Sub-Saharan Africa

Zimbabwe

  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Zimbabwe Crops Fail, Hunger Looms
    Of Zimbabwe’s almost 13 million people, 1.6 million of them will require food aid, and the number is likely to grow. An estimated 1.8 million tons of maize, the staple crop, is necessary to feed Zimbabwe. But, farmers unions are saying that the harvest is likely to be 1.1 million tons short. The ministry of agriculture is saying that about one third of all planted crops have failed due to the lack of irrigation and 45 percent of the maize crop must be written off. The World Food Program is preparing for a big increase in need. But WFP’s Zimbabwe program budget of $119 million faces a shortfall of about $85 million. Why is Zimbabwe once again facing food shortages? According to Zimbabwe’s acting president Joice Mujuru, the answer is drought related to climate change. She is calling for the development of drought-resistant maize, and she introduced in August one such variety developed by the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre in Harare. It is certainly true that there is a shortage of rain in most parts of the country. According to the Meteorological Service Department, rains have started late and were below normal in the first half of the growing season. But, the cause of hunger is more than drought. According to the press, banks have been financing the production of cotton and tobacco rather than maize. Charles Taffs, the president of the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe, argues that a major contributing factor is government agricultural policy. He specifically cites the planting of maize in areas that are unsuitable for the crop. Hunger, agriculture, and land continue to have a racial subtext in Zimbabwe. Taffs is white and the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe is associated with white farmers, a diminishing group as land invasions continue. (Whites are now less than 1 percent of Zimbabwe’s population.) For many—perhaps most— of the remaining whites and many others as well, Zimbabwean hunger’s root cause is Robert Mugabe’s seizure without compensation of white owned commercial farms, ostensibly for distribution to poor peasants, but very often also to his political cronies and allies. Certainly there is drought in Zimbabwe. But official government policy probably has turned an agricultural challenge into a disaster. It is too soon to say what the impact of hunger will be on Zimbabwe’s currently stalemated politics. But, if elections come soon, as Robert Mugabe wants, hunger could be the backdrop. Elections in Zimbabwe have been characterized by violence. That in conjunction with hunger could again set off refugee flows, especially to South Africa.
    Blog Post by John Campbell September 7, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    South Africa: Zuma Tries to Mediate Zimbabwe Constitution Impasse
    South African president Jacob Zuma went to Harare on August 15 in his capacity as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) “facilitator” for the implementation of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Accords (GPA), which ended the post-2008 elections violence. Zuma is expected to report on GPA progress at a SADC ministerial this weekend in Mozambique. SADC’s position has been that Zimbabwe should draft a constitution that would be ratified by the public. That process would be followed by the drawing-up of a new voters’ register, along with other reforms to enhance the credibility of elections. Only then would national elections take place, with foreign observers present. But, President Mugabe wants elections sooner rather than later. His opponents charge him with delaying the SADC-mandated political process so that elections take place without the necessary reforms being in place, thereby benefitting his ruling ZANU-PF. The parties had agreed July 18 on a draft constitution. Since then, however, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF has reneged, and is seeking revisions to the draft. It is likely that the purpose of Zuma’s visit is to try to break that impasse. The day Zuma arrived in Harare, South Africa media was reporting that “senior” South African diplomats stationed in Harare were saying that ZANU-PF “individuals” were “deliberately and systematically” obstructing Zuma’s GPA facilitation work. It is unlikely that these South African diplomats were talking to the media on their own, especially in conjunction with a visit by the South African president. What they were saying is almost certainly accurate, but President Zuma could not say so if he is to keep his channels open to Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Thus far, in public President Zuma has said only that there are “hitches” to be ironed out for full implementation of the GPA.
    Blog Post by John Campbell August 16, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Zimbabwe
    Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Closer U.S.-South Africa Relations
    As Zimbabwe moves closer to elections, the prospect for political violence, even civil war, grows. President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) are wrangling over a new constitution and the timing of upcoming elections. The eighty-eight-year-old Mugabe is suffering from cancer and wants elections soon to ensure his "liberation" legacy. At the same time, Mugabe-allied military factions, flush with off-the-books cash from Marange diamonds mined in the eastern part of the country, are mobilizing to stay in power when Mugabe dies. Political murder is on the upswing and Zimbabwe is as tense and divided now as it was during the run-up to the violent 2008 elections. The United States wants a peaceful succession to Mugabe in Zimbabwe through credible elections. So, too, does Zimbabwe's southern neighbor, South Africa, which bore the brunt of the hundreds of thousands of Zimbabwean refugees who fled across the border from the 2008 violence. These shared interests create an opportunity for Washington and Pretoria to forge a partnership on Zimbabwe. If successful, it might improve the tone of the overall U.S.-South Africa relationship. The margins of the upcoming United Nations (UN) General Assembly provide an excellent venue for the United States and South Africa to hold high-level conversations about Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's Accelerating Crisis Developments in Zimbabwe are accelerating. The chief of staff of the Zimbabwe National Army says that the military will not allow a presidential candidate to assume office if he does not share President Mugabe's ZANU-PF "ideals." Mugabe's chief rival, Tsvangirai, and his MDC accuse the army of lowering its recruitment standards to incorporate ZANU-PF youth militias in anticipation of early elections. These militias could be the muscle to ensure a Mugabe win through violence and intimidation—a role they played in the last elections—especially if elections are soon. The finance minister, an MDC founder, is claiming credibly that government diamond revenue is bypassing him and going directly to the ZANU-PF–controlled ministry of defense. South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the relevant regional organization, brokered a power-sharing arrangement between ZANU-PF and MDC to end the bloodshed after the 2008 elections. That is falling apart as new elections approach. If MDC wins the elections, whenever they are held, a military faction may try to seize power ostensibly on behalf of Mugabe if he is still living or invoke his legacy if he is dead. The MDC, possibly supported by other military factions, would resist, which could result in civil war, drawing in various party militias. Under such circumstances, South Africa would face renewed cross-border refugee flows for which it is ill prepared. Washington and Pretoria's Diplomatic Opportunity Washington and Pretoria should work together to solidify SADC support for a democratic transition. Already, there are strong ambassadors in both cities to facilitate a dialogue between the Obama and Zuma administrations on specific steps. South African president Jacob Zuma's incentives should be strong to move in concert with the United States on Zimbabwe. Through SADC, he has been pushing Zimbabwe to defer the elections until necessary political and electoral reforms are implemented. Zuma's government has already threatened sanctions if Zimbabwe does not follow the SADC-sponsored sequence: a new Zimbabwean constitution approved by a referendum, followed by the compilation of a new voter roll. Only then could elections be held with international observers. Moreover, in South Africa, popular resentment against Zimbabwean immigrants and refugees fleeing Mugabe's violence, who may number up to three million, has led to xenophobic outbreaks, tarnishing the country's international reputation as "the rainbow nation." Zimbabweans competing for jobs in South Africa cause domestic political problems for President Zuma and the governing African National Congress (ANC). (South Africa's unemployment rate is around 25 percent.) Former presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki saw Mugabe as a fellow colleague in the "liberation" struggle and too often looked the other way. Zuma, who defeated Mbeki for the party leadership, does not appear to have the same personal interest in maintaining close ties with Mugabe. Like many of his fellow South Africans, he would like the Zimbabweans to go home. That requires an end to the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe. Under Zuma, South Africa has finally assumed the regional leadership role on Zimbabwe that Mandela and Mbeki often sidestepped. Further, the South African population is favorably disposed toward the United States and especially President Barack Obama. A coordinated approach by the two countries to achieve a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe would be popular among South African voters. Zuma faces a serious challenge to his leadership at the ANC convention this December. Enhanced identification with Obama before then could strengthen his hand with party activists who do pay attention to public opinion. A Diplomatic Strategy To forestall a repeat of the 2008 scenario by which Mugabe held on to office, the Obama and Zuma administrations together should insist to the Mugabe regime that Zimbabwe elections be free, fair, and credible. The Obama administration should encourage Zuma and SADC to blanket the country with election observers as part of that effort. It should encourage participation by American election observers. The administration should ask Zuma to mobilize SADC support for American election monitoring in the face of inevitable ZANU-PF objections. If ZANU-PF resorts to postelection violence, the United States and South Africa should discourage another power-sharing arrangement. Instead, the United States should urge Zuma and SADC to impose targeted sanctions on the ZANU-PF elites, including barring their travel to South Africa where many of them have houses, receive medical care, and shop for luxury goods. U.S. sanctions should go at least as far as those of SADC. In advance of the elections, the United States should encourage Zuma to lead SADC contingency planning for a police action in Zimbabwe to curb postelection violence. As events in Zimbabwe unfold, White House and State Department public statements should affirm U.S. support for SADC's approach and publicly praise South African leadership whenever there is an opportunity to do so. At the same time, the United States should regularly and publicly reiterate its support for constitutional and democratic processes in Zimbabwe. Presidents Obama and Zuma should meet about Zimbabwe on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September. Subsequently, at an appropriate moment, a telephone conversation between the two presidents followed by a joint press release that focuses on Zimbabwe should signal the new, higher level of partnership. If Mugabe does call snap elections before Zimbabwe adopts a new constitution and other reforms, the United States should support Zuma and SADC leadership in its official statements, including for implementation of a sanctions regime. Finally, the Obama administration should quietly signal now that if cooperation between South Africa and the United States over Zimbabwe's transition to constitutional democracy goes well, there should be a South African state visit to Washington to celebrate the closer relationship. The twentieth anniversary of South Africa's transition to nonracial democracy in 2014 would be an appropriate timeframe. What If South Africa Says No Over the next few months, Zuma's focus will be on internal ANC politics, where Mugabe has many admirers. To many of the black poor in South Africa he remains a hero of the region's struggle against apartheid and white domination. Julius Malema, the expelled head of the ANC Youth League, is exploiting this sentiment in his struggle to topple Zuma at the December ANC convention. These domestic pressures may limit Zuma's ability to maneuver. Zuma may also be cautious about partnering with Washington because of uncertainty about the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. Even if Zuma rebuffs, the Obama administration should insist on free and fair elections in Zimbabwe, impose a stricter sanctions regime if necessary on the Mugabe clique, and acknowledge SADC's lead role on southern Africa security. However, the United States should decline to endorse power-sharing as the means to buy off ZANU-PF violence, as SADC did in the past. The U.S. approach to Zimbabwe need not be closely coordinated with South Africa's, though it might largely parallel it. What a rebuff would lose is the opportunity to build a closer bilateral relationship by working together on an issue where the United States and South Africa have parallel interests. The Obama administration should quietly make that point to Zuma in Washington and Pretoria. But Washington should burn no bridges. Beyond Zimbabwe, the United States needs closer ties with South Africa in the face of crises in eastern Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia, and the Horn. South Africa is now the only African country with the clout to partner with the United States on such African strategic issues. In the past, Nigeria played that role. But Abuja is currently facing multiple domestic crises, and President Goodluck Jonathan cannot be as diplomatically active as former president Olusegun Obasanjo. South Africa is the only realistic alternative to fill that void. There will be other opportunities to strengthen the ties between the United States and South Africa after the ANC convention, whether Zuma stays or goes.
    Policy Innovation Memorandum by John Campbell August 9, 2012 Center for Preventive Action
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Who Owns the Land in South Africa?
    At the just-concluded African National Congress (ANC) policy conference, the issue of land reform surfaced – but did not really go anywhere. There was a call for “review” of the principle of “willing seller, willing buyer,” and delegates complained that the pace of land redistribution has been glacial. As was true of virtually all of the other important policy issues, serious discussion of reform was postponed. The conference was mostly concerned with politicking, as rivals President Jacob Zuma, Deputy President Kgakema Motlanthe and Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale jostled for advantage, looking toward the December conference where the ANC will elect its top leadership. But the land reform is emotional and unlikely to go away. On July 2, I posted a blog “South Africa’s Land Issue Not So Simple” in which I tried to indicate some of the issues. Some of its readers raised questions about the racial breakdown of land ownership. I have tried to follow up and conclude that the question of which racial group owns what is not so clear, either. A spokesman for the Department of Land Affairs notes that the Deeds Registry Database does not record land ownership according to race. At the same time, he said that blacks owned 13 percent of the country’s surface area in 1994. Since then, he said, blacks had acquired 4.9 million hectares, or 4.69 percent, the result of government land reform and land restitution programs. (These programs do record the race of recipients; the former refers to broad-based changes in land ownership, the latter to restitution of land seized by the apartheid regime to separate the races.) That would indicate blacks own about 18 percent of the surface area. But this figure does not include private land sales by whites to blacks since 1994. At present, the number and amount of such transactions seems to be based on speculation. It is commonly assumed that South African governments (federal, provincial and local) own about a quarter of the land—which is comparable to the U.S., where the federal government owns about 30 percent—and, of course, such ownership is “non-racial.” Ownership by corporations is similarly “non-racial.” If these figures are correct, they indicate that private whites own or control perhaps half of the surface of South Africa. But, as a reader of the July 2 post pointed out, much of South Africa is semi-arid and not good agricultural land. So, the quality of the land that one group or another owns is an issue as well as the quantity. Commercial agriculture is important, but it is only 3 percent of the economy, as opposed to 20 percent of Zimbabwe’s before Mugabe expropriated white-owned commercial farms. Further, as another reader noted, South Africa’s population is predominately urban; many blacks accepted monetary payment in lieu of land as compensation for apartheid-era land seizures, presumably because they are now urbanized. Still, whites are 9.7 percent of South Africa’s population and own a disproportionate share of the land. That is an issue easily exploited by African populists when the overall economy is growing slowly and the lot of the disenfranchised is so slow to change.
    Blog Post by John Campbell July 19, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • China
    Diamonds Are Forever in Zimbabwe
    The Zimbabwean finance minister, Tendai Biti, has complained that that the Zimbabwean-Chinese joint venture diamond mining company Anjin failed to remit revenue to his ministry from its operations in the Marange fields during the first quarter of the year. He raised the possibility that there is a "parallel government" that is the recipient of the revenue. On June 17, in parliamentary testimony reported by the press, the deputy minister of mines confirmed that the Zimbabwean military, in partnership with the Chinese, owns Anjin. He said that Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI) owns forty percent of the Anjin mining company. ZDI is a private company, but all of the shares are owned by the Ministry of Defense. The state-owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) also owns ten percent of Anjin. The remaining half of the shares are held by a Chinese military company, Chinese Defense Industries. The suspicion must be that the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defense is the “parallel government” posited by the finance minister. The current Zimbabwean government is a power-sharing arrangement between Zanu-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) cobbled together under pressure from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s 2008 violent elections. The minister of finance is one of the founders of the MDC. The Ministry of Defense is controlled by Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party. The minister of defense, Emmerson Mnangagwa, is widely seen as a leading candidate to succeed Robert Mugabe. It is not much of a stretch to see diamond money routed around the finance ministry bankrolling Mnangagwa’s political agenda in the run up to national elections. As of now, Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai will be the leading presidential candidates. Mugabe, elderly and ailing, wants new elections soon. Tsvanagirai, the MDC, and the SADC want elections delayed until a new constitution is ratified and a new voters roll is compiled. Earlier in the spring, Biti said the government in fact did not have enough money to hold early polls. ZANU-PF dismissed his statement with contempt. It remains to be seen whether Mugabe will have his way. However, whenever Mugabe leaves the political scene, Mnangagwa will have a powerful, if disputed, claim to the presidency.
    Blog Post by John Campbell June 22, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Military Saber-Rattling in Zimbabwe
    The chief of staff of the Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA,) Maj. Gen. Trust Mugoba, says that the military will not allow a presidential candidate to assume office if he does not share the “ideals” of President Robert Mugabe and his ruling party, ZANU-PF. This week, Mugabe’s chief rival and prime minister, Morgan Tsvangirai, told a civil society organization that the army has lowered its recruitment standards to incorporate Zanu-PF youth militias in anticipation of early elections. It was the military that perpetrated much of the violence against Tsvangirai’s opposition party during the last elections, and there must be concern that party militias incorporated into the military will be used by Zanu-PF for the same purpose in the next elections. Gen. Mugoba’s comments are likely directed at Tsvangirai. A journalist in a leading Kenyan newspaper, Daily Nation, concludes that “fears of military coup mount in Zimbabwe.” Chatham House has just published Graham Boynton’s analysis titled “Mugabe’s Last Throw of the Dice.” He sees signs that Mugabe and the generals are looking for a snap election in September or October, before a new constitution and other reforms can be implemented, thereby guaranteeing that the president and the generals behind his regime remain in power for another five years. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the relevant regional organization led by South Africa, has been deeply involved in the search for peace in Zimbabwe. To end widespread violence with the prospect of civil war, it brokered the arrangement whereby Morgan Tsvangirai and his party have participated in Mugabe’s government since the last elections. SADC and South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma, have been pushing to defer the next elections until the necessary reforms are in place. Boynton points out that South Africa has threatened sanctions if Zimbabwe does not follow the agreed sequence of a new constitution to be approved by a referendum, the creation of a new voter roll, and—only upon successful completion of these steps—elections with international monitors. Hence, Boynton sees Mugabe’s push for early elections as a high-stakes gamble. I am not so sure. Mugabe may still have considerable popular support among Zimbabwe voters, though Zanu-PF intimidation makes it difficult to gauge. Zuma has certainly taken a tougher line on Zimbabwe than did his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki. But for him and other senior leaders in the ANC, Mugabe remains a hero of the region’s struggle against apartheid and white domination. Implementation of sanctions to force out Mugabe would be politically difficult for Zuma. Mugabe knows that and likely considers it when calculating the risk of throwing the dice.
    Blog Post by John Campbell June 11, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Zimbabwe Police Label Nigerian Televangelist a Sorcerer
    Evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity are powerful forces in sub-Saharan politics. So, too, is the belief in prophecy and sorcery. In Zimbabwe, it is tense times, with uncertainty about President Robert Mugabe’s health, the dates of the next election, and whether constitutional and other reforms will be achieved. Taken together, faith and politics are the context for the Zimbabwean partisan wrangling over a Nigerian Pentecostal preacher. Zimbabwean prime minister and opposition presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai has allegedly invited the Nigerian televangelist and faith healer Temitope Balogun (‘TB’) Joshua to Harare to be the guest speaker on Africa Day, May 25, a “National Day of Prayer.” In response, the police, dominated by President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party, are pulling out all of the stops to prevent the visit. A senior police officer accuses Joshua of being a “false prophet,” and screened at the Harare police headquarters a video that dwells on Joshua’s alleged womanizing, titled “T.B. Joshua’s Evil Doings Finally Revealed.” Close Mugabe ally, the schismatic Anglican bishop Nolbert Kunonga, accuses Joshua of “Satanism” and of being “diabolical.” Previously, other pro ZANU-PF clergy have claimed on state-controlled media that Joshua’s preaching is “judgmental, partisan, and unorthodox.” The apparent anger of Mugabe’s supporters also reflects that many Zimbabweans, like others in sub-Sahara Africa, treat prophesy, “Satanism,” and the “diabolical” with deadly seriousness. Hence, the denunciation of Joshua as a “false” prophet. Joshua earlier prophesized that “an African leader” would die in sixty days. In fact, the president of Malawi died shortly thereafter. More recently, he has prophesied that another “African leader” will fall “critically ill’ and be hospitalized soon. For Mugabe, who reportedly suffers from prostate cancer and seeks medical treatment in Singapore regularly, this “prophecy” is probably too close to home. It doesn’t help that Joshua has apparently been invited to Zimbabwe by Tsvangirai who might somehow benefit from Joshua’s charismatic preaching whenever the elections are held. An estimated 15,000 attend Joshua’s Nigerian services on Sundays, at his Synagogue Church of All Nations (SCOAN). He also runs Emanuel TV, which broadcasts via satellite and Internet. He has affiliated congregations in Ghana, the UK, South Africa, and Greece. Zimbabwe police are reportedly investigating a “fraudster” church in Harare allegedly linked to Joshua. His faith healing ministrations have included South African rugby players.
    Blog Post by John Campbell May 21, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    The Central Methodist Mission in Johannesburg
    When a measure of economic stability returned to Zimbabwe, South Africa dismantled its special treatment regimes for refugees from that country. It now requires entry permits, work permits, and imposes other requirements which, according to a human rights NGO, are consistent with international practice. However, xenophobia remains in job-starved South Africa, and the under-trained and poorly paid police often have been unduly rough with Zimbabweans. The Central Methodist Mission in downtown Johannesburg has a tradition of social activism dating back to apartheid times. Originally a white congregation, it now is almost entirely black, thoroughly middle class in appearance, though its bishop is white. During the height of the anti-Zimbabwean xenophobia, it began providing a place for refugees and migrants to sleep. It provides no food or bedding, but does facilitate entry into a primary school. My interlocutor said that the facility is unsafe, because there is no control over entrance into the church. Apparently, criminals prey on the the residents. Our intern, Melissa Bukuru, discussed the shelter and other immigrant spaces in a blog about intra-continental immigration earlier this year, after she returned from Johannesburg. My research associate, Asch Harwood, and I also visited the Central Methodist Mission over the past weekend. Our guide told us that more than a thousand people sleep in the Sunday school rooms, corridors, and along the steps. Even mid-afternoon the overcrowding was oppressive. Only a few residents had small, curtained-off areas. Everybody else slept where they could. Children were everywhere, and daily activities were underway: cooking, laundry, etc. Our guide told us that one toilet served five hundred people. To me, conditions were squalid, and the facility was a firetrap. But, residents have no other place to go. There are periodic police raids in search of illegal aliens (probably a large percentage of the residents), but, thus far, the bishop has managed to get them to back off. I was told that the congregation is split over hosting the Zimbabweans (and others). Probably the majority want their facility back. But the bishop is adamant and so far has carried the day. The Central Methodist Mission is stark testimony to the mayhem that disfigured Zimbabwe in the past and may do so again. It also illustrates the very high cost to South Africa of the Mugabe regime.
    Blog Post by John Campbell March 29, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Zimbabwe Elections This Year?
    Press reports indicate that President Robert Mugabe has decided to press ahead for elections this year, despite the lack of a new constitution and other reforms designed to forestall a repetition of the electoral violence of 2007. The opposition Movement for Democratic change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai, remains opposed to pre-new constitution elections as does South Africa and much of the international community. The press reports that the politburo of the ruling ZANU-PF party has approved party primaries for June, with the anointing of Mugabe as the presidential candidate. National elections would then take place before the end of the year. The politburo’s action must still be endorsed by the party’s central committee. The minister of finance has argued in public that there are insufficient funds to hold an election this year. His objections were swept aside by a party spokesman, who commented that it is the minister’s responsibility to find the money, according to the press. The press comments that Mugabe intends to use these elections in part to punish those party members who talked freely to American diplomats about internal party divisions. Wikileaks released classified reports of those conversations. When to hold elections has been a contentious issue within ZANU-PF, with Mugabe wanting them sooner rather than later. In general, the ruling party appears increasingly factionalized. Still, on balance, it is likely that the central committee will endorse the politburo’s decision. However, early elections are not yet a foregone conclusion. ZANU-PF is far from monolithic. Also, it remains to be seen what maneuvers Tsvangirai will attempt. There is also the South Africa factor. President Jacob Zuma has advocated delaying the Zimbabwe elections until the new constitution and other reforms are in place, a position reiterated by the South African foreign minister in parliament last week in Cape Town, to the consternation of Mugabe’s supporters. The South African press reports that personal relations between Mugabe and Zuma are at an all time low, and the South African president is expected to visit Zimbabwe “soon.” The elections pot is simmering, but it has not yet come to a boil.
    Blog Post by John Campbell March 20, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Zambia’s Populist President
    Zambia’s president Michael Sata gave a January 22 interview to London’s the Telegraph newspaper that is worth reading. This interview is the first Sata has given to the international media. (The Telegraph is often regarded as the more conservative of the UK’s quality newspapers with a national circulation.) Sata is in many ways an old line, populist politician. He was elected president of Zambia last year with a plurality of the votes, campaigning as a champion of the poor and against corruption. The election was credible, and Sata was sworn-in without opposition. Sata prides himself on his sharp tongue and appears to like the moniker ’King Cobra.’ In the interview, Sata makes it clear he has a love-hate relationship with the UK, where he was once a railway worker. "But every hour I spent on manual work, every hour I was humiliated in England or degraded has helped me, because that’s the same way other people feel in the townships here." On the other hand, as the interviewer observes, he is also looking to the West and the UK to balance Chinese influence in Zambia. His comments on Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe have also attracted attention in Harare. He called Zimbabwean opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai a "stooge," and said that constitutional reform and a reformed voters roll were not prerequisites for new elections, despite South African president Jacob Zuma’s insistence on them. The Telegraph quotes Sata as saying, "You people, the Western countries, you taught us that democracy is elections. Now somebody wants elections and you say no." Sata’s comments may reflect the solidarity he feels with Mugabe as a leader of the "liberation struggle." However, President Sata also told the Telegraph that Zambia must solve its own problems before involving itself in the problems of other countries. His comments on Zimbabwe may signal that he is not prepared to get involved in Zimbabwean political developments at present. That would be consistent with his populist orientation.
    Blog Post by John Campbell January 26, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    South Africa’s ANC to the Rescue of Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF?
    ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe gestures during a media briefing at the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg April 6, 2009. (Siphiwe Sibeko/Courtesy Reuters) Gwede Mantashe, secretary general of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC), in a speech in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, said the ANC would assist Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF in the upcoming elections. Mantashe is quoted in the media as saying, “It is important for ZANU–PF to regain lost ground and continue to represent the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe.” While there may be little of practical consequence in the ANC offer, Mantashe’s speech illustrates the contradictions of South Africa’s policy toward Zimbabwe. Jacob Zuma, South Africa’s president and the head of the ANC, has long been involved in seeking a settlement in Zimbabwe between Mugabe and ZANU-PF on one side and Morgan Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change on the other. But, Mantashe’s speech indicates that far from being neutral, the ANC-dominated South African government will likely support Mugabe. The ANC and ZANU-PF are both “liberation movements,” and that common ground may be more important than South Africa’s national interest. (South Africa hosts up to a quarter of Zimbabwe’s population as refugees; their presence unleashes periodic waves of xenophobia in the townships.) It might be argued that Mantashe was speaking only for the party, not the South African government. However, given the overwhelming majority of the ANC in South Africa’s legislature and its dominance of the executive, the boundaries between party and government are blurred, to say the least. Some South African human rights activists are concerned about a seeming trend in which the party is increasingly identified with the state. They see this as an element in the ANC-sponsored “Secrecy Act,” which may stifle criticism of ANC politicians by whistle blowers and the vibrant South African press, which, however, is mostly white-owned. Some on the left, notably Winnie Mandela (Nelson Mandela’s ex-wife) and Julius Malema (now deposed head of the ANC youth league), express frustration with the various legal and constitutional protections enshrined in law as inhibiting South Africa’s “transformation” from a white-dominated state into a “non-racial democracy” characterized by “justice” for the black majority. In such circles, there is sympathy for Mugabe’s dispossession of white Zimbabwean farmers – especially as South Africa’s own land reform program has made little progress. The identification of the party with the state may be a comfortable stance for Mantashe, who, however, is no friend of Malema’s. He is chairperson of the South African Communist Party as well as secretary general of the ANC. Until 2008, he was secretary general of the National Union of Mineworkers. So, he bridges the three parts of the alliance that governs South Africa: the ANC, the Communist party, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. However, like many of his colleagues, he does not seem to be hesitant about participating in the capitalist system: he was the first trade unionist to be appointed to the board of directors of a Johannesburg Stock Exchange limited liability company.
    Blog Post by John Campbell December 14, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process
    An illegal diamond dealer from Zimbabwe displays diamonds for sale in Manica, near the border with Zimbabwe, September 19, 2010. (Goran Tomasevic/Courtesy Reuters) Yesterday, Global Witness announced that it was leaving the Kimberley Process, the international certification scheme to prevent trade in blood diamonds it helped to found. The immediate provocation for the international NGO was the KP certification for Zimbabwe to begin selling diamonds from its Marange diamond field. The Marange fields are infamous for Zimbabwe government human rights violations (pdf) against illegal miners. This included firing on miners from helicopters. As recently as August 2011, Human Rights Watch released a report citing continued human rights violations in Marange. Nevertheless, at its plenary session in November, KP approved the sale of Marange diamonds. The United States, which has sanctions in place against Zimbabwe, abstained from voting. Le Monde Diplomatique, the Guardian, and Global Witness all report that allowing these exports will directly benefit the Zimbabwean military, which allegedly has deep ties with diamond mining companies. In particular, Anjin Investments, a joint Chinese-Zimbabwe government venture with top Zimbabwean military brass among its executives, has stockpiled million carats of diamonds, which it is beginning to sell. Global Witness’ courageous departure highlights the lack of credibly of the Kimberley process. Likewise, Zimbabwe profits from its Marange diamonds will help it skirt existing international sanctions and provide new streams of funding for the military, which has a long history of suppressing dissent. H/T to Asch Harwood
    Blog Post by John Campbell December 8, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Gay Rights in Africa
      U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks about the rights of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender people from around the world in her "Free and Equal in Dignity and Rights" speech on International Human Rights Day at U.N. premises in Geneva December 6, 2011. (POOL New/Courtesy Reuters)   On December 6, in a presidential memorandum and a speech by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Geneva, the Obama administration announced that it will use all diplomatic means to promote gay rights around the world. In effect, the administration is trying to establish a new international norm, much as the Carter administration tried to do with respect to human rights. In sub-Saharan Africa, homophobia is widespread. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, for example, have used it to whip up public support and to distract attention from bad governance. In Uganda, there is legislation under consideration that could include the death penalty for homosexual acts. In Zimbabwe, the Anglican Church’s alleged sympathy for homosexuality was part of the pretext for, in effect, the seizure of the property of the country’s largest church and for official castigation of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Paradoxically, Mugabe’s attack has led to an Anglican revival in Zimbabwe—even though the population is probably as homophobic as elsewhere in Africa. (Notably, Mugabe’s chief presidential rival, Morgan Tsvangirai, has recently publicly supported gay rights.) In nominally democratic Nigeria, Muslim and Christian leaders have called for additional laws penalizing homosexual behavior, one of which recently passed through the senate. The outlier is South Africa, where public gay pride parades are held in Johannesburg and Cape Town and discrimination based on sexual preference is outlawed. South Africa has among the most thorough constitutional guarantees of human rights in the world. But gay rights are a “white” issue, and homophobia is widespread among other racial groups. There is African resentment at what some see as Western imposition of norms, and some will put the Obama administration’s new policy in that context --as the International Criminal Court has been because the cases before it all involve African figures. Nevertheless, as former president Jimmy Carter’s sponsorship of human rights shows, new norms can over time influence the behavior of governments.
    Blog Post by John Campbell December 7, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Robert Mugabe’s Health
    Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (R) listens as Finance Minister Tendai Biti delivers his budget speech in parliament in Harare, November 24, 2011. (Philimon Bulawayo/Courtesy Reuters) Succession issues are dominating Zimbabwean domestic politics. The ruling party, ZANU-PF, is holding its eleventh annual non-elective conference in Bulawayo this week, and the media expects that party functionaries will be positioning themselves for a post-Robert Mugabe Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s health is a state secret, but, according to WikiLeaks, members of his inner circle say he has prostate cancer. He has been making visits to  Singapore for what the media identifies as radiation treatments. Born in 1924, he certainly appears to be in failing health. The press reports that at an October 31 cabinet meeting, he could stay awake for only twenty minutes. However, Mugabe denies that he is seriously ill, and his disciples recall that his mother lived to be more than one hundred years of age. Some in the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) are trying to make Mugabe’s foreign medical expenses a political issue. Last week, one of them said Mugabe should seek treatment at home: “He is the one who destroyed our medical facilities since 1980 and his destruction of medical facilities must not lead Zimbabwe to splash millions on his illness.” However, the MDC party leader and current prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai has said it is the government’s responsibility to pay for Mugabe’s medical expenses. Some ZANU-PF factions want Zimbabwe’s next election, which must occur before March 2013, to be held while Mugabe can still be the ZANU-PF presidential candidate. His vice presidential running mate would then be his heir apparent. If, however, Mugabe were to die suddenly and before the elections, factional infighting within ZANU-PF could spin out of control. One of the chief faction leaders is Joice (or Joyce) Mujuru, currently the vice president and widow of Solomon Mujuru, who commanded Mugabe’s soldiers during the pre-independence guerrilla war and who died (or was killed) under suspicious circumstances in August 2011. Another is Emerson Mnangagwa, at present minister of defense and often identified as the richest man in Zimbabwe.
    Blog Post by John Campbell December 5, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    South Africa: Was Julius Malema in ZANU-PF’s Pocket?
    Julius Malema (L), leader of the ruling African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL),is welcomed by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (R) at State House in Harare, April 5, 2010. (Philimon Bulawayo/Courtesy Reuters) In the aftermath of Julius Malema’s suspension from the African National Congress, there is press speculation that his allegedly close ties with Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF played a role in turning the party’s leadership against him. Specifically, there are press whispers that ZANU-PF was funding Malema to undermine President Jacob Zuma’s mediation efforts in Zimbabwe, which included the ultimate goal of toppling him. Many South Africans, not just in the business community or among whites, see parallels between Malema’s calls for the nationalization of the mines and seizure of white-owned land and Mugabe’s policies in Zimbabwe. Like Mugabe, Malema does not hesitate to play the race card. And, again like Mugabe, Malema is the voice of the poor and marginalized. So, it’s no suprise that there are whispers that he was funded by Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. Many South Africans thought Malema funded his flash lifestyle through access to government contracts, but Zimbabwean payoffs may have also helped. In Zimbabwe, commentary on Malema’s departure has been divided. Some associated with ZANU-PF are critical of the ANC, while those close to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) tend to praise the ANC, especially for the transparency of the process by which Malema was disciplined. I have seen insufficient evidence to be convinced that Malema was indeed on Mugabe’s payroll. But, it is not improbable. A ZANU-PF connection might also account for the suprising unity within the ANC, at least thus far, in support of Malema’s suspension, but that remains speculation.
    Blog Post by John Campbell November 18, 2011 Africa in Transition