Religion

Africa watchers have been focused of late on Burundi. On December 12, however, their attention was drawn back to Nigeria. The Nigerian army killed a number of Shia Muslims in Zaria, Kaduna state. This has resulted in representations from Tehran, Iran, which regards itself as the protector of the Shia everywhere, including Nigeria. As of now, reports from Shia sources are more credible than the lame denials from the military. Amnesty International is demanding an urgent investigation. Yet again, the Nigerian military’s lack of transparency may have made a bad situation worse. Iranian involvement in northern Nigeria and the potential radicalization of the Nigerian Shia could have negative consequences for Africa broader than the current turmoil in Burundi. Shia sources are reporting that the army killed up to one thousand in Zaria, and that the fighting is continuing. Many of the same sources claim that the army attacked a Shia procession that was blocking the movement of the Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai’s motorcade; the military is claiming that the Shia threatened the motorcade and attacked a police station. Military sources claim that the number of casualties was as low as seven. As reported in the New York Times and elsewhere, the specificity of the Shia spokesmen lends credibility to their claims. The Times quoted Abdullahi Tumburkai, a journalist, as saying he had counted more than 830 bodies in a local mortuary. Ibrahim Musa, a Shia spokesman, said up to one thousand had been killed. Chidi Odinkalu, a Nigerian human rights advocate and not a Shia, has characterized the killings as “a massacre.” According to the media, the Nigerian security services on December 13 arrested the Nigeria Shia sect’s leader Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky as fighting continued. Social media is carrying pictures of him bloodied. Citing as its source Odinkalu, ABC News is reporting that Zakzaky suffered four bullet wounds, and two of his sons and one of his wives were killed. There are also reports of Shia protests in other cities, and that the group blocked the highway between Abuja and Zaria. The Times, citing Iranian media, reports that the Iranian foreign minister has called the Nigerian foreign minister for an explanation. ABC News reports that Iranian President Hassan Rouhai has called Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari to say that he expects the Nigerian state to compensate the families of the dead and injured. Zakzaky has claimed a following of millions, almost certainly an exaggeration. The Shia presence in Nigeria appears to have been established by Iranian missionaries and to receive funding from Iran. The Nigerian Shia and Zakzaky have nothing to do with Boko Haram, the Sunni Salafist insurrection against the Nigerian state. Indeed, they would appear to be mortal enemies, and Boko Haram has launched suicide bombers against Shia crowds. Iran has long sought to increase its influence in Nigeria, and maintains a large diplomatic presence. The Nigerian Shia have been a vector of Iranian influence. Though the two movements are enemies, there are disturbing parallels between the 2015 Zaria killings and the 2009 killing of Boko Haram members and the murder of its leader, Muhammed Yussuf, which led to its murderous radicalization. In both cases the numbers killed may have been of the same magnitude: eight hundred. There are differences. Yussuf was murdered; Zakzaky was not, though the description that he was “bloodied” and suffered bullet wounds indicates it may have been close. But, perhaps the most significant difference is that Boko Haram had no foreign patrons then; Zakzaky and the Nigerian Shia do have a foreign patron: Iran.

Over the last weekend in August, suspected Boko Haram operatives killed some eighty people in three villages in northeast Nigeria, according to the media. The latest round of killings highlights a dramatic resurgence of violence associated with Boko Haram. The most important planks in President Buhari’s election campaign were promises to fight corruption and defeat Boko Haram. Since his inauguration, the president has fired the Jonathan administration’s military service chiefs and replaced them with appointments chosen on merit. He has moved the military headquarters of the operation against Boko Haram from Abuja to Maiduguri, the epicenter of Boko Haram operations. Shortly before last weekend’s carnage, he directed the service chiefs to defeat Boko Haram in “three months.” He has also appointed a new intelligence chief. Perhaps in response to reinvigorated government pressure, Boko Haram appears to have shifted tactics. It has been making greater use of suicide bombers rather than whole sale attacks by a large number of operatives, which were typical at the beginning of the year. Since Buhari’s election suicide attacks had become more frequent, but were generally claiming fewer lives than had the prior large scale attacks. However, events in August indicate there has been a reversion to the previous pattern, with larger numbers of Boko Haram insurgents conducting attacks. It remains to be seen whether this upsurge will be sustained. What is unusual about the August 29-30 village attacks was that Boko Haram used horses rather than gasoline powered vehicles. That might indicate that it faces fuel and vehicle shortages.

Lagos, one of the largest cities in the world and the heart of Nigeria’s modern economy, has not been the venue for Boko Haram or other radical jihadi terrorism. The sole episode occurred in 2014 and was small in scale. However, Nigeria’s Department of State Services (DSS), which has some similarities to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, is raising the possibility that Lagos’ immunity may be about to change. According to the BBC, the DSS claims that it has arrested twelve Boko Haram operatives in Lagos since July, and there have also been arrests in Enugu, in the southeast of Nigeria. A DSS spokesman says that the spread of Boko Haram’s activities is the result of increased pressure from the Nigerian security services in the northeast, its usual operational venue. It is true that Boko Haram activities in the northeast have become more scattered since the group has shifted its focus away from occupying territory. However, according to the Nigeria Security Tracker, deaths involving Boko Haram had fallen to 557 in May and 445 in June, jumping to 1,389 in July. President Muhammadu Buhari has launched a military offensive against Boko Haram, and shifted the locus of the counterinsurgency efforts to Maiduguri. In his speech on August 13, President Buhari charged the military service chiefs with the defeat of Boko Haram in three months. In July he fired the previous service chiefs appointed by former President Goodluck Jonathan. The new service chiefs know that they have no guaranteed security of tenure in the event they fail against Boko Haram. Similarly, Buhari appointed a new DSS director general in early July. He, too, will be under pressure to show results. Such pressure could result in the military and the DSS overstating their success. However, as Boko Haram is decentralized and increasingly geographically scattered in its operations, a future attack on Lagos or other large cities in the south cannot be ruled out.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 15, 2015 to August 21, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   August 15: A suicide bomber killed himself and four Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) members in Askira/Uba, Borno. August 16: Hunters killed 100 Boko Haram insurgents in Madagali, Adamawa. August 16: A clash between cult members at Kwara Polytechnic in Ilorin, Kwara resulted in sixteen deaths. August 17: Boko Haram killed seven in Mobbar, Borno. August 18: A Boko Haram attack in Gujba, Yobe, resulted in 160 civilian deaths. While most were victims of violent acts, some deaths were the result of drowning as villagers fled. August 19: Nigerian soldiers killed "a number" of Boko Haram insurgents (estimated at twenty) in Gwoza, Borno. August 21: Nigerian soldiers killed "a large number" of Boko Harm insurgents (estimated at forty) in Kukawa, Borno. August 21: Landmines planted by Boko Haram killed two Nigerian soldiers in Guzamala, Borno.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 8, 2015 to August 14, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   August 8: Members of a cult killed four in Makurdi, Benue. August 9: Boko Haram killed four in Damboa, Borno. August 11: Sectarian violence in Anambra East, Anambra, led to four deaths and three abductions. August 11: A bomb explosion killed forty-seven in Sabon Gari, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. August 11: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Mangu, Plateau. August 11: Boko Haram killed eight and kidnapped four in Jere, Borno. August 11: Cameroonian soldiers killed twenty Boko Haram insurgents and lost one of their own in Ashigashia, Cameroon. August 12: A vigilante group killed seventeen Boko Haram fighters and lost one of their own in Askria/Uba, Borno. August 12: Boko Haram killed two soldiers and eight civilians in Blamé, Cameroon. Cameroonian soldiers repelled the attack, killing twelve insurgents. August 13: Sectarian violence resulted in four deaths in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.

Chadian President Idriss Deby’s August 11 comments that Abubakar Shekau has been replaced by Mahamat Daoud and that the latter is open to negotiations with Nigeria’s Buhari government, has predictably stirred the Western media. (As of August 12, the story is not yet featured by the Nigerian media.) As is usual with stories about potential negotiations, Western media ties this story to hopes for freedom for the more than 200 Chibok school girls. There have been many previous stories of potential negotiations between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government. None have occurred. How credible is this one? The sole source for the story is President Deby, who, as a Nigerian blogger comments, “isn’t exactly a paragon of honesty when it comes to claims he has made regarding Boko Haram and Shekau in the past.” At the same press conference where he commented on Shekau, Deby also predicted that Boko Haram would be “wrapped up” by the end of the year. That same day, a Boko Haram suicide bomber killed forty-seven in northern Nigeria. On the other hand, Shekau has issued no videos or any other public communication since his March 14 pledge of fealty to the Islamic State. There are many rumors that he is dead. He might have been killed by Nigerian, Nigerien, or Chadian military forces, or he might have been the victim of a bloody, internal Boko Haram leadership struggle. This is speculation: we just don’t know. Deby also said: “Boko Haram is decapitated. There are little groups scattered throughout northeast Nigeria, on the border with Cameroon. It is within our power to definitively overcome Boko Haram.” Maybe. But, Boko Haram has always appeared to be highly decentralized in its operations. It now shows little interest in occupying territory or state building such as that of the Islamic State. The carnage since President Buhari’s inauguration as president would indicate that it is resurgent, and there is no evidence that it has abandoned its goal of destroying the Nigerian secular state. If Boko Haram resembles more of a decentralized movement than an organization, then Shekau’s replacement as its “face” by another may not matter very much. Further, the more decentralized it is, the more difficult negotiations with it would be.

This is a guest post by Claire Wilmot, an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. She is a master of global affairs candidate at the University of Toronto. In June 2014, Nigeria experienced its first attack by a female suicide bomber. Since then, Boko Haram has increasingly used girls and women as operatives in suicide attacks on soft targets. According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, Female suicide bombers have been responsible for over 200 deaths since May 2015, nearly half of all casualties from Boko Haram-attributed suicide bombings during this period. Female suicide bombers serve a number of tactical purposes. They are effective smugglers and rouse less suspicion while moving in civilian areas. Their attacks have a high propaganda value and are more likely to be sensationalized by the media than attacks by men. It is no coincidence that the first series of female suicide attacks in Nigeria took place shortly after 200 girls were abducted on Chibok, capitalizing on the international attention generated by the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. The attacks using female suicide bombers made the government appear weak and stoked fears that the girls had been “weaponized” by Boko Haram. In Nigeria and also abroad, the dominant narrative of female involvement in terrorist violence is one of coercion. The argument is supported by the high incidences of kidnappings of girls and women (more than 2000 since the insurgency began in 2009), and the testimony of escapees, who report egregious physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their captors. Human rights groups have reported that some girls and women appear to have been “brainwashed.” Moreover, some female bombers have been children as young as seven—incapable of granting informed consent to participate in such an act. Conventional wisdom suggests that terrorist groups resort to the use of female operatives when they are at their weakest. Boko Haram’s spike in female suicide bombings could indicate that Boko Haram is experiencing difficulty recruiting from its historic support base—young, uneducated, unemployed men from Nigeria’s northeast. Excessive and indiscriminate violence against civilians may be eroding support among communities who previously sympathized with Boko Haram’s vision. However, according to at least one credible source in northeastern Nigeria, most women in Boko Haram are acting voluntarily. They become suicide bombers to seek revenge for the deaths of their spouses or parents, as well as reunification in the afterlife. Detailing the dire humanitarian situation in the northeast, the source reported that many girls and women in Boko Haram controlled areas feel there is little prospect of a return to civilian life. Those who choose to return face ostracism, and would be ineligible for marriage. In a context of loss and hopelessness, martyrdom becomes an acceptable option. Incidences of gender-based violence and other human rights violations by Nigerian security forces could also push women to support or join Boko Haram out of fear. In the early days of Boko Haram’s insurgency, one source emphasized that female support for the group’s activities has been understated. Women were reportedly converting female family members, and receiving training in the group’s former stronghold of Markas. That source also claimed that some women had donated their daughters to carry out suicide bombings. Last year, several members of a “female cell” of Boko Haram were apprehended in Abuja, charged with recruiting female members. The two narratives of female involvement in Boko Haram—passive victims versus active participants—are not mutually exclusive. Both reflect the complexity of gender in insurgencies, and should contribute insight into post-conflict policy. Treating women and girls solely as passive victims can lead to incomplete understandings of conflicts and inadequate subsequent peace processes. Women may also be political actors with grievances that find resonance with extremists, and as important sources of community knowledge, they are uniquely positioned to build or disrupt ideological momentum for political movements. Gender inclusive peacebuilding strategies in Nigeria could help diminish support for extremists.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 1, 2015 to August 8, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   August 1: Boko Haram killed thirteen in Konduga, Borno. August 2: Boko Haram killed eight in Madagali, Adamawa. August 4: Boko Haram killed eight and kidnapped 135 in Tchakarmari, Cameroon. August 4: Boko Haram killed ten fishermen in Kukawa, Borno. Thirteen insurgents were also killed in the incident. August 5: Chadian soldiers killed seven Boko Haram insurgents in Tchoukou Dallah, Chad. August 6: Boko Haram killed nine in Fika, Yobe. August 7: Suspected pirates killed four soldiers and one policeman in Bayelsa, Niger Delta.  

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 4, 2015 to July 10, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   July 10: Reported late, Boko Haram killed forty-five in Monguno, Bauchi. July 11: Boko Haram attacked a prison in Diffa, Niger. Three insurgents and one Nigerien solider were killed. July 11: Unknown gunmen killed fifteen people in Eleme, Rivers. July 12: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and fifteen others, including two Chadian soldiers, in Fokotol, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. July 12: Soldiers killed seven Boko Haram insurgents in Mobbar, Borno. July 12: Sectarian violence in Shiroro, Niger state led to eleven deaths. July 13: Boko Haram killed six Quranic scholars, all children, on Tetewa Island in Lake Chad. July 13: Boko Haram killed thirty in Konduga, Borno. July 14: Boko Haram killed fifteen in Kaga, Borno. July 15: Boko Haram killed twelve in Gamgara, Niger. July 15: Thirty-two Boko Haram fighters and sixteen Nigerien villagers were killed in Bosso, Niger. July 16: Two bombs in Gombe killed fifty. Boko Haram is suspected. July 17: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and forty-eight others at a mosque in Damaturu, Yobe. Boko Haram is suspected. July 17: Nineteen Boko Haram insurgents and two Chadian soldiers were killed in Komguia, Chad. July 17: Boko Haram killed eleven in Kaga, Borno.