And also it’s a similar story that you’re seeing here in Washington. Central Command is very, very skeptical, has very negative views of Turkey and the Turkish military. So the third factor is in the past when we had these problems there was overarching threat that kept these countries together despite all the problems. And now not only is there not an overarching threat, but these two countries are in bed with each other’s archenemies. The United States is working with the PKK Syrian offshoot and Turkey is working with the al-Qaida-linked groups. So it’s really difficult to bridge that gap. And the last factor that I want to talk about is the question of nationalism. President Erdoğan has built his political—domestic political legitimacy on a very aggressive nationalist, anti-Kurdish policy, and this nationalist strain is pushing him toward confrontation with the United States rather than conciliation. So Erdoğan’s political interests are served by these rather very, very strong anti-American narratives, hedging with Russia, or with very aggressive anti-Kurdish policies. So I think in the past fixing relations through government contacts and thinking that limited concessions will placate Turkey is a very outdated approach now because many of the problems that we’re seeing in Turkey-U.S. ties are rooted in Turkey’s domestic political transformation. LAIPSON: Thank you. Thank you very much. Henri, your take on the current and prospective state? BARKEY: Thank you. Sometimes people say everything that’s been said has already been said, but not with my accent, but. (Laughter.) So I—let me take a step back a little bit and say—and look at the Turkish-American relationship. And for the most part, we all know that one thing that determined and was the most important factor in Turkish-American relationship was what real estate people talk about, is location, location, location. I mean, the fact—the fact that Turkey was—controlled the straits; the fact that Turkey, if you look at it from NATO’s perspective, was the most eastern part of NATO in terms of confronting the Soviet Union; that’s what—that’s what counted. And that’s why—that vision of Turkey has not disappeared. It still, I think, remains, and you still see—whether it’s in government circles or elsewhere in Washington, you see this notion that Turkey’s important because it is—its location is crucial to NATO plays a very important role in the way people perceive Turkey. That said, if security and location were the most important factors in the Turkish-American relationship, that kind of changed for a little while when the Turks actually engaged in very, very seriously reforms because of the European Union accession process. And then there was a significant change here in Washington, that maybe we should look at Turkey as a model country. Here’s a Muslim country going through significant democratic changes on its own, and this could be essentially a model for the rest of the Islamic world, with which the United States had serious, serious problems, especially on the democracy side. And unfortunately, that little, shall we say, window of opportunity disappeared with Erdoğan becoming more and more autocratic. So now we are essentially in a third phase. And I heard the other day General McMaster say that Turkey’s geopolitical shift is one of the most significant strategic surprises of the last—I don’t know what he said, whether it was ten or twenty years. And so there a perception that Turkey is moving in another direction. And that direction—the implicit thought here is that that direction it towards the Soviet Union or—I’m sorry, Russia. I’m still—I’m still in the 1950s. But towards Russia and maybe other, shall we say, adversaries of the United States, and maybe China. But I would argue that this is not the case; that is, that Turkey is not moving towards Russia. Turkey is making all kinds of deals with the Russians. We saw the S-400s. We saw the Sochi deal. We see a very much improved relationship between Russia and Turkey. But fundamentally—and also Gönül implied—this is really about Erdoğan. Erdoğan is trying to create a new Turkey, in his mind, a new narrative for Turkey. He is ambitious for Turkey. He is—but mostly, of course, he’s ambitious for himself. And so what’s really happening is if you want a third way, he wants to see Turkey as a leader. I’m not sure exactly what. Maybe he wants to reconstitute the Third World around him. But look at all his—some of his pronouncements, some of the policy options. You saw only last week in the New York Times that he’s now talking about a nuclear option, that Turkey should have nuclear weapons. By the way, that’s not new; he’s been saying that for a while. He’s been wanting to reform the U.N. Security Council. In 2017 he had actually a detailed plan for that. And of course he thinks that, you know, Turkey should be a permanent member of the Security Council and that the world is greater than five—the five permanent members. So you see, very ambitious. But this is very much in line with authoritarian leaders kind of ideational foreign policy. It’s mission-driven. It comes sometimes very aggressive and ideological, but he is also very pragmatic. He knows how much to push, and he knows when to stop pushing, and he knows when to make—to make deals. And the trick here is to understand that, you know, he can—he can be—he can be stopped. But part of—but the most significant aspect of his foreign policy is really domestic. It is really a way of consolidating power, but also making himself kind of the most important leader since Ataturk, maybe even upstaging Ataturk. But in the process he’s creating, essentially, a system that is completely personalized. The state has been de-institutionalized and he is replacing the state. But for that he needs a message. He needs a message that continuously galvanizes/mobilizes people. And part of that message, and a critical part of the message, has to do with antagonizing liberal democracies. You know, you’ve seen him calling the Europeans Nazi remnants. But of course, Turkey’s trade—most of Turkey’s trade is with Europe. Let’s not forget that. One of his great new buddies is Nicolas Maduro. So, I mean, all of these policies are designed for domestic purposes. And especially when it comes to America, an amazing amount of anti-Americanism comes from the palace. That gets repeated by the Turkish press, basically saying that Turkey has one big enemy and that’s the United States. LAIPSON: Thank you. So I think what we should follow up with is two remarks on the domestic determinants of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Gönül wrote an interesting piece in Foreign Affairs about the Turkish desire to take over northern Syria as being driven by some specific domestic realities of Erdoğan’s hold on power at home, so I thought maybe you could say more about that. TOL: Sure. I’ve always argued that Turkey’s reaction to the conflict in Syria must be seen against the backdrop of President Erdoğan’s domestic struggle to consolidate his one-man rule. It’s always been the case. In 2011, for instance, when the Syrian conflict started, Erdoğan’s number-one priority was toppling the regime and securing an Islamist victory because at home he had consolidated his power. Until 2011 his Islamist ideology really could not play a role because he was still vulnerable. He was facing opposition. But by 2011 he had consolidated his power and saw the Arab uprisings as an opportunity to embark on an Islamization process at home. So that’s—that shaped his priorities in Syria, and that was again toppling the regime and securing an Islamist victory. And in 2015 that priority changed, because in 2015 President Erdoğan, his ruling party lost its parliamentary majority after many years, and that was thanks to the rise of a pro-Kurdish party. And after the June 2015 elections, to hold onto power he decided to strike a deal with the country’s ultra-nationalists that is known for their very anti-Kurdish stance. So after that deal he turned his attention, so domestically his priority was to contain Kurdish nationalism both at home and in the region. So his priorities in Syria shifted accordingly. Starting from 2015, containing the Kurdish gains in northern Syria became his number-one priority and toppling the regime took the backseat. And in fact, Erdoğan weakened the opposition. For instance, Turkish actions in Aleppo played a decisive role in the fall of Aleppo because Turkey decided to enlist the opposition fighters fighting in Aleppo in its fight against the Kurds. And Turkey worked very closely with Iran and the Assad regime starting from 2015, which ended up consolidating the regime’s gains on the ground. And we have recently seen another change with the recent local elections that dealt a huge blow to Erdoğan’s rule. So in March 2019 elections his ruling party lost almost all major cities in Turkey. And in the rerun elections in Istanbul he lost Istanbul again, by even a bigger margin. And the number-one reason is, obviously, the economic downturn played a very important role, but one of the top reasons for his failure was the presence of 3.6 million Syrian refugees. We’ve been seeing an increasing nationalist backlash against the Syrian refugees. So now his priority has shifted again in Syria, so he’s now talking about creating a safe zone that could host up to 3 million Syrian refugees. That’s his plan, and I think that’s even a more urgent priority for him than containing the Syrian Kurds. In a recent talk he said that we have to clear that area—northeastern Syria—of the YPG elements because it’s going to make it—they are going to make it difficult for us to establish that safe zone so we can send back the Syrian refugees. So even his narrative shifted, and you could see that in the way he talks about the Kurds. So they are—that containing Kurds is still—is still important, but I think his number-one priority is the Syrian refugees now. And that’s why we’re seeing what we’ve been seeing today, the recent—most recent Turkish military incursion into northeastern Syria and the deals with the United States and Russia. So that’s what he’s been trying to do. LAIPSON: Thank you. Naz, I think it would not be an exaggeration to say that relations between the White House and Congress on foreign policy issues is also in a state of some agitation these days, whether it’s Ukraine or the Turkey-Syria crisis. So I wonder if you could just flesh out for us a little bit, maybe, the different parts of that conversation, and whether the legislative activity to impose sanctions on Turkey is real. Do you think it’s likely to, you know, produce a particular outcome? How do you see those—the debates that include Turkey, but not exclusively Turkey, playing out as a political struggle between the White House and the Congress? DURAKOGLU: Sure. So, actually, to do that I have to move away from Turkey for a quick second. But you know, again, what I referenced earlier, there are separate authorities between the executive and legislative, and what we’ve been seeing since President Trump’s election and since he’s come into office is the Senate in particular, but Congress across the board—and in fact, under Democrats it’s been happening even more in the House—there is an effort to regain certain authorities that Congress feels like it’s lost over time. There is a push and pull for that reason. And quite frankly, it did exist a little bit under the last administration as well. Congress always, you know—it does have a place in foreign policy; it’s just a different type of place than the executive has. So there is this constant tension between the executive and legislative branches over this. But when President Trump came in, particularly over issues regarding Russia, there was an overwhelming mistrust of his intentions. And obviously, there are some members of Congress that are more willing to talk about that than others, but it really played out in the—in 2017 when the CAATSA legislation actually came forward. And that was a huge—that was a huge move because, quite frankly, Leader McConnell at the time allowed for Democrats and Republicans to come together to put together a massive sanctions package that not only enforced new sanctions on Russia, but it also took away the executive branch’s ability, and particularly the president’s ability, to remove sanctions off certain entities, existing sanctions, particularly those related to Ukraine. So this whole—this situation actually shaped the current—the current narrative—what’s currently happening between the executive branch and the legislative branch. Now, going to what we’re dealing with now, you’re seeing that again. And that’s—quite frankly, the legislative branch is, again, mistrustful of President Trump’s intentions when it comes to Turkey. They don’t really understand what happened in December 2018, when there was a phone call between Erdoğan and Trump, and Trump tweeted that U.S. troops would be withdrawn from northeast Syria. And they certainly don’t understand what happened on October 6, when we basically saw the same thing happen, but this time with very real consequences. And further, many of these members of Congress—including my own boss, Senator Shaheen—have visited northeast Syria. They actually went there when it was a stabilized region. They met with multiethnic groups. And they have their own perception of what was happening there, and they very much feel like Trump opened the door to have Erdoğan basically ruin that stability. And the numbers, if you just look at what UNHCR is reporting in terms of people fleeing to Iraq, really do illustrate that. There is absolute—people there, even with whatever agreements were reached with the United States and Russia. And so what we’re dealing with now are a number of separate proposals. You have two proposals, mainly, in the House, and then two proposals in the Senate. And initially I think what congressmen and -women were trying to do, they were really trying to send a message, and they were trying to let everyone—globally, they wanted to kind of reclaim the message that they felt like President Trump was abusing a little bit, and that was they don’t feel like Turkey’s incursion was right. They feel like the U.S. has a valid presence in northeast Syria, and it was actually one that was working, and therefore it shouldn’t have—the president shouldn’t have done what he did. So the initial packages, I think, were really meant to send this loud message. Now there’s more of a deliberative effort to try and get these sanctions right. So what you’re probably going to see is next week the House will bypass markup and bring forward one of their sanctions proposals, and then it’s really going to be up to Leader McConnell and others in the Senate as to what they’re going to do next. And McConnell has already spoken on the floor in support of sanctions, but again, he’s also—he indicated that they have to be very carefully put together. So it’s a little bit unclear still what the pathway forward is, but I have to say there is an overwhelming, you know, push to do something. What senators will say is we have to have a response. So I think you are going to see that. And whatever ends up happening, I do think it has a veto-proof majority both in the House and the Senate. So you will see something. LAIPSON: Thank you. So in this complicated dynamic and crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations, there’s more than two actors. We’ve mentioned Russia. We’ve mentioned the Syrian regime. But I think we—the Kurds deserve a little more attention as a party to this current crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations. Henri, you’ve been looking at the kind of Kurdish future, looking at Kurds within Turkey, the activities of the Syrian Kurds as well as Iraqi Kurds. So I wonder if you want to address how the Kurdish question has always been a part of the U.S.-Turkish relationship and whether—you know, what’s the Kurdish side of the story these days? BARKEY: Thank you. Look, for the Kurds, clearly, this is a really—a major, major setback, but they’ve been here before. They’ve been—everybody knows the Kurds have been betrayed left, right, and center whenever it was convenient for the large powers, whether it was Mahabad Republic, if it was the shah of Iran and the United States in the mid-’70s. So there’s been a number of cases. But in terms of understanding also Erdoğan’s actions over the Syrian Kurds, let me just mention a couple of things. Erdoğan keeps saying that this was—the YPG is PKK, this is a security threat for Turkey, but the truth of the matter is that there was never a bullet that crossed the Syrian-Turkish border. So the YPG never engaged the Turks militarily, was never a threat. They wouldn’t have been because the Americans also would not have let them, even if they had thought about it. Of course, what is—what is forgotten here is in the elections—the municipal elections that Gönül mentioned this year, at one point Erdoğan, realizing that his party was going to lose, had emissaries sent to none other than Abdullah Öcalan, the head of the PKK, in jail to see if he could convince Öcalan to tell the Turkish Kurds not to vote for the opposition and abstain. So this is part of the pragmatism that I talk about Erdoğan. He’s very, very pragmatic. But when it comes to Syria, he did have a threat. I mean, I do—actually do concede that there was a real threat to Turkey in Syria. And it was not necessarily the YPG itself, but it was the possibility of the emergence of another autonomous statelet in Syria, especially after the creation of the KRG. And in both instances—remember, the KRG—the midwife of the creation of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq was the United States. And the United States was doing exactly the same thing, in a way, from the Turkish perspective. Was in the process of helping a group that had created an autonomous—functioning autonomous region in Syria. And the logical step is that once the Syrian civil war is over, that with the United States’ help the Syrian Kurds would actually get autonomy in Syria. That in and of itself is a strategic threat to Turkey because, guess what, who’s next? And in a—in an environment where there’s paranoia and the West is seen as the enemy, you see all the time government officials and Turks mentioning the fact that what United States really, really wants to do, and the reason it went into the Middle East, was to split Turkey up. So this fear of Turkey being split up is not real, of course. But for many people. it is actually a galvanizing, an organizing principle. So for Erdoğan, it was critical to stop the Syrian Kurds from achieving anything. And that’s because down the road they would create an autonomous region supported by the United States, all right? So what does it mean, very briefly, about the future of the Kurds? I mean, as I said, the Kurds have been here before, and they have come back. And they will come back. And every—you know, it’s like it’s always two steps forward, one step backwards, right? So over the years—and all you have to do is look essentially at the last hundred years, after the Sèvres treaty, that the Kurds have made slow improvements in their stature. Yes, they get defeated. Yes, they get killed. Yes, they get—people get displaced. But let’s face it, there’s—now there is the KRG. Everybody in Turkey realizes, and everybody outside Turkey realizes, that Turkey’s main and single most important problem is not the PKK. It is a Kurdish problem. Syria now has a Kurdish problem. That’s something that people did not really focus on a few years ago. And I can assure you, the Iranian Kurds are also looking at the situation. There’s already been demonstrations in Iranian Kurdistan in favor of the Syrian Kurds. And especially the fact that the Syrian Kurds managed to defeat ISIS, made an alliance with the United States—and it’s true that the alliance was broken. But it was broken by one man. Let’s face it, it was broken by President Trump, not by the American government. I mean, in that sense, we have a very bizarre situation in Washington. And the assumption is if there is a change of government here that maybe things would go back to normal. But that said, there was an alliance between the PKK Kurds, if you want, and United States. So these are all small steps, if you want, that improves slowly the Kurdish position internationally. That doesn’t mean there’s going to be a Kurdish—an independent Kurdish state anywhere in the future. Chances are it will be autonomous regions everywhere if we were—if we were to get together a hundred years from now here. But that’s where this is going. So think of it, as I said, two steps forward one step backwards. LAIPSON: OK. We’re now a minute or two overdue to let our members and guests join the conversation. I do ask you to—first of all, today we’re on the record, as you may have been able to tell from cameras. Please wait for the microphone, speak directly into it, state your name and affiliation, and please limit yourself to one question. So I’m going to start in the back, please. The woman on this side of the table. Yes. Stand up—can I ask you to stand? Q: Rachel Oswald, reporter with CQ Roll Call. Next week the House is expected to pass, under suspension of the rules, a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide. The resolution says this shouldn’t be a one-off; this should be a continuous part of U.S. policy toward Turkey. Would the panel comment on that, as well as what this—is this likely to infuriate the Turkish public? Will this play into Erdoğan’s hands, if he can use it to rally his base and increase his likelihood to be reelected? LAIPSON: Who would like to take that one? DURAKOGLU: Well, I mean, you’re right. It’s definitely—it’s on the Rules Committee now, and the House does have intentions of moving that. Yes. I mean, this is not the first time we’ve seen the Armenian genocide resolution. And, yes, each time it infuriates the Turkish government and Turkish public. That being said, I think another reason—what’s happening right now on the Hill is there are such heightened emotions over what they just saw over northeast Syria. And, again, this is a collection of heightened emotions over time—over Pastor Brunson, over S-400s, over a number of other issues. So I do think there is an effort to just try and get everything out the gate right now. I won’t necessarily comment on whether or not that’s a strategy that’s going to lead to shaping Turkey’s behavior or not. But at the same time I do know that, you know, this is on the radar, and this is definitely one of the reasons why the Hill feels the need to kind of move forward on that measure, as well as others. TOL: But I think it’s also—I think Congress using this as a political tool is not a wise strategy. First, I think it’s a disservice to the victims of the genocide. So every time when there is—something is wrong with Turkey, you bring this issue to the table. I think it’s not the right strategy. LAIPSON: Henri, did you want— BARKEY: Very quickly. I mean, it’s certainly going to lay into the narrative of the government and the anti-Americanism. But let’s assume this all passes, et cetera. Again, remember, Erdoğan is a pragmatist. He’s going to rail against it, but when it comes to making deals he will make deals. Look, Trump wrote him the most insulting letter anybody has ever sent from the White House. I mean, and in 1974 there was a famous—I’m sorry—1963 there was a famous Johnson letter. And he took a long time to get over it. This time it’s really an insulting letter, and Erdoğan seems to have, as he said, thrown it in the trashcan and make a deal with Trump. So, yes, he’s going to be upset, but he will live with it. LAIPSON: Mike, you’re next. And right here. Q: Thank you. I’m Mike Haltzel from Johns Hopkins SAIS. Henri, you make a convincing case for Erdoğan’s pragmatism. And he’s already gotten the S-400s, which I think are a severe threat to our F-35s. And that’s a done deal. My question to all of you, really is, how important is NATO to Erdoğan? I’m not suggesting that Turkey should be kicked out. I might just say parenthetically that there had been two examples in the last few decades where countries—members of NATO have been chastised and punished without being thrown out. The Greek colonels, ’67-’73, and for a few weeks in the summer of ’75 when Portugal looked like it was going communist. They—in both causes, they were barred from the NAC, they were denied intel. I mean, it’s a rap on the knuckles, and it might be a way to make clear to Erdoğan that there are limits. But basically, my question is how important is NATO, not the United States? LAIPSON: And I guess a variation on the question would be is it more likely that NATO would take action or that Erdoğan himself would say, as the French have done or others, you know, I’m suspending my NATO membership for the following reasons? So. BARKEY: I was actually going to mention this in my—in my initial comments, but I thought I was running out of time. I don’t think Erdoğan wants to get out of NATO. I think NATO is very, very critical to Turkey, and he understands it, because Turkey that is not a member of NATO is a much-diminished power. Remember, he wants to create—he wants to make Turkey one of the big, important powers in the world. And if you’re not in NATO, then your wings will have been clipped. So he’s playing this game. I mean, he gets S-400s, but he’s never going to leave NATO. And he keeps pushing the envelope, and to see how far he can go. TOL: And also I think we also have to underline the fact that there is still mistrust. Despite everything going on between Turkey and Russia, there is still a lot of mistrust between the countries. They don’t really trust each other. Just a few years ago, in 2015, remember that was when Turkey shot down the Russian jet. President Erdoğan begged its NATO allies, it appealed to them not to withdraw the Patriots. That was—in some ways, that was a turning point. But as recently as just a few months ago, when he was talking about the tension in Eastern Mediterranean, he again appealed to the NATO partners. So NATO is still very important. And Turkey-Russia partnership is not that tight. I mean, we’re not—we’re not at a point where we can talk about a strategic Turkey-Russia partnership. I think I see that relationship as still very fragile. There are so many policy disagreements everywhere—in Eastern Mediterranean, where Russia is on the opposing front, in the region, in Africa, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus everywhere. So despite that close partnership, Turkey is the junior partner. And I think Erdoğan understands that. So that’s one of the reasons why I think leaving NATO is not going to be his preferred option. DURAKOGLU: If I could add—if I can add to that? I think it’s also important to just—what Henri said. Erdoğan is pragmatic. So obviously NATO is going to be a continued tool, because it’s in an alliance with a number of nations that pay close attention to Turkey’s domestic turn as well—some of the authoritarian actions and things. So as long as Turkey is in NATO, it could—it is somewhat of a chip for Erdoğan to make sure that others aren’t necessarily paying too much attention, or at least expressing frustrations with what he’s doing internally in his own country. But that being said, I think you also have to look at Turkey’s actions in NATO. For the most part, they are actually a pretty good NATO partner with AWACS, they have Kosovo missions, they’re a framing nation in Afghanistan. So it’s not a country that I think we should—this rhetoric about kicking Turkey out of NATO, which we all know we can’t do, we do have to be careful because it’s—even in his really tumultuous time we have to be really careful to try and hold on to those levers that exist between the West and Turkey. And NATO’s probably the premier level and the premier foundation for making sure that in the future, you know, a future Turkey, post-Erdoğan, will still maintain its links. LAIPSON: I’m going to go to the front here, and then Steve Cook, and then John Negroponte, and then to the back. Q: Grace Skuh (ph) Josena Capital (ph). I wanted to pick on two points the panel has spoken about. The first one is, Congress’ best tool is a sanction. Second point is, Turkish public opinion is turning against America. And my question is, normally in foreign policy you like to see sticks and carrots. And to me, the recent years we’ve been using lots of sticks and very little carrots. So can you comment on that, and, you know, kind of reflect on your thoughts of what’s the best way forward? Thank you. DURAKOGLU: Should I go ahead? In terms of sticks and carrots, I think actually before this time period that we’re currently in, just since October 6, there have been discussions about carrots as well as sticks. In fact, the discussion of carrots, in my opinion, outweighed the discussion on sticks. And if I could be so bold to say, I think that’s part of the reason we may be here right now as well. But in terms of looking at other countries, yes, that might be true. The discussion of sticks sometimes outweighs the discussion of carrots. But with Turkey, there’s always been this effort to try and make sure we’re not pushing them away, that it’s, you know, somehow the United States is really the one that’s kind of in charge of making sure that you can determine Erdoğan’s next move, and next alliance, and next phone call. But I think there is now more of a realization that the country itself under Erdoğan is moving in a direction—and, again, I agree with you, it’s not the country itself. The country is much more than one man, Erdoğan. But Erdoğan is pretty much all-powerful. And he is making these decisions. We have to see what the sanctions package—what will actually come of that. But I do—I do sense that it won’t be—it won’t be an exact replica of the bills that you’re currently seeing right now. TOL: And you have to be careful with the sanctions too. You want to make sure that you don’t punish the Turkish public that’s already very anti-America, because that will only strengthen Erdoğan’s hand. LAIPSON: Good point. Steve. Q: Steven Cook from the Council on Foreign Relations. I’m wondering if anybody or all of you can reflect on this question. I know that it’s hard to imagine Turkey without Erdoğan, but what do you think the state of relations would be between Turkey and the United States without Erdoğan? And I ask this question because Gönül made the point, and a very good point, about the domestic determinants of what is happening in Syria. It strikes me that Erdoğan two years ago was very proud of the way in which Turkey had handled the Syrian refugee crisis. Now he is the leading voice of pushing Syrians back. He’s taken that from the opposition. It strikes me that we talk a lot about Erdoğan, as we should, as Naz just pointed out, but it’s—is this a Turkey-U.S. problem or is this an Erdoğan-U.S. problem? Thank you. LAIPSON: Henri? BARKEY: Look, it isn’t an Erdoğan problem in the sense that there’s always been anti-Americans in Turkey. It goes back decades. But Erdoğan has amplified it, has organized it, has routinized it and so—and because there’s no free press in Turkey, there are no outlets for alternative viewpoints anymore. It is—that view is becoming—it has become completely dominant. Completely dominant. That said, Turkey without Erdoğan, I think Erdoğan plans to stay until 2034, so if the kind of Turkey you’re thinking about without Erdoğan is—(laughter)— Q: (Off mic)—my question. BARKEY: —is far away. But that said, authoritarians are their own worst enemies. They always must make mistakes and they always make the kind of mistakes that ultimately become—undermines them. We saw a small one in Istanbul this year by Erdoğan when he had the elections cancelled and had to run again. But you see the same thing in—today in Bolivia. I mean, in many different countries authoritarians don’t know where to stop. And at some point there will be other factors that will intervene. And change in Turkey will come, maybe before 2034, but it will be also—the kind of change that will come will also change, I think, Turkish-American relations, because it will go back to the old normal, so to say. A healthy dose of anti-Americanism, but at the same time a close relationship, a working relationship. DURAKOGLU: I’d like to say this. I think it’s really important. Your question’s important because we do have to actually think about what Turkey will look like post-Erdoğan, and that—I think one of, and I know Senator Shaheen has said this as well, one of the big criticisms is that we’re not necessarily doing what we can as the United States to invest in that day, to make sure that we have strong links to Turkish civil society, to make sure that we’re actually looking at other segments to see where we can actually grow our relationship in the future. And I think we do that in other countries, for sure, but it hasn’t been as strong in Turkey. Part of that is because we don’t have a USAID mission in Turkey, so there are some practical reasons. But looking at Russia, I mean, the Turkish public is also—or was also rather anti-Russian as well. If you look at public opinion polling now, they are not as anti-Russian anymore. So if we look a little bit at what the Kremlin’s doing with their public diplomacy initiatives and others in Turkey, I think you can see that there’s a bit of a blueprint there that we probably should have followed as well with our own public diplomacy initiatives and just civil society in reaching out to the actual people in Turkey. TOL: And I— LAIPSON: Who wants to— TOL: Can I just—and I—actually, I don’t think that we can talk and think about a post-Erdoğan Turkey because I think he’s electorally at his most vulnerable. I mean, because of the Syrian incursion, I’ve heard that there are now public opinion polls show he’s—the support for him is now at 40 percent, which was hovering around 32 (percent) before that. But I think this is going to be short-lived. So he is very vulnerable, and I can think of several scenarios where he can actually survive this, and one is in which the PKK ramps up its attacks inside Turkey. That’s definitely going to empower Erdoğan. And the second, if somehow Turkish economy turns around and the economic concerns are not there anymore. But aside from that, I think he is very vulnerable. And that’s one of the reasons why the Western world, as Naz mentioned, has to engage the opposition. And to your question about what happens after Erdoğan leaves, do we go back to normalcy? How would a Turkey-U.S. relationship look like? I think—imagine if the CHP is in power. First they have to dismantle this very personalized system that Erdoğan has built, because I think that’s one of the—one of the big problems. LAIPSON: Explain who CHP is. TOL: Well, the main opposition party. If they’re in power, I think they really have to rebuild the institutions. And it’s going to take a lot of effort and time, but I think things could change. LAIPSON: OK. Let’s go quickly, as we—because we have a number more hands. John Negroponte’s next, then the woman in the back is next. Q: Hi. John Negroponte, McLarty Associates. One comment and one question. The comment is simply as the Senate or others contemplate sanctions, just be sure that that doesn’t increase his popularity rather than decrease it. So I suggest we reflect on that possibility. LAIPSON: Important point. Q: The question is what happened to Kemalism and the notion of a non-sectarian, political state in Turkey, and where are the remnants of Kemalism in the body politic? I mean, where are the strong points and where can they be found? LAIPSON: Henri, want to—Henri and Gönül on that one, maybe, then— BARKEY: Kemalism is alive and well, I can assure you, but it is a little bit dormant, all right? It is dormant in the sense that because Erdoğan is so omnipresent, because he dominates everything, the Kemalist element has been pushed down. But—and let me put—I mean, today for example, they announced that at important national events like the Republic Day on the 29th of October, Turkish embassies will no longer serve alcohol, right? This is clearly an attempt at Attaturk’s, since he was a bon vivant—it’s his legacy. But the great—(inaudible)—in Turkey with the Kemalists—and look, the Kemalists were not democrats, so let’s not say that this is—they are the savior in this situation. I mean, they are the ones who backed the military for all these years and backed military coups. So I’m a little bit skeptical in trying to look at the Kemalists as a—as a panacea. That said, the point is that the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, was a Kemalist party is awful. I mean, they would not know how to win an election. If everybody was against Erdoğan, they would still manage to lose the election. So the problem with part of it is that there is no organized political movement, if you want, to represent Kemalism. It’s out there, as an idea it’s, as I said, it’s a little bit dormant. LAIPSON: Did you want to quickly—and then we’ll go to the— TOL: Yeah. And it has been transformed that radical secularism that defined Kemalism is not there anymore. The main opposition party, the representative of Kemalism, if you look at the candidates that it fielded in major towns, in Istanbul and Ankara, for instance, they come from center-right backgrounds. They are the one in Istanbul has come from a conservative background. So Kemalism has transformed itself. But what has happened is in places like military, for instance, Kemalism is in alliance with Erdoğan’s Islamism. And their common denominator is nationalism and the anti-Kurdish sentiment. So they are not—they’re not completely against each other, so you see the merging of these two ideologies, and the result is a policy that is very anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Kurdish. But both Erdoğan’s Islamism and Kemalism’s focus on state power is there. Henri just mentioned how Kemalism has never been a liberal democratic ideology. He’s right. I mean, they are both obsessed with state power and statism, and that’s one of the reasons why Kemalism has not delivered on democratic consolidation. So imagine, picked—all the worst elements of Kemalism was nationalism, anti-Kurdish sentiment and statism. Erdoğan’s Islamism has all of those, and now they are in alliance. LAIPSON: You’ve been very patient. Thank you. Q: Thank you. I am Katerina Sokou with Greek daily Kathimerini, correspondent here in town. and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. Moving to the Eastern Mediterranean, I was wondering, how concerned are you with Turkey’s drilling activity in the—Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone? And can you see the U.S. administration doing something to stop it? And given the recent experience in Syria, do you think that this would be enough? Thank you. LAIPSON: OK. Henri, you’ve written on this. So I don’t know if the others have, but I know you’ve written on this. BARKEY: Look, I think it goes back to this notion of—with Erdoğan and the United States is—the United States has done all these things for Erdoğan and basically his response is, OK, that was yesterday; what are you going to do for me today, right? I mean, we see it—we see it even today because now he wants the Kurdish military leader that Trump (touted ?) to be extradited. So on the Eastern Med—and there are people in this room who know the situation better than I do—but my sense is there essentially two problems. One is, as you said, the drilling activities, and he’s going to push as much as he can, all right? And the other one is Famagusta, and whether or not there may be an attempt by the Turkish Cypriots or by Erdoğan himself to take over the town of Famagusta, which is this area which is uninhabited between the two—the Greek and Turkish zones. The point is I worry because every time he sees the West backing down, he will take another step. He will push the envelope. But what will he do? I don’t know. LAIPSON: I’d like to just see how many more hands are up, see if we can do a very, very quick round. Pat, the gentleman there, and why don’t we take all three questions and then we’ll do a final round. Very quick questions, please. Q: Yeah. Patrick Theros, retired Foreign Service officer. How does Erdoğan view the tension in the United States? How does he see the difference between how the Congress and the president—I mean, there seems to be a bit of a bromance. Does he see the president as a get-out-of-jail card for him? LAIPSON: OK. Q: Hi. Tatiana Smialowski with RIA Novosti news agency. I’d like the panel to talk a little bit more about the arrangements between Russia and Turkey versus United States and Turkey, how that will all play out. Thank you. Q: Nelson Cunningham, McLarty Associates. Another intersection between Turkey and the U.S. we haven’t talked about really yet is Gülen. It’s recently been come out that Rudy Giuliani was lobbying for the extradition of Gülen. People forget that Michael Flynn in part was brought down for work he was doing on behalf of that. So Gülen. LAIPSON: Thank you. All right. So you’ve got three issues. Why don’t we quickly each take one minute if you could to just pick up on any of the questions? DURAKOGLU: Sure. I could just—I mean, this touches on both, but I think if Erdoğan doesn’t see Trump as a get-out-of-jail-free card, then he’s blind, because clearly that’s why he calls him directly and every time he’s called him he’s been able to bypass those in the administration who may have other opinions. And definitely Congress has been concerned about this, and yeah, we‘ve seen those reports as well. I think it’s all a part of a larger discussion about the administration, the president and who he surrounds himself with and what sort of effect those individuals have on our foreign policy. And if, you know, there’s a larger-picture inquiry in the House that’s taking place on some related matters. TOL: Well, there was a question about Russia, U.S. and—in Syria. I think with the recent deal that was agreed in Sochi between Turkey and Russia, Turkey got half of what it wanted from Putin, which was now there’s going to be a—that the Kurds will be pushed back. There’s going to be a thirty-kilometer-deep zone and that’s going to be off-limits to the YPG forces, the Kurdish forces. And that was one of the things that he wanted, Erdoğan wanted from Putin. But he also wanted a larger zone, a wider zone so he could send back the Syrian refugees. He didn’t get that. Russia only agreed to the current military presence, Turkish military presence in northeastern Syria. And also with that agreement, Turkey is one step closer to recognizing the Assad regime again, because there is a clause in that agreement that refers to an agreement that was signed between Turkey and Syria in 1998 and the agreement says it’s the duty of the Assad regime to address Turkey’s security concerns. So the Assad regime is saying that if you have problems with the Syrian Kurds, let me deal with it, so you stay away. So but I think that in the short term this is only the Russians have agreed to Turkish military presence, but I think that’s going to be—that’s going to be a short-term solution. In the end, they will ask Turkish forces to leave. And in terms of American troops, well, you know, it takes a Tweet to change everything. But just yesterday we heard that Americans are now might—the president is weighing options to send hundreds of troops to send hundreds of troops back to Syria. If that happens—to secure oilfields, which is not a realistic thing. But if that happens, that would only strengthen the Kurdish hands in their negotiations with the regime and Russia. But it’s not going to fix U.S.’s problems in Syria. LAIPSON: Henri, final thoughts? BARKEY: On Russia, look, I think you have to take your hat off to Putin. I mean, he essentially is playing a three-stage game. First, he managed to create tensions between Turkey and the rest of NATO, and so that always has been one of his goals. He—we also saw him doing that earlier. He got the United States out of Syria, all right? And third, and this is what the Turks don’t realize, his next step is he’s going to get the Turks out of Syria. Because he very much wants Assad to consolidate power completely, all of Syria. He couldn’t have done it with—as long as United States was there, so essentially Turkey played into his hands and you’re already seeing that the—and this was to be expected that the next move from Russia is going to be with Assad to take over Idlib, which is going to create problems for Turkey in terms of more refugees. So I don’t know if actually—yes, Erdoğan won against United States, but he lost against Russia. So Russia is a real big winner. As far as Gülen is concerned, look, there’s been always all these lobbyists and Giuliani, the characters who have been trying to get Gülen extradited. The problem is that when the Turks have not sent a file that is one that you can use in an American court, because they’ve put in everything they want into those files, and they really do not necessarily make much sense. LAIPSON: I’m sorry that we’ve run out of time, but I want you to join me in thanking this terrific panel. (Applause.) (END)

As the Syrian conflict extends into its ninth year, risks to international security and regional stability remain. Our panelists discuss U.S. policy toward Syria, including military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives and multilateral efforts to bring the conflict to a close. SHANKER: Well, good afternoon to all of you and welcome to today’s Council on Foreign Relations meeting. The topic is Syria: State of the Conflict and U.S. Policy. I’m Thom Shanker. I’m an editor with the New York Times Washington bureau. And I’m completely thrilled and honored to be here with a blue-chip panel, as always. Whenever the Council convenes on these important questions they get just the absolutely best people to elevate a conversation with all of you today. Just a couple quick housekeeping things. If you have cellphones, please silence them. I’m sure you know that already. We’ll begin with a half-hour discussion here on the stage, and then I’ll move to your Q&A. We will end at 1:30. I lived five years in the Soviet Union, so I run these meetings Stalinist efficiency—(laughter)—and all of you with busy schedules will be out at 1:30 sharp, I promise. And most importantly to me, and many colleagues in the journalism profession, this discussion is on the record today. Our panel includes Gayle Lemmon. She’s adjunct senior fellow for women and foreign policy here at the Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of a couple outstanding books, I highly recommend them, Ashley’s War and The Dressmaker of Khair Khana. Welcome. We have Mouaz Moustafa, executive director, Syrian Emergency Taskforce. We have Michael Mulroy, who’s deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East. And we have Joel Rayburn, deputy assistant secretary of state for Levant affairs, and special envoy for Syria. Thank all four of you for being here today. Everything important in life I learned from two sources, Johnny Cash and the United States military. And the military is relevant today because when you look at complex problems like Syria, the military breaks them down into strategic operational and tactical to try to understand. And I thought we would guide our conversation today along the same lines. So I’ll start at the top with a strategic question for all four of you, please. As a nation, we’ve learned since 9/11 that militaries can’t win wars. Militaries can defeat other militaries, but it’s up to the rest of the government, NGOs, and others to actually win the peace. So as you look at the very complex situation on the ground in Syria today, it’s a civil war. There are terrorist safe havens. There’s international meddling. Very complicated relations with neighbors. Walk me through, if you could, what is the route to peace and stabilization? LEMMON: (Laughs.) So I should start with a Johnny Cash song I Walk the Line in giving this answer. I think I’m very keen to hear from the other panelists. It’s delightful to join all of you today. I do think that we have a moment where there is a chance. There is a sense that the Iraq War is the ghost that hangs over every decision that has been made on Syria. And a sense on the ground, certainly when you’re in the northeast, that there actually is a moment, there is something to protect. Because, having had the privilege of traveling in and around the northeast six times in the past two years, I will tell you that it is a story of progress, and very fragile, very endangered, but very real gains that moms and dads are fighting for every single day. And so in this one corner you have a by, with, and through that actually has done its job, and perhaps done too good a job because no one wants to pay attention to it. There’s another Johnny Cash song, It Ain’t Me, Babe, you’re looking for. Everybody’s sort of trying to drop the hot potato and walk out. And I do think that there is a fragile progress that is worth protecting. And then you have the question of how do you get to a diplomatic endgame, and where is the pressure going to be? Who is actually going to help get to some kind of process that works? It’s hard to find people on the ground who believe in Geneva. And I would actually love very much to hear other people’s views on this. But I think that you have a northwest situation, al-Qaida discussions. I know there was a piece from your colleague that is concerning to many. And the question is, how do you solve multiple conflicts at one time? I do think there’s a role for the United States to help exercise leadership and get the concerned parties at the table. I think that our colleagues here from the U.S. government have been working on this and can talk to this. But there is nothing easy about what comes next because I don’t think that, policy aside, anybody sees the Assad regime going anywhere, except perhaps a day trip to either Tehran or Moscow. SHANKER: Thank you. Mouaz, please. MOUSTAFA: So I want to thank the Council on Foreign Relations for having me here. It’s truly an honor to be back and to sit on such a respected panel. And I want to thank the service of DASD Mulroy and DAS Rayburn for all that they have done in the service of our country, and also to help get Syria through this horrible mess that it’s in. And as we look at the over—I agree with the points that you made, Gayle. And I think that, you know, with all the competing interests in Syria, and the fact that the country now, if you go to a certain, specific geographic location, and the armed groups on the ground, the political powers on the ground differ greatly. And I think one mistake that we have made in the past is we’ll focus—for example, be hyper-focused on the northeast and not think about the implications of the events happening in the northwest and how that affects it. Same applies across the board in the different areas in Syria. I think the complicated conflict, the competing interests from regional countries and others make it very difficult. But at the same time, I think it’s very, very important to stay in tune with the population itself—this population that came out in 2011 in multi-confessional, nonviolent, peaceful protests initially asking for reform. And as the brutality of the regime and its allies increased exponentially, they started asking for a full transition from this dictatorship to something that they’re all hoping for, which is to have their dignity, first and foremost, but to have freedom and democracy in Syria. And I think investing in civil society, investing in these people is very important. I think they look at the situation today and they do not see the United States sitting at the table. In the last administration, and to a degree in this administration, there had been sort of a ceding of the decision-making for long-term strategy future of Syria to Iran, Russia, and Turkey. If you look at Astana and Sochi, these are processes that, at least in our interaction and our work on the ground in Syria, do not vibe and are not respected by the population. I would say to a greater degree they would look, and they would prefer to go back towards Geneva and the agreements that we had there. So I think what’s most important is, first of all, to remember what the Syrian people have gone through, because without justice, without accountability, and without really sort of catering to their grievances and managing their expectations, we can get anywhere. And so you’re looking at around thirteen million people displaced, half a million dead, hundreds of thousands that are in jails, with unequivocal proof of the torture, of what the regime, Russia, and Iran has done. And so what I think is really important is we need to ensure that the Assad regime and its allies understand that they themselves cannot have a military solution to the conflict, that that’s simply not possible. Whenever the regime commits horrendous crimes—whether that be with chemical weapons or conventional weapons—and the world sits on as a bystander, then the regime, again, thinks that he can, by military force, take over Idlib—by the way, potentially doubling the refugees in Europe, empowering extremist propaganda—and he can sort of wait the United States out in the northeast. What’s really important is that we find a way, first of all, to create some sort of continuity between the northwest and the northeast, all the areas that are liberated and free from Assad regime control. It’s important that we do everything we can here, as the United States, to come back and sit at the table, where Sochi and Astana are not the drivers of the future of Syria, but Geneva and Resolution 2254. And at the same time, by doing all we can here to higher the cost of the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran’s criminal activities and genocidal atrocities that are unfolding in Syria. And one way to do that here domestically is something—is, for example, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, one that is not going to solve and end the conflict, but it represents a ray of hope to many Syrians that see this as the very least that the United States can do to help, you know, find a way that’s conductive to a political solution in Syria. SHANKER: Please. MULROY: So, as somebody who spent a whole career in conflict zones, I couldn’t agree more with the premise of the question. The U.S. military plays a part in these, but certainly should not ever be the only answer to these really complex problems. So I break it down to three things in Syria, at least groups I can talk about. The kinetic element. Obviously the quality and the capability of the partner force that was the SDF allowed the U.S. military to do what we call an economy of force mission. So we enabled them. And I think it’s important to note, they bear—they bore most of the burden when it came to defeating a caliphate—a territorial caliphate that got to be the size of West Virginia. And I know we have a lot of work to do, but we shouldn’t just gloss over the efforts that it took to actually accomplish that. We, quite frankly, could not carry out our strategy, our national defense strategy, if it weren’t for partners like that. So that’s the first thing. And I know we’re going to talk a lot more about that. Stabilization. We don’t have the lead, Department of Defense, of stabilization. The State Department does. And the major implementors are USAID. The Defense Department, with our ability to do logistics and security, support them. And we’ve codified that in the SAR 2018 agreement that was between all the heads of those agencies. We are still working through issues that I see in that when it comes to authorities to spend money and then authorities to be protected under the Department of Defense. We can go into that later if you’d like, but those are things that we have to work out internally so that we can maximize the effect of the stabilization operations we have, because at the end of the day the stabilization part of this is just as important as the kinetic. It is just as much a part of defeating ISIS as the military direct-action campaign was. And if we don’t do that, we will be back there, for sure, doing this again. We owe it to the people that live there, who have beared unspeakable burdens, and we owe it to the men and women that are going to come after us at the State Department, at the Defense Department, that we don’t just leave this undone. The last part I’d say is more of a philosophical political part. As Gayle might have mentioned, but I know she just got back from Al-Hawl camp. That is a big concern for us at Defense Department, not just because it’s a massive humanitarian process—or, crisis, but also because these are people, many of them children, who are only going to have one view and one philosophy the entire time they’re in that camp. So if the international community doesn’t come up with a way to rehabilitate them and reintegrate them into society, that’s the next generation of ISIS. They have no other input. And if we don’t do something about that, we consider that to be a substantial issue for the world—not just for the United States, and certainly not just for that region. The last thing, and I know Joel will get into this much more, is the UNSCR 2254 process. We spent a lot of time; we met with Mouaz and Caesar this week. And we also—we also have a representative from the White Helmets here, Asaad Hanna, which I’d really like to recognize, because that’s an organization that we feel is one of the best operating out of Syria. But we’ve had a lot of those discussions this week. And it’s really on us to be there, from my perspective, the military, to enhance the mission of the people leading the charge, which is DAS Rayburn and Ambassador Jeffrey, when it comes to the United States. And just having that presence there, I think, helps that efforts. SHANKER: Joel, please. RAYBURN: Like the other panelists, I appreciate the opportunity to speak today, and for the Council for setting this up. I’m nervous, though, because my West Point debate team partner is in the room, and I’m afraid she’ll stand up and start cross examining me. (Laughter.) She was a much better debater than I was. SHANKER: Whoever it is, feed me some notes. (Laughter.) RAYBURN: But the Syrian conflict is a political conflict. It has political causes, so it has to have a political solution. That’s what we mean when we say there can’t be a military solution to the Syrian conflict. The Russian military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, on behalf of the Assad regime, aided by Lebanese Hezbollah, could attempt to reconquer every square inch of Syria, and that wouldn’t be the end of it. What you’re seeing is a conflict that spans the northern Middle East in such a way that if the political causes are not addressed they will go on, and on, and on, and our children and grandchildren will be dealing with the same conflict. I’m confident of that, having sat through the same movie a number of times in Iraq. Earlier this year the president gave us in the executive branch some very clear guidance on what strategy to implement to try to bring a close to the Syrian conflict. He gave us three strategic objectives—three overarching ones. There were some others that were in support. But the first was to continue the campaign against Daesh so that in the—especially in the former territories of the physical caliphate, Daesh has no chance to come back. In other words, to complete the military phase of the campaign and then to do the things that come after to ensure that you inoculate those territories from Daesh’s return. The second was to—was to achieve a withdrawal from Syria of all Iranian-commanded forces and militias in Syria. In other words, to roll back the Iranian power projection grab that is taking place. The Iranians—the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, IRGC, on behalf of the Iranian regime, has essentially reached across Iraq, Syria, to the Beqaa Valley, trying to threaten the Golan Heights, in a bid to try to establish strategic outposts in Syria that can pose a new kind of existential threat to Israel and to others of Syria’s neighbors. And that’s something it’s in my view, it’s the most dangerous strategic element in the northern Middle East today, and it’s the factor that’s most likely to cause a regional conflict across the northern Middle East. But the third objective that the president gave us was to try to achieve a political resolution to the Syrian conflict under the auspices of U.N. Security Resolution 2254. In other words, to get a political solution to the conflict that could address really the other two objectives, because both the Daesh caliphate and al-Qaida-type safe havens that pop up here and there, and the IRGC power projection across the northern Middle East are symptoms of the underlying conflict. They’re not the cause of the conflict, they’re things that—they’re things that have arisen on the part of those who’ve exploited the underlying conflict. So the proximate cause of the conflict has to do with the nature of the Assad regime. It has to do with the nature of governance in Syria. It has to do with the—with the way the Assad regime has behaved in the region. In order to—a political solution to Syria—to the Syrian conflict, in order for it to be sustainable, the Syrian government’s behavior toward its people and toward the region is going to have to change. And that’s what we’re—that’s the path out of the conflict. That will require serious pressure from the United States and from the rest of the international community, on the Assad regime and on those who are the patrons of the Assad regime, to compel the regime to change its behavior, to make the concessions that are necessary to get to a resolution under 2254. SHANKER: Well, thanks all four of you for that fabulous survey. You’ve touched on all the important issues. I’m going to drill into a couple more here, and then, of course, all the members in attendance will do the same. The question of chemical weapons came up. That is one of the things that does capture the attention of the broader public, when the regime uses chemical and other prohibited weapons. What tools of deterrence does the U.S. and its partner nations have? And what should be done about that? And I don’t even want to raise the “redlines” phrase, but where are we today and what should be done? Please. RAYBURN: Well, you’ve seen two times the president has shown that he’s willing to use military force to try to do—prevent the use, and production, and proliferation of chemical weapons inside Syria. He’s willing to use military force when he deems it necessary. We have other tools that we use. And both times that we did military operations in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons we used economic pressure and diplomatic pressure alongside those. So we have a range of tools. Most recently last week Secretary Pompeo was able to announce that the United States has come to the determination that the Syrian regime used chlorine as a chemical weapon in May in Latakia province. And our response to that was to use our economic sanctions tools and to use political pressure that has only just begun to play out at the U.N. and other international fora. So we do have a range of tools. Clearly the use of chemical weapons in May shows that the Assad regime is not yet deterred from using them. So it’s going to take more pressure on our part, and on the part of the international community. And I would say there’s a strong international consensus behind that. And secondly, it also raises the risk that the Assad regime may not have abandoned the idea that they can somehow rebuild their chemical weapons program with who knows what kind of dangerous chemical weapons. I mean, we know they’ve used chlorine, we know they’ve used sarin. So that’s something that’s a threat, not just to the Syrian people but to the surrounding region. And because of the propensity for proliferation by a rogue regime like that, to international security. So it’s definitely something that, you’re right, does get a lot attention. And it rightly does. But we’re bringing the—we have a pretty full toolbox to use, I think. SHANKER: Michael, thoughts from the Pentagon perspective? MULROY: So to Joel’s point, obviously we have shown that we are politically willing to take action in response to chemical attacks, and the military capabilities are obviously there. I don’t think anybody doubts that. I would say that if you look at the last response in 2018, that was the result of an attack that killed upwards of seventy people—men, women, and children. I’m sure that was a factor that was considered. We are, of course, tracking the same announcement that Secretary Pompeo made at the General Assembly on the last use. I would say going forward factors that will discussed in any response will be—again, to Joel’s point—deterrence, right? So we’ve obviously taken strikes before. They did not deter them. You know, should—whether that level of strike is sufficient or not. And if they were not, then perhaps it would be more substantial. We’d also like to recognize that it wasn’t just us last time. It was also the French and the U.K. And we’d hope that even more countries would join in any response, either politically or even militarily, in the event they’d make the terrible decision to use chemical weapons as a means of war in the future. SHANKER: Joel, you spoke at length about the Iranian influence. I’d love to hear from the panelists about another foreign power that’s very much involved in Syria, which is Russia. Do you have—any of the four of you—what’s your assessment about their role today? How the level of communications is with the U.S.? And, you know, how the U.S. should impose some measures on that, looking to the future? MOUSTAFA: I’d just like to say, I think what’s really important—first of all, Russia coming into Syria was a disaster. I’m speaking strictly from sort of the perspective of just the humanitarian toll that’s happened. We run for school for orphans, women’s center, bakeries in places in Syria. And I remember, when the regime would bombard with its horrendous barrel bombs and take out an entire residential building, killing many civilians, that was horrible. Then when the Russians came in, they’re essentially testing weapons on Syrian people, I think by their own admission, even in terms of the new weapons that they’re utilizing. And they’re taking out entire city blocks. This is resulting in things like massive flows of refugees and so on. I think what’s important about Russia is I think it’s easy—first of all, we shouldn’t overstate its leverage over the Assad regime. In a way, I think the Iranians have even more leverage with Assad, and they’ve sacrificed a lot more in blood and money there. But there are places—they’re not sort of—they don’t have the same interests in the country. And I think we need to find ways of exploiting that difference between Iran and Russia to help drive the Iranians completely out, and make Russia understand that in the long run they cannot afford to keep up what they’re doing there, and try to give them some guarantees for things that they would care about, whether it is their Tartus space on the Mediterranean, and others. But the Russian role in Syria I think is a result of the United States sort of ceding that whole area. And, again, that began under the previous administration. I just want to add one more thing on chemical weapons. I think it’s really important that the next time, God forbid, the Assad regime uses chemical weapons against civilians, the strike must be much harder than it was. I Think the—what President Obama’s inaction on that was a disaster. The Trump administration deserves credit for its response on the first attack. And then on the second attack, the response was even weaker. And I think we need to up the price for the Assad regime, to ensure that never happens again. SHANKER: Gayle. LEMMON: Just on the Russian front, I mean, having written for Kevin Baron and some others here on this for the early years of this conflict, right, that Russia has been all-in on the side of the regime, while folks struggled for years to understand where the Americans were, and what their equities were, at what point they were willing to intervene. And so when you have this Russia and Iran are all in versus a United States that couldn’t quite decide how much, right? And I think this is now the second administration that really hasn’t, for very understandable reasons, wanted to get further into wars in the Middle East, right? And I think that has been a defining both characteristic and, I think, a behavior shaper of the previous two administrations. And when you are on the ground it’s very clear that Russia has really seen this as a success story in many ways. And it has used it as a testbed of unmanned in particular, if you look at what they have used in terms of testing, because even if there’s a failure of those systems it’s a learning point. And I do think you see what happens when there is no U.S. leadership. Or, I shouldn’t say no, you see what’s happens when there’s very little U.S. leadership. SHANKER: But even for those who may think that the Syrian conflict is away and doesn’t affect, the Times did a story in recent days, it was referenced earlier, that the Russian air defenses in the northwest that are there to protect their allies in the Assad regime are actually giving cover to a new Qaida affiliate, creating a safe haven that may, again, launch attacks against the West. So, I mean, is there some way to work with the Russians against that real and clear and present threat? RAYBURN: Can I? SHANKER: Please. RAYBURN: First, just to address the overall Russian role. The Russians, in my view, have decisive influence over the Assad regime. The Assad regime could not survive without the support that the Russians give them. If the Russian Air Force were to ground itself tomorrow, I think within a month the Assad regime would be losing the war again. The Assad regime military is extremely weak, and without heavy, heavy support from the Russian Air Force and from Russian private security contractors, who act as ground forces, I don’t think the Assad regime would be taking back any territory at all. That seems demonstrable on the ground. The Syrian government operates at a deep deficit. No one, really, I think knows how much, but it’s big. And that deficit is made up by the Russians. It’s made up—and partly by the Iranians too. The Iranians are quasi-gifting oil to the Assad regime right now. But the Russians are making up deficits in wheat, and in a whole host of other things that the Syrian regime needs, and in cash. Usually lines of credit, I think, by this point, not actual cash, that the Assad regime needs just to keep going. The state apparatus in Syria could not run without these things. So if the Russians took the decision tomorrow to actually work with the international community on a political resolution of the conflict through UNSCR 2254, the Assad regime could not defy them. The Russians can’t—the Iranians can’t possibly replace all the support that the Russians give. So the Russians are in a good position. They can make the Assad regime do whatever really they think they need them to. Recently the Russians—we do have—we do have continuing contact with the Russians on a diplomatic level. Nick can talk about military deconfliction. That’s not in my lane. But on a diplomatic level we’re in pretty constant touch with the Russians on ways to get to an end state that, I think, we both roughly agree with, which is that, as I said before, governance inside Syria and the Syrian government’s behavior in the region has to change in order for the underlying causes of the conflict to be addressed. But how we get there, we have a lot of disagreements about. And we talk about those all the time. One way in which we were recently able to—one area in which we were recently able to agree, though, was in the establishment of the constitutional committee, which we’ll try to—which will be charged with undertaking constitutional reform to try to address some of these structural problems in Syrian governance. So we have high hopes for that. It’ll kick off at the end of this month in Geneva. But the Russian role. Let’s not be—there’s a lot of speculation about, well, how much leverage do the Russians have over Bashar al-Assad? He’s a very tough client, et cetera. I don’t—I don’t buy that. SHANKER: But we haven’t really seen Russia doing much. RAYBURN: Yeah, so it’s a matter of—it’s Russian will. It’s not that they don’t have the ability. It’s not that they don’t have the leverage. Of course they have the leverage. SHANKER: Please. MULROY: Sure. To Gayle’s all-in point, which I agree with, they are all in, but they should be all-in for all the consequences as well, right? So we could spend the rest of the time talking about the atrocities done by the regime and their Russian backers here, so I won’t do that. But I will point to one statistic that stood out at me as were preparing for this. Between April and September, fifty-nine schools have been destroyed in Idlib province—fifty-nine schools. RAYBURN: By aerial bombardment or shelling? MULROY: Yes, shelling, right? So it’s not just chemical weapons use that’s bad, but killing innocent civilians by any means is wrong, and they need to be held accountable, to the point of— RAYBURN: And in lot of cases, it is a war crime. MULROY: It is. So I like to point that out. They’re all-in for the consequences of all the bad decisions that the regime makes. To your point on al-Qaida affiliates, obviously there’s many. And they keep spawning additional ones. And so you had Al Nusra, then you had HTS, and now you have Hurras al-Din. We’re not going to mitigate our efforts to attack them and to ensure that they’re not plotting external plots outside of Syria, or whether it’s, you know, in Europe, anywhere in the world. And you can see that. We just—we just conducted an attack that was very successful. I know I already brought up the National Defense Strategy. Counterterrorism is, like, the fifth priority. And that’s where it should be. However, one of those attacks is successful, and you know how that’ll turn out. So we’re never going to let off the gas when it comes to the threat, specifically posed now—and I’ve seen this, I would say, on my past job. Oftentimes when a terrorist organization is relieved from the burden of governance—I take that from a quote that was written on a wall once when we liberated an area—they’d get back to their true calling, which is killing the infidel. RAYBURN: Right. MULROY: And I think that is something that we, and particularly DOD but also my old organization, will spend a lot of time ensuring that if they return to that, and we know they are, that we will do everything we can to mitigate it. SHANKER: Right. I know the members here have lots of questions, so I’ll self-edit. But I do want to ask one more before I go to questions from the members. It’s about the humanitarian catastrophe, but a very specific part. You know, there are two thousand foreign fighters in SDF camps, and more than seventy thousand ISIS women and children. And there’s lots of hang-wringing about that. But I’d love to hear specifically in a concrete and tactical way, how we deal with that? And, again, not to be too practical, but it’s not just a humanitarian disaster, but it’s setting up all of the prerequisites for ISIS 3.0. What do we do? Gayle, please. LEMMON: So I was in Hawl camp in May. And I just want to say, I deeply believe that this is entirely foreseeable overnight crisis six months in the making. It is almost as if, to use an example some are more familiar with, we took the Northern Alliance post-2001 and said: Hey, seventy-three thousand Taliban families from all over the world, please, find a way to house, feed, care, educate them. And the international community cellphone is going to be off in case you need any help. It is absolutely astounding to me that folks whose children and whose colleagues died fighting ISIS are now really being held responsible solo, in many ways, to take care of the children and the wives of those—and members. Because I do think it’s more than ISIS wives. I think that reduces the agency for many of these women, who deeply believe in the Islamic State. And people are pleading. People who run these camps are pleading for assistance from the international community. You know, this one woman said to me: You know, one of the main challenges is the mentality of the new arrivals. We can’t do much for them, and they’re having a big impact on the people who are already there. This is a camp that nine thousand people, had kids going to school, and it was prepared for twenty (thousand), thirty thousand more. And now they’ve seventy-three thousand. And when you go, it is more or less the United Nations of the Islamic State. I mean, there’s so many different languages. My colleague and I—my wonderful colleague and I were trying to figure out if we could decipher. There were many—which I think I’m pretty fluent in a number of them—they we couldn’t identify. There were folks we met from Seychelles, folks we met from Germany, folks we met from Egypt. And I am not arguing, actually, that all of these people are ISIS members, or should be imprisoned. It requires the international community to come and help solve an international problem. This is not a solely homegrown effort that requires folks who are stretched thin to resolve on their own. You now have a nonstate actor, in the form of the SDF and the SDC, faced with real state problems, and nation-states who don’t want to pony up and help. And I do think we have to address this, because it is about the little ones and the next generation. These kids did not choose to be in this camp. They did not choose the ideology of their parents. And I’m telling you, there’s great fear in the region. One mother I met who was—I think probably gave birth baby in Ayn Issa camp during the Raqqa campaign the summer of 2017. I saw her again. We’ve been tracking her story for the last two years. We saw her. She’s now cleaning at Mercy Corps in Raqqa. And she’s just, you know, one of the most articulate, powerful voices in terms of Syrians who have seen too much, whose children have seen too much, and who are fighting for their kids’ futures. And she told me there were twenty-four ISIS family orphans. I don’t want to call anybody an ISIS orphan. But children of ISIS, of followers, who came to Ayn Issa. And I said, oh—she said, they’re so cute, but nobody wants to take them because no one knows what’s in their heart. And I’m telling you, this is not just her issue alone. SHANKER: Thank you very much. I’m eager now to invite members to join the conversation with your questions. I’ll remind you this is on the record. If you would please wait for the microphone, stand, identify yourself, and please be concise. Sir. Q: I’m Don Alishek (ph) from Turkish embassy. You may know there is a terrorist organization that’s called MLKP, which is Marxist-Leninist Communist Party. They are based in northeast Syria. They have a camp there. They do military training and then they sign songs about starting the revolutionary violence in Turkey. And last weekend they attacked a bus carrying Turkish police officers in Adana, Turkey. And they announced it on their Twitter account. They put photos glorifying the great attack against Turkey. And we know there are other European— SHANKER: Sir, can I ask for your question, please? Q: Yeah, yeah, I’m coming. SHANKER: Well, I’d like to hear the question now, please. Q: For sure. For sure. The other European far-left organizations that are also getting military training in the northeast. So what is the U.S. position regarding these structures that definitely PKK is fostering in northeast Syria? Thank you. RAYBURN: So you know, right now at both—on both the diplomatic side and the military side—we’re embarked on implementing an agreement that would establish a zone along the Turkey-Syria border of varying depth that’s meant to—we’re meant to have a security mechanism within that zone that will ensure that there can be no threats that would emanate from that zone against Turkey, and that there would be no threats that would emanate from within that zone against the people of northeast Syria. It’s meant to be a zone that’s safe for both Turkey and for—and for Syrians. So far, the implementation is going pretty well. It’s going apace. We have a lot of military to military coordination on the ground, but I would leave DASD Mulroy to comment on that. But I would say that this is part—this is part of a larger effort to stabilize at a political level the border between Turkey and Syria east of the Euphrates, because we think that’s the only—that’s a necessary condition for the resolution of the overall conflict. As long as there is the danger of a conflict along the Turkey-Syria border, it’ll be difficult—that’ll make the job of reaching a political resolution of the conflict much, much harder. And we certainly think that a conflict along the Turkey-Syria border would serve the interests of all the bad actors in the conflict and in the surrounding region—whether that’s Daesh, or al-Qaida, or the Iranian regime, or what have you. MULROY: So on the security mechanism, we do believe there’s been progress from the military side. We’ve established a joint operations center on the border. We’ve begun joint patrols both in the air and on the ground. And some of the fortifications that were of concern have been destroyed. So we think working together we have made progress on that, for all the reasons that Joel just mentioned. SHANKER: Thanks. Michael. I’ll abuse the power of the chair and call on a friend and colleague. (Laughter.) Q: I’m Michael Gordon, Wall Street Journal. A question for the DOD and State Department reps. It was stated that President Trump’s goal is to have Iranian forces leave Syria. How do you propose to do that, since striking Iranian forces is not within the mandate of the U.S. military in Syria? The Russians seem to have no interest, or even the capability in getting the Iranians out of Syria. They don’t want to be the ground element. And while the sanctions may be hurting the Iranian economy, Iran has become more aggressive, to witness the attack on the Saudi oil facility. So what’s your plan to get Iranian forces out of Syria? Or is there a real plan, beyond relying on Israel? RAYBURN: So there are a number of things that we’ve undertaken to try to bring pressure to bear on the Iranians and on the Assad regime to get Iranian forces—Iranian-commanded forces, which is not just the IRGC; it’s also the militias that they’ve exported into Syria—out. First of all, we use economic pressure. We use economic pressure against the Assad regime. We use economic pressure against the actual forces themselves. And we link the pressure campaign that we have inside Syria to the maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian regime. Those of us who are implementing the president’s Syria policy and strategy stay very tightly coordinated with our colleagues who are managing the Iran front, such as Brian Hook. And you’ll recall that when Secretary Pompeo described the outlines, the conditions that the United States would have for essentially relieving the maximum pressure campaign in his speech that he made in the spring of 2018, as he laid out his twelve conditions on of the conditions on the list of that Iran policy was that IRGC and militias should leave Syria. So it’s very—we’ve made it very clear to the Iranian regime that one of the things that it’s going to have to do if, at the end of the day, it wants to get out from under the pressure from the United States and from the rest of the international community that cooperates with us, is they’re going to have to exit Syria. We think that’s pretty powerful. The Iranian military presence in Syria comes under pressure from other powers, not from us. We watch that out of the corner of our eye. And we just predict—we observe that that kind of pressure is probably going to continue for as long as those Iranian-commanded forces are in Syria and are posing a serious threat to Syria’s neighbors. MULROY: So I agree. You’re right. We’re not—we do not have the authorization for direct military action against Iran in this area. We’re there to defeat ISIS, and that’s the authorization. But I would say that our presence, just like with stabilization, also has a positive effect when it comes to the Iranian problem. Physically, being there obstructs—not completely, but it does obstruct the routes that—what we call the GLOCs, but in regular terms the routes that the Iranians use to move weapons systems, some of them very lethal and very precise, right next to—right over the border with Israel. Being there actually makes it difficult for them. Al-Tanf garrison is a good example of that. And also, being there does provide both DAS Rayburn and Ambassador Jeffrey leverage when it comes to the whole political process, part of which, as just described, is their reduction or elimination of Iranian-backed forces in Syria. That’s part of the process. It won’t be easy, but it is there. SHANKER: Thanks. I want to go to the back of the room and work my way around. There, in the corner, please. Q: Kevin Baron from Defense One. A question from, first, the two gentlemen from the administration. I heard in the beginning you mentioned stabilization efforts be as important as the military. But we’ve heard that, and we’ve heard generals and others asking for a much larger presence of the U.S. stabilization projects, or something, for years now. So give us the current state of what the U.S. contribution to that is, versus what the international community has been able to contribute. And for the other two on the left, the on-the-ground perspective of the same question. What are you seeing out there? How effective is that? I mean, I was—it’s been a while—I was in Raqqa a couple months after the liberation. And there were about, you know, three or four bulldozers with the State Department logos on them, or AID, for a whole city. But that was a couple years ago. So where are we now? Are we really getting—is the U.S. really involved? Or is this, you know, Band-Aid level stuff? RAYBURN: So we have—we have some pretty good burden-sharing going on in northeast Syria, especially in Raqqa and some of the other areas that were once under the control of Daesh not too—not too long ago. The U.S. does have some portion of funding that we’ve been executing. But we’ve gotten really good contributions from our coalition partners, from some of the Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, that’s helped us to be able to do the kind of restoration of essential services and those kind of stabilization activities that we’re used to, as well as some very good contributions from European countries. The United States does a lot in northeast Syria. We have a lot of—our military forces that are there do a lot through their advising of local partners, and through the kind of—through the kind of projects that they’re able to do. And of course, we have humanitarian assistance throughout the country. It’s never—the Syrian conflict is such a deep hole of instability that we’re always going to feel like we’re running behind in the funding that is necessary to address it. But I do think that there’s a pretty good commitment—right now, the kind of things we do at a diplomatic level and to try and keep the international community focused on the Syria problem. And so that the international community doesn’t just conclude that because the Daesh territorial caliphate is destroyed that it’s time to move on, and the funding would dry up, and so on. We’ve been pretty successful at that so far, but it’s always something that we have to—it takes—it takes constant tending. MULROY: So, like I mentioned, the—I focus on conflicts, and my travel reflects that. I go to a lot of these areas, and that’s where I know the most people actually. And one of the things they all tell me is how important stabilization is. We’ll never get from phase three—and using DOD parlance, the kinetic phase—to phase four if you don’t have that. The Department of Defense does have the authority to do humanitarian aid, and we do, in Syria right now. We also have stabilization with our partners. We are pushing to have—in the cases where the only personnel can get to these areas are DOD, for us to actually have the authority to deliver the stabilization funding, which is different from humanitarian aid. It’s more about economic infrastructure—turning the lights on, turning the water on, and getting life back going. It’s called defense support to stabilization. And we’re talking to all of our committees in Congress right now about making sure that we can do that and increasing the actual funding. And we are grateful for all the countries that do contribute. And one of the reasons why we wanted to have this event today was to bring this issue to the forefront, through all of you, so we can talk about contributing more to that effort. SHANKER: Thanks. Mouaz, did you want to comment? MOUSTAFA: Yeah. So I think it’s a very important question, Kevin. And I think that a lot of amazing work is being done by the State Department and Department of Defense. But I think that—for example, the cutting off of humanitarian aid and support that was going to the northwest, I think that’s a problem. One thing that is important to mention, especially when there is lulls in bombardment by the Assad regime and Russia on places like Idlib, that’s when the population goes out, not to protest Assad, and Russia, and Iran, but to protest against things like HTS and like others. And so ensuring that what we’ve already invested in in the northwest, whether it the amazing work of the White Helmets or the civil society organizations there, and the people that are trying to rule and govern local communities in a way that keeps at the heart of their sort of vision, which is the values that they came out with so many years ago, calling for democracy and for their voice to be heard. That is disappointing that that has stopped. And continuing that isn’t just humanitarian aid and stabilization. It’s a very important counterterrorism tool. When it comes to the northeast, I think what’s really important is to try to empower as much as possible not just our direct partner forces that played a role in defeating ISIS—which, by the way, has a huge contingent of Arab fighters that were there but that feel in a lot of way disenfranchised. They feel that there as more token representatives than people that can make decisions. So empowering the majority Arab Sunni population in that area, both in ensuring that they’re playing an important role that’s not just a symbolic role in governance, and supporting them, I think that’s something that is very important to do, because that’s what’s going to keep them away from being prey to the messaging of violent extremist actors. And that’s something that I think we could do a lot better job of. And finally, when it comes to places that have been very difficult for the United States’ State Department to reach, and I bring up again Rukban camp that’s next to the Tanf base, there are some situations where it might be the best decision to declare at the State Department that this is something—due to the Russian and the regime blockading and hurting the sort of U.N. process of providing these people aid—and allow the Department of Defense to bring direct aid there. I already know that the amazing work of American servicemen and -women is already overwhelming, such a huge responsibility. And I don’t say it easily that—or take it lightly that they should take a role in providing that direct aid to Rukban camp, for example. But that’s a camp within ten miles from a military base. And these are the families of some of the partner forces that are fighting against ISIS and keeping Iran, Assad regime, and other enemies at bay. So we owe them that. So I think there’s a lot more that could be done. SHANKER: Gayle, please. LEMMON: So stabilization is the thirteen-letter word that has been a four-letter word, even though it’s absolutely central to keeping conflicts ended. And when you see it on the ground, what you see are people—I went in Raqqa April of 2018. And there were very few people there in term of if you compare it to now. Now there are traffic jams, you know, a very fragile stability that those on the ground are the ones fighting for. And the first thing you heard was the sound of generators, you know, people who had spent their money on getting generators going, who had either rented, or borrowed, or somehow gotten ahold of very light equipment to do rubble removal. And you think, you know, these are folks who are working themselves to rebuild their lives. And stabilization dollars that could do rubble removal, demining, very basic, you know, water, power, light—that is, I think, central to keeping conflicts ended, which has been a challenge for the United States. And here, you have folks on the ground who are willing to do the work. You know, one mother I met—there’s a shopkeeper I met who was one of the first women I met in April of 2018 who had a shop. We went and talked to her. And then we visited again. Business was very slow, so we visited again in May of 2019. And I thought her shop would be closed. And so we walked in. And actually now she had a sixteen-year-old girl who was nearly arrested for ISIS for crossing between apartment buildings and going to see here family uncovered. And she had been very scared to come out and to, you know, go to this shop but to work. But because her cousin had this shop, and the shop was doing well, she came and started working there. And the shopkeeper said to me, you know, I was open till 12:30 a.m. last night because of Eid. You know, people were coming out. She said, we see this city. We are willing to do the work. We just need the basics of help. And so I think that it is absolutely true, this often becomes it’s the Kurds versus everybody else, especially from the Washington discussion. But when you go around Raqqa, you hear a very different story about people who are simply pushing ahead. And my final story is I went to the opening of the Raqqa Women’s Council in summer of 2018. And I interviewed people—woman after woman who was telling me they were there because many of them had husbands who were pushed too far by ISIS. So one woman had three of her husband’s relatives were hung by ISIS. And so they had to assume responsibility for all the wives and all the children of that family. And she was just talking about the fact that what we have now is room for us to rebuild our own society. And I think that’s where the stabilization dollars go in to make a difference, is helping with the basics for stability and people who are fighting for their own futures. SHANKER: Thanks. This table, yes, please. Mmm hmm. Q: Thank you. I’m Asaad Hanna from the White Helmet. So I have very quick two questions. First thing, when we talk about changing the behavior of the regime, that doesn’t—you don’t see it, like, in message to the regime that if you change something, we will keep you in power. For example, if he released all the detainees now, and he became, like, the best regime in the world, we will forgive him for killing half-million people? Will we forget him for using the chemical weapons in Syria, and for using the bomb barrels? So what’s that? Like, how we identify changing the behavior of the regime? Isn’t that a solution who—like, which kill all the accountability process in Syria? First thing about—second thing about civilization, how can we talk about making civilization in Syria, meanwhile the countries and U.S. starting the fund for the hospitals and for the education and for—like, they started all the fund for the civil society organizations in the northwest of Syria, not in the northeast. So how can those people, which—as a city—there is more than four million people now in Idlib under the attacks, under everything. And we started the main—the essential two things for them. We started the hospitals, and we started the schools. So what do we think, in the future, those people will have? SHANKER: Thank you very much. Who wants to take that one? RAYBURN: On the question of the Syrian—the way I would term it is the Syrian government’s behavior. The U.S., as we went through our policy process that the president decided upon earlier this year, we came down to a set of conditions the United States would have to have any Syrian government meet—whether it’s the current one or a future one—in order for the U.S. to have normal relations with that government in Damascus. And they amount to a change of policy and behavior by the Syrian government. The first is we would require that that government sever its ties with the Iranian regime military and its militant proxies. Second is we would require that that government cease being a state sponsor of terrorism. Third, cease being a threat to its neighbors. Fourth, surrender its weapons of mass destruction programs, verifiably. Fifth, create the conditions on the ground for refugees and displaced persons to return safely and voluntarily to their homes. And sixth, and gets to the point that Assad Hanna was making, is we would require that that government hold war criminals and atrocity criminals accountable or cooperate with the international community in doing so. I agree with Mr. Hanna that you can’t have political stabilization in Syria without real political reconciliation. And you’re not going to have political reconciliation unless there’s an accounting for what has happened. The Syrian population that has voted with its feet is not going to go back home into the teeth of a killing machine that’s still there unchanged, unreformed. So there has to be some measure of accountability. And we have not just an interest in that for the purposes of stabilizing Syria, but also for the global example. There are some NGOs that are quite reputable that estimate that there could be up to or maybe even now exceeding 215,000 people who have disappeared into the Assad regime’s detention centers whose fate is unknown. The Assad regime is re-running the Holocaust in the twenty-first century. And we, all of us, have an important stake in making sure that one of the lessons of the Syrian conflict is not that an authoritarian regime can kill its way out of a crisis that it has created because of its unwillingness to acknowledge legitimate calls of reform from its people. Because if that’s the lesson that people take from the Syrian conflict, then the twenty-first century is going to see that repeated—that method repeated over, and over, and over again. SHANKER: Well, we could spend the rest of the day talking about how we get from here to resolving those six points. That’s the hard part. But in the three minutes left, I know there was a question in the back. Yes, ma’am. Q: Missy Ryan from The Washington Post. (Comes on mic.) Thanks for being here. My question is for DASD Mulroy and DAS Rayburn, and building on your earlier question, Thom, about what to do with the foreign fighters, and their families, in the camps in Syria. So just so I can understand what—again, what the—what the plan is, if—what is the plan B if the European countries and the other countries of origin do not take large numbers of their citizens back in a timely manner/ You know, it seems like from what everybody said, if you wait several years the problem—the radicalization problem is going to increase exponentially. What is the plan B? What is Iraq’s role in all that? Any details would be great. Thanks. SHANKER: Do you want to start? MULROY: Sure. I mean, it’s already been pointed out there are about seventy thousand families, right? Well, there’s about eleven thousand fighters that are being held. Two thousand of them—over two thousand of them are foreign. And they come from fifty different countries. So I know this is a lot of admiration of the problem, but I guess that’s the first step, right? You need to identify the issue. We expect countries to take them back. As has been pointed out by many of the panelists, this is a nonstate entity who’s bearing the burden the world, housing their most dangerous problems. There’s a lot of people, or countries, on the sideline criticizing the conditions, et cetera, but quite frankly they only have so many resources so be able to do this. We’re going to keep pushing countries to take back their foreign fighters that came from their countries. And there does have to be a plan B of what we do next. I can’t declare what that is here today because, quite frankly, we haven’t developed it entirely. And it’s not up to me to be the one to say that. But the problem, just like you said, is serious. And if it’s not addressed directly—not just the fighters. We already know they’re a problem. They’ve proven to be a problem. But what are we going to do with the children, for example? They didn’t do anything. And they’re not going to stay incarcerated, because you can’t do that. They’re going to—they’re going to get out. And we think as an international community we have to come up with a plan to rehabilitate them so they can get back into society and not follow the path of their fathers. SHANKER: Thanks. And I do need to keep my promise to the Council and to the members. I know, again, this topic is so rich, the panel is so expert, your questions are so smart, but we do have to adjourn now. I thank the four panelists for a very thought-provoking, if troubling, discussion. I thank the Council for hosting this terrific event. And I thank all of you for coming and sharing your thoughts with us. (Applause.) (END)