• Sub-Saharan Africa
    Africa on the UN Security Council
    First, a primer. The UN Security Council consists of fifteen members. Five are permanent and have the power to veto all resolutions. These member states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, there are ten non-permanent members that are elected for two-year terms by the UN membership in the General Assembly. To be elected as a non-permanent member, a candidate country must receive a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. Countries are divided into regional groups, and, by an agreement of some years standing, each group is assigned a specific number of non-permanent seats. The groups and the number of non-permanent Security Council seats they are assigned as follows: Africa, three; Asia-Pacific, two; Eastern Europe, one; Latin America and the Caribbean, two; and Western Europe and Others, two. If there are closely matched rivals for a regional non-permanent seat it is possible to have prolonged deadlock in the voting due to the two-thirds requirement. There have been cases of more than a hundred votes before a compromise was reached. At present, the three African seats are held by Nigeria, Chad, and Rwanda. The terms of Nigeria and Chad expire in December 2015; Rwanda’s term expires in December 2014. Angola is the only African country to have declared its candidacy for the seat now held by Rwanda. Angola’s candidacy is strong. It has served before as a non-permanent member, in 2003-2004. It enjoys the support of the South African Development Community and the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community. The Angolan government claims the endorsement of permanent members of the Security Council. Angola as a non-permanent Council member would provide linguistic balance in the Africa group: Nigeria is Anglophone, Chad is Francophone, and Angola is Lusophone: English, French, and Portuguese are the principle European languages spoken in Africa. The Security Council is especially important to Africa. It is responsible for UN peacekeeping missions, more of which are located in Africa than on any other continent. Support for reform of the Security Council is widespread in Africa. Nigeria and South Africa have campaigned for permanent seats on the Council, and each advances its candidacy for a permanent ‘African’ seat. Most Africans who follow the United Nations also advocate for the abolition of the veto power by permanent members. Other states urging for reform of the Security Council include Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. However, reform of the Security Council is a long way off. Reform would require the approval of all five of the permanent members, and that is not in the cards. Reform of the Council would, in effect, reduce the present power of the permanent members.
  • China
    Brazil: A New Tiger in Africa?
    Americans sometimes think that the Chinese in Africa are ten feet tall.  But, other countries are more quietly expanding their African economic and political ties:  India and South Korea come to mind.  A must-read August 8 story in the New York Times highlights the increasingly important Brazilian presence. Brazil has the largest population of African descent outside of Africa and had close links particularly with Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau during the days of the Portuguese empire. In Nigeria, a Yoruba traditional ruler told me that he regularly visited his “subjects” in Brazil’s northeast. Brasilia’s current focus on Africa, however, is much more recent.  It is usually dated from the administration of President Lula (2003-2010) and reflects Brazil’s remarkable economic development and the search for new trade and investment venues– according to the Times, Brazil has displaced Britain as the world’s sixth largest economy.  Brazil’s presence in Africa is also diplomatic – there are now thirty-six Brazilian embassies in Africa, compared with forty-four American embassies.  Brazil also has a small aid program. In my view, the expanded Brazilian interest and presence in Africa is win-win.  Brazilian trade and investment will promote African economic development.  Brazil is a democracy:  its greatly enhanced diplomatic presence can only encourage the development of African democracy conducted according to the rule of law.  And Brazil may be able to exercise positive influence in those places where there is ambiguity about the United States, such as Angola.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Angola’s Dos Santos Supporting Gbagbo
    Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos talks to journalists after a signature agreement ceremony held at Sao Bento Palace in Lisbon March 11, 2009. (Hugo Correia/Courtesy Reuters) Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, in many ways a throwback to the African “Big Men” of a previous generation, looks like he is trying to derail sub-Saharan democracy where he can. He is clearly worried about what the North African “democratic wave” means for his own regime. Human Rights Watch reports that dos Santos has arrested Angolan advocates and journalists ahead of a planned pro-democracy rally in Luanda that was then canceled. The human rights organization places those arrests in the context of broader regime-sponsored intimidation of journalists, democracy advocates, and opposition political leaders. Dos Santos is also backing strong man Laurent Gbagbo in his struggle with Alassane Ouattara, whom the international community regards as the legal president of Cote d’Ivoire. But dos Santos may also be providing more than diplomatic support for Gbagbo. The Economist reports that dos Santos has dispatched Angolan soldiers to provide security for the presidential palace where Gbagbo is living. The Economist also notes rumors that Angola has lent money to the Cote d’Ivoire president so that he can circumvent internationally-imposed economic sanctions and the closing of international banks in Abidjan. If the latter is true, Angolan financial support could be crucial for Gbagbo, enabling him to continue to pay the Ivorian army—essential if he is to retain its loyalty and hang on to power. [cetsEmbedGmap src=http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&ll=-12.382928,13.183594&spn=62.929099,108.720703&z=4&msid=215110937314986215762.00049e8c88c70c14f334d width=285 height=212.5 marginwidth=0 marginheight=0 frameborder=0 scrolling=no]
  • Angola
    Toward an Angola Strategy
    Peace has become a reality in Angola since the end of its bloody, twenty-seven-year civil war in 2002. However, much work remains to be done if Angola is to become a democratic state with an inclusive and prosperous society. It is in the interest of the United States to help develop a sustainable and lasting peace in Angola—not only for the security of U.S. energy supplies, but also to promote stability in southern Africa. In so doing, the United States must tread carefully, because while Angola's leaders respect and, at heart, want a strong relationship with the United States, there are many in Angola who—based in part on the history of U.S.-Angola relations—are suspicious of American policy. The mission of the Council's Center for Preventive Action (CPA) is to help prevent, defuse, or resolve conflicts in countries or regions that may otherwise be overlooked. After a careful assessment of the country, the CPA's Independent Preventive Action Commission finds Angola to be an emerging power on the African continent, one with the potential to realize long-term stability and prosperity. Sensitive that any proposals must not exceed the reach of American power and influence—and recognizing that stamping out corruption or producing respect for democracy in a manner Americans would recognize, especially after centuries of Portuguese colonial rule in the country and decades of civil war, is a long-term goal—the commission aimed to be realistic in its recommendations. The commission believes that the United States should firmly and clearly state that nurturing U.S.-Angola relations is important to the United States. In addition to increased diplomatic attention and sustained assistance, the United States can take steps to advance shared objectives through more regular bilateral discussions, cooperation with multilateral organizations, and innovative partnerships with private enterprises.
  • Angola
    The Repatriation of Angolan Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
    1. What we know: The United Nations hopes that the peace process in Angola is irreversible. The disarmament of the National Union of the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) military forces has been completed. There has been no violation of the cease-fire since the signing of the agreement between the parties on April 4, 2002. The first phase of the Angolan peace process, military disarmament, has been completed. The second phase, restructuring and strengthening of the political process, is now underway. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1433 created a UN Mission in Angola (UNMA). The six month-long mission, scheduled to end in February 2003, has a mandate to assist with political and humanitarian matters. This includes the protection and promotion of human rights and the building of institutions to consolidate peace and enhance the rule of law. In addition, the mission mandate includes facilitating and coordinating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs). A Joint Commission has been the principal forum to discuss the problems and define solutions to secure the peace. Once the UNMA mandate ends, UN agencies will continue working in Angola in normal ways. The Angolan government has accepted responsibility to resolve the problem of human displacement caused by nearly three decades of conflict. The legal and policy framework in Angola for repatriation, established in May 2002, incorporated by reference the guidelines on internal displacement of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. However, there are no mechanisms in place yet to monitor compliance with the Angolan government’s regulamento for the Norms on the Resettlement of Displacement Populations. International refugee repatriation arrangements are measurable against guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and are normally implemented and facilitated through host country programming. Negotiations are on-going in relation to a series of tripartite agreements between the Angolan government, UNHCR, and refugee hosting governments in the region. After almost three decades of civil war, there is an enormous amount of internal and external human displacement. It is estimated that there are nearly 500,000 Angolan refugees in Zambia, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia and South Africa (70,000 of whom have already returned according to UNHCR). There are also an estimated 4.1 million IDPs, of which 80,000 are former UNITA soldiers, and 160,000 are other individuals who were formerly mobilized. There is great concern over how these populations can be safely demobilized, resettled and reintegrated. UNHCR estimates that 860,000 IDPs have already returned home. Many camps for these uprooted persons have been set up by the military. The Angolan government has announced that the camps will remain open until the end of the year. This will facilitate access by international agencies to needy people during this period. But there is a concern by NGOs that closure of the camps in the coming rainy season would cause extreme hardship on account of lack of shelter and food insecurity in the country. Abuse, in particular of young women, has been reported. Many children have been placed in orphanages with inadequate care and supplies. But no government structures currently exist to address these problems. The Angolan government specifically lacks the local capacity to receive and integrate returnees. 2. What we don’t know: Whether the peace in Angola is sustainable remains uncertain. The demobilization and reintegration process of ex-combatants is a serious, long-term issue. Although the military forces have been disarmed, the military structure and hierarchy remain in place. The UNITA command structure remains tight, and former soldiers, largely residing in camps, could be mobilized in a short period of time. Many of the camps set up by the military are in areas very far from the necessary resources and services. One meeting participant, having recently returned from one of the camps, suggested that international agencies provide assistance in camps that would alleviate suffering as well as create a greater sense of security and self-sufficiency amongst the inhabitants. Another participant argued that the focus should be on long-term development rather than on immediate humanitarian aid. How international agencies help to fill the gap between relief and development will be a central question for the future. One of the greatest challenges will be how to address the prospect of repatriation into conditions that cannot support new populations, with the danger of growing alienation on the part of returnees. This issue is a potential threat to the future stability of Angola. Among the other major challenges identified was the need for adequate programs of demining. It was noted that the issue of spontaneous resettlement could produce tensions over land. Questions of transitional justice for war criminals are likely to arise. There is also a debate on the degree of UNITA involvement in the reintegration of IDPs and refugees. There will be a key role for the international financial institutions in Angola’s recovery. Angola is considered resource rich, particularly in terms of oil reserves. But this raises fundamental questions about fiscal integrity, transparency, and corruption. Human rights enforcement is an issue as well. Elections may occur in 2004, and could provide a measure of progress with respect to the quality of governance. But Angola’s political future, while hopeful, remains uncertain. 3. What are the next steps; what should be done and by whom? Among the most daunting long-term issues confronting Angola now is the resettlement of IDPs and refugees. The United Nations has been involved in the process of repatriation. A collaborative effort between the Angolan government, the UN, NGOs, and business interests will be needed in order to help make return sustainable. It is crucial to address potential donor government concerns about indigenous fiscal integrity, restructuring provincial governments, and building local infrastructure. The implications for the return of IDPs and refugees, moreover, are profound. Therefore, these key issues will be examined in depth in subsequent CFR meetings. In particular, an effort will be made to marshal comparative experiences from elsewhere in the world in order to apply past lessons to these daunting challenges. The objective will be to assist the UN to help the Angolan government and its people to help themselves.