Burkina Faso

French President Emmanuel Macron announced on May 10 that French military forces rescued four hostages in Burkina Faso held by Islamist militants. Two were French, one was American, and one was South Korean. The operation cost the lives of two French soldiers. Burkina Faso is now subject to Islamist attacks similar to those in Mali. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has congratulated groups operating in Burkina Faso for swearing allegiance to the Islamic State. In an official statement, the French government thanked Burkina Faso and Benin for there “perfect cooperation;” presumably those two countries also played a role in the rescue. The French minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, in a twitter statement praised the “valuable support of our American allies.” However, she provided no details about what that support was. Whatever the American involvement was, it is unlikely that there were American casualties. France has by far the largest military contingent in West Africa, some 4,500. The United States has been involved in training of the Burkinabe military, so the total number of U.S. troops present is likely small. In comparison with the uproar over the October 2017 death of four American soldiers in Tongo Tongo, Niger, the French public response to these recent military casualties has been muted. The French commonly regard the former French colonies in West Africa, such as Burkina Faso, as Europe’s “near abroad,” and French public opinion is generally supportive of French military operations in the region, so long as they are small.

According to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), a respected and credible human rights non-governmental organization, Burkinabe security services have executed summarily more than 115 civilians in operations against jihadi militants between April 2018 and January 2019. HRW also reports that the Islamists have killed forty-two alleged government collaborators during that same period. Burkina Faso has been dealing with Islamist militant attacks for the last three years, but over the past three months in particular, attacks have accelerated; the Burkinabe government declared a state of emergency in January. In response to accusations of human rights violations, the authorities have acknowledged the charges and stated that they are being investigated. The Burkinabe security services’ murder—for that is what it is—of civilians is tragically reminiscent of the early days of the Boko Haram insurrection in northeast Nigeria. Ever since, abuses by Nigerian security services have been a driver of Boko Haram recruitment. The fear must be that this pattern will reproduce itself in Burkina Faso. To break the cycle, the Burkinabe authorities must conduct a credible investigation—something most observers conclude the Nigerians have failed to do—and bring the perpetrators to justice.  U.S. military assistance is typically contingent on respect for human rights. In February, for example, the U.S. military cut some military aid to Cameroon over human rights abuses associated with operations against the separatist movement in the west. Not only are these abuses counterproductive, it makes it more difficult for France, the United States, and other Western countries to support Burkina Faso in their struggle against jihadist terrorist groups.

Adam Valavanis is a volunteer intern in the Africa program at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. On December 3, police officers killed six terrorists after a security patrol was ambushed in eastern Burkina Faso. Reports from the country in the past year point to a worrying sign that the spread of Islamist terrorism continues unabated in the West African country. Jihadis, many of whom are affiliated with al-Qaeda and other Islamist militant groups active in Mali, now operate in and sometimes control parts of the north and east of the country, many of which are labelled no-go zones due to government’s inability to secure them. The east has historically played host to local militias and crime syndicates, which operate with impunity in a region largely outside of the government’s influence. Islamist terrorism has wracked the Sahel for several years now, but it is a relatively recent phenomenon in Burkina Faso. Its arrival is partly related to the fall from power of former President Blaise Compaore. Popular unrest in response to a failed bid to extend his nearly three decade-long tenure in 2014 pushed Campaore from power. The country’s Western-trained presidential guard, still loyal to the former president, staged a coup to topple the transitional government in 2015. The coup ultimately failed and the presidential guard was subsequently dissolved. The dissolution of the presidential guard left a hole in the Burkinabe security apparatus, providing an opening for jihadist groups to expand in the country. Some believe that the recent spate of attacks have been supported by former members of the presidential guard, who could see these Islamist groups as their way back into power, though no direct evidence to support this is available. Initially, terror groups affiliated with Tuareg rebels in Mali and al-Qaeda primarily operated in the north of the country, along the border with Mali. In 2016, the situation escalated as attacks led by these groups began targeting southern Burkina Faso, including the capital Ouagadougou. This year has seen the spread of Islamist terrorism to the east, along the border with Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Niger.  Both the north and east have long been neglected by the central government, which failed to extend the state security apparatus over the region and invest in the local economy. This negligence has allowed organized crime to flourish in the east making possible the expansion of jihadist groups there. The area is also home to dense forests that provide an ideal landscape for militant groups to evade the government. Compounding the problem, the Burkinabe military has credibly been accused of recent extrajudicial killings and other abuses. This undermines their efforts against jihadis, further allowing them to use the region as a launch pad for attacks in Burkina Faso and across West Africa.   

This is a guest post by Tyler Lycan. Tyler is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program, he recently obtained his Masters in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews, and is a former U.S. Marine. Burkina Faso recently arrested several people accused of plotting a coup d’état planned for October 8. The country has a long history of coups, at one point having more coup attempts than any other on the continent. The last few years have seen a resurgence in Burkinabé coups, with these recent arrests being only the latest chapter. The series of coups that plagued Burkina Faso in the early years of independence, ended, ironically, with a coup. Blaise Compaoré took power in 1987 and ruled as president until he himself was ousted in October 2014. The ousting followed his attempt to extend his term, an effort that was met with fierce resistance from the political class. One year later, Compaoré’s Regiment of Presidential Security (RPS) reacted to an attempt to disband it by staging a coup. This attempt failed and ended with the capture and imprisonment of several leaders. The coup earlier this month was the second attempt by segments of the RPS to put in place a leader more friendly towards them. The coups in 2015 and 2016 are a consequence of measures taken to reduce the likelihood of coups: payoffs. Payoffs are usually done in two main ways: enormous budgets that benefited the entire military, or selecting or creating a “special” unit that received the best training, equipment, and promotions. In the case of Burkina Faso, it was the latter. While payoffs typically insulate the president from coup attempts, as it did for most of Compaoré’s twenty-seven year rule, they also increase the chances of a coup following a change in the head of state. When a new leader comes to power, a unit once lauded with attention may feel threatened. The best way for an entrenched unit to prevent the erosion of its privileged position is to displace the new executive with either an individual from inside the military, or a politician who will continue the favoritism. This is likely the reason for the two most recent coups in Burkina Faso. Ethnicity appears to have played little role in these particular coups. Elsewhere, however, chiefs of state often used ethnicity as their criterion for membership in elite and privileged units. The payoff approach to coup prevention so often coincides with ethnicity that it has its own term: ethnic stacking. Ethnic stacking has been the cause of dozens of coups throughout the world. Democracies throughout Africa have been interrupted and even displaced by coups for decades. Military intervention will likely continue until civilian administrations can exercise stronger control over the military.

The resolution of Burkina Faso’s week-long military coup that temporarily ousted a civilian interim government is a good example of “African solutions to African problems.” The coup was rolled back by the relevant regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under its chair, Senegalese President Mackay Sall. Directly involved in the roll back were the presidents of Ghana, Benin, Togo, Niger, and Nigeria. A lead negotiator was the former ECOWAS Director President, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, now the head of the UN office for West Africa. ECOWAS has long pursued a policy that military coups are not acceptable. The elite presidential guard led by Gilbert Diendere deposed Burkina Faso’s interim civilian government on September 16. The plot leaders are close to deposed dictator Blaise Compaore. Their motivation appears primarily to have been fear that those close to Campaore were going to be excluded from power and influence, first by the interim government and then by the administration that will result from elections initially scheduled for October. Friction between the presidential guard and regular army units also played a role. The coup was denounced by the African Union (AU), the UN Secretary General, and numerous national governments, including those of France and the United States. The AU and ECOWAS were proceeding to levy sanctions on the coup organizers. Civil war threatened when units of the army opposed the elite presidential guard. Civil war was averted by the ECOWAS heads of state meeting in marathon meetings in Abuja. The ECOWAS intermediaries apparently have secured an agreement from all parties that restores the civilian interim government, postpones elections by one month, and military units on all sides have stood down.

This is a guest post by Jean-Yves Ollivier, a French businessman who has spent over forty years involved in peace talks in Africa. He serves as CEO of the Brazzaville Foundation for Peace and Nature Conservation. Judging by the media coverage, everyone seems to be in agreement: since the wind of revolt pushed Blaise Compaoré out of Burkina Faso and finally liberated the “Republic of honourable people” from a "twenty seven year dictatorship," the other “dinosaurs” in power in Africa just have to sit tight and forget about any ideas they had about keeping power. But people have jumped to conclusions regarding the nature of the revolt, the nature of the deposed regime, and the chances of current presidents to keep power. To start with, it was a coup d’état by young people. Whoever saw the revolts in Ouagadougou – whether in real life or on TV – must have realized what demographers have been telling us for years: that 70 percent of the population is under 30 and have never known any other president than Blaise Compaoré. I can remember a thirty-odd year old man shouting at the camera: “Fed up with Compaoré! I have a Master’s degree in law but no job.” Whoever comes to power in Burkina Faso, I’m very afraid that he will remain unemployed…and outraged. The Sahel is not all of Africa. In this southern strip of the Sahara the population growth rate is greater than 3 percent. However, there is but dry earth to scrape and not enough paying jobs for the hordes of young people who haven’t had the right education but dream of what they see on satellite TV night after night. Hence emigration or escape to so-called economic “rackets” or else full-scale contraband including drug trafficking; hence the fundamentalism of new moral economies whether it be Christian born again-style Pentecostal churches or jihadist movements from Ansar Dine in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria to al-Shabaab in Somalia. Data and situations vary from one end of this huge continent to the next. For better or worse, how do you compare the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), rich in every ore, with Burkina Faso? The same goes for the nature of the regimes. This is the second conclusion that has been jumped to and muddles Blaise Compaoré’s government with Joseph Kabila’s in DRC or Paul Biya or Paul Kagamé in Cameroon and Rwanda. The lone commonality between these men is how long they have been in power. Is that enough to conclude that an enduring power is a harsh government or dictatorship? We might as well praise the “cabinet reshuffle.” And, there’s the third sweeping conclusion: wanting to stay in power would surely be “bad” and wrong whilst a change in power would be good and more democratic. In the aftermath of Ouagadougou’s sweeping change, it would seem that the rejection of any constitutional amendment to extend the presidential mandates, whether it is done democratically or not, gives the opponents a rightfulness and support from the international community. However, if the people freely decide to pay a premium for stability by way of a referendum for example, who can stop them? And who’s to say that the young people who ransacked parliament in Ouagadougou represent the people? The army got involved for a reason. The opposition was unable to control its troops. Once in power, will it be capable of ensuring order and respect for property and people? Will it respect liberties and the liberty of those who are against it? It’s too early to tell. If presidents in power want to renew their mandate wherever they are despite existing constitutional constraints, they must reinvent themselves and win over their young populations – that is essential and that will be a determining factor in defining the effect as a domino or a boomerang.

This is a guest post by Molly Rapaport, a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. She recently returned from a Fulbright fellowship in Burkina Faso, where she studied polygamy. Ça chauffe moins pour le moment au Burkina. Things have cooled off in Burkina Faso, where massive protests three weeks ago led to the October 31 resignation of Blaise Compaoré. Blaise, as he is known colloquially, was president for twenty-seven years and intended to remain in power. When his proposed constitutional revision, which would have allowed him to run again in 2015, went to the National Assembly for a vote, hundreds of thousands of Burkinabe citizens protested. Their message, reinforced by burning the parliament building and tearing down a statue of Blaise, was crystal clear. Protest signs combined the president’s name with that of a terrible virus (making “Ebolaise”), and Burkinabe entreated their fellow citizens to “disinfect” themselves. And they did—Blaise ultimately resigned. With French assistance, he fled to Côte d’Ivoire before moving to Morocco. Place de la Nation, a major gathering point in Burkina’s capital of Ouagadougou (known as Ouaga), is now Place de la Révolution. Ouaga denizens cleaned up their streets. Following Blaise’s departure, Burkina recovered quickly. Power settled in the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Zida, second-in-command of Blaise’s presidential guard, who was not concerned by the African Union’s threat of sanctions if he did not transfer power to a civilian within two weeks. Luckily, within that deadline, the constitution was reinstated, a transitional charter was signed by diverse Burkinabe leaders, and on Tuesday, former ambassador to the United Nations Michel Kafando was sworn in as interim president. He will lead Burkina’s transition until elections in November 2015. Zida, for his part, has assumed the post of transitional prime minister, and has been busy at work firing the heads of public corporations close to the Compaoré regime. Zida’s next job will be to appoint a transitional government, and it is rumored that military personnel could occupy several of those posts. Despite the Burkinabe military’s continued prominence in the transition, the United States never labeled it a coup. Blaise had become a U.S. ally, and as part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, the United States has trained Burkinabe troops. Additional U.S. presence in Burkina comes from the diplomatic community, over one hundred Peace Corps Volunteers, and a U.S. military base from which it launches surveillance drones. U.S. recognition of a coup would have required withdrawing this aid from Burkina. As Burkina prepares for elections next year, observers should remain focused on what Blaise’s departure means for the average Burkinabe who overthrew him. While he received praise for maintaining stability and holding elections, Blaise cannot call his tenure a success. Burkina’s GDP grew considerably – 6.5 percent in 2013 – but the corruption of the president and his entourage kept the country poor. GDP per capita in 2013 was just $1,500, the majority of roads are unpaved, and access to electricity, which itself is unreliable, is far from universal. The quality of education remains low and not even a third of the population is literate. Clearly, this did not dampen Burkinabe spirits. It was thrilling to witness the courage of Burkinabe protestors, and the photos were powerful. Burkinabe care about their country, and about democracy; when the army took over following Blaise’s departure, they protested that too. Kafando and Zida have daunting jobs ahead of them and an invested populace to whom they must answer—and the United States should make sure they do. At first, the United States called for power to be transferred to a civilian, and on Sunday, the U.S. ambassador spoke on French radio about the importance of a democratic transition. But the United States can—and should—support this process with more than words. Many Burkinabe appreciate American culture but not what they perceive to be hypocritical American policy toward their country—rhetoric about democracy accompanied by a partnership with Blaise. This is an opportunity for the United States to rectify that, and a recent visit to Ouaga by Bisa Williams, deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, suggests the United States is paying close attention. It should take advantage of this moment and work with Burkinabe to build a democratic government that truly serves its people.

Last year, international attention was riveted by the near humanitarian disaster in the Horn and East Africa caused by prolonged drought. Relevant UN agencies and NGOs were able to mobilize the necessary resources, and a famine of biblical proportions was forestalled, though there were high casualties among children and the elderly. This year, it is West Africa’s turn. A drought that began late last year destroyed much of the harvest, and some communities are running out of food several months before the next harvest is due. According to the national director of Mauritania’s Ministry of Water and Sanitation, a third of its population already suffers from food insecurity. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Cameroon and Nigeria are calling for international assistance. As in East Africa last year, the UN and NGOs are trying to rally international assistance. But, thus far, the international community has pledged only about half of the $650 million dollars needed by the UN alone. NGOs also face funding shortfalls. José Luis Fernandez, regional emergency coordinator of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization points out the advantages of early mobilization with respect to efficiency and costs—to say nothing of lives saved. He notes, for example, that it costs ten to twenty times more to airlift food than to ship it. Droughts have long been feature of Africa. But their frequency and severity appears to accelerating, and the international community needs a better understanding of their causes. The conventional wisdom is that they result from the interrelationship between climate change, population growth, acute poverty, changing migration patterns, conflict and bad governance. No doubt, broadly speaking this is true, if not necessarily helpful for understanding a particular episode. Famine often is localized in its causes and frequently involves political factors, as it did in Somalia last year, where al-Shabaab blocked international aid efforts and Somali children paid with their lives. It can’t be the money. For the international community $650 million is peanuts. After all, the conventional wisdom is that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan was costing the U.S. taxpayer $300 million per day. Perhaps more important in explaining apparent donor lassitude may be factors such as the international community’s limited attention span, compassion fatigue, and frustration over an apparent inability to deal with the root causes of humanitarian disasters. At least in West Africa, there is no al-Shabaab.