Cameroon

Paul Biya, the president of Cameroon, announced on October 12 that twenty-seven kidnap victims have been freed and turned over to the Cameroonian authorities. The victims were kidnapped on May 16 and July 27. They included ten Chinese workers, the wife of Cameroon’s vice-prime minister, and the Lamido of Kolofata, a traditional Cameroonian ruler. Boko Haram has not claimed responsibility for any of the kidnappings, though the media regularly assumes its responsibility for all high-profile kidnappings. But, criminal kidnapping gangs are active in Cameroon and Nigeria. Cameroon claims that it never pays ransom. But, the Nigerian press reports speculation that there had been a ransom demand of $400,000 for the wife of the vice-prime minister. It also reports speculation in Cameroon’s capital of Yaounde that that the Biya government may have swapped the hostages for low-level Boko Haram fighters. Boko Haram is usually careful to claim responsibility for its acts – and not to claim responsibility for acts it has not committed. On that basis, I suspect that the kidnappings were carried out by criminal gangs rather than Boko Haram. If so, it is likely that Cameroon has paid a ransom to secure the release of the kidnapped victims. If, indeed, the kidnapping was carried out by Boko Haram, then the speculation that the victims were freed as part of a swap for Boko Haram fighters is also plausible. In the world of West African kidnappings, victims are never released without a quid pro quo.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 4 to October 10, 2014. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. Learn About Tableau October 5: Kidnappers killed two in Abia, while a man was stabbed to death in another part of Abia. October 5: Nigerian troops killed two hundred Boko Haram insurgents around Madagali, Adamawa. October 6: Nigerian troops killed two hundred more Boko Haram insurgents, losing seventy soldiers around Madagali, Adamawa. October 6: Boko Haram beheaded seven civilians in Ngamdu, Borno. October 7: Boko Haram launched a rocket from Nigeria into Amchide, Cameroon, killing eight refugees. Cameroonian soldiers killed eight Boko Haram insurgents in retaliation. October 9: Unknown gunmen attacked Nigerian refugees in Kereomafa, Cameroon, killing an unknown number (approximately twenty). October 2-October 10: Over the course of a week, Fulani herdsmen killed twenty-six members of the Berom ethnic group in Riyom, Plateau. October 10: A riot at Kirikiri prison in Lagos resulted in the deaths of ten inmates.

The Nigeria Security Network, a group of academics and think tankers, has issued a special report on the remarkable expansion of Boko Haram’s control in the northeastern state of Borno.  It is a must-read.  The report includes a detailed map that pinpoints the towns and territories that Boko Haram occupies. It reveals something approaching a crescent around the major city of Maiduguri, that has a population of at least one million, including a Christian minority. It concludes that Nigeria is losing control of Borno state. It suggests that if Borno falls to Boko Haram, Yobe and Adamawa could follow, along with parts of Camerooon.  If that were to happen, a major humanitarian crisis is likely. The link to the Nigeria Security Network’s Report is here. Below is our weekly visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 23 to August 29, 2014 as reported in the Nigerian media. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. This visualization is congruent with data from the Nigeria Security Network special report. Learn About Tableau • August 23: Boko Haram took over Madagali, Adamawa. On August 28 it was confirmed that Boko Haram had taken over the Madagali Catholic church along with several houses. • August 24: Twenty were killed in Wukari, Taraba by unknown gunmen. • August 24: Eggon and Fulani clashed in Lafia, Nasarawa, resulting in thirty deaths. • August 25 -August 26: As Nigerian soldiers fled across the border from Borno to Fokotol, Cameroon, Cameroonian soldiers killed twenty-seven Boko Haram insurgents. • August 26: Boko Haram captured the town of Ashigashya in Gwoza, Borno, killing three. • August 27: Eggon and Fulani clashed again, this time in Obi, Nasarawa, resulting in sixty deaths. • August 27: Cameroon shelled Boko Haram’s camp in Gamboru Ngala, killing "many" although the exact number is unconfirmed.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 26 to August 1, 2014. These incidents are also available here, and are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. Learn About Tableau • July 27: Boko Haram kidnapped the wife of Cameroon’s vice prime minister and killed three others in Kolofata, Cameroon. • July 27: A female suicide bomber at a university gate and another bomber outside a church killed five people in two blasts in Sabon Gari, Kano state. The attacks were attributed to Boko Haram. • July 27: In three separate attacks in Gombi, Madagali, and Hong local government areas of Adamawa state, Boko Haram killed four soldiers and fifty-two others. • July 28: Two female suicide bombers–one at a gas station and one at the Kano Trade Fair complex–detonated in Kano state, killed three people. • July 28: Boko Haram killed eight people in Gujba, Yobe state and bombed the Katarko Bridge. • July 29: Boko Haram bombed two mosques in Yobe state, killing seventeen people. • July 30: During a successful rescue mission of Cameroon’s vice prime minister’s wife, sixteen Cameroonian soldiers were killed in Kolofata, Cameroon. • July 30: The fourth Boko Haram female suicide bomber of the week attacked a university in Kano state, killing six people. • July 30: Suspected cultists killed fifteen people in Rivers state.    

After a weekend of carnage in Kano and two high profile kidnappings in Cameroon—following a nearly successful attempt on the life of former chief of state Muhammadu Buhari—Boko Haram is more than ever a central preoccupation in Nigeria (and now, presumably, in Cameroon). The only thing we know for certain is how little we actually know about Boko Haram. It should be noted, for example, that Boko Haram has yet to claim responsibility for the attempt on General Buhari’s life. Certain political elements in Nigeria would be happy if Buhari left the scene, and pre-electoral periods in Nigeria are historically murderous. So it is possible that the attempt on Buhari’s life was authored by a group—or individual—other than Boko Haram. It’s also true that Buhari stands for many of the elements that are anathema to Boko Haram, at least in its rhetoric. A genuine Nigerian patriot, he is also a devout Muslim. An active participant in public life, he has constantly interacted with Christians on the basis of mutual respect and shared interests. And his fierce battle against corruption was an attempt to address the fundamental bad governance that has fed Boko Haram. Boko Haram murders Muslims who participate in secular politics, and who oppose the group. It is hostile to Muslims who seek good relations with Christians. It utterly rejects the secular state. Hence, I think it is likely that Boko Haram was in fact the perpetrator. But the evidence remains circumstantial. So, where is Boko Haram going? Is it seeking to establish a territorial state along the lines of the ‘caliphate’ established by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)? Boko Haram warlord Abubakar Shekau has said he wants to establish a ‘caliphate’ in northern Nigeria, and he has praised the ISIS caliphate. Boko Haram’s recent campaign of bridge destruction in Borno state could be part of an effort to establish a separate territorial entity, one which may be the basis for a caliphate. Perhaps Maiduguri could play a role similar to that of Mosul in Iraq. However, Boko Haram has not yet established any visible institutions of government in the territories it controls, though there are reports that it is levying tolls at checkpoints. A Boko Haram caliphate is, of course, only speculation for now. But, because the group appears to be evolving quickly, scenarios difficult to imagine only two or three months ago have become plausible.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 11 to July 18, 2014. These incidents are also available here, and are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. Learn About Tableau July 19: Police and students clashed in Ibadan, Oyo when students demanded the release of one of them who was arrested. There were 0 casualties. July 21: Four died as armed Kogi indogenes stormed a disputed oil area when they found Alugeri people on site in Ibaji, Kogi. July 22: Boko Haram was blamed for blowing up a bridge linking Borno, Nigeria to Cameroon. There were 0 casualties. July 23: There were two suicide bombings in Kaduna South, Kaduna, killing a total of 110. The first targeted former Head of State and APC leader Gen. Muhammadu Buhari while the second targeted prominent Islamic cleric and Boko Haram critic, Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi. July 24: A bomb hidden in a fridge exploded in a bus park in Kano, killing 5. Boko Haram was suspected of being behind the attack. July 24: Boko Haram killed 2 Cameroon soldiers in Balgaram, Cameroon, across the border from Borno. July 25: Police opened fire on a a group of Shiite Muslims in procession both to mark the annual Quds day and also to condemn the military operations in Gaza by Israel, killing 11.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 29 to June 5, 2014. These incidents are also available here, and are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. Learn About Tableau May 31: Boko Haram killed forty-three people in four towns across Borno state. June 1: Sixty people were killed when a bomb exploded near a bar screening a football match in Adamawa state. Boko Haram was blamed for the attack. June 1: Boko Haram opened fire on a church service in Borno, killing twelve people. Vigilantes, however, pursued the attackers, killing thirty-seven of them. June 2: Cameroon’s military killed sixty Boko Haram members in Dabanga, across the border from Nigeria’s Borno state. June 3: Boko Haram killed approximately four hundred people in three villages across the Gwoza local government area in Borno state. This was partly as revenge for the killing of thirty-seven of their own members on June 1. They came dressed as soldiers and told the villagers they were there to protect them before opening fire on the crowd. June 4: Members of Boko Haram dressed as preachers killed forty-five people in a village near Maiduguri, Borno state. June 5: After killing several civilians in Kwabula, Adamawa state Boko Haram attacked a Nigerian army outpost, just as the soldiers, backed by a fighter jet, moved to counter the militants. Three other villagers died in Madagali when a Nigerian air force jet dropped a bomb on them as they put out the fire at the church. Total casualty numbers are still inconclusive.

We will be posting the week of February 2, 2014, the Nigeria Security Tracker data for January, 2014. We anticipate it will show an increase in Boko Haram and security service activity at the beginning of 2014. In particular, it will take into account the late January jihadi attacks on Christian churches in Adamawa state. Adamawa is the venue of Boko Haram attacks from time to time, but less so than the other states adjacent to Borno in Nigeria’s northeast. In the October-December 2013 time frame the NST documents only three Boko Haram attacks in Adamawa, but twenty in Borno, two in Plateau, and one in Kaduna. Unlike other states within the Boko Haram sphere of activity that are predominately Muslim, Adamawa is said to be evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. It shares a long border with Cameroon, making it easy for perpetrators to escape. It is also easy for refugees to flee. There are press reports that in response to the recent church attacks, several thousand Nigerians have fled to Cameroon. For the last quarter of the calendar year, Boko Haram attacks were highest in October, declined in November, and with a further decline in December. Unlike other years, there was no spike in Boko Haram activity around the Christmas holidays, perhaps because of tight government security. January is likely to show a return to higher levels of Boko Haram violence. This pattern is consistent with the peaks-and-valleys pattern of violence shown by the NST. A peak in violence is followed by a decline for two or three months. The NST uses open source materials that rarely distinguish between “Boko Haram,” a movement consisting of the followers of the murdered Mohammed Yusuf now led by Abubakar Shekau, and “Ansaru,” a more violent and radical break-away group. So, the NST combines under “Boko Haram” the violence perpetrated by “Ansaru.” Ansaru is known to attack churches more frequently than Boko Haram does. But, Ansaru has not before operated extensively in Adamawa. The January attacks on churches in that state may indicate that Ansaru is broadening its area of operations. Alternatively, these most recent atrocities may indicate that Boko Haram is increasingly using a tactic, targeting Christian worshippers in church, which is more commonly associated with Ansaru. The NST’s death totals, being derived primarily from Nigerian media and other open sources, almost certainly are significantly understated. However, the patterns it indicates are credible.

Last week, a French Catholic priest, Georges Vandenbeusch, was kidnapped in northern Cameroon. According to the local Roman Catholic bishop, some fifteen gunmen invaded the priest’s compound looking for money. A nun working in the community said the kidnappers spoke English, not French, the predominant European language in that part of Cameroon. A Cameroonian official says that Fr. Vandenbeusch has been spirited away to Nigeria. An anonymous sources, quoted by France-24, claims that the operation was joint between Boko Haram and Ansaru. Ansaru has previously carried out the kidnapping of Europeans for ransom. The priest was kidnapped in the same area of Cameroon as a French family in February. That family was released after the rumored payment of a U.S. $3 million ransom, according to the BBC, citing a confidential Nigerian government report. However, it is not clear who paid the ransom; the French government denies that it pays ransoms. Ansaru and Boko Haram have not cooperated in operations since they split in January 2012. Ostensibly, Ansaru split because it objected to the large number of Muslims among Boko Haram’s victims. It is plausible, however, that with increased Nigerian government pressure on Boko Haram, it is willing to cooperate with Ansaru on highly lucrative kidnapping activities and perhaps on other operations. If so, then the Boko Haram insurgency in the north may be entering a new phase.

While attention is focused on the manhunt for the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombings, there is good news from West Africa. In a Paris news conference, French president Francois Hollande announced that the French family of seven kidnapped in northern Cameroon—including four children—have finally been released after two months of captivity. Hollande said the release followed several weeks of secret negotiations, and that the French had not paid a ransom. As has been well documented, ransoms paid by European countries in the past have been a significant source of revenue for terrorist operations in West Africa and the Sahel. In March, an alleged Boko Haram video threatened to kill the hostages, presumably including the children, unless militants were released from detention. This is a frequent demand and a high priority for Boko Haram, and it has carried out organized attacks on prisons aimed at freeing detained militants. However, there are many unanswered questions. What group really held the hostages? Did the kidnappers sell the hostages to Abubakar Shekau’s Boko Haram? (Boko Haram has not typically resorted to kidnapping expatriates, while Ansaru, another radical Islamist group, has.) With whom did the French negotiate? Who were their interlocutors, those who held the hostages or a third party? Where did the negotiations take place? What were the terms of the release? Whatever the answers, the horror for one family is over.

Kidnapping is not a part of the repertoire of the radical, diffuse Islamist group called Boko Haram. Some of its alleged spokesmen have denounced the practice. However, kidnapping is common in the Sahel and ransoms are an important source of revenue for the rival criminal networks also involved with smuggling, some of which have links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM has regularly claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of foreigners. Kidnapping is also a well-established tactic of the criminal groups in the western part of the oil-rich Niger Delta. As in the Sahel, Delta kidnappings are mercenary, with little political content. Most of the Delta kidnappings are of Nigerians, not foreigners–though it tends to be the periodic high-profile foreign kidnappings that make international headlines. In the Sahel, the huge ransoms paid by governments or corporations ensure that most of the victims are foreigners. This month, there have been two high-profile kidnappings in northern Nigeria. A group called Ansaru claimed responsibility for kidnapping seven foreigners on February 16; on February 19, a French family was kidnapped in northern Cameroon and allegedly taken across the border to Nigeria. No group has claimed responsibility, but reports suggest it may be Ansaru. Matthew Bey and Sim Tack have published a useful analysis of Ansaru, “The Rise of a New Nigerian Militant Group,” available on the Stratfor website. They see Ansaru as having separated from Boko Haram over the latter’s killing of innocent Muslims. They also argue credibly that Ansaru has links with AQIM and has an international focus. By contrast, Boko Haram has a specifically northern Nigerian focus, not an international one. Such a focus has made it largely immune to the blandishments of the international jihadi groups. Bey and Tack argue that Boko Haram’s use of suicide bombers and ambushes make it the more dangerous of the two with respect to local civilian populations. But, Ansaru’s orientation toward the far, rather than the near, enemy, makes it the greater danger to Western targets. If Bey and Tack’s approach is correct (and I find it credible), Ansaru is a cross-border terrorist operation with tangible links to non-Nigerian criminal and terrorists groups, while Boko Haram is a grassroots insurgency that uses terrorist tactics to further a domestic agenda.