Mali

Sub-Saharan Africa is urbanizing at the fastest rate in the world. Western commentators, notably McKinsey in its 2016 report “Lions on the Move II,” see rapid urbanization as increasing the continent’s p roductivity. McKinsey states, “urbanization has a strong correlation with the rate of real GDP growth,” and that “productivity in cities is more than double that in the countryside.” Other observers, however, question whether urban infrastructure—especially water and education—can meet the needs of an exploding population. The Financial Times recently published a balanced report on the pros and cons of rapid African urbanization. It focuses on Bamako, Mali, as an example of the continent-wide phenomenon. It cites a World Bank estimate that Bamako’s population today, at 3.5 million, is 10 times larger than it was at independence in 1960. A professor at the University of Bamako comments that that the city’s growth is a “catastrophe foretold,” that “Bamako is a time-bomb.” Among other shortcomings, the professor notes that the city lacks a land registry even as real estate booms. The exploding population growth translates into high land prices that encourage corruption. Peppered through the Financial Times piece are arresting statistical notes. For example, a World Bank economist observes that Africa is now 40 percent urban with a per capita GDP of $1,100. By the time Asia reached that level of urbanization, its per capita GDP was $3,500. Statistics about Africa are generally weak, but for frequent travelers to Africa, the explosion of the urban population is obvious. So, too, are the slums, the lack of schools, water shortages, and unpaved roads. Unemployed male youth are ubiquitous and do, indeed, constitute a potential time bomb with respect to political instability. Experience shows that urbanization cannot be reversed, as few residents are willing to return to the countryside unless compelled to do so, as occurred in Chairman Mao’s China or Pol Pot’s Cambodia. But no African state has comparable means of repression should it wish to reduce its urban population. African urbanization will continue and public authorities having few tools with which to manage it.   

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

Last week, French soldiers deployed to Mali killed twenty jihadis near the border with Burkina Faso. According to the media, there are about 1,600 French soldiers deployed in Mali. They are part of the larger Operation Barkhane, which is a joint operation between France and the G5 countries—Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Mauritania—against Islamist extremists in the Sahel. On June 3, the military chiefs of the G5 countries met in Mali’s capital Bamako with European Union (EU) diplomats and French military officers, with their respective foreign ministers scheduled to meet the next day. According to a Malian general, the ministers will ask the EU for 50 million euros (about $56 million) to establish a multinational force to counter radical groups. The multinational force would supplement regular armed forces, Operation Barkhane, and United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. While the United States has a military training operation for the Malian military and provides some funding and personnel support for the UN peacekeepers that assistance is relatively minor. Members of the G5 are all francophone with a history of close ties to France. Most notably, France intervened in Mali at the request of the Malian government in 2012 to drive back a consortium of radical groups that had threatened to overthrow the government there. Though French intervention was successful in preventing such an outcome, they did not succeed in destroying the jihadist groups threatening Mali. These groups have reasserted themselves in the vast, largely empty territory north of the Niger River. The Malian government has managed to retain control of cities along the river and territory to the south, but these groups still remain a potent threat. In November 2015, Islamist militants killed more than twenty people at the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako. The episode received widespread media attention in the United States—the hotel hosted many foreign diplomats and businesspeople—but coverage of the security situation in the country has since fallen off, despite continued deterioration. For France, the Sahel and the G5 countries are in its own backyard. Paris has long been concerned that the region could be a staging and training area for radical attacks on European targets. It should be anticipated that France will be a strong advocate in the EU for the financial assistance requested by its G5 partners.

Once the most effective military force in West Africa, the Nigerian military played a highly positive role in peacekeeping missions. However, Nigeria was unable to subdue the Niger delta insurgency; in 2012, it could not deploy for front line operations in Mali; and, it suffered a series of reverses in the fight against Boko Haram until it was stiffened by troops from its neighbors and South African-led mercenaries in 2015. What happened? A June 8, 2016 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) provides some answers. Titled “Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform,” the report analyzes the malfunctions and challenges of Nigeria’s defense management. The survey is comprehensive and written in a style that makes it accessible to policy makers. Especially strong is the discussion of the legacy of military rule. There is the reminder that between 1966 and 1999 there were six successful coups, two failed coups, and three additional alleged coup plots. These were all followed by military trials and executions. In the new era of democratic rule, diminishing the military became a part of a strategy to inoculate the country against coups no matter who was president. The ICG provides specific recommendations for the involvement of all aspects of the government, including the National Assembly, as well as civil society in the whole-sale reform of the military. The report is a must-read for those concerned with security issues in West Africa.

In 2012 radical, jihadist Islamist groups overran northern Mali with Taureg allies. Before they were defeated by French and Malian troops in 2013, the al-Qaeda linked rebels governed the territories they controlled according to what they represented as the principles of Salafist Islam. One prominent group was Ansar Dine, which continues to be active in northern Mali. While the group occupied Timbuktu its governance resembled that of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. One of the similarities was the destruction of ancient monuments associated with other religions or varieties of Islam. The Islamic State’s destruction of ancient monuments in Palmyra, Syria, and Mosul, Iraq, are notorious. So, too, has been Islamic State looting and selling of ancient artifacts. Similarly, Ansar Dine radicals destroyed ancient tombs of local Muslim saints and a number of mosques in Mali. They also destroyed (or sold) ancient manuscripts. Individuals involved in such looting and destruction may be held personally accountable. The International Criminal court (ICC) has determined that the destruction of cultural heritage is a war crime. On September 18, 2015 the ICC issued a warrant for the arrest of Ahmad al-Mahdi al-Faqi, charging him with ordering the destruction of ten buildings of cultural, historical, and religious importance in Timbuktu between June 30, 2012 and July 10, 2012. The Niger authorities arrested al-Faqi and delivered him to the custody of the ICC on September 26. His first hearing was today. ICC prosecutors say that as a member of the radical group Ansar Dine, he played an active role when it occupied Timbuktu. Al-Faqi, a Malian, fled to Niger when the French and Malians drove Ansar Dine out of Timbuktu. The ICC’s chief prosecutor is Fatou Bensouda, herself an African. A citizen of The Gambia, she received her legal training in Nigeria. In a September 28 statement from the ICC, Bensouda said, “intentional attacks against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion are grave crimes.” She is quoted by the Financial Times as saying that the destruction was “a callous assault on the dignity and identity of entire populations, and their religious and historical roots.” Mali and Niger are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. In 2013, Mali asked the court to investigate possible war crimes associated with the radical occupation of the north. That investigation resulted in the indictment of al-Faqi. Niger as a signatory of the Rome Statute was legally obligated to apprehend al-Faqi if it could and hand him over to the custody of the ICC. It did so. Al-Faqi’s arrest and trial is a welcome step forward to holding accountable those who destroy cultural heritage. However, with respect to the Islamic State, neither Syria nor Iraq is a party to the Rome Statute, which limits any ICC role if and when the Islamic State is destroyed.

Mali has been relatively quiet over the past few months, with a UN and Algerian-brokered peace process underway to address decades of ongoing conflicts between the Bamako government and Tuaregs in the north. However, on April 27, pro-government forces seized the town of Menaka from Tuareg separatists following heavy fighting. Details are scarce. The following day Tuaregs fired on UN peacekeepers near Timbuktu, apparently thinking they were Malian soldiers. The Tuaregs apologized, according to the UN mission spokesman. But, there are also sketchy reports of Tuareg attacks on government troops in the same area at about the same time. The main Tuareg separatist group is the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). “Azawad” is the name the separatists apply to northern Mali. The MNLA had occupied Menaka in eastern Mali. In 2012, Tuaregs had separated themselves from Bamako and taken over some two-thirds of the country. Shortly thereafter, al-Qaeda militants took over land occupied by MNLA, ultimately triggering foreign interventions. A multinational, African force, largely directed and coordinated by the French, forced the jihadists out of the cities and towns that they had occupied. However, MNLA continues today as a political movement with the goal of autonomy from Bamako. The UN and Algerian peace process is seeking a solution. Leading up to the peace accord, MNLA has complained that their essential demands are not part of the deal. The concern must be that an upsurge of violence will set the peace process back further. Whether the peace process can broker a deal between Bamako and the MNLA remains to be seen. A breakdown in the peace process may lead to increased violence.

Jacob Zenn has published an important article that analyzes the various factions that comprise “Boko Haram,” their leadership and rivalries, and their links with other radical Islamist groups outside Nigeria. The article is dense and exhaustively documented. Here, I highlight certain of his points that I found especially relevant, given that the kidnapped Chibok school girls remain in captivity and a focus of intense domestic and international concern. Zenn’s reminder is salutary that the French intervention in Mali likely had a perverse consequence of revivifying Boko Haram and strengthening its ties with other radical Islamist groups. There is a lesson here as western governments consider what they can do to free the Chibok school girls. Further, given the preoccupation with freeing the girls, his discussion of the role of Boko Haram’s use of kidnapping is of particular use. He shows that the financial profits from kidnapping are very high, especially in a part of the world where the costs of conducting terrorism are low. For those who follow Boko Haram closely, his suggestion that the name “Abubakar Shekau” may have become a nom de guerre for Boko Haram’s collective leadership is useful. The nom de guerre is still of course used by Shekau himself. I find the suggestion credible and could account for why “Abubakar Shekau” appears somewhat different in appearance and mannerisms in some of the videos Boko Haram has released. If Zenn is correct, it also means that negotiating the release of the girls is likely to be more complicated than it would be if there was a single leader to negotiate with. Zenn highlights that Boko Haram statements indicate their view that northeastern Nigeria, parts of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger was a single cultural unity rent asunder by the colonial powers. These “colonial” boundaries therefore have no legitimacy. So, colonial boundaries—and the secular states they deliminate—may be like western education: haram. Finally, Zenn sketches scenarios for the future directions that Boko Haram might take. But, even his most optimistic scenario implies that Boko Haram will have the ability to de-stabilize Nigeria for a long time to come. Jacob Zenn has given us much to think about.

Two French journalists working for Radio France Internationale, Ghislaine Dupont and Claude Verlon, were kidnapped in Kidal in northern Mali on November 3. Shortly thereafter, and only seven miles from where they were abducted, they were murdered. In a blog I posted on November 4, I expressed surprise that the two were not held for ransom. Ransom is an important income stream for jihadist groups operating in the Sahel. According to the French media, the four French hostages held for three years in Niger were released in October upon the payment of U.S.$27 million, though the French government says that it did not pay a ransom. On November 6, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) issued a statement claiming responsibility for the murder of the journalists. It was published by a Mauritanian news agency and picked up by Deutsche Welle. In it, AQIM claims that the murders were retaliation for a French “new crusade” in Mali. I would have thought that kidnapping for ransom would be a more profitable form of “retaliation” than murder. Associated Press, however, reports a plausible explanation. It quotes an unnamed Mali intelligence officer as saying that the kidnapping was done by low-level jihadists attempting to “please al-Qaeda operatives in the Islamic Maghreb after being accused of stealing money.” The French government says it is sticking to its timetable for withdrawing its troops from Mali despite the upsurge in violence in the north. The episode would appear to be an example of the intersection of the criminal and the political that persists in northern Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel region.

It is not so surprising that Radio France Internationale journalist and sound engineer Claude Verion and colleague Ghislaine Dupont were kidnapped on November 2 in the northern Mali town of Kidal. The kidnapping of foreigners in the Sahel is, if not frequent, then also not uncommon. The question is, however, why were they murdered and not held for ransom? According to Radio France Internationale (RFI), Deutsche Welle (DW), and the Voice of America (VOA), the two journalists were kidnapped shortly after they concluded an interview with a leader of the MNLA, a Tuareg separatist group. Quoting the French foreign ministry, RFI reports the two were taken by a group of armed men. An MNLA spokesman is quoted by VOA as saying the captors killed the journalists and French troops found their bodies a short distance from Kidal. Apparently, they were murdered shortly after they were seized. No group or organization has claimed responsibility. Criminal groups and jihadists operating in the Sahel (including northern Mali) have grown fat from the ransoms paid for the release of European kidnap victims. Hence the kidnapping of the two French journalists fits a pattern. What does not fit is their murder. Kidnap victims are sometimes held for a long time. Last week, four French men were released in Niger after having been held for more than three years. While never openly reported, the common supposition is that most kidnap victims are released upon the payment of ransom. Ransoms constitute an important revenue stream for jihadists in the Sahel as well as a variety of smuggling and other criminal syndicates active in the region. Official American and British government policy is to never pay ransom. Not so among some European states, and private corporations have long been suspected of paying ransom for their captive citizens and/or employees. American and British policy and practice may reduce the attractiveness of their citizens to kidnappers. On the other hand, kidnappers will kill their victims when it is clear that no ransom is forthcoming. That can constitute formidable pressure on governments to pay. So, if ransom was not the motive, why were Verion and Dupont killed? The French and Malian governments have launched an inquiry and a search for the perpetrators. The UN Security Council has called on Mali to “swiftly investigate the case” and to hold the perpetrators to account. But, in northern Mali where jihadist and other violence continues, infrastructure is poor, and the government weak or non-existent. The likelihood of learning the truth behind this tragic episode is remote.

On September 30, I posted “Mali and Tuaregs: Deja Vu All over Again?” The focus was on the breakdown of a peace process between the Malian government and three separatist Tuareg groups. Since then, violence is back in the north. There was a suicide attack in Timbuktu that resulted in the death and injuries of several civilians and soldiers. Media reports are as yet unclear on the exact number of victims. The following day rebels exchanged heavy gunfire with Malian soldiers at Kidal, formerly a separatist stronghold. And on October 7, Deutsche Welle reported that Islamic militants shelled Gao, the largest town in northern Mali. There is also a resurgence of discontent among some of the Malian forces. A group of soldiers fired shots at the Kati Military Base near Mali’s capital of Bamako, discontented over their lack of promotion. They had participated in the 2012 military coup that initiated the 2012-2013 crisis. The Defense Minister subsequently met with the soldiers, according to French media. I have seen no open-source reports as to the outcome. Mali’s new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, cut short a visit to Paris and returned home immediately following a meeting with French president François Hollande. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for the Timbuktu suicide bombs. Thus far, no group has claimed responsibility for the other incidents. The jihadist movements that took over northern Mali in 2012 and threatened Bamako were driven out of the cities by the French, Malian, and other troops in 2013. When they controlled the north, the jihadists appear to have been disunited, with the radicals coming to displace the moderates. That disunity appears to persist now that they have gone underground. Following the Timbuktu suicide bombing, the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) repudiated the attack and appeared to blame it on its former partners, AQIM and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). It appears that the principle elements of the previous crisis are back. But, violence, while also back, appears to be at a low level. And discontent within the Mali military does not appear widespread. But, President Keita needs to move quickly to address northern discontents. He was right to cut short his Paris visit.

This is a guest post by Jacob Zenn, an analyst of African Affairs for the Washington D.C.-based think tank, The Jamestown Foundation, and a contributor to the West Point CTC Sentinel. On August 1, Nigerian media reported that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was either shot by the Nigerian security forces or deposed by his own men in a mutiny. Shekau has been the sole face and voice of Boko Haram’s most violent faction since its first attack on a prison in Bauchi in September 2010. The reports about Shekau are still unconfirmed—and even denied by the Joint Task Force and a rival factional leader of Shekau’s—but, if the reports are true, it would be the fourth time Shekau was wounded or almost killed. In July 2009, Shekau was the deputy of Boko Haram founder, Muhammad Yusuf, who was one of the thousand Boko Haram members killed in clashes with the Nigerian security forces that month. Shekau claimed to have been shot by the security forces during the clashes, but was released by the police after they failed to identify him as a top-level Boko Haram figure (presumably, he would have been killed if identified correctly). When Shekau reemerged in a video interview in July 2010, with a journalist who was taken to Shekau’s hideout in Maiduguri, the police said that the images were “digitally manipulated” since they had assumed Shekau was dead. On March 30, 2011, Nigerian security forces raided a home in Damaturu, Yobe suspected of hiding Boko Haram members. When they approached the house three of the suspects, including one believed to have been Shekau, detonated explosives and escaped. Two wives of Shekau’s lieutenant, one of whom was Yusuf’s younger sister, and three children were left behind, however. On January 20, 2012, an attack in Kano that killed more than 185 people (mostly Muslim civilians) may have led breakaway factions to inform on Shekau to the security forces. It was after that attack in Kano that Shekau’s rivals in Ansaru formally split from Boko Haram, dropping leaflets in Kano denouncing Boko Haram as “inhuman” to the Muslim community. Not long after the attack, in April 2012, Nigerian security forces surrounded Shekau’s hideout in Kano, arrested his wife and children, and reportedly shot Shekau before he escaped from the house. Shekau left Kano and allegedly traveled to Mali disguised as a Fulani herdsman. This may be why in April 2012, dozens of Boko Haram members were reported in Gao, Mali carrying out attacks with AQIM and MUJAO, and why Shekau started speaking mainly in Arabic in his video messages after April 2012. The recent news of Shekau’s demise does not come completely out of the blue. In late July, the security forces reportedly arrested Shekau’s in-laws and “cornered” Shekau in Gwoza in the hills of Borno State—an area that Boko Haram controlled until the security forces launched an all-out offensive in May. The US $7 million reward for Shekau’s capture may also be enticing some of Shekau’s inner circle—frustrated by setbacks and Shekau’s harsh leadership style—to abandon him. Two of Shekau’s former spokesmen were among those who betrayed Shekau in 2012 because of his ruthlessness. After one spoke to the police about Shekau’s brutality (which was leaked to the media), Shekau retaliated by killing the spokesman’s father. They killed the other spokesman when he tried to defect from Boko Haram in Kaduna. A video clip recovered from a Boko Haram camp in the Sambisa Forest Reserve in Borno, which was raided by the military on May 16, also reportedly shows Shekau limping, providing evidence that he may have been shot. Since President Jonathan announced the state of emergency in May, Shekau has only appeared publicly in one video, in which he ruled out any possibility of negotiations with the government (at a time when other factions seem interested in talking). He also recently announced that the only spokesman authorized to speak on Boko Haram’s behalf was Abu Zinnira. Shekau’s elimination would mean the end of the era. He is the Boko Haram leader most closely connected to founder Muhammad Yusuf. Without Shekau, and with a weakened link to Yusuf, Boko Haram may face a legitimacy struggle. Factions of Boko Haram willing to negotiate with the government may also step into the power vacuum. However, if Shekau does survive, and reassert his leadership, it could add to the mystique of invincibility he has built since his first reported death in 2009.

A story in the June 21 New York Times, “Military Says Law Barring U.S. Aid to Right Violators Hurts Training Mission,” calls attention to a U.S. legal provision that prohibits U.S. training of foreign security forces that violate human rights. The Times reports that U.S. military leaders are complaining that the Leahy Amendment is restricting their ability to train foreign troops “to fight militants and drug traffickers.” The United Nations and other regional organizations are increasingly dependent on African peacekeepers, especially with respect to African conflicts, as the ongoing crisis in Mali demonstrates. What is the Leahy Amendment and how does it work? The Leahy Amendment is a 1997 attachment to a foreign aid bill. It was sponsored by Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont. It prohibits the training or equipping of foreign units that commit “gross human rights violations.” The amendment was revised two years ago to require the suspension of aid to an entire unit even if only a few of its members were implicated in human rights violations. The vetting of units is the responsibility of the Department of State. Under most circumstances, the initial investigations are conducted by the U.S. embassy in the relevant country. The process can take months, not least because of a shortage of embassy and State Department resources, itself the result of chronic under-funding of the diplomatic function for at least a generation. As the Times points out, how a stigmatized unit rehabilitates itself according to the amendment’s terms is unclear. Senator Leahy is quoted in the Times as saying, “this is a law that works, if it is enforced. We can help reform foreign security forces, but they need to show they are serious about accountability. If not, we are wasting American taxpayers’ money and risk prolonging the abusive conduct that we seek to prevent.” So, there is a conundrum: the Leahy Amendment precludes U.S. training, which usually has a significant human rights component and an emphasis on military subordination to civilian authority, for those units that presumably have the greatest need of it. On the other hand, it is an open question whether U.S. training can have a transformative effect on foreign militaries, especially as it too is under-resourced, given its goals. After all, Captain Amadou Sanogo, the leader of the 2012 coup that overthrew the ostensibly democratic government in Mali, had three rounds of U.S. military training in the United States.

This is a guest post by Jim Sanders, a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are his personal views and do not reflect those of his former employers. Occasionally, the financial press experiences a twinge of conscience, or so it seems. News of Africa’s economic progress, in particular the growth of its middle classes, thrums almost daily though a range of papers. But this spring the Financial Times’ Simon Kuper slammed on the brakes. “Poor people’s analyses rarely fit neatly into the formats through which the ruling class interprets the world,” he wrote. Such people are “rarely interviewed,” he added, concluding that “we’re exactly the media that an unequal world requires.” A couple months later, Fortune Magazine reported on the publication of Cotton Tenants: Three Families, a manuscript drafted by James Agee, based on his 1936 investigation of Alabama tenant farmers for Fortune, his employer at the time. The magazine never used Agee’s report and it has only now been published. Agee’s work focuses on the American south, but it illuminates capitalism’s dark underbelly everywhere, the poverty it breeds, the mindsets it fosters, and those that sustain it. His subjects don’t think of life as “in the least controllable.” They “welter on their living as on water, from one hour to the next…” They feel that “structures of government are irrelevant if not indeed inimical to them.” And, “the infiltration of all that has to do with the outside world is slow, verbal, and distorted in transit.” Despite substantial economic progress, many in Africa, like the cotton farmers about whom Agee wrote, remain imprisoned by circumstances. “My boyfriend bought me this,” a young Malian sex worker said of her counterfeit smartphone. “We sleep together and he gives me money to buy food and other things I need. Because he is a soldier he is at least paid, even if it is not enough.” Another said of her work, "I don’t want to do this, but I have no choice. It is really bad but this is the only way for me to get money at the moment." In his introduction to Cotton Tenants, Adam Haslett notes that “close and thorough description of people’s actual circumstances in the manner of Agee’s long-form report from Alabama,” helps defog reality. We need more of this type of genre to put Africa’s economic growth into perspective.

This is a guest post by Jacob Zenn, an analyst of African Affairs for the Washington D.C.-based think tank, The Jamestown Foundation, and a contributor for the West Point CTC Sentinel. Boko Haram has carried out hundreds of attacks since September 2010. But the attacks have been restricted almost exclusively to domestic targets. Therefore, when a breakaway faction, Ansaru, carried out a series of kidnappings against a British and an Italian engineer in Kebbi in May 2011; a German engineer in Kano in March 2012, (which was claimed by AQIM); a French engineer in Katsina in December 2012; seven foreign engineers in Bauchi in February 2013; and killed two Mali-bound Nigerian troops in Kogi, the insurgency took on a new dimension. Ansaru’s internationalist tendency is likely the result of an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) strategy to “shift” southwards by training new pan-West African groups like Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Ansaru, which I discussed in a recent article. More recently, I analyzed symbolism in Ansaru’s messaging, focusing on Ansaru’s logo, which features a rising sun over the Quran. This analysis further supports the notion that AQIM influenced Ansaru ideologically and operationally. Ansaru’s logo and the logo of AQIM’s predecessor, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), both have a rising sun over the Quran. Looking further, the 1976 national emblem of Algeria, the country where AQIM and the GSPC originate, also has a rising sun over the Quran. This sun represented the “new era” or “new dawn” for Algeria. Algeria held a referendum to revise its Constitution in 1976. Why would Ansaru copy the logo of the GSPC–and not AQIM? One reason could be that Ansaru’s leader, Khalid al-Barnawi, fought with Mokhtar Belmokhtar in Algeria and Mauritania as early as 2005, before the GSPC became AQIM. Notably, Boko Haram member Kabiru Sokoto, who is on trial for masterminding the Christmas Day, 2011, church bombings near Abuja, said that Boko Haram received funding from an Algerian group called “the group from the sunset” and that disputes over this funding contributed to Ansaru’s split from Boko Haram. This has been corroborated by Nigerian intelligence reports. In Ansaru’s Arabic-language Charter [English], the group says that the guns surrounding the Quran in the logo mean “the implementation of religion by the Holy Book and Iron (weapons),” which comes from Surat al-Hadid (see footnote forty-six). Ansaru interprets Hadid, or “iron,” to represent the “weapons” with which jihad is waged. Others, however, commonly interpret “iron” to mean the power of “human development and progress” or “political power” to allow Muslims to lead the world. Ansaru, like Boko Haram, adopts the jihad interpretation of the Quran. Boko Haram also surrounds the Quran with guns in its logo (see 7:15). There may be a few takeaways from this analysis of Ansaru’s logo. First, militant groups are often deliberate about their external image and strategies, as Usama bin Laden’s and AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel’s confidential documents reveal. Second, a group’s messaging can offer insights about its connections with other militant groups when viewed in context. Third, given Ansaru’s relation to AQIM, how will AQIM’s retreat from northern Mali, which is less than three hundred miles from Nigeria, affect Ansaru’s operations in Nigeria; and if Ansaru is a transnational group, is West African regional cooperation sufficient support for Nigeria to counter Ansaru and other transnational threats? This inquiry about Ansaru could take on additional importance if, as I suspect, the dozens of kidnappings in Borno since the Mali intervention in February 2013, are a sign that Boko Haram’s “special kidnapping squad” is comprised of reintegrated Ansaru members. This may explain why when Boko Haram kidnapped a French family in Cameroon in January 2013, an Arabic-speaking militant said the operation was in response to “France’s War in Mali”—a distinctly Ansaru theme.