Religion

A car burns at the scene of a bomb explosion at St. Theresa Catholic Church at Madalla, Suleja, just outside Nigeria's capital Abuja, December 25, 2011. (Afolabi Sotunde/Courtesy Reuters)   While I had said I would not post again until January 3, I felt this weekend’s attacks in Nigeria warranted a response. ’Boko Haram’, a highly de-centralized Islamic radical movement, has allegedly claimed responsibility for attacks on Christian churches in an Abuja suburb and elsewhere in the North and the Middle Belt over the Christmas weekend. Reports of incidents and casualties are incomplete. However, estimates of civilian casualties range up to seventy and there are reports that the security services also killed about sixty suspected members of Boko Haram in Yobe state. While Boko Haram has murdered Christian clergy and attacked churches before, it has primarily targeted representatives of state and federal governments, such as police officers, soldiers,  politicians, and even traditional Muslim leaders. Boko Haram may be intent on showing Nigerians and the international community that it can make the country ungovernable for President Goodluck Jonathan’s predominately southern Christian administration in Abuja. Attacks on Christian churches on one of the two principal Christian holidays of the year drive that point home and ensured international press attention. For example, some American media paired the attacks with Pope Benedict XVI’s call for peace--thereby introducing Boko Haram to parts of the international community that hitherto had not been paying much attention. Boko Haram may also seek to demonstrate that it can strike anywhere--and some Western media seem to draw that conclusion. In fact, the Christmas attacks did not take place in areas outside of Boko Haram’s usual theater of operations. Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for attacks in Abuja and Damaturu previously. Similar bombings happened on the Christmas holiday last year in Jos, which has been the center of local and religious and ethnic conflict for a decade, and whose Christian governor is widely unpopular among the state’s Muslim population. Notably, an alleged spokesman for Boko Haram cited revenge for killings of Muslims and the government’s refusal to protect Muslims to justify the bombing. Boko Haram may seek to provoke retaliatory Christian killings of Muslims outside of the North, thereby promoting the fragmentation of the country. Fringe groups in the Niger Delta have already threatened to kill Northern Muslims living in that region, and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the mainstream Christian umbrella group, has said that Christians should "defend themselves." There is anecdotal evidence that some Northern Muslims living in southern states have returned home out of fear. Finally, the Christmas attacks may indicate that Boko Haram is increasingly identifying Christianity with the Jonathan government, and possibly with the hated police and security services. A White House spokesman has stated that the United States "pledges to assist" the Nigerian federal government in "bringing those responsible to justice." Such identification of the United States with the Jonathan administration may result in Boko Haram attacks on American targets. However, there are few of them to be found in those parts of Nigeria where Boko Haram has operated up to now. What does Boko Haram want? As a diffuse movement, there is no charismatic leader, no ’politburo’, and no manifesto. Boko Haram rhetoric is focused on the application off Islamic religious law and justice for the poor. But, it doubtlessly includes nihilistic and criminal elements as well. A common thread appears to be hatred for the secular government in Abuja, certain governors, and parts of the traditional Islamic establishment it sees as having sold out. It is premature to see the Christmas attacks as more coordinated than those carried out by Boko Haram in the past. Nor do they necessarily indicate enhanced relations between Boko Haram and international jihadist movements, as some commentators are concluding. Boko Haram seems to be financing itself through bank robberies and is arming itself by thefts from government armories and purchases -- there is no shortage of weapons on the market in Nigeria. So, it is not necessary to look for a "foreign hand" to account for Boko Haram’s current operations.

Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi (C) leans on the shoulders of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (centre R) and President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh (centre L) as they laugh during a photocall before the second Afro-Arab Summit in Sirte October 10, 2010. (Asmaa Waguih/Courtesy Reuters) Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi’s relations with Nigeria were ambiguous and complex. He maintained a regular dialogue with both military and civilian governments in Abuja, though usually outside normal diplomatic channels. Nevertheless, within the past year, he gratuitously called for the splitting of Nigeria into two countries, one Christian, the other Muslim. Among Nigeria’s Muslims, he was praised for providing significant financial support for Muslim institutions, including the Murtala Mohammed mosque in Kano. Many Nigerian Muslims were repelled by Qaddafi’s murder and the subsequent desecration of his remains, saying that because of his work on behalf of international Islam he should be forgiven. Among Nigerian Christians, Qaddafi was often something of a bogeyman. They suspected him of financially supporting radical Islamic groups in the North, as well as legitimate Muslim institutions and charities. However, at the time, his call for the breakup of Nigeria received some support from anti-Islamic, often Pentecostal clergy. The chairman of the Nigerian Council of Ulamas expressed the ambiguous views of many Muslim Nigerians about Qaddafi: “The killing of Qaddafi should serve as a lesson to Nigerian and world leaders ranging from local government chairmen to governors and so on. They should know that the most important thing a leader should do is to continue to be just to his followers, going by what has happened to a renowned leader like Qaddafi who had made his mark in the international community. Look at how he has ended in the hands of criminals who call themselves liberators of the Libyan people.” Nigeria, a current, non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, voted in support of the resolution authorizing NATO action to protect Libyans from Qaddafi. However, as the NATO mission unfolded, many Nigerians, especially Northern Muslims, became increasingly critical of it. According to the press, negative reaction to Qaddafi’s killing in the predominately Muslim North has resulted in the Nigerian security services taking “proactive measures” to “forestall the breakdown of law and order.” In particular, the police have increased their check points, especially in Kaduna and Maiduguri. According to the Kaduna state police commissioner, “In view of the news of the demise of the hitherto strongman of Libya and its condemnation in some quarters of the society, the Kaduna State Police Command has increased its patrols both foot and vehicular in the entire state so that mischief makers will not cash in and take advantage to cause mayhem.” A spokesman for the State Security Service said that surveillance of religious leaders, especially preaching, had increased: “We have identified some people who had started devising tactics to cause havoc in the state, but we are closing in on them and we will make sure they are isolated.” Northern Nigeria remains a tinder box, with regular killings that the government blames on “Boko Haram,” a radical Muslim movement, and widespread alienation from the Abuja government. So, the enhanced security measures are no surprise. But, rough security service behavior – including allegations of extra-judicial killings and ubiquitous shake-downs at police checkpoints – has probably made the security situation worse in Maiduguri and other parts of the North. For many Muslims, the “face” of the Abuja government is the police, who are widely hated and are often targeted for killing by radical groups. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask whether further beefing up the police and the military now in the North is wise or whether it will merely increase that region’s alienation from the Abuja government.

A signboard is seen from the Indian side of the Indo-China border at Bumla, in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh on November 11, 2009. (Adnan Abidi/Courtesy Reuters) Last week, I joined my colleagues Paul Stares, Dan Markey, and Micah Zenko in Delhi for a few days of discussions with senior Indian officials, experts, and journalists. We covered a fair amount of the U.S.-India political waterfront, including bilateral relations, China, Pakistan, and broader Asia. The discussions were quite lively: a great thing about foreign policy experts in India is that there are as many opinions expressed as there are people—a breath of fresh air after more constrained or sometimes just strained discussions with Chinese counterparts. While the variety of views we heard makes it hard to generalize, some common themes emerged. Put in rather stark terms, they boil down to: Beijing is not trustworthy An overarching theme was China’s growing “confidence, hubris, and economic ascension.” Some Indians argued that China is challenging the existing power equation and trying to limit the extent of any other power in the region, particularly the United States and India. Not surprisingly, worry over China’s intentions in South and Southeast Asia was paramount—and continued Chinese territorial claims to Arunachal Pradesh in northeast India were a central source of concern. (India has reportedly just sited missiles in the region.) At the same time, the Indians with whom we met generally admired China’s ability to get things done, particularly in terms of modernizing the country and developing the infrastructure. They would like to benefit more from China’s market (wouldn’t we all?) and are pushing hard to get the Chinese to open their doors to Indian pharmaceuticals and IT industries. Trade with China is booming, but India is rapidly looking at the same type of trade imbalance that the United States suffers with China. The Indians apparently spend as much time as we in the United States do in WTO adjudication over Chinese intellectual property rights infringement. The United States is also untrustworthy Generally, our Indian interlocutors—many of whom have spent significant time living in the United States—appreciate the free and frank dialogue that they have with their U.S. counterparts. They recognize the shared value of democracy as a key component of the relationship and see cooperating to advance common ideals such as freedom of navigation, transparency, etc. They worry greatly, however, about the steadfastness of America’s commitment to India, particularly if the United States is forced to choose between India and China. President Obama’s failure to meet with the Dalai Lama before his trip to Beijing in 2009 was cited as one example in which the United States sacrificed principle (and presumably India) in order to improve relations with China. They also wanted to know the U.S. position on Arunachal Pradesh, and whether Washington would be willing to take on Beijing on this issue. Some of the calls for greater demonstrations of U.S. fealty to India may well have been a bit of political gamesmanship, but there was a core of not unreasonable concern over the extent to which the United States is a dependable political partner. Ergo India will find its own way forward Not surprisingly, the end-game is that India will chart its own course, relying overwhelmingly on no-one but itself. It is true that much of Indian foreign policy allies nicely with U.S. aims at the moment. For example, India is expanding its relations with countries throughout Asia, such as Australia and Japan (apparently a favorite of PM Singh), as well as advancing ties with more politically sensitive players, such as Taiwan and North Korea. Such a strengthening of relations among various Asian nations is precisely what the United States is seeking to keep Chinese assertiveness at bay. At the same time, on issues that cross business with politics, such as Iran, Sudan, and Burma/Myanmar, India is far more inclined to see common interest with China. India, unlike China, might support democratic transition in Burma, but unlike the United States has strong reservations about breaching sovereignty to promote democracy. In the United Nations, for example, India is far more likely to ally with China’s position on sanctions and sovereignty than with that of the United States. All of this suggests to me that however much Washington would like to partner with India in much the same way that it cooperates with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, that scenario is probably wishful thinking. Instead, Washington can take advantage of where interests with Delhi overlap—on China for example—but move cautiously on issues such as advancing India’s desire for a seat on the UN Security Council, where our interests diverge far more than coincide.  

A decade after 9/11, U.S. Muslims grapple with their place in American society in the face of concerns about homegrown terrorism and questions by non-Muslims over the threat they might pose.

Britain's Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip (R) attend the ninth Inauguration of the General Synod at Westminster Abbey, as the Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams (L) and the Archbishop of York John Sentamu, 'Exchange the Peace', in central London November 23, 2010. (POOL New/Courtesy Reuters) Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, has asked to meet with Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe during a pastoral visit to Zimbabwe next month, according to his office. As of now, Mugabe has not responded. The archbishop and the churches of the Anglican Communion have strongly criticized Mugabe’s human rights abuses and bad governance. In 2007, the then-bishop of Harare, Norbert Kunonga, a long-time Mugabe supporter, sought to take his diocese out of the Anglican Communion. Accordingly,  the church deposed him and chose a new bishop, Chad Gandiya. But, Kunonga continues to enjoy Mugabe’s support, and a pro-Mugabe judge has given him "custody" of church property pending a high court ruling. In the meantime, there are numerous reports of pro-government goons threatening supporters of Bishop Gandiya. Kunonga says that he left the Anglican Communion because of its tolerance of homosexuality, which is anathema to Mugabe and perhaps most Zimbabweans. Mugabe supporters say that he is also seeking to ’Africanize’ a colonial institution. I suspect it is not so straightforward. Some around Mugabe think that Anglicans in Zimbabwe disproportionately support the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Morgan Tsvangirai. They also bitterly resent the criticism of Anglicans worldwide of the Mugabe regime. (The Archbishop of York -- of Ugandan heritage – literally cut up his clerical collar on television and said he would not wear it until Mugabe was removed from power.) Race, as always, probably plays a role. In the past, when Mugabe felt threatened by the opposition MDC, he turned against white farmers who he accused of bankrolling the party. Now, in the run up to elections, he’s turning against some of his most vocal critics, the Anglican Church. The Archbishop of Canterbury is going to central Africa in a pastoral capacity, not as a representative of the British government. (No high-level British political figure has visited Zimbabwe since 1991.) But, his visit, whether or not Mugabe sees him, will highlight the travails of the Anglican Church in Zimbabwe and the regime’s apparent effort to dominate it. Mugabe himself is (or once was) a Roman Catholic.

Western Europe’s burgeoning Islamic population continues to spark concerns about Muslim assimilation and a cultural divide.

President Barack Obama meets with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama in the Map Room of the White House on July 16, 2011. (Pete Souza/Courtesy The White House) Is it ritualized noise or does China really mean it? Here is what the Chinese Foreign Ministry had to say about President Obama’s July 16 meeting with the Dalai Lama: “We demand that the U.S. side seriously consider China’s stance, immediately adopt measures to wipe out the baneful impact, stop interfering in China’s internal affairs and cease to connive and support anti-China separatist forces…such an act has grossly interfered in China’s internal affairs, hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and damaged Sino-American relations.” Did President Obama’s meeting with the Tibetan spiritual leader really “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people”? The reports of the meeting suggest two primary outcomes: President Obama telling the Dalai Lama that the United States does not support Tibetan independence, and President Obama reiterating his support for the maintenance of Tibetan culture. Both of these are supported by Beijing. And here is what the People’s Daily had to say about the meeting between Admiral Mullen and General Chen earlier that same week, “The United States should understand that the obstacles to exchanges between the Chinese and U.S. militaries over recent years are not the lack of transparency in China’s military or the aggressive posture adopted by China. The root cause is the mentality of containment to which the United States has long clung, which lies behind its public statements. This has sometimes caused the nation to make moves threatening China’s core interests. Only a country that respects other countries can win their respect.” The U.S. has no mentality of containment—although it probably would be fair to raise U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and reconnaissance missions off the Chinese coast as contributors to tensions in the Sino-U.S. military to military relationship. But does the Chinese government really believe that its lack of transparency and assertiveness in the South China Sea are not relevant to the challenges in military to military relations between China and the United States? Beijing’s propensity for hyperbole and its frequent repetition of ideas and phrases that may not be relevant or even true reflect an effort both to define the terms of debate and to reinforce traditional policy thinking for domestic consumption. China’s leaders should realize, however, that they run the risk of being like the boy who cries wolf: when you keep repeating something that isn’t true, people eventually stop listening. The danger then becomes that when the wolf really does show up—when everyone really ought to listen to what Beijing says—no one will be paying attention anymore.

Arab world pro-democracy movements raise questions about how much Islam will figure into the political calculus in emerging governments in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as new ones that might arise elsewhere, says religion expert Ebrahim Moosa.

A rise in Iraq’s violence and sectarian tensions--and the highest U.S. monthly combat deaths since 2008--come amid mounting concerns over the government’s role and questions about the U.S. troop presence, says expert Sean Kane.