Somalia

As the self-proclaimed Islamic State loses ground in Syria and Iraq, there is increasing concern that it will gradually shift its operations to Africa. Indeed, in late 2016, Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Bagdhadi claimed that the group had shifted elements of command, media, and wealth to Islamic State “provinces in north Africa and west Africa.” However, in a useful article Joseph Siegle of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies convincingly argues that the Islamic State is not well established in those areas of Sub-Saharan Africa where extremist Islamist groups operate. The two most violent groups, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, predate the formation of the Islamic State and are not dependent on it for operational or tactical support. Furthermore, it is the Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states that is the major ideological foundation of radical, Jihadi Islam in sub-Saharan Africa, rather than the Islamic State. Siegel contends that the Islamic State has had a negligible impact on Boko Haram despite the latter’s pledge of allegiance to it in 2015. Boko Haram remains focused on northeast Nigeria and adjoining territories in Cameroon and Chad. Most of its fighters are recruited from this region. Siegel contends that defeats suffered by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq are unlikely to have any influence on Boko Haram and its activities. Similarly, a resurgent al-Shabaab remains focused on Somalia and as its trajectory is influenced by clan dynamics, the success or failure of the Somali government, and its ties to Wahhabi ideology. Siegal’s article implies that the fate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is unlikely to have much influence on al-Shabaab. In contrast with sub-Saharan Africa, Siegel does see the future for operations of the Islamic State in the states of North Africa: Tunisia, Libya, and the Sinai. He notes that vast numbers of Tunisians have gone to Syria to fight for the Islamic State. Should they return home, they could entrench the presence of the Islamic State in Tunisia. With regards to Libya, Siegel views the Islamic State as having little indigenous support. However, fragments of Islamic State forces in Libya could bring other displaced Islamic State fighters into the fold. In reference to the Sinai, he suggests that displaced Islamic State fighters could strengthen indigenous jihadi groups. All this being said, the bottom line is that the trajectory of the Islamic State is unlikely to have any substantial implications on affairs in sub-Saharan Africa.

The United States and Kenya have a long standing military relationship. They are allies in the “war on terror,” of which Kenya has been a major victim. Notable attacks on Kenyan soil include the 1998 Al-Qaeda led bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi where twelve Americans and hundreds of Kenyans lost their lives, and the Westgate Shopping Mall bombings of 2013 by Al-Shabaab, which claimed the lives of nearly seventy Kenyans and expatriates. In addition, Kenya has been embroiled in a war against al-Shabaab in Somalia. U.S. forces are involved in training exercises with the Kenyan Defense Forces. As a result of this conflict, the insurgency has spilt over into Kenya’s northern (Turkana) and Coastal regions (Mombasa and Lamu). This has sparked numerous successful, and unsuccessful terrorist operations throughout the country. In this context, the Obama administration approved a $10 million drone sale to Kenya in 2016. In early 2017, the Obama administration also approved a $418 million sale of armed aircraft to Kenya. This would be the largest sale of U.S. military material to Kenya. Ted Budd the Congressman from North Carolina, led fellow members of Congress in questioning the procurement and contracting dimensions of the sale, however, observers think that the sale will be approved. The Trump administration has yet to signal whether it will continue the close relationship between Kenya and the United states as characterized by the Obama administration. Based on regional security partnerships and the “war on terror,” an early reading is that the Trump administration is likely to maintain, and perhaps even enhance, security cooperation with Kenya. However, human rights advocates will be concerned about Kenyan military abuses, especially with regards to the country’s Somali minority. In Congress, questions remain over the appropriateness of the equipment that the Kenyans wish to buy. The human rights record of the current administration of Uhuru Kenyatta is hardly unblemished. He was accused of gross human rights abuses in the context of the 2007 presidential elections and was indicted by the International Criminal Court. The indictment was later dropped, and the prosecutor claimed that the Kenyatta government refused to cooperate and intimidated witnesses. Kenya faces national elections at the end of 2017, which could again turn violent.

This is a guest post by Claire Wilmot, a former intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. She is a master of global affairs candidate at the University of Toronto. In a report titled “Fighting Terror with Terror,” the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights confirmed over a hundred allegations of human rights abuses committed by Kenyan security forces since 2014. Meanwhile, recruitment in Kenya for the Somali extremist group al-Shabaab is at an all time high, suggesting a link between state-sponsored repression and growing radicalization. The report details twenty-five confirmed extrajudicial killings by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), incidences of torture, the discovery of several mass graves, and over eighty arbitrary arrests and detentions. The targets of these abuses are disproportionately young Muslim and Somali men. In December 2014, The Kenyan National Assembly passed draconian legislation known as the Security Laws Amendment Act. The act limited oversight of the ATPU while giving it sweeping new powers. It allowed for the curtailing of civil liberties, most notably the increase of arrest without trial time to 360 days. What is more, as a result of the legislation, hundreds of civil society organizations have been listed as potential sources of funding for terrorism, including the Muslim Human Rights (Muhuri) organization and Haki Africa, which work to protect and promote human rights in Kenya. Muhari suggested they were targeted due to their work exposing abuses by the security services. Kenyan police targeting of Somalis, many of whom are Kenyan citizens whose families have resided in Kenya for generations, is hardly a new phenomenon. After the terror attack on Westgate Mall in 2013, the Kenyan police increased the frequency and invasiveness of home sweeps in Eastleigh, a predominately Somali neighborhood in Nairobi. By April 2014, over a thousand Somalis were being held without charge in a football stadium in the outskirts of Nairobi, and hundreds of others had disappeared. The combination of heavy-handed tactics and ethnic discrimination discouraged reporting of missing family members lest they became targets of the security forces. Young Somalis in Kenya face challenges common to youth in other developing countries, and then some. If rampant unemployment, poverty, and lack of opportunity disproportionately affect youth, Somalis face the added challenge of ethnic discrimination, police brutality, and in the case of refugees, barriers to formal sector employment. Of Kenya’s half a million refugees, over 400,000 are those who have fled Somalia’s protracted conflict. In a context of marginalization and fear, young Somali men become ideal targets for al-Shabaab recruiters, who offer them security, monetary compensation, and a sense of purpose and belonging. As Somali youth are increasingly victimized by Kenyan security forces and marginalized from mainstream Kenyan society, it is possible to see the appeal of joining the al-Shabaab insurgency. The rise of homegrown terror in Kenya must be interpreted in the context of the country’s security policy, and international funders of anti-terror programs should use their leverage to ensure that parties responsible are held to account. Rather than increasing security in Kenya, the ATPU is adding to the discontent that fuels participation in the extremist groups in the Horn of Africa.

This is a guest-post by Andrea Crosta, co-Founder and Executive Director of Elephant Action League (EAL). The Elephant Action League (EAL) is appreciative of this opportunity to justify our findings on al-Shabaab’s involvement in the ivory trade and our decision to not share certain details gleaned from confidential sources due to security and confidentiality reasons. The professional investigative team that conducted the investigation – including myself – considers the safety of our sources nonnegotiable. As such EAL will not release sensitive details until our sources are safe. However, we hope that more information supporting our work will be published in the coming months. The figures presented in our 2013 report, Africa’s White Gold of Jihad: al-Shabaab and Conflict Ivory, are based on an investigation into the potential role of al-Shabaab in the trafficking of ivory conducted between 2011 and 2012. At the time, African governments, international governmental organizations, and law enforcement agencies were apathetic and often unaware of the magnitude of elephant poaching and the large quantities of ivory trafficked through East Africa. Especially prominent was the port of Mombasa, through which an estimated 188,170 kg of ivory was smuggled between 2009 and 2015, as outlined by our newly released report (based on an estimated 10% seizure rate). In Tanzania, between 2009 and 2014, over 85,000 elephants have been poached, which is equal to roughly 200 tons of ivory smuggled every year from Tanzania alone, often through Kenya. In that period, we began picking up information about large quantities of ivory being trafficked by Somalis, either through Somalia or directly from Kenya. The fact that Somalis were involved in ivory trafficking was not new, as they have been historically linked to elephant poaching. What was unique was the alleged involvement of al-Shabaab, as also reported by Jeffrey Gettleman in an article for the New York Times in September 2012. Over the subsequent eighteen months, thanks to personal introductions by trusted individuals coming from the same clans and sub-clans (crucial in the Somali culture), the investigators met several Somali traffickers and businessmen who were doing businesses with al-Shabaab who confirmed and explained how the terrorist organization had positioned itself as an important middleman in the trafficking of ivory, making hundreds of thousands of dollars every month through their direct involvement in this illicit activity. At that time al-Shabaab still controlled vital points on the border with Kenya, as well as key ports in Somalia such as Kismayo and Merca. EAL has never denied the importance of other far more substantial sources of profit for al-Shabaab - such as charcoal - but through this investigation, we simply exposed an important regional player that contributed significantly to ivory trafficking. Terrorism and terrorist organizations do not drive elephant poaching and ivory trafficking,  but they certainly do play a role. The magnitude of al-Shabaab involvement in the illegal ivory trade at the moment is unknown although occasionally through our on-going field activities, we receive information about ivory continuing to be smuggled through Somalia by various entities.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Last month, Soma Oil and Gas, a London based energy company, searching for hydrocarbon deposits off the coast of Somalia, announced that it had completed a seismic survey to ascertain the potential for recoverable oil and gas deposits. Although further details have yet to be released, chief executive Rob Sheppard announced that the results were encouraging. However, Somalia, and potential investors, should proceed with caution when considering entering this frontier market. East African oil exploration, and in Somalia specifically, is not a secret. Energy firms like Royal Dutch Shell and Exxonmobil operated in Somalia before the government collapsed in 1991. But recent gains against the insurgent group al Shabaab in the south and the decrease in piracy off the coast have sparked a regeneration of the industry. The Somali president, riding these positive evolutions, recently stated that the country is “open for business.” Although recent security developments are encouraging, substantial hurdles still exist. The Heritage Institute recently released “Oil in Somalia: Adding Fuel to the Fire?,” by Dominik Balthasar. The paper discusses how the oil industry in Somalia could have a promising future, but it also explores the risks facing Somalia if the development of its petroleum resources is not carefully managed. Balthasar rightly asks, “is Somalia ready for oil?” The historic challenges that have limited business opportunities in Somalia, domestic insurgency and piracy, have diminished for now, but these threats have not disappeared. Al Shabaab has been largely pushed out of southern Somalia by multinational forces, but has recently proven that it is still able to operate in the north of Kenya. As Kenya flexes to counter al Shabaab in its own country, it could provide an opportunity for al Shabaab to return to its previous strongholds in Somalia. And even as piracy has largely stopped, it is conceivable that al Shabaab or others could see oil tankers as opportunities to resurrect that practice as well. Beyond these security challenges there may be political disadvantages to developing the hydrocarbon sector in Somalia. Balthasar notes, among other things, that oil will likely exacerbate existing rifts and political tensions. In the context of the recent political turmoil and contentious federalism process, it is clear that any foreign oil companies would face a high degree of political instability and uncertainty. Balthasar also points out that the legal and constitutional conditions in Somalia are ambiguous in determining who can enter or negotiate contracts with oil companies. Without a well-defined regulatory environment for oil and gas resources, federal states, semi-autonomous regions, and the central government could all separately negotiate and enter into conflicting extraction agreements with private companies. The opaque regulatory nature of these resources has already proven problematic in the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland. Even with updated agreements on how to negotiate for and claim oil fields, Puntland and Somaliland have already leveraged their autonomy and granted their own licenses without the central government’s blessing. This is all likely to lead to further turmoil and maybe even conflict over profitable fields and the distribution of revenues. Somalia is probably not ready for oil development. With excellent access to shipping lanes and supposedly massive untapped wealth (perhaps as much as 110 billion barrels) it is no surprise that multinational oil companies are intrigued, but responsible investors would be wise to think twice. The underlying political instability and security challenges of Somalia will likely inhibit the long term feasibility and profitability of these projects. It could also cause backsliding for the hard fought improvements in Somalia’s government.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. In mid-December, the Kenyan parliament passed counterterrorism legislation that has since been hotly contested by politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, and ordinary citizens alike for its alleged infringement on basic civil liberties. Since al Shabaab’s bold and bloody siege of Nairobi’s Westgate shopping center in September 2013, the government of President Uhuru Kenyatta has been under pressure to upgrade its security and counterterrorism framework. Al Shabaab’s campaign against civilians, government officials, and police and security forces across Kenya has continued, culminating last month in two assaults in the northeast that left sixty-four dead. The newly passed Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014--President Kenyatta and his supporters’ response to al Shabaab--grants government agencies and security forces expansive powers to enhance counterterrorism efforts. Yet, these security measures have incited intense criticism. Leaders of the opposition coalition, the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), view the law as a bid to consolidate political power and an attempt to roll back hard won democratic gains in Kenya. CORD’s Raila Odinga petitioned Kenya’s high court to suspend the bill for its unconstitutionality and spoke out publicly against the law, arguing this is “how dictatorship and collapse all begin.” Certain aspects of the bill have also prompted serious scrutiny from outside the political arena. Notably, the law expands the powers of security forces, which Human Rights Watch fears will violate citizens’ right to due process. It extends the length of time terrorism suspects can be detained without charge from ninety days to almost a year, and it enables National Intelligence Service officials “to stop and detain suspects, search and seize private property, and monitor communications without a current warrant.” Additionally, the law imposes restrictions on the press, requiring journalists to receive approval before beginning investigations or publishing stories on issues of domestic terrorism and security. Journalists, civil society organizations, and activists fear the government will use the law to diminish the free flow of information and to protect security forces from public scrutiny. Foreign governments and international organizations have also criticized the security law. In particular, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International denounced the bill’s infringement on basic rights and called attention to articles restricting the freedoms of assembly and association. U.S. Department of State Spokesperson Jen Psaki echoed similar sentiments and expressed particular concern over the provisions that “appear to limit freedom of assembly and media, and access to asylum for refugees.” In light of recent events, Kenya needs to mount a robust counterterrorism campaign against al Shabaab, but this security bill is far from the answer. While internal critics see it as a threat to democratic governance and freedoms, the bill also has important security implications. The expanded surveillance, search and seizure, and detention powers in the new bill will allow the security forces to escalate one particularly controversial aspect of current counterterrorism efforts: collective targeting of Muslims and ethnically Somali communities. From indiscriminate arrests and mass round-ups to assassinations of Muslim clerics, security forces’ use of collective punishment has been well documented. Already, this strategy has fermented a sense of injustice and exclusion among Muslims and ethnic Somalis. Continuing on this trajectory will only further alienate these communities and exacerbate radicalization by driving marginalized citizens into the open arms of al Shabaab recruiters. While it may seem that the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill is purely a domestic Kenyan issue, Kenya’s national counterterrorism strategy affects the entire region. Kenya’s efforts could either help curb al Shabaab or provide them fertile recruiting ground, and thus have profound implications for U.S. interests in maintaining regional security in the horn of Africa and preventing Somalia from turning into a hotbed of terrorist activity.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Recently, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud organized for the Somali parliament to lodge a petition for a vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed Mohammad. This comes on the heels of a spat between Ahmed and President Mohamud after the prime minister removed a minister of justice and constitutional affairs. That minister, now the minister of veterinary and animal husbandry, is a major ally of President Mohamud, who declared the move “null and void” citing constitutional authority. If this all sounds familiar, that is because last year President Mohamud got rid of then Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon for precisely the same reason, using precisely the same tactics. The president’s argument is as thin this time as it was last time. He is simply removing a political obstacle, and he will likely succeed. There is little silver lining to this development. The president’s move was met with immediate displeasure by Somalia’s international partners. The United States pulled out of a recent conference on Somali development, citing concern with the “political turmoil” in the country. Further, Somalia has also been using recent gains against al Shabaab to try and lure investment back to the country, but some are now worried that this political bickering could scare investors away. This cycle of a new prime minister every year is partly the fault of the president’s ambition, but is also evidence of a larger constitutional problem that allows him to claim powers he does not possess. It may be time for Somalia to begin considering a structural change in its governance system if it wishes to maintain its positive momentum. There are two options. The first is to adopt a strong centralized system. It is becoming increasingly clear that a strong presidential office and a strong prime ministerial office cannot coexist without regular disruption. However, many Somalis do not trust a strong centralized system after strongman Siad Barre was forced from power. His horrible twenty-five year rule lingers in the minds of most Somalis. A more realistic option is to finally set up a constitutional court in Somalia. This independent body would theoretically adjudicate constitutional questions and provide some stability and clarity to the constitution. At the very least it could provide some political stability by ruling on matters like the one currently under discussion. It would also have the added value of assisting during the creation of federal states. These changes are unlikely. It is more likely that the cycle of instability in the prime minister’s office will continue. The current prime minister will be forced from power and the president will pick a new one in thirty days. Unfortunately, it seems likely that individual will run afoul of the president in a year’s time and the cycle will continue. These are setbacks Somalia cannot afford as it continues to battle an increasingly wild insurgency, readies itself for democratic elections in 2016, and tries to organize federal states.

  This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Last week, the United States conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab target in the Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in the attack. This is certainly good news for Somalia and the rest of East Africa. Godane was the mastermind of the Westgate Mall Attack and numerous other bloody operations. Some will use Godane’s death to support the narrative of a waning al Shabaab. The argument is that as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continues to deny al Shabaab territorial control, the group will weaken. Mogadishu is more secure than it has been in years. Now is the time for the economy to blossom and for the central government to take full control. But while al Shabaab’s capabilities have certainly degraded, attacks continue and illustrate the group’s resolve to destabilize the country. The loss of geographic control does not necessarily mean the group has been defeated. In truth, this shift may make al Shabaab more dangerous and less predictable. This group, in its various forms since the 1990s, has absorbed setbacks and leadership losses before. It will likely survive the loss of Godane. The U.S. airstrike reaffirms the United States’ principle policy concern in Somalia: the dissolution of al Shabaab. The United States is concerned with al Shabaab’s global ambitions. American and British citizens have been recruited by al Shabaab in the past, and recruitment does not seem to be waning. Western jihadis training abroad and returning home is a concern. The United States would also like stability in East Africa. Al Shabaab threatens this stability by continuing to strike targets outside of Somalia such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and perhaps even Tanzania. Somalia’s challenges do not diminish. Few other countries around the world have seen the tempo of drone strikes and Navy SEAL assaults. The country is under constant threat of famine, the federalism process creates violence and disenchantment, and Kenya’s anti-terror policies continue to create new recruits for al Shabaab on both sides of the Somali border. The United States has done relatively little to help counter these realities. Eventually AMISOM will leave. Instability and increased violence will likely follow. In the ensuing vacuum, it is likely that al Shabaab, or a new form of the group, will be waiting to reclaim what it has lost. Taken together, the United States and its allies should remember that the only way to definitively achieve its goals in Somalia is to remove the economic and societal conditions that allow extremism, and groups like al Shabaab, to survive. Godane’s death is significant and it is important to continue to disrupt al Shabaab activities with direct U.S. action. But for lasting solutions, the United States will have to do more than intervene militarily.

This is a guest post by Sarah Madden, volunteer intern for the Council on Foreign Relations, Department of Studies. Sarah is currently a student at Santa Clara University studying business economics and entrepreneurship. Her interests are in Africa, economic development, and emerging markets. In December 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice levied a $1.9 billion fine against HSBC Holdings PLC. The bank’s failure to enforce money laundering controls had allowed illegal organizations to maneuver around U.S. banking laws to launder money for decades. HSBC’s fine and the recent tightening of international finance restrictions have led several financial institutions to reevaluate the security of accounts (many in Latin America and Africa) that do not have the “proper checks in place to spot criminal activity and could therefore unwittingly be facilitating money laundering and terrorist financing,” according to a Barclays’ statement. This development will have a particularly serious impact on Somalia. Money transfer operations (MTOs) and access to accounts held with multinational banks are particularly important in Somalia, where MTOs are used for remittances, the “financial lifeline” for many Somalians. Remittances in Somalia channel almost $2 billion, making up over a third of the counry’s GDP with 80 percent of new business ventures in Somali territories funded or supported by remittances. For a country still struggling to recover from a decades-long civil war, famine, and continuing violence, Somalia lacks any form of banking or institutionalized financial system. In effect, MTOs with accounts through Barclays, Moneygram, and Western Union are the financial system. Following in the footsteps of several large banks, Barclays announced in May 2013 that by July 10, the company would shut down accounts to almost two hundred and fifty MTOs in North and East Africa. Dahabshiil, Barclays’ premier partner in East Africa and largest MTO in the Horn of Africa, brought Barclays to the British High Court to protest the closures that would effect millions of their clients. In April 2014, Dahabshiil won an injunction to delay the account closures until October 2014. Barclays’ precautionary actions to avoid inadvertently channeling money for illegal activity will have devastating effects on Somalia’s already “fragile economic recovery.” The closure of these MTO accounts will destabilize any progress made over the past decade. With the injunction’s expiration date rapidly approaching, and few viable options for Dahabshiil, the money transfer industry might soon be pushed underground, where it will be nearly impossible to monitor or track illegal activity. OxFam International claimed it was “a bleak day for Somalis” when Barclays announced their closures last May. In Somalia, 4.2 million citizens rely on money transfers as a substantial portion of their income for basic needs like food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care. Annually, the amount of transferred remittances from displaced Somalians far exceeds the amount of international aid sent by foreign governments to Somalia. International aid organizations and NGOs rely on MTOs for their finances. If they cannot receive their funds or can only access capital at a higher cost, the need for humanitarian aid will skyrocket. It is likely that nations with high Somalian populations (United States and United Kingdom) will burden taxpayers with the cost of dispensing foreign aid to address education issues, food security, and economic growth. The humanitarian, academic, and political outcry all reiterate—“Somalia is different.” The country cannot afford to lose the Barclays partnership. Barclays, and other enormous institutions are positioned to promote transparency and stability in the Somalian financial system. With the cooperation of many African nations and Western governments, these banks have the opportunity to not only strengthen money transfer channels and bolster the African financial system. Achieving that would ensure the livelihood of an estimated 40 percent of Somalians who rely on MTOs as the country “begins to see the light at the end of the tunnel.”

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, program coordinator, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies program.  Somalia continues to improve after a nearly a quarter century of war, but integrating economics and governance remains difficult. IRIN identifies five core challenges for Somalia’s economic reconstruction. Potentially, the country offers interesting prospects to investors, including vast herds of livestock, bountiful fisheries, oil and gas reserves, and a long coastline with natural deep water ports. However, IRIN highlights such brakes on investment as security uncertainty, inconsistent trade and financial policy, and an unstable currency. These problems are not insurmountable. As the report shows, by formalizing institutions, increasing transparency, and generating cooperation between federal, regional, and tribal administrations, progress can be made. A second report, “Decentralization Options for Somalia,” published by African Arguments, focuses on governance. It lays out various forms of decentralization as options for Somalia. Little enthusiasm exists for a return to a centralized government structure after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and federalism is already endorsed by the Provisional Constitution of Somalia. The report also explains that distrust in and among the political elite, animosity between Mogadishu and the hinterlands, and the desire for widespread political participation have driven Somalia towards decentralization. Diffusing power to the regional states is the most stable way forward, and the most likely one. Separately, these recommendations make sense. However, when considered together, they may prove difficult to integrate into a coherent political system and economic structure. Many of the economic changes required to build an economy, like trade agreements with other countries or oil and gas revenue sharing, require agreement and consolidation on a national level. To achieve a robust federal system, there will need to be strong states that can effectively govern their territory and provide basic services to the population. However, as investment increases, often so does corruption and cronyism, which can have devastating effects on governance and confidence in government. As power diffuses amongst states, so does momentum in national endeavors like infrastructure development, national unity, and defeating al Shabaab. Governance and economics together are essential to the stability and sustainable success of the country. The drivers for decentralization are already in place, and hostility or suspicion of centralized economic policy may be a brake on growth.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Allen is currently an officer in the Army National Guard. His interests are in Africa, conflict, and conflict resolution. In the last week of January news outlets reported that an American drone had conducted an unsuccessful strike against a high level al-Shabaab leader in the Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Later reports stated that the target of the strike was Ahmed Abdi Godane, the presumed current head of al-Shabaab. While the strike failed in its main mission to eliminate Godane, it and other such strikes may represent greater success for American and Somali strategies against the terrorist organization than this single unsuccessful strike. While Godane is still alive, sources have confirmed that he was in close proximity to the attack. The U.S. military was acting on accurate intelligence, and in fact killed one of Godane’s top aides, Ahmed Abdulkadir Abdullahi, in the attack. In an apparent response to this intelligence leak al-Shabaab recently began abducting the residents of villages in the Lower Shabelle. Of even more importance they are abducting people within their own organization. Four al-Shabaab members have reportedly been arrested. This response reflects a deterioration in the stability of al-Shabaab as an organization. The breach in their security has forced al-Shabaab to react. Their reaction has been to attack their own members and base of power, as well as residents of al-Shabaab held territories. This kind of reaction may cause a backlash against al-Shabaab by residents within their sphere of activity, and possibly even their own members. Another successful part of the U.S. mission was just how well the American and Somali governments cooperated. According to Somali officials they were notified of the intelligence and operation prior to its execution. According to Somali government spokesman, Ridwaan Haji Abdiwali, “such operations will help Somalia to be safe from the terrorists hiding in the country.” The cooperation between the Somali government and U.S. forces is key in combating al-Shabaab. While the future of this conflict is uncertain and it is a difficult task to combat any insurgency, it seems that U.S. forces are moving in the right direction. By creating distrust within al-Shabaab and its power base along with building stronger ties with the Somali government, the U.S. forces are conducting successful counter-insurgency operations. It will be interesting to see if the U.S. continues this strategy and if it will be able to assist in dismantling al-Shabaab in Somalia for good.

This is a guest post by Jim Sanders, a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are his personal views and do not reflect those of his former employers. As the Somalia diaspora returns to the country, along with foreign embassies and international organizations, the country’s long slide into darkness appears to be slowing. Despite many obstacles rendering such an idea unrealistic, establishing a national newspaper could contribute to greater unity and stability. Al-Shabaab, the violent extremist group responsible for most of Somalia’s insecurity, has shown itself to be especially sensitive to media outlets. Most recently, it banned internet use nationwide, allowing just fifteen days for providers to comply before facing attacks. Forced out of some areas, the group seems to feel its grip slipping and by targeting internet and electronic media, it reveals its vulnerability to communications. In the current digital age, the idea of establishing a hardcopy newspaper with national reach in such a hostile environment seems counterintuitive. Yet according to a study by Cornell University professor emeritus Benedict Anderson, “the very existence and regularity of newspapers cause[s] readers, and thus citizens-in-the-making, to imagine themselves residing in a common time and place, united by a print language with a league of anonymous equals.” Ordinary Somalis are hungry for news about their country. William Travis, whose book, The Voice of the Turtle recounts his efforts to build turtle canning factories in Somalia, writes that in his travels around the country, Somalis he met usually commenced conversations with the question: “‘What news from the South?’—or wherever you had come from. Sometimes it was just one word ‘news!’” Rajo, the small newspaper created by the United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) during its deployment to Somalia in 1992-93, had a daily run of 15,000-28,000 copies and was distributed to every town and village where UNITAF soldiers were deployed. Many copies were literally read to shreds. Similarly, Riodoce, a small Mexican newspaper covering drug wars, operates in a tough environment, but has succeeded by managing risk—learning “what not to write in order to keep writing.”

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, program coordinator, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies program.  Last month, with little fanfare, the Somali federal government voted to approve the appointment of a new prime minister, Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed, just a little over a year after his predecessor was sworn in. The change came after a constitutional struggle between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and then-prime minister Abdi Farah Shirdon. The president demanded the prime minister resign because of his incompetence as illustrated, in part, by his choice of cabinet ministers. The prime minister refused to go, and the president thereupon promptly organized a vote of no confidence in parliament to force the prime minister out of office. On its face, the change seems to be merely constitutional governance at work. Indeed, it is refreshing to see a change of leadership come from a vote rather than a coup in a country that has been plagued by anarchy for over twenty years. But, the reality is that the president simply removed a political obstacle by evicting the prime minister from office. Now, the question must be whether this new prime minister will be any stronger than his predecessor—or if he too will only have a year or so in office before falling afoul of President Mohamud. Looking at the backgrounds of the former and current prime ministers is not encouraging. Prime Minister Ahmed’s resume is eerily similar to that of Shirdon. Both are technocrats who were schooled abroad and have spent a significant portion of their lives outside Somalia. They both hail from the Marehan clan, a sub-clan of the Darod, which is one of the dominant clans in Somalia. Under a clan-based power-sharing formula, the Somali prime minister usually comes from the Darod clan to balance the Hawiye, the clan of the current president and the dominant clan in the Mogadishu area. But, perhaps the single most important similarity between Ahmed and Shirdon is that they are political newcomers. This point may be critical: without experience in Somali politics, the new prime minister is likely to be just as reliant as his predecessor on the president for political support. Why did the president appoint another expatriate technocrat seemingly destined to repeat the same mistakes of his predecessor? Perhaps by this appointment the president is trying to consolidate his power in the parliament, honor his clan commitments, appease international spectators, and maintain Hawiye clan dominance in government. Such an agenda would be credible for a president with little control over his country’s territory and with little ability to control political and clan bickering.

The former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Herman J. (Hank) Cohen wrote an important article in African Arguments entitled “Time to Bring Eritrea in From the Cold.” For those involved in policy formulation and implementation in the Horn of Africa it is a “must read.” In a few short and lucid paragraphs Ambassador Cohen reviews the sorry history since 1997 of the tangled relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with the complications posed by Somalia and al-Shabaab, the jihadist organization with ties to al-Qaeda, and the U.S. response. By 2008, the administration of President George W. Bush determined that Eritrea was a “state sponsor of terrorism” and imposed sanctions. Subsequently, President Barack Obama’s administration said that Eritrea allowed arms shipments to be delivered to al-Shabaab. In 2009, the administration sponsored a UN Security Council resolution (UNSC 1907) that in effect made Eritrea the international pariah it is today. But, times change. Cohen recalls that “all available intelligence” indicates no Eritrean contact with al-Shabaab since 2009. Further, as Cohen points out, Eritrea is fearful of Islamic radicalism. There are signs of a warming in the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This confluence provides a special opportunity for a new approach to Eritrea with positive implications for the Horn of Africa. Normal relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea would be a win-win not only for both countries economically as well as politically, but also for the Horn of Africa region. How to move forward? Specifically, Cohen suggests that a European member of the Security Council should propose the repeal of UNSC 1907, and the United States should agree to abstain. He also proposes a face-saving solution to the long standing border issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea, to be mediated by a neutral European nation. Cohen shows that the benefits for U.S. policy would be significant. Normalization of Ethiopian/Eritrean relations would open the space for the United States and others to encourage better governance in both countries, and military cooperation between the United States and Eritrea could materially assist in the struggle against jihadi terrorism in the region. Ambassador Cohen makes a compelling case for a rethink of U.S. policy in the Horn and he proposes a practical strategy for moving forward.