Cameroon

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 28 to December 4, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   November 28: Boko Haram killed 110 people in Jere, Borno.   November 28: Gunmen killed two in Jos South, Plateau.  November 29: Unknown attackers killed eight in Jema'a, Kaduna. November 29: Cultists killed three in Ughelli North, Delta. November 29: Cultists killed three in Ezza North and one in Ezza South in Ebonyi.   November 29: Gunmen killed four in Wukari and two in Jalingo in Taraba.  November 29: Troops killed one bandit while the bandits killed two people in Chikun, Kaduna.  November 30: Pirates killed one and kidnapped two in Okrika, Rivers.  November 30: Troops killed one bandit in Igabi, Kaduna.  November 30: Bandits killed seven farmers and abducted thirty in Sabuwa, Katsina.  November 30: Bandits killed one traditional ruler and kidnapped eight in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara.  November 30: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno.  November 30: ISWA abducted one aid worker and two local officials in Kaga, Borno.  November 30: Bandits killed four at a market in Mashegu, Niger State; the villagers killed one bandit in retaliation.   December 1: Suspected Fulani militias killed three and kidnapped two in Jos South, Plateau.  December 1: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  December 2: The assistant commissioner of police was killed in Calabar, Cross River.  December 3: Electoral violence resulted in two deaths in Bakura, Zamfara.  December 3: A land dispute resulted in two deaths in Akure North, Ondo.  December 3: Kidnappers killed three and abducted ten in Uhunmwonde, Edo; vigilantes killed one of the kidnappers.  December 3: A cult clash resulted in five deaths in Alimosho, Lagos. December 3: Boko Haram killed four and kidnapped two in northern Cameroon.  December 3: Villagers kidnapped four police officers and three vigilantes in Ijebu North, Ogun.  December 4: Police officers killed two bandits in Tambuwal, Sokoto.  December 4: Robbers killed four at a market in Oredo, Edo.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 21 to November 27, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   (Last week, November 20: Bandits killed five and kidnapped forty at a mosque in Maru, Zamfara.) November 21: Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants killed seven soldiers and one militia member in Gubio, Borno.  November 21: Nigerian troops killed one Boko Haram militant in Bama, Borno.   November 21: Nigerian troops killed approximately seven bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara.  November 21: Nigerian troops killed six bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  November 22: Nigerian troops killed one bandit in Zurmi, Zamfara.  November 22: Gunmen killed two vigilantes in Udu, Delta.  November 22: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Kokona, Nassarawa.  November 22: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno.  November 23: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. November 23: Airstrikes killed sixty-seven bandits in Faskari, Katsina. November 23: Airstrikes killed fifteen bandits in the Ajjah Forest in Zamfara. November 24: Suspected herdsmen kidnapped three in Ajaokuta, Kogi.  November 24: Airstrikes killed "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno.  November 24: Nigerian troops killed two ISWA militants in Gwoza, Borno. November 25: Boko Haram killed three and kidnapped one in Koza, Cameroon.  November 26: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. November 27: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped one Chinese engineer in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti.  November 27: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno.  November 27: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Ngala LGA, two Boko Haram militants in Gwoza LGA, and one Boko Haram militant in Damboa LGA in Borno. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 10 to October 16, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     October 10: Kidnappers abducted twenty-four people in Kuje, FCT.  October 10: One person was killed during protests against the Special-Anti Robbery Squad (SARS) in Ogbomosho, Oyo.  October 10: Gunmen killed nine in Giwa, Kaduna.  October 10: Gunmen killed two in Bauchi, Bauchi.  October 11: Soldiers killed two during a curfew protest in Sanga, Kaduna.   October 11: Bandits killed eight in Faskari, Katsina.  October 11: Three people were killed during protests against SARS in Ogbomosho, Oyo.  October 11: Gunmen killed a mobile police officer in Okpe, Delta. October 12: One police officer and one civilian were killed during protests against SARS in Surulere, Lagos. October 12: Bandits killed six vigilantes in Rafi, Niger State. October 12: Boko Haram killed fourteen farmers in Maiduguri, Borno. October 13: Vigilante members killed eleven herdsmen in Kurfi, Katsina. October 13: A military airstrike killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Batsari, Katsina.  October 15: Armed robbers killed a mobile police officer in Warri, Delta.  October 15: Gunmen killed three at a mosque in Koton Karfe, Kogi.  October 15: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA members in Abadam, Borno.  October 16: Communal violence led to nine deaths in Isoko South, Delta.  October 16: Two people were killed during protests against SARS in Oredo, Edo.  October 16: ISWA killed fourteen soldiers in Konduga, Borno.  October 16: Boko Haram killed three people and kidnapped five children in Oudal, Cameroon. Learn more about John Campbell's upcoming book, Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World, out in early December 2020.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 26 to October 2, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. September 26: Kidnappers abducted four in Aniocha North, Delta.  September 26: Air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno.  September 27: Bandits killed one and kidnapped seven in Danko Wasagu, Kebbi.  September 27: Cultists killed one at a church in Oruk-Anam, Akwa Ibom.  September 28: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Kajuru, Kaduna.  September 28: Two herdsmen were killed in Ivo, Ebonyi.  September 28: Boko Haram killed two Cameroonian soldiers in Zeleved, Cameroon.  September 29: ISWA killed ten Nigerian soldiers in Marte, Borno.  September 29: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Marte, Borno.  September 30: Suspected Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members killed one police officer in Oyigbo, Rivers.  October 1: Military air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  October 2: Nigerian police officers killed six armed robbers in Uyo, Akwa Ibom. 

On September 8, U.S. Senators Jim Risch and Ben Cardin, joined by an impressive bipartisan group of cosponsors, introduced a resolution calling for an end to the violence in Cameroon and for inclusive dialogue to address the underlying political tensions that are at the root of the conflict between the state and anglophone separatists. They are the latest in a large and diverse group of senior U.S. officials who have worked to highlight the crisis in Cameroon. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tibor Nagy has engaged in direct and personal diplomacy aiming to influence the situation. Congresswoman Karen Bass, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, has been resolute in condemning abuses, and has worked on a bipartisan basis to clearly communicate U.S. concerns and support for peace talks to Biya’s government, including in a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives last year. The Trump Administration removed Cameroon from the list of countries eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and has scaled back military assistance to the country. But Cameroon is a case in which concern in Washington does not translate into effective influence. In Cameroon itself, little political progress has been made as various factions grapple for control of the talks and sometimes competing lines of effort stop and start.  Meanwhile, the people of Cameroon continue to suffer despite calls for a ceasefire in light of the COVID-19 crisis. Just this week, the army launched a new campaign in Bamenda, ostensibly to bring law and order to the city. The BBC reported that the operation involved house-to-house searches, seizures of citizens’ property, and even indiscriminate shooting. Residents of the city largely stayed home, caught between the government and separatists who have called for citizens to stay home as a form of protest, in an all-too-familiar impossible situation. This summer the Norwegian Refugee Council named Cameroon the world’s most neglected displacement crisis, noting that half a million people have been forced from their homes. It can be painful to reckon with the limited capacity of the United States, or of any external power, to bring seriousness of purpose to urgently needed political dialogue. But ultimately civil conflicts with political roots cannot be resolved without domestic will and leadership, and Cameroon’s ossified political class has thus far failed to muster either. But the efforts of U.S. officials still matter. Should those vital domestic ingredients emerge, the United States is well-positioned to support a process that prioritizes the urgent needs of civilians and gives all parties in a tremendously diverse country greater opportunity in the future.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 22 to 28, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     August 22: Police killed three Shiite protestors in Kaduna, Kaduna.  August 23: Two State Security Service operatives and twenty-one IPOB members were killed during a clash in Enugu East, Enugu.  August 23: Nigerian troops killed one bandit in Bukkuyum LGA and one bandit in Anka LGA in Zamfara.  August 24: Gunmen attacked a school, killing one and kidnapping seven students and one teacher in Chikun, Kaduna.  August 24: Nigerian troops killed fifteen ISWA leaders in Ngala, Borno.  August 25: ISWA killed fourteen in Bulgaram, Cameroon.  August 27: ISWA/Boko Haram militants (the exact sect was unknown) killed two in Ngala, Borno.  August 27: Kidnappers killed two and abducted four in Chikun, Kaduna.  August 27: Bandits kidnapped four in Dandume, Katsina.  August 28: Boko Haram killed two and kidnapped two in Maiduguri, Borno. 

Tareian King is a former intern with CFR's Africa Program and a student at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. She is also the founder of Nolafrique, an e-commerce platform that enables artisans in African villages to have global exposure and opportunities for scale up. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) is making the news again as the Trump administration continues its efforts to diminish the program. DACA protects eligible immigrant youth who came to the United States when they were children from deportation and allows them to apply for jobs. Recipients of the DACA program are often referred to as “Dreamers.” Since 2017, there has been an ongoing legal battle to save the program, which shields approximately 700,000 immigrants in the United States. While the media has readily portrayed DACA as a policy for Latinx, it is also relevant for Africans. The last report by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services on DACA recipients revealed that in 2017, 1,020 Nigerians, 490 Ghanaians, and 700 Kenyans reaped the benefits of the DACA program. On average, African immigrants make up only 1% of DACA recipients. While the number is small compared to, for example, 79.4% of Mexican recipients, for those Africans involved, the continuation of the DACA program is just as important for them as it is for Mexicans. Africa has the fastest growth rate of migration to the United States; it is more than double the rate of migration from Asia, South America, or the Caribbean. As of 2018, there were more than two million immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa residing in the United States and this number will continue to increase. From 2010 to 2018, the number of African migrants in the United States increased at a rate of almost 50%, higher than in previous decades. While Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Ghana have the highest number of immigrants in the U.S., Nigeria being the highest, it is Cameroon that provides the perfect example of why Africans may want to fight for DACA. Cameroon has the fastest growing population in the United States. In 2018, the number of Cameroonian immigrants in the U.S. doubled to 80,000 since 2010. Despite being the fastest-growing population in the U.S. in recent years, only 130 (0.0%) Cameroonians were DACA recipients in 2017. As more Cameroonians migrate to America, there will most certainly be an increase in the number of children who migrate with them.  Africans’ interest in the fight for DACA is not as much about the present, as it is about the future. The point is not that there are only 130 Cameroonians who have received DACA, but rather, for example, that there are growing numbers of Cameroonians legally in the United States who may overstay their visas. Their children might be eligible in the future for DACA. If the DACA program is no longer available to such African youth, they may be forced to navigate America’s daunting immigration system. This may include deportation, difficulty in registering for higher education, and lack of work authorization.

Nigerian Major General Ibrahim Manu Yusuf, commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) fighting the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, announced August 7 that 109 Boko Haram fighters and their prisoners had defected on the Nigerian-Cameroonian border. Yusuf said the defection was encouraged by a campaign through which Boko Haram fighters who defect would be pardoned. This specific group of defectors have been taken to the Cameroonian Center for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The facility reportedly was built to accommodate 100 but already has 250 residents. According to Voice of America (VOA), the defectors consisted of forty-five Nigerian and three Cameroonian fighters, forty-five Nigerian children, and sixteen women, characterized as "sex slaves." It is not clear whether the women and children had been kidnapped. One defector said he had joined Boko Haram in return for a promised motorcycle. He said that in the two years he had been part of the movement he had been unable to see his two wives, perhaps implying that his participation was coerced. There are many questions to be answered. Were the defectors coerced into joining Boko Haram? Were the women and children coerced? Or did the defectors include family units? What were the motivations behind joining Boko Haram and then defecting? Finally, what will happen to them now, in an over-crowded rehabilitation facility? Voice of America has expanded its on-the-ground coverage in Borno; it is to be anticipated that there will be more objective reporting on Boko Haram and the MJTF.   

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 1 to 7, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1597073429766'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   August 1: Boko Haram killed eighteen civilians in Mayo-Moskota, Cameroon. August 2: Police officers killed three kidnappers in Etche, Rivers.  August 2: Cultists killed five in Akpabuyo, Cross River.  August 2: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and two others in Konduga, Borno.  August 3: Police officers killed one protestor in Isoko North, Delta.  August 3: Gunmen killed one journalist and one other in Nassarawa Egon, Nassarawa.  August 4: Nigerian troops killed six pirates in Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa.  August 5: Gunmen killed four at a church in Yenegoa, Bayelsa.  August 5: Fulani killed thirty-three in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna.  August 6: Police officers killed ten bandits in Batsari, Katsina.  August 6: Nigerian troops killed ten bandits in Dutsinma, Katsina. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 11 to 17, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1595259109595'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   Last week: July 10: Gunmen killed nine in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna. July 10: Boko Haram killed twenty Nigerian soldiers in Kukawa, Borno. July 10: Boko Haram killed fifteen Nigerian soldiers in Ngala, Borno.  July 10: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Maru, Zamfara.    This week: July 11: Gunmen killed three in Dutsinma, Katsina. July 11: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara.  July 12: Gunmen killed one in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna.  July 12: Gunmen killed two and kidnapped kidnapped twenty in Chikun, Kaduna.  July 13: Kidnappers abducted five in Gassol, Taraba.  July 13: Boko Haram killed eight Nigerian soldiers in Konduga, Borno.  July 13: Boko Haram killed four Nigerian soldiers in Kaga, Borno.  July 13: Boko Haram killed "several" (estimated at ten) civilians in Maiduguri, Borno.  July 14: Nigerian troops killed six bandits in Zurmi, Zamfara.  July 14: Nigerian troops killed four bandits in Danmusa, Katsina.  July 15: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  July 15: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Sabon Birni, Sokoto.  July 17: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Kolofata, Cameroon. 

International Crisis Group, a well-regarded NGO, has issued a thoughtful evaluation of the effort by Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and Niger to coordinate their military efforts against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. The coordinating instrument is the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), authorized by the African Union in 2015 and with a civilian oversight board. Participating states collectively pledged 8,000 troops to the MNJTF. (The Republic of Benin is a member of the MNJTF but contributes no troops.)  Crisis Group notes successes by the MNJTF: instances of troops engaging with Boko Haram across national borders and improved morale among soldiers. However, Crisis Group also notes that Boko Haram factions often quickly regroup after MNJTF operations because such operations are rarely sustained. In fact, Boko Haram appears to be strengthening, especially in northeast Nigeria. According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, the last two years have been deadlier than any other period for Nigerian soldiers since the Boko Haram insurgency began in 2011.   Further, the report finds that participating countries are reluctant to cede command over their own troops to the MNJTF, planning is poorly coordinated, and there is a shortage of funding. Participating countries often have different political goals. For example, Crisis Group suggests that the Nigerian government sees the MNJTF as a fig leaf to cover the Chadian military's operations within Nigerian territory. Further, civilian oversight is weak and poorly funded. To that end, Crisis Group recommends enhanced intelligence coordination, establishing clearer lines of authority, and improving the human rights posture. Those participating in the MNJTF should approach the AU and the EU for increased funding.  The economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the fall in oil prices has weakened the already struggling economies of the MNJTF, and so the prospect of asking the force to do more must be seen in the context of the cash-strapped current climate. But some of the report’s recommendations may not require much in the way of funding, such as trust building among MNJTF participants and better coordination and communication. Beyond its clear-eyed evaluation of the MNJTF, Crisis Group notes the need of participating governments to win the trust of the local populations in the Lake Chad Basin. This implies a political process that is largely absent, though the report makes the important observation that a well-functioning MNJTF could promote trust. That dimension could prove to be more significant than its military operations against Boko Haram.

Maurice Kamto is the leader of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC) and was the main challenger in Cameroon’s 2018 presidential election. He was imprisoned by the government from January to October in 2019. Nearly one year ago, on August 2, 2019, journalist Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe—better known as Wazizi—was arrested and detained by government forces in Buea, located in the South-West region of Cameroon. Since 2017, Buea has been home to unrelenting violence between the government and separatist fighters. For three hundred days after his arrest, despite numerous domestic and international calls to produce Wazizi, authorities in Cameroon remained silent about his fate. This detention was indeed a textbook case of enforced disappearance. Despite holding out bleak hopes that Wazizi might eventually emerge alive, our worst fears came true when we learned he had died in custody following torture.  Like many other critics in Cameroon—including additional journalists—Wazizi was accused of “collaborating with separatists,” though his lawyers claim he had not been charged with any offense prior to his disappearance. I personally experienced this treatment. In early 2019, I was charged by a military court with rebellion and “hostility to the homeland” after my political party—the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (CRM)—staged peaceful protests in major cities, following a rigged presidential election in October 2018. Since that time, I have been repeatedly intimidated by the government and its associated militia groups, often being threatened with arrest and death. Luckily, I am alive today and can raise my voice, while Wazizi can no longer. His commitment to basic freedoms, and his legacy, will surely live on. Importantly as well, his death at the hands of Cameroonian authorities raises major questions about the future of our country. Just last week—for the second year in a row—Cameroon topped the Norwegian Refugee Council’s list of “most neglected crises” worldwide. Our country is hemorrhaging under the boots of a dictatorship. More than ever, we need international assistance. Indeed, for Cameroon to meet the long-subdued aspirations of its people, we must implement a democratic agenda—a viable path forward. The situation demands leadership and it is evident that the current ruling regime is unwilling to exercise the necessary courage. First and foremost, all political prisoners incarcerated in Cameroon must be released—this would include Ayuk Tabe, the Anglophone separatist leader, and Mamadou Yakuba, our first Vice-President at the CRM. Secondly, to ensure that Wazizi’s death is not in vain, the government and key political and civic actors, should agree to a consensual political roadmap that principally includes an overhaul of the electoral system to end the ongoing post-electoral crisis. Lastly, we must agree to definitively end our country’s ongoing civil war in the Anglophone regions. Too often over the years, the government has used conflict to justify the incarceration of journalists like Wazizi and opposition leaders like myself and my colleagues. This is why the international community must organize an all-inclusive dialogue with Cameroonian leaders across the political spectrum. This initiative would ideally fall under the auspices of the United Nations and cooperate directly with African Union leadership and Cameroon’s development partners. For now, it is not yet too late to act. But act we must.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 23 to 29, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1591025961002'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 23: Communal violence resulted in one death in Afikpo, Ebonyi.  May 23: Four cultists were killed in Ifako/Ijaye, Lagos.  May 24: Nigerian troops killed twelve Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  May 26: Nigerian troops killed thirty bandits around Birnin-Magaji/Kiyaw, Zamfara.  May 26: Five Boko Haram militants and two Cameroonian soldiers were killed during a clash in Soueram, Cameroon.  May 27: Communal violence resulted in one death in Awka North, Anambra.  May 27: Bandits killed seventy-four in Sabon Birni, Sokoto.   May 28: Bandits killed thirteen in Faskari LGA and two in Sabuwa LGA in Katsina.  May 28: Gunmen killed five in Bassa, Plateau.  May 29: Kidnappers abducted four in Ika North East, Delta.  May 29: Communal violence resulted in three deaths in Awka North, Anambra.  

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 4 to 10, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1586786037403'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 5: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and ten others in Amchide, Cameroon.  April 6: Nigerian troops killed nineteen Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 6: Nigerian police killed six in a clash over the lockdown in Kaduna South, Kaduna.   April 7: Suspected herdsmen killed one in Oshimili North, Delta.  April 7: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  April 7: Gunmen killed four in Bassa, Plateau.  April 7: Nigerien and Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 7: A military officer and three kidnappers were killed during a shootout in Okene, Kogi.  April 7: Boko Haram killed three in Askira/Uba, Borno.  April 8: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Ukum, Benue.  April 8: Bandits killed one and kidnapped sixteen in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  April 8: Gunmen abducted nine in Chikun, Kaduna.   April 8: The Chadian army said that military operations over the past month had resulted in the deaths of one thousand Boko Haram militants and fifty-two Chadian soldiers in the Lake Chad area.  April 10: Suspected herdsmen killed a pastor in Oshimili North, Delta. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 1 to 7, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1581350858423'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 1: ISWA (Boko Haram) killed three soldiers in Askira/Uba, Borno.  February 1: Bandits killed one and abducted twenty in Borgu, Niger.  February 2: Cult clashes led to seven deaths in Etche, Rivers. February 3: Three were killed during a clash between the police and protesters in Apapa, Lagos.  February 3: Bandits killed six vigilantes in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  February 3: Bandits killed five in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. February 3: Gunmen killed four in Etche, Rivers.  February 4: Herdsmen killed three policemen in Oshimili North, Delta.  February 4: Boko Haram killed two in Extreme-Nord, Cameroon. February 4: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Arochukwu, Abia.  February 4: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  February 4: Gunmen killed four in Eleme, Rivers.  February 5: Gunmen killed three in Kaura, Kaduna.  February 5: Nigerian police killed 250 members of the Ansaru terrorist group (Boko Haram faction) in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna and lost two officers.  February 5: Bank robbers killed four in Ile Oluji/Okeigbo, Ondo.  February 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) ISWA (Boko Haram) militants in Ngala, Borno.  February 6: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ibi, Taraba.  February 6: Nigerian police killed two more Ansaru (Boko Haram faction) commanders in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna and lost one police inspector.  February 7: Boko Haram killed six in Bosso, Diffa, Niger.