Southeast Asia

Overview Competition between the United States and a rising China has shaped the contours of global politics, security, and economics since the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, the perspectives of Southeast Asian countries, where this great power rivalry has far-reaching consequences, are often overlooked. To acquire a more nuanced understanding of Southeast Asian views of U.S.-China competition across a range of issues—including maritime disputes, trade and investment, and transnational security challenges—the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Lowy Institute for International Policy convened prominent scholars, think tank representatives, and current and former government officials for a workshop in Singapore on April 3–5, 2016.  The report, which you can download here, summarizes the discussion's highlights. The report reflects the views of workshop participants alone; CFR takes no position on policy issues.  Framing Questions for the Workshop The Role of the United States and China in Southeast Asia What role do Southeast Asian states want the United States and China to play in the region? How do their visions compare with those of the United States and China for the region? To what extent should the United States continue to exert leadership in Southeast Asia? How do different Southeast Asian states view the rise of China? Is China perceived as a regional security threat or as a potential economic partner? Should a leading Southeast Asian state, or ASEAN members collectively, seek to balance the United States and China in the region? Regional Trade and Investment Architecture What is the best regional trade and investment architecture for Southeast Asia? Do Southeast Asian states see the Transpacific Partnership; the One Belt, One Road initiative; and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as competing or complementary? How do they view the rise of new institutions, such as China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS’ New Development Bank? To what extent can the United States and China cooperate economically in the region? Regional Maritime Issues What are the priorities of Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea? How do Southeast Asian states view China’s activities in the South China Sea? What are the prerequisites for concluding a binding South China Sea Code of Conduct among China and ASEAN members? What steps should the United States, China, and Southeast Asian states take to strengthen communication, reduce tensions, decrease the risk of accidents, and prevent the unintentional escalation of conflict in the South China Sea? What role should the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), play in arbitrating maritime disputes among regional actors? To what degree does the failure of the United States to ratify UNCLOS undermine its credibility in the region? Transnational Security Issues in Southeast Asia What are the domestic and transnational security concerns of Southeast Asian states? How do states in the region view U.S. and Chinese counterterrorism policies? To what degree is the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia linked to events in the Middle East and North Africa? What are the other domestic and transnational security concerns of Southeast Asian States? How can the United States and China help Southeast Asian states build their capacities to confront their most pressing security concerns? The Future of ASEAN In light of competition between the United States and China, what role should ASEAN play in promoting regional order, economic prosperity, and security? How do recent measures to institutionalize ASEAN bolster its capacity to do so? What are the prospects for further integration among ASEAN member states? To what extent should ASEAN partner with, or balance against, the United States and China? Following U.S. President Barack Obama’s summit with ASEAN leaders in February, what are the prospects for intensified U.S.-ASEAN cooperation, and what are the regional implications vis-à-vis China?

Overview Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Senior Fellow Joshua Kurlantzick analyzes the effects of the Obama administration's pivot on Southeast Asia and argues that the United States should refocus its Southeast Asia policy in two ways: prioritize the countries of peninsular Southeast Asia and restore the emphasis on democracy and human rights in the region. The U.S. rebalance to Asia involves building relations with countries in mainland Southeast Asia once shunned by Washington because of their autocratic governments, and reviving close U.S. links to Thailand and Malaysia. The Obama administration has also upgraded defense partnerships throughout the region, followed through on promises to send high-level officials to Southeast Asian regional meetings, and increased military-to-military cooperation. Kurlantzick contends that the White House has focused too much on the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, at the expense of attention to the countries of peninsular Southeast Asia—Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore—that are of greater value strategically and economically. Second, increased U.S. ties with mainland Southeast Asia have facilitated political regression in the region by empowering brutal militaries, condoning authoritarian regimes, and alien­ating young Southeast Asian democrats. A shift in Southeast Asia policy would allow the United States to better align Asia policy with democratic values and maximize the strategic benefits of U.S. interest in the region.

Overview Since the late 2000s, Southeast Asia's democratization has stalled and, in some of the region's most economically and strategically important nations, gone into reverse. The region's rollback from democracy reflects a worrying global retrenchment toward anti-democratic political change, with significant implications for freedom, health, and prosperity locally and consequences for U.S. interests around the world. Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia Joshua Kurlantzick details the region's startling democratic regression, assesses the reasons behind this recent stagnation, examines the role of the United States, and offers recommendations for policy options to help support the foundations of democracy in Southeast Asia. This new paper builds on the topic of his most recent book, Democracy in Retreat (Yale University Press, 2013), which identifies forces that threaten democracy and shows that conventional wisdom has blinded world leaders to an ongoing crisis. This publication has been made possible by the generous support of the Open Society Foundations and the Starr Foundation.

Overview In a region largely bereft of regional organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been the most significant multilateral group in Asia for the past forty-five years. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has largely achieved its initial purpose of preventing Southeast Asia from further outbreaks of war following the Indochina Wars, and has also accomplished several notable achievements in the economic and nonproliferation realms. Yet ASEAN today lags woefully behind its full potential. Unlike other regional institutions, ASEAN does not maintain a peacekeeping force, have the authority to enforce human rights, or posses a formal mechanism for conflict resolution. Most Western leaders and even many of Southeast Asia's top officials do not consider the organization capable of handling serious economic or security challenges, including disputes in the South China Sea. In this International Institutions and Global Governance program Working Paper, Joshua Kurlantzick analyzes the major obstacles facing ASEAN today and prescribes recommendations for the both the United States and ASEAN that will enable ASEAN to firmly establish itself as the essential regional organization in Asia.

Over the past year, Myanmar, ruled for five decades by the military, has undergone its most dramatic reforms in decades. A new civilian government has begun opening the economy, freeing political prisoners, relaxing censorship, and allowing the opposition to reenter politics. The reforms offer the best chance for change in Myanmar in fifty years and a rare window that American policymakers should not miss. To respond, the United States should launch a new conditional normalization that is far more comprehensive than the White House's current policy. Working with other industrialized democracies, the United States should be prepared to provide a large new aid package, upgrade relations, push for Myanmar's reentry into global organizations, and potentially end sanctions—if, in return, Myanmar continues to move toward holding free elections, ending its insurgencies, and demonstrating real transparency about its weapons programs. Through this policy shift, the United States could prevent instability that could spread to Thailand, India, and other partners; stop Myanmar's development of nuclear programs; and help promote democratization in one of the world's most repressive countries. The Situation From 1962 until 2010, Myanmar was ruled by the military. In November 2010, the military held elections to create a new parliament. These elections were considered neither free nor fair: 25 percent of seats were reserved for the army, and army-backed parties dominated the election. Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy, boycotted the election because of its unfairness. Yet in 2011 the parliament has surprised everyone. Besides releasing prisoners and promoting an end to censorship, the government this month set the stage for new elections in which Suu Kyi will run, potentially putting her in parliament for the first time ever. The government has also vowed to end decades of insurgencies by ethnic minority militias in northern and northeastern Myanmar. One of the militias, the United Wa State Army, is considered among the most powerful narcotrafficking groups in the world. By ending the insurgencies, the government could restore central authority to these regions, making it easier to confront narcotrafficking. Though some skepticism is warranted, there is significant reason to believe this glasnost is real. Observers who have met Myanmar's new president, Thein Sein, including Suu Kyi, describe him as genuinely dedicated to reform as no one from the regime has been in decades. He apparently understands how far Myanmar, with a per capita GDP of roughly $3,000, has fallen behind once-comparable neighbors like Thailand, and he already has taken steps toward liberalization that will be hard to reverse. By boosting ties with the West, Thein Sein also would reduce Myanmar's strategic dependence on China. Just as important, liberalization through Thein Sein, rather than a democratic uprising, might allow senior generals to retire with their wealth intact. The Stakes In the past five years, Myanmar has assumed greater strategic significance to the United States. Evidence has emerged of the regime importing nuclear and missile technology from North Korea. Military officials from North Korea appear to be working in underground facilities in Myanmar. Thailand and the United States have intercepted suspicious North Korean ships offloading machine tools with no use in Myanmar's civilian economy. In such an opaque environment, it is not hard to imagine nuclear technology slipping out of Myanmar and into the hands of terrorist groups. Worse, continued repressive rule in Myanmar would prolong the ethnic minority insurgencies, which have made some areas ungovernable. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled ethnic minority regions, potentially destabilizing Thailand, India, and southwestern China. The refugee exodus has also created one of the worst HIV/AIDS crises in Asia. Finally, Myanmar and its offshore regions reportedly contain among the ten largest deposits of petroleum in the world. Despite the country's growing importance, and the shift in the Myanmar government's actions, U.S. policy has changed only marginally in two decades. In 1997, responding to human rights abuses, Congress imposed sanctions, and it has renewed sanctions every year since. The Obama administration has attempted to alter policy cautiously, worried about being overruled by Congress. It has appointed a new special envoy and held out the prospect of further policy shifts following a "fact-finding" trip to the country by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton this week. How to Proceed Opportunity for liberalization in Myanmar is extremely rare; by engaging now, the United States can help prevent retrenchment by hard-liners, build relations with the country's future leaders, and significantly boost American influence at this most critical time. To take advantage of this opportunity, the United States should pursue a policy of conditional normalization that makes clear to the Myanmar leadership what it stands to gain if it makes substantial progress in achieving three goals: moving toward a free election in 2015, developing a solution to its insurgencies, and making its nuclear programs more transparent. To verify Myanmar is achieving these goals, the United States and its partners would follow Myanmar's progress in preparing for a free election, insist that independent inspectors be allowed in to observe and potentially dismantle Myanmar's nuclear program, and monitor the government's progress in achieving permanent written ceasefires. Because the Myanmar leadership has been isolated for so long and is so unpredictable, Washington and its partners need to lay out this clear road map to Myanmar's government. Launch a Significant Aid Package. The United States should immediately launch a new aid package, to be coordinated with the EU, Australia, and Japan. The Obama administration has made some small suggestions of new aid, but the United States now channels nearly all aid to groups working from outside Myanmar. Instead, the United States should use sanctions waivers to create a package totaling at least $200 million. This money would be delivered inside the country and would include assistance to combat HIV/AIDS, support microfinance in rural areas, and rebuild the country's devastated educational system, among other initiatives. To ensure the aid is not siphoned off by government ministries, American aid organizations would have to produce twice-yearly reports to Congress of how they are disbursing the aid. Upgrade Diplomatic Relations. More than many other governments, Myanmar craves international prestige, perhaps because the country was isolated for so long. Beyond the Clinton visit, Washington should upgrade its embassy in Myanmar to include an ambassador—it is now run by a charge d'affaires—and push for Myanmar to be reintegrated into the World Bank, IMF, and other international institutions. Promote Accountability. Realistically, Myanmar's senior generals are unlikely to allow reforms to be consolidated if they believe change will result in their prosecution. The country's political situation is so unstable that the United States and its partners should allow the generals to avoid international prosecution as long as they retire permanently. Although the White House is still backing a UN commission on war crimes in Myanmar, the United States should instead encourage a truth and reconciliation commission be set up inside Myanmar, possibly modeled on other Southeast Asian examples such as East Timor. However, for the generals to obtain this amnesty, the senior military leadership would have to formally retire and permanently cut its ties to any political parties. Remove Sanctions. The last reward would be the most substantial: dropping all U.S. sanctions on investment in Myanmar and coordinating with the EU, Australia, and Japan to end their sanctions as well. Once the United States removes sanctions it would be difficult to reinstate them, so this should be the last of the four initiatives, taken only when Washington and its partners are convinced that progress toward peace, free elections, permanently dismantling any nuclear and missile programs, and ending insurgencies cannot be reversed. Building Support for Normalization Although this strategy is far more ambitious than the White House's current plans, there is reason for optimism that the Obama administration could build support for it in Congress and among partners in Europe and Asia. Even in Congress, some leaders see the potential for a new relationship with Myanmar, given the United States' strategic interests and how Myanmar is changing rapidly. And up until the United States ends sanctions, any policy changes can be reversed, without damaging American prestige: the human rights situation in Myanmar is unlikely to get worse simply because Washington engaged and then reversed, while the United States would have shown Myanmar citizens, and America's Asian partners, that it tried its best to work with the regime. Already, American diplomats report that the EU, Australia, and possibly even India will be willing to follow the United States' lead on a new Myanmar policy. Finally, there is room for considerable U.S.-China cooperation in addressing Myanmar's nuclear program and its internal conflicts. China does not consider Myanmar a "core interest" or a formal ally like North Korea, yet Myanmar's instability spills over China's borders, and Beijing is unable to address problems like refugees unilaterally. As long as the Obama administration shows this new normalization policy is not designed to replace China's influence in Myanmar, it will find many complementary interests with Beijing.