Sub-Saharan Africa

Kenya

  • Kenya
    Election Monitoring: Power, Limits, and Risks
    In this Markets and Democracy Brief, Judith Kelley examines the achievements, shortcomings, and drawbacks of international election monitoring, arguing that it merits both enthusiasm and healthy skepticism.
    Expert Brief by Judith Kelley March 29, 2012 Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Guest Post: IPaidABribe in India and Kenya
    This is a guest post by Asch Harwood, the Council on Foreign Relations Africa program research associate. Follow him on Twitter at @aschlfod. My attention was recently called to a neat online anti-corruption tool—Ipaidabribe.com (h/t Debbie McCoy). As the name implies, the original founders set up a crowdsourcing website to report and track corruption in India. It is probably too soon to judge whether the site has had an impact on corruption (an oft cited success is an invitation to the founders from the Indian transport commissioner to brief her staff on corruption in the transportation department). However, despite the difficulties of actually measuring corruption due to its illicit nature, Ipaidabride has successfully gathered a wealth of data, including fairly concrete numbers of how much money is going towards bribes. Most striking is that the police demand bribes almost three to one over other public agencies. What does this have to do with Africa? A group in Kenya has also set up an Ipaidabride.or.ke website. It has received far fewer reports than its Indian predecessor, although it was only established just over a year ago. Nevertheless, of the 252 reports of paid bribes, 56 percent went to the police. This figure corroborates a Transparency International study from 2009 that asserts that the Kenyan police is not only the most corrupt agency in Kenya, but also in East Africa. I really hope this catches on, in Kenya as well as other parts of continent. The challenge will not only be getting the word out that this resource exists but showing people that reporting their experiences is worth the time. This means addressing a culture of impunity by holding perpetrators accountable. Without it, people likely will become more apathetic, akin to recent findings that knowledge of a politician’s corruption leads voters to withdraw from participating. Or even worse, they will lash out, as has been the case in Nigeria. That the police, supposedly there to “protect and serve,” are so deeply involved, in both India and Kenya (not to mention Nigeria), highlights the challenges of overcoming such impunity.
    Blog Post by John Campbell March 8, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Guest Post: New Figures on Facebook and Twitter in Africa
    This is a guest post by Asch Harwood and Melissa Bukuru. Asch is the CFR Africa program research associate. Follow him on Twitter at @aschlfod. Melissa is the CFR Africa program intern. Like mobile statistics (which Asch wrote about yesterday), information on social media use can also be thin. A communications firm, Portland, has set out to address this deficit and measure just how prevalent Twitter and how it is being used across Africa. They analyzed about 11.5 million geolocated tweets across the continent (including North Africa). Unsurprisingly, South Africa dominated the African Twitter landscape with over five million geo-located tweets (not users) in a three month period. Nigeria came in third, with just over 1.6 million tweets in the same period, putting it behind South Africa and Kenya. While the 140-character missives have been lauded for their role in building social movements, in Kenya, tweets are being used for a smaller but also important impact. Francis Kariuki (@chiefkariuki), the administrative chief of a Western village in Kenya uses the medium to warn the area’s residents about crime and other happenings in the area. The Los Angeles Times reported yesterday that the tech-savvy chief once tweeted about a robbery in progress at 4am, and "within minutes residents in this village of stone houses gathered outside the home, and the thugs fled." Chief Kariuki also uses Twitter for more optimistic purposes by tweeting the residents inspirational quotes ("We’ve been destined to live in victory, destined to overcome, destined to leave a mark on this generation") or encouragement to get involved in government proceedings ("Our MP is coming today at 2:00pm to issue cheques to some CDF projecst [sic] at DO office Gathioro. U R WELCOMED [sic]"). So, not really the stuff of revolutions, but still, Erik Hersman, founder of the popular Ushahidi, a non-profit software company based in Kenya (which our own Nigeria Security Tracker uses) concluded from Kariuki’s tweeting that "if a chief in upcountry Kenya is able to use and have an impact with his constituents by using tools like Twitter, it’s not too long before we see a massive movement in the country with these types of social media." That said, lacking from Portland’s analysis is the number of twitter accounts on the continent—a number that we were unable to find as Twitter is famously private about its user data. (If anyone has any good estimates, please send them our way.) We do know that many users surveyed in the study said that at least half of the accounts they follow are based in Africa. This might plant the grains for what Hersman is alluding to. Facebook statistics, on the other hand, are more abundant. The continent boasts over 38 million users, but North Africa accounts for more than fifty percent of those users. And Egypt is by far the dominant user with almost ten million users. Add Nigeria’s four million users and South Africa’s five million users with North Africa’s usership, and you can account for 80 percent of all Facebook accounts on the Africa continent. (North Africa plus Nigeria and South Africa account for about 37 percent of the continent’s billion plus population.) If we look at per capita, Tunisia tops the entire continent with 30 percent, followed by Egypt with about 12.5 percent, and South Africa at about 10 percent. While Nigerians compromise the greatest absolute number of Facebook users in sub-Saharan Africa, its gigantic population means that only about 2.5 percent of Nigerians are using it. Nevertheless, as these tools become more entrenched, as access to mobile phones and internet improves, and Africans become more aware of their potential, we think we will continue to see continued rapid adoption across the continent.
    Blog Post by John Campbell February 16, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    U.S. Energy Trade Mission to Africa
    U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson is leading an eleven day trade mission to Mozambique, Tanzania, Nigeria and Ghana, with a brief stop in Kenya, starting on February 6. The focus of the mission is to look for opportunities for U.S. companies to invest in power generation. The mission is co-sponsored by the Corporate Council for Africa, a private organization that brings together potential business partners as well as seeking to raise Africa’s profile among American investors. According to a State Department announcement, participating U.S. companies are Anadarko Petroleum, Caterpillar, Chevron, Energy International, General Electric, Pike Enterprises, Strategic Urban Development Alliance LLC, and the Symbion and Zanbato Group. In addition to the assistant secretary, the delegation will include a vice chair of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, representatives from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency and from the State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources. Companies cover the cost of their participation, not the U.S. government. This is a high profile delegation and reflects U.S. eagerness for power generation investment opportunities in Africa coupled with the African view that increased power generation is essential for economic development. International development agencies regularly cite Mozambique, Tanzania and, especially, Ghana as African governance and development success stories. In Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan has made increased electric power generation one of his most important political priorities. Though the trade delegation’s focus is on investment opportunities for U.S. companies, it also will be warmly welcomed by the host states as a visible expression of U.S. support for their governments and confidence in their economic potential. As such, this trade mission has an important political dimension.
    Blog Post by John Campbell February 3, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    South Sudan-Kenya Oil Pipeline in the Works
    An unresolved issue between Juba and Khartoum has been how to divide the revenue from oil that is essential to the finance of both South Sudan and Khartoum. According to the press, South Sudan is now producing 470,000 barrels of oil per day. But the infrastructure and principal port for its export is in Sudan. The two governments have not been able to reach agreement on fees, tolls and other payments that Juba would make. The South Sudan government alleges that Khartoum has seized up to $815 million worth of oil.  This week Juba announced that it will stop exporting oil stop exporting oil through Sudan, even as talks continue. South Sudan president Kiir and Sudan president al-Bashir are supposed to meet today. Given these hang-ups, many in South Sudan have sought an alternative export route for their oil. And maybe they have found one. On January 25 South Sudan and Kenya announced an agreement whereby Juba would construct an oil pipeline and a fiber optics cable from its oil fields to the Kenyan port of Lamu. While the pipeline would be owned by Juba, it would pay fees to the Nairobi government. For Kenya, the pipeline would be part of an elaborate infrastructure development program that would include railways, super highways, airports, and tourist resorts as well as new port facilities at Lamu. Some may see the agreement as part of Juba’s effort to pressure Khartoum. But, given the host of unresolved issues between Sudan and South Sudan, including border disputes that are resulting in low-level warfare, the political arguments for Juba to acquire a new outlet to the sea appear to be strong. It remains to be seen how the pipeline will be financed or how long it will take to build it. But, even in the unlikely event that Juba and Khartoum reach an oil agreement today or tomorrow, the construction of the pipeline will probably proceed.
    Blog Post by John Campbell January 27, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    ICC Delivers Decision on Kenya’s "Ocampo Six"
    This is a guest post by Asch Harwood, Africa program research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. Judges at the International Criminal Court delivered their long awaited decision to move forward with charges of crimes against humanity against four of the six accused Kenyan political figures implicated in the 2007/2008 post election violence. Charges will be against former minister of education William Ruto, radio host Joshua Sang, head of civil service Francis Muthaura, and deputy prime minister Uhuru Kenyatta. Read the decision here. As Human Rights Watch notes, the verdict represents a step forward in addressing Kenya’s culture of political and criminal impunity. But, it also presents a number of challenges for the Kenyan judiciary as well as the peace and reconciliation process in the run up to presidential elections, to be held in March 2013 (unless the ruling coalition collapses before). In an insightful piece on African Arguments, Ken Opalo notes the first challenge will be whether Muthaura and Kenyatta, who are both still active in public office, should resign. Of course, the ICC judges have emphasized that both are innocent until proven guilty. Nevertheless, this issue will be put to the Kenyan judiciary. Can Ruto and Kenyatta still run for president, given the ICC charges? As Opalo argues, the ICC decision poses enormous challenges for Kenya’s ethnically charged politics, particularly because no one has yet been brought to justice for the violence that left more than one thousand people dead and six hundred thousand displaced in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. Read Opalo’s piece here.
    Blog Post by John Campbell January 24, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Improving the ICC’s Image in Africa
    This is a guest post by Asch Harwood, Africa program research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. The International Criminal Court is expected to announce its decision (possibly next week) about whether to proceed with its charges against the “Ocampo 6,” the Kenyans accused of involvement in provoking violence following that country’s 2007 elections. In anticipation, the International Crisis Group has issued a brief emphasizing the potential impact of these proceedings on Kenya’s upcoming elections. Specifically, the report acknowledges the importance of the ICC to send a signal that “entrenched impunity for wealthy and powerful politicians will not be permitted to endure.” However, given the possible consequences on ethnic tensions, “if the ICC process is to contribute to the deterrence of future political violence in Kenya, the court and its friends must explain its work and limitations better to the public.” The ICC regularly is accused of having a bias against Africa. (Currently, all its cases are in Africa.) As the Economist notes, “these days the ICC’s biggest opponents are in Africa,” and the African Union has spoken out against its proceedings. The ICG’s recommendations are worth noting, particularly as the ICC’s new chief prosecutor and former Gambian justice minister Fatou Bensouda will replace Luis Moreno-Ocampo in June, giving the court a new opportunity to position itself as an objective arbiter of justice.
    Blog Post by John Campbell January 13, 2012 Africa in Transition
  • Nigeria
    Somalia: Is Collective Military Action the Answer?
    Kenyan troop stand guard at the Garrisa airstrip near the Somali-Kenyan border October 18, 2011. (Stringer/Courtesy Reuters) This is a guest post by Mohamed Jallow. He is an interdepartmental associate at the Council on Foreign Relations and graduate of the CUNY Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies. Mohamed came to the United States as a refugee from Sierra Leone in 2003. As Kenya’s invasion of Somalia approached its third week, smaller African nations—Djibouti and Sierra Leone—have upped their contribution to the African Union mission in Mogadishu. They are there partly to shore up support for the transitional government and AU forces, but mostly to take advantage of al-Shabaab’s vulnerabilities at a time when it is under duress. The United States has drones in the skies over Somalia, and there are indications that Ethiopia is preparing to engage any al-Shabaab forces that try to flee from the Kenyan army. With all these converging forces pressing on al-Shabaab, there is once again another opportunity to end the Somali conflict, at least from a military perspective. Al-Shabaab has become a menace in the region, and the internationalization of its activities is becoming unbearable. The group has launched attacks in neighboring countries, including Kenya. The final straw came with incursions into Kenyan territory by al-Shabaab linked kidnappers, forcing the country to launch an offensive against militants it believes were directly threatening its lucrative tourism industry. One might think that the African Union would take advantage of the Kenyan invasion. However, it has so far been unable to muster both the military manpower, and the political will to launch an offensive to get rid of al-Shabaab. Africa’s erstwhile heavyweights—Nigeria and South Africa— have been conspicuously absent. Nigeria actually promised to send troops but so far has not followed through. If the AU manages to secure more troops and contributions from other countries, launching an offensive against al-Shabaab from the north could shrink the size of al-Shabaab controlled territory, and cut off its supply lines, effectively starving it of much needed resources to sustain a long fight. Simplistic as that may sound, there is real potential here for a military end to al-Shabaab’s dominance over Somalia, as well as removing the threat it poses to the transitional government and the AU forces protecting it. While I am not a strong advocate for military action in many cases, a stronger and more forceful intervention by the African Union in this instance (with the blessing of the transitional government), especially when the Kenyan army and American drones are on the heels of al-Shabaab, is the best opportunity to end the decades long suffering in Somalia.
    Blog Post by John Campbell November 8, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Is the West Helping Kenya on Somalia?
    The New York Times quotes a Kenyan military spokesman as saying “one of the partners” supported the recent Kenyan air strikes that killed some al-Shabaab militants in Somalia. In the aftermath of Libya, such a statement sounds plausible. But U.S. officials have said they had no prior warning of Kenya’s incursion into Somalia. The U.S. ambassador to Kenya did say that while the United States would not send its troops to Somalia, it would “go out of its way” to help Kenya to restore its territorial integrity that has been compromised by al-Shabaab attacks and kidnappings in Kenya. The Kenyan offensive is entitled Operation Linda Nchi, Kiswahili for “protect the country.” On October 23, a Kenyan official said that a French naval ship had shelled Koday, a city in south Somalia. Both the United States and France have intervened before in Somalia against al-Shabaab or piracy. Nevertheless, I find credible U.S. statements that it was not informed in advance of the Kenyan incursion and the American ambassador’s statement that no U.S. troops are being sent to Kenya. That, however, does not rule out U.S. intelligence support that could be seen as a regular part of the close Washington-Nairobi defense relationship. I do find credible Kenyan hints of more muscular French involvement in the aftermath of President Sarkozi’s (and popular) outrage at the kidnapping and, in effect, murder of French feminist, quadriplegic, and cancer survivor
    Blog Post by John Campbell October 24, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Kenya
    Dedieu’s Death Focuses World Attention on Kidnapping and Piracy in the Horn
    Marie Dedieu, who was kidnapped from Ras-Kitau on Manda island and taken hostage, is pictured in this undated handout photo released to Reuters on October 3, 2011. (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters) A heavily armed band of Somalis kidnapped Marie Dedieu, once a prominent French feminist, from the tourist island of Manda off the coast of Kenya on October 1. She had lived there for some years following health problems that left her wheelchair-bound. According to the press, her kidnappers took her without her wheelchair or medications. The French government tried to send her medications, but her captors refused to give them to her, according to French news reports. She died on October 19. The French authorities are still trying to recover her body. The French, Kenyan, and Somali governments are expressing outrage. According to the New York Times, French Foreign Minister Juppé called the kidnappers “savages.” The kidnapping may be part of a pattern of Somali attacks on tourist facilities—one million tourists visited Kenya last year, including about 174,000 from the United Kingdom and roughly 108,000 from the United States. (The Kenyan ministry of tourism has requested government funding for a new six month marketing campaign to assuage safety concerns.) These attacks have been part of the Kenyan government’s justification for its incursion into southern Somalia. Commentators in the region have been quick to identify the attacks as the work of al-Shabaab. In the case of Marie Dedieu’s horrific death, it may be too soon to label it international terrorism. Kidnapping and piracy in the Horn are ubiquitous, and often the motivation is money. Rather than having a political purpose, the kidnappers may have been criminals looking for ransom. However, if it is true that the kidnappers denied her French-supplied medicine, that would indicate they were not concerned to keep her alive so that she could be ransomed. On the other hand, the French ministry of defense is saying that the kidnappers are trying to sell her body, indicating a mercenary motive. In any event, this tragedy will likely have political consequences, at least in the short-term. It will probably strengthen international sympathy for the Kenyan incursion into Somalia, and it may dampen domestic Kenyan opposition to it. That said, the history of outside incursions into Somalia is sad, and even with international approbation, Kenya’s intervention is high-risk.
    Blog Post by John Campbell October 20, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Politics and Government
    International Criminal Court to Investigate War Crimes in Ivory Coast
    Dogbo Ble Brunot (C), a general loyal to former President Laurent Gbagbo, is detained by soldiers from the pro-Outtara Republican Force of Ivory Coast (FRCI) in Abidjan, April 15, 2011. (STR New/Courtesy Reuters) The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has authorized prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity in the aftermath of the November 2010 Ivory Coast presidential elections. In addition, the ICC judges directed the prosecutor to report back in one month on any additional information on relevant crimes since 2002, when the ICC was established and when the ongoing political crisis in Ivory Coast was well underway. Ivory Coast is not a signatory to the ICC, but in May President Ouattara asked the ICC to investigate post-election violence, saying that Ivorian courts would not be able to prosecute those at the highest levels for the crimes committed. In July, forty Ivorian human rights organizations asked the ICC to extend its investigation to crimes committed since 2002. Following the 2010 elections, human rights organizations have charged supporters of defeated president Laurent Gbagbo and victor Alassane Ouattara with gross human rights violations. Moreno-Ocampo said that at least three thousand people were killed, seventy-two disappeared, five hundred and twenty subject to arbitrary arrest, and one hundred raped. (I suspect these statistics are understated.) Some human rights organizations claim that pro-Ouattara militias are still committing abuses against Gbagbo supporters. The consequences of the ICC investigation could be significant, especially if, as is likely, Moreno-Ocampo indicts senior political leaders from both sides, as he did in Kenya following post election violence there. Ivory Coast remains bitterly divided, if no longer at war. Former president Gbagbo is in prison and Ouattara has established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to promote national reconciliation. But some opposition figures are saying that they will not participate until Gbagbo is freed. This is the seventh ICC investigation in Africa, and there are none currently underway elsewhere. There has been criticism that the ICC has a bias against Africa and is holding the continent to higher standards than elsewhere. The high-profile prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo is an Argentine; eight of the judges are European, five are African, four are from Latin America (including one who is serving ad interim) and two are Asian. Justices must be from the one hundred and sixteen ICC countries. Only about half of the sub-Saharan African states are signatories to the Rome Treaty, which established the ICC. Despite these downsides, I think that the ICC investigation in Ivory Coast is a positive development. Along with its investigation, indictments and prosecutions in Kenya following its 2007 bloody elections, the ICC is confronting a culture of impunity with respect to political, ethnic, and religious violence that has been widespread. The ICC’s willingness to go after very senior political leaders (including a son of national icon Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya) also promotes leadership accountability.
    Blog Post by John Campbell October 4, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Kenya
    Kenya: ICC Hearings Resume
    Kenya's former Higher Education Minister William Samoei Ruto (front L) sits in a courtroom of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Netherlands September 1, 2011. (Bas Czerwinski/Courtesy Reuters) The International Criminal Court (ICC) started a series of hearings today for the “Ocampo Six”--the Kenyan political figures indicted on several counts of crimes against humanity relating to the country’s 2007-2008 post-election violence that killed over one thousand people and displaced over half a million. The hearings at The Hague will determine whether full-fledged trials will begin for the six indicted Kenyans, and I’ve written previously about the investigations, not least because of the apparent attempts to obstruct them. Yesterday, the ICC denied a formal appeal to suspend the trials. Charlie Warren, a former African program intern and now interdepartmental program associate at CFR, has a new piece out today in which he discusses some of the issues facing the ICC and its prosecutor. “The International Criminal Court and Kenya: Ocampo’s Six an Important Hurdle for ICC” is published on African Arguments, part of a larger project from the Royal African Society (UK) and the Social Science Research Council. The Kenyan hearings will last for the next few weeks and will attract a great deal of local as well as international coverage. Given the Court’s uneasy relationship with the continent--its current prosecutions are only of African political figures--and the spate of poll violence in Ivory Coast, the ICC faces an important question: can its prosecutions help to reduce future bouts of electoral conflict across Africa? I think the answer is ‘yes,’ but the Kenyan hearings provide a unique opportunity for the Court and its prosecutor to persuade the international community of that larger case. Read Charlie’s article here.
    Blog Post by John Campbell September 1, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Kenya: Transparency and the Open Data Initiative
    Kenya's President Mwai Kibaki addresses the nation during celebrations to mark Kenya's Madaraka Day, the 48th anniversary of the country's self rule, at Nyayo national stadium in Nairobi, June 1, 2011. (Thomas Mukoya/Courtesy Reuters) Last Friday, Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki inaugurated the Kenya Open Data Initiative, a free internet platform that catalogs and displays visually numerous government data sets. South Sudan’s independence overshadowed the debut of this important online resource.  Nevertheless, the Open Data Initiative is an important step forward and will allow citizens to monitor Kenya’s public resources against the backdrop of endemic corruption. (Kenya ranked a dismal 154 out of 178 total countries in Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index.) In the past, the Kenyan government’s statistics on health, infrastructure, poverty, water and sanitation, energy, and population trends were seldom publicly available, or they were often subject to delayed releases and/or hosted on outmoded websites. The same is true for many other African governments, and broadband access is still limited across the continent. But for those who do have Internet access in Kenya, the new platform represents an important milestone in government transparency, with highly practical applications for researchers, international development professionals, and local members of civil society alike. The Kenya ICT Board also plans to encourage new users: it will award as many as thirty grants this year to the groups and individuals who provide the most useful manipulations of the data. Huduma (Kiswahili for “service”), another offshoot from the developers of Ushahidi, has already begun to use the data in order to compare aid and the provision of services across different regions in Kenya, making way for open source monitoring and evaluation. Information communications (ICT) applications using the Open Data Initiative are also in development. The Kenya government has demonstrated a commitment to innovation and reform. It remains to be seen whether the ready availability of official information will result in popular pressure against corruption.
    Blog Post by John Campbell July 13, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Politics and Government
    The Failed States Index and Africa
    Civilians flee from renewed fighting between government soldiers and the Al Shabaab in Somalia's capital Mogadishu May 24, 2011. (Feisal Omar/Courtesy Reuters) On June 20, Foreign Policy published the Fund for Peace’s annual Failed States Index. Drawn from millions of publicly available sources and covering 177 countries, the statistical analysis has become required reading in government and policy circles over the last decade. Unsurprisingly, Somalia continues to top the list as the most unstable state in the sample. Ivory Coast also rejoined the top ten most fragile states, and the data set does not account for the country’s post-election conflict that left more than one thousand people dead. However, some of the results below the Sahara are encouraging: of the top ten most improved countries, three are from Africa. Kenya now ranks sixteenth, down from thirteenth last year—an indicator of increased stability following the 2007-2008 electoral conflict. Ghana (115) and Botswana (113) continue to be low in the rankings. The Failed States Index can be a helpful analytical tool for policymakers, academics, and development professionals alike. But it is only a tool, and it can be limited. The most recent data set covers indicators from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2010, excluding the post-election violence in Nigeria, the demonstrations in Uganda, the recent strife in Sudan, and other events. Further, as I write in Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (2010), fixing failing states may not be not analogous to fixing “broken machines.” The Failed States Index is not necessarily predictive, and it may not represent what every citizen experiences on a daily basis. My CFR colleague Stewart Patrick also has a new thought-provoking article in Foreign Policy that challenges the prevailing logic behind state failure. Read it here.
    Blog Post by John Campbell June 22, 2011 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Justice and Accountabilty: Kenya and Uganda
    Kenya's Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta (L, back row), Cabinet Secretary Francis Muthaura (2nd L, front row), and former police chief Hussein Ali appear (2nd R, front row) at the International Criminal Court in The Hague April 8, 2011. (Staff Photographer/Courtesy Reuters) While I have been focusing my attention on Ivory Coast and the elections in Nigeria along with everybody else, there have been significant developments in East Africa—and they have implications for the continent as a whole. In Kenya, the ‘Ocampo Six’ appeared before the International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber on April 7 and 8 in The Hague. They have been ‘indicted,’ but the Court will not determine until September 1 whether they will face trial. Their recent ICC appearance has spurred a significant development in Nairobi: popular politician William Ruto, like Moi a member of the Kalenjin ethnic group,  and finance minister Uhuru Kenyata, a Kikuyu and son of Jomo Kenyatta, have used their potential trials to form an informal inter-ethnic political alliance looking toward  the  2012 general elections. Uniting under a Kiswahili slogan—Tuko Pamoja, “We are Together”— the two politicians have used the ICC trial abroad to galvanize political support at home. Nevertheless, while I have mentioned many African leaders’ disdain for the ICC, it is not shared by all Africans. A recent poll from a credible firm suggests 61 percent of the general population in Kenya favors the ICC process rather than a local tribunal. With important ramifications for future trials, I will continue to watch how Kenya’s ICC process—and the subsequent political situation—unfolds. While the criticism remains that all of the cases currently before the ICC involve Africans, the ICC does appear to be a means of holding politicians accountable. In Uganda, the Museveni government continued its heavy-handed treatment of political opponents. On Monday, police arrested main opposition leader Kizza Besigye when he was protesting rising food and fuel prices by “walking to work.” Although Ugandan authorities released Besigye on bail, his detention on the charges of “inciting violence” and “refusal to take lawful order from the police” demonstrates the Museveni regime’s increasing disregard for the freedom of assembly and the right to political expression. In February, I discussed Museveni’s “re-election” to extend his twenty-five year rule. Besigye’s detention does not augur well for peaceful political reforms, at least in the short term.
    Blog Post by John Campbell April 13, 2011 Africa in Transition