Chad

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 25 to March 3, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1488819604877’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); *(last week, February 24: Nigerian soldiers killed eighteen Boko Haram militants in Gujba, Yobe) February 26: Four were killed in a cult clash in Ondo West, Ondo. February 27: Suspected herdsmen kidnapped three teachers in Ovia North-East, Edo. February 28: Kidnappers killed four vigilantes for thwarting a kidnapping in Aba South, Abia. March 2: Nigerian police killed a kidnap kingpin in Ikwerre, Rivers. March 2: Sectarian violence led to six deaths in Gwer East, Benue. March 3: Three suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected.

The public reappearance of polio in northeast Nigeria is a disappointment. Nigeria had been thought to be free of polio for two years. The recent cases of paralysis caused by polio are likely the result of ongoing, undetected transmission rather than a new introduction of the disease from elsewhere. The small numbers of paralysis probably masks the extent of the presence of the disease. Only about one in two hundred polio cases results in paralysis. Polio would appear to remain present in areas formerly under control of Boko Haram, which is opposed to vaccination and western medicine in general. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative, a consortium that includes UNICEF, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations, is responding to the newly detected outbreak with a major campaign to vaccinate 41 million children against polio in the Lake Chad basin, which comprises Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. UNICEF states that the Initiative has deployed 39,000 health workers in the region and has already vaccinated approximately 30 million children using oral polio vaccine. UN spokesmen identify two challenges: continued insecurity in the region and a shortage of funds. Boko Haram has not been destroyed and continues to attack soft targets. For example, Nigerian media report that a Boko Haram bombing killed at least eighteen in Maiduguri on October 11. UNICEF has also not received all of it’s necessary funding, it has received only $50.4 million of the $158 million it needs for the Lake Chad basin campaign. Victims of paralysis in the Lake Chad basin lack even the most rudimentary medical care where wheelchairs are a rare luxury. Given the horror of polio, surely the international community can cover the $108 million shortfall, a pittance compared to other government expenditures.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 5, 2015 to December 11, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   December 5: Three suicide bombers killed themselves and twenty-seven others in Koulfoua, Chad. Boko Haram is suspected. December 6: Three soldiers and "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram insurgents were killed in Sambisa Forest in Gwoza, Borno. December 7: Unknown gunmen killed four in Lagos State, Lagos. December 9: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram insurgents in Sambisa Forest in Gwoza, Borno. December 9: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram insurgents in Geidam, Yobe. December 10: Boko Haram killed fourteen and abducted "several" (estimated at five) in Biu, Borno. December 11: One suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed himself and ten others in Kolofata, Cameroon.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 10, 2015 to October 16, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   October 10: Five Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and thirty-six others in Baga Sola, Chad. October 10: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and nine others in Kangaleri, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. October 13: Three suicide bombers killed themselves and four others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. October 13: Nigerian troops killed ten Boko Haram insurgents in Okene, Kogi. October 15: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers attacked a mosque in Maiduguri, Borno, killing themselves and thirty-two others. October 16: Four Boko Harm suicide bombers attacked Maiduguri, Borno, killing themselves and twenty-two others.

Boko Haram warlord and public face, Abubakar Shekau, was last heard from in March, when he pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State.  His silence since then led to speculation that he was dead or had been replaced. Chad’s president, Idriss Deby, recently claimed that Shekau had been replaced as Boko Haram’s leader with a figure unknown to observers. (See Africa in Transition, August 12, 2015.) Deby’s comment led to Shekau issuing an eight minute audio message in Hausa on August 16 in which he said he was still in command. The SITE Intelligence Group, Agence France-Presse, and the BBC have stated that “there is no doubt that the voice is that of Abubakar Shekau.” So, at least we know he is not dead. Because so little is known about Shekau and the inner workings of Boko Haram, it is tempting to over-read his audio message in much the same way as 1950’s Kremlinologists approached the words of Stalin and the actions of the Soviet Union’s Central Committee. Nevertheless, it is striking that Shekau, in effect, reaffirmed his allegiance to the Islamic State and its “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He dismissed Nigeria’s new president, Muhammadu Buhari, who had earlier ordered the military service chiefs to defeat Boko Haram in three months: “This ostentatious person, a liar – I mean Buhari, who raised arms to crush us in three months. You Buhari, why didn’t you say in three years?” (The quotation is from Nigerian media.) Conventional wisdom has been that Boko Haram has been focused on the destruction of the Nigerian state rather than the broader agenda of the Islamic State. Other than the attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja in 2011, Boko Haram has attacked no foreign facility, though it has been involved in the kidnapping of foreigners. However, there may be a hint in Shekau’s latest audio that Boko Haram is moving closer to the Islamic State. He said, with reference to Buhari, “We will certainly fight you by the grace of Allah until we establish Allah’s law everywhere on Earth.” This may imply a Boko Haram area of operations broader that Nigeria and its border regions. On the other hand, Shekau’s public utterances have usually lacked precision, and that may be the case here.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 23, 2015 to May 29, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     5/23: Boko Haram killed forty-three in Gubio, Borno. 5/23: The Nigerian military killed thirty Boko Haram insurgents in Mafa, Borno. 5/24: Sectarian violence over several days in Logo, Benue resulted in the deaths of ninety-six. 5/27: Chadian soldiers killed thirty-three Boko Haram insurgents, and lost four of their own on Choua Island in Chad. 5/28: Gunmen killed five in Gokana, Rivers. 5/29: A twin bomb attack at a wedding in Hawul, Borno killed seven. Boko Haram is suspected. 

Adam Nossiter wrote an article featured in the February 19 issue of the New York Times titled “In Nigeria, Boko Haram Loses Ground to Chadians.” While Nossiter says that it is too early to tell, others have declared that the Chadians have somehow “turned the tide” against Boko Haram. While the Nigerian federal government has remained relatively silent about the Chadians, they too have recaptured terroritory and claimed victories over Boko Haram. Despite these territorial gains and favorable headlines, there are critical questions to ask about the situation developing in northeast Nigeria. First, how meaningful is it for the Chadians or the Nigerians to dislodge Boko Haram from towns or villages? Though Boko Haram has declared the establishment of a caliphate, the group seems uninterested in state building or administration. Instead, it raids, wrecks mayhem, and then moves on from any location that requires significant administration. By doing this, Boko Haram is more fluid and difficult to defeat on the battlefield. Indeed, despite Chad and Nigeria’s victories, Boko Haram has continued its campaign of terror – it killed at least thirty-eight people in two separate suicide attacks on February 17. The face of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, also issued a new video vowing to disrupt the Nigerian elections, now scheduled for March 28, and threatening violence against those participating: Second, who are the Chadians? The relationship between the central government in N’Djamena and the clans on the Chadian side of the Chad-Nigeria border is complex and obscure. Given its decentralized structure of governance, it is difficult to determine to what extent the Chadian central government controls Chadians fighting Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. While Chad’s forces have been hailed due to their victorious intervention in Mali, troops in Mali were under the command and control of the French and owe much of their success to French leadership. The Chadians fighting in Nigeria are in a vastly different situation from those that fought in Mali. Adding to the complexity are the nebulous ties among some Chadians, some northern Nigerian politicians, and perhaps even some elements of Boko Haram. These relationships are a veritable house of mirrors. As for the Nigerian government, it now must face the reality that there are armed Chadians operating in northern Nigeria beyond the control of Abuja. This would have been unimaginable even five years ago.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 7, 2015 to February 13, 2015. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. <a href=’#’><img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https:&#47;&#47;public.tableau.com&#47;static&#47;images&#47;NS&#47;NSTWeeklyFeb7-Feb13&#47;WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard&#47;1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /></a> February 7: The Nigerian military killed "scores" of Boko Haram terrorists in Damboa, Borno. February 8: Boko Haram attacked Kerawa, Cameroon, abducting thirty civilians from a bus and killing seven of them. The Cameroonian military killed eleven of the insurgents. February 8: Fulani herdsmen killed eighteen in an attack on Logo, Benue. February 8: The Niger army repelled a Boko Haram attack on Diffa, Niger. Ten civilians reported dead. February 9: The Niger army repelled a Boko Haram attack on a prison in Diffa, but Boko Haram successfully detonated a car bomb in the town, killing five. February 11: Boko Haram attacked Chadian troops in Gamburu, Borno, but the Chadian military killed thirteen insurgents. February 11: Two suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers attacked the Niger town of Diffa, but only killed themselves. February 12: Two teenage female suicide bombers attacked Biu, Borno, killing themselves and nine others. February 13: Boko Haram attacked Ngouboua, Chad, killing eight civilians, one policeman, and lost two of their own. February 13: Boko Haram attacked two towns outside of Maiduguri, Borno, killing twenty-one.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar–“Mr. Marlboro”—allegedly leads the al-Mulathamun Battalion. The U.S. Department of State designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on Wednesday, December 18. This group appears to be an amalgamation between “Those Who Sign In Blood,” the group that Belmokhtar formed when he separated from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2012, and the Malian-based group “Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa” or Mujao. But, the exact relationship between the two groups is unclear. The State Department characterizes the al-Mulathamun Battalion as “among the most dangerous” to U.S. interests in North and West Africa. The designation as an FTO is the same as that applied to Boko Haram and Ansaru in October this year. It prohibits any material assistance being provided to the organization by Americans or American entities. It also denies U.S. visas to adherents and prohibits remittances from the United States. I oppose the FTO designation in this case for many of the same reasons I opposed it for Boko Haram and Ansaru. In the case of Belmokhtar, it has little practical consequence, but designation greatly enhances the profile and prestige of an individual and a group that, arguably, more closely resembles a bandit and smuggling network than a terrorist organization. Little of Belmokhtar has been heard over the past few months. In March, the Chadian military claimed to have killed him. The fact of the FTO designation now may indicate the U.S. government has reason to believe that he and his organization will soon be more active.