Race and Ethnicity

The future of Iraq depends as much on melding the many differences between its Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish groups as on integrating its smaller ethnic and religious communities. Among its largest minority sects are Christian Assyrians, who comprise 800,000 of Iraq’s 27 million inhabitants, or 3 percent of the population. But after a rise in attacks by Muslim extremists and political persecution, a growing portion—roughly 100,000 Iraqi Christians since the U.S.-led invasion of March 2003—has either fled the country or been displaced, says Michael Youash, an Iraqi Christian and project director of the Washington-based Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project. Many of them flee to nearby Muslim countries like Syria or Turkey. Syria alone is home to nearly 250,000 Iraqi Christians who have fled their country since the first Gulf war, according to a recent UN report. The most recent series of attacks targeting Christians came on January 29 when four churches were struck and three civilians killed. “We live in a climate of fear,” said Benjamin Sleiman, Roman Catholic Bishop of Baghdad, in a January 30 interview with Agenzia Giornalistica Italia. But he added: “I am certain that there is no premeditated plan against the Christian minority [in Iraq].” Integration of Christians into Iraq ’s political hierarchy has come slowly. Just one Christian—Younadam Kanna, of the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM)—was elected to Iraq’s 275-member parliament last December. Cfr.org’s Lionel Beehner spoke with Kanna about the status of Christians in post-Saddam Iraq, the recent attacks against them by insurgents, and the plight of Christian refugees in the region. Tell me a little bit about the status of Christians in post-Saddam Iraq?In general, we are very pleased for the first time in history to be recognized officially in this country. In the beginning, I was a member of the Governing Council for the Christians and Chaldo-Assyrians. Later on, we were in the [Transitional] National Assembly as well. I mean, politically, there’s a big change. We are free to have televisions, radios, and publications; we are free to educate our kids in our model-language schools. The constitution recognizes our language—Aramaic—as an official language in our region.Explain the breakdown between Chaldeans and Assyrians in Iraq.Those are the names of one nation, but different churches and different denominations. The Catholic Assyrians are called Chaldeans. Now we call ourselves Chaldo-Assyrians, for example, as a political agreement to unite ourselves. We all have the same language, the same ethnicity, the same historical roots. The problem is the leadership of the Church, which is not united. This is the reason why we are so weak in this country. The names have historical roots, but mostly belong to the Church differences. We have a national movement, the Assyrian Democratic Movement, for example, and we are all together in this, regardless of Church or region. So you’re saying Christians in Iraq act as a united bloc? The differences between us are seeded by those outside of our community. Of course, like other Iraqis, we are suffering because of this transitional period of instability and the security lags in Iraq, the same as our other brothers, the Kurds and Arabs.How were Christians in Iraq treated under Saddam?We were fifth-degree citizens. What I mean is first degree were Arab Sunnis, second were Arab Shiites, third were Kurds, fourth were Turkmen, and we were the fifth. Yes, the country was more civil, but the regime was a dictatorship—killing people, discrimination policies, etc. We were never accepted to be in the military as leaders or high-rank officials unless we accepted that we are Arabs and not Assyrians. Several hundred thousand Christian Assyrians fled from Iraq during Saddam’s time, especially after 1991, when he adopted his faith campaign and closed all our businesses that were dealing with liquor or alcohol. More than 300,000 Christians fled after [the first Gulf War]. But weren’t some Christians, such as [former Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz, high-ranking Baath Party officials?Two or three guys—no more than that—who Arabized, which means they denied their religion and identity as Assyrians. Which issues are most important to you as the lone Christian in parliament? I’d imagine you’re involved with issues related to national identity.First, we will try for an amendment to the constitution, which was under the control of two blocs, the Kurdish and Shiite coalitions. So the preamble of the constitution we are not happy with. We want to add some amendments to make it more fair and equal to all Iraqi people. Second, the religious role of Islam in the state, we have to take care of that. So we must be very careful when we are legislating rules for explaining articles of constitution, because it could be explained in two ways—[first, the letter of the law, and second, according to Article 2 of the constitution, which broadly says all laws must adhere to Islamic principles]—particularly as it pertains to democracy principles, women’s rights, minority rights. How will you as a Christian amend the constitution if your party has just one seat in parliament?Over 50 percent of the national assembly has, if not the same opinion, a similar view of those articles. The Shiites make up maybe 45 percent. If [there are no amendments], then we will not have a stable Iraq .So you will form coalitions with non-Shiite groups?Yes, but even with Shiites. Because Article 2 says no legislation shall contradict with Islam principles, [there are, in effect, two bodies of law]. No one can say which or how many principles—100, 200, 300 principles? Were you disappointed by the outcome of December’s elections? After all, the new electoral system was set up to benefit smaller parties whose support was spread out over the regions. Yet Christians only won one seat. Were you surprised?I’m sorry to say but the way the distribution of those compensatory seats was designed by the major parties for themselves and far away from the spirit of the law. We were supposed to get two seats—one in Baghdad, one as a compensatory seat. But our seat in Baghdad was swallowed by Sunnis and others. Still, I am very happy the political process is going forward. It’s a matter for transition. In the future, we may get more than ten seats. Is part of the problem that hundreds of thousands of Christians are fleeing Iraq? Isn’t that diminishing your voter base?Yes, in Saddam’s time more than 300,000 fled Iraq. Nowadays, only less than 100,000 have fled, but not only to neighboring countries but also to the north. [Christian Chaldo-Assyrians] fled their neighborhoods and cities for other locations in Iraq. For example, Karbala is one of the most dangerous cities in Iraq because it’s a tangent point between Fallujah and Najaf, between the most extremist of Sunni and Shiite [cities]. And now we are there as victims of those two. We are not targeted. So they leave this region to go north. In Syria , more than 50 percent of the Christian refugees were there during Saddam’s time, and they are still there. Will they move back to Iraq once it’s stabilized?Yes, like in Beirut . Once peace came, the people came back. Over the weekend a number of Christian churches were targeted. Is it your impression that Christians are being targeted by insurgents more, and if so, why?This was a reaction by the fanatics by the bad jokes done by some journalists in Denmark and Norway . It was only a message. It wasn’t an attack on Christianity. You mean the cartoons in Denmark ?Yes. It was a reaction from extremists for the bad-color sketches of [Prophet] Mohammed.One of the recent attacks was in Kirkuk. What will happen to Christians there if and when the city is handed over to the Kurds, as some expect in late 2007? We have a community among the majority Kurds in [the northern provinces of] Dohuk and Arbil. And they are living in good relations. We have some individual encroachments here and there. But we have been together since 1991. I was a member of the regional assembly there. We have forty-three modern-language schools there. But maybe Kirkuk may be a time bomb for relations between the federal and regional state. It’s a big problem, but not because we are Assyrian or Christians with the Kurds or with the center. Most of our people are in Kurdish neighborhoods. What about Christian relations with Turkmen? No problems. Bad situations only come from al-Qaeda [in Iraq] and extremists. So just to be sure, you’re saying that recent attacks against Christians as we witnessed over the weekend are not pushing Christians to flee Iraq?I don’t think so because previous attacks were to draw the attention of the international community. It was only five among ninety-five attacks that month, the previous one in August 2004. People said this was an attack against Christianity. It was not.Do Christians expect to win a cabinet post in the coming government?Yes. According to Article 3 in the constitution, all Iraqi communities and sects must be represented in the cabinet.

This publication is now archived. What role will Kurds play in Iraq’s future government? Kurds are expected to play a kingmaker role in forming Iraq’s new coalition government. Kurdish parties look likely to win around fifty-five seats in the 275-member parliament, making them vital players in Iraqi politics. No political bloc won the two-thirds majority required to form a government. Hence, Shiite and Sunni Arabs have courted Kurdish leaders to form a governing coalition. Some experts suggest that Kurds, most of them secular, may partner up with secular Shiite and Sunni parties to prevent Iraq from becoming too Islamist. But most experts expect the Kurds to align themselves again with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), Iraq’s ruling Shiite bloc, which is expected to win around 130 seats. In general, Kurdish leaders have provided a moderate influence on Iraqi politics, arbitrating between Iraq’s more polarized Sunni and Shiite leaders. Kurds have also pushed for further decentralization of Iraq’s government and to exert greater regional autonomy, including issuing visas, establishing a foreign ministry, and negotiating exploration deals with foreign oil firms. Iraq’s Sunni leadership has accused Kurds, who have enjoyed near autonomy since 1991, of trying to split up Iraq. But most experts say Kurds are within their constitutional rights in their demands for self-government in Kurdistan. “All they’re doing is institutionalizing the authorities they already had, which are included in the constitution,” says Peter Galbraith, a former ambassador to Croatia and senior diplomatic fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. What do the Kurds want from a political standpoint? The biggest issue for Iraq’s 4 million-plus Kurds is federalism. Since 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan, a mountainous area in northern Iraq, has enjoyed “special status” as a semiautonomous region protected as a U.S.-enforced no-fly zone. Kurdistan has its own regional parliament, judicial system, and security forces—the 100,000-strong peshmerga. Kurds do not want to cede control of these institutions to Baghdad. “The federalism concept is non-negotiable for the Kurds,” said Qubad Talabani, Washington representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and son of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, in a May 2005 Council on Foreign Relations meeting. A poll taken last year indicates the majority of Iraqi Kurds prefer outright independence to federalism. Kurdish leaders, however, have been more moderate with their demands, experts say. “They would prefer a world in which they were independent but their deal under the constitution gives them substantial autonomy,” says Brendan O’Leary, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and former constitutional adviser to Kurdistan’s government. Kurds also want to incorporate Kirkuk, an oil-rich and ethnically diverse city 150 miles north of Baghdad, into Iraqi Kurdistan. Many of the city’s Kurds were forcibly removed under Saddam Hussein as part of his “Arabization” program to alter the city’s demographics and bring in more Arabs. Thousands of Kurds have repatriated the city since Saddam’s ouster and have assumed control of many of its municipal institutions. Kurds are looking to 2007, when a referendum will be held to decide Kirkuk’s status. For Kurds, “Kirkuk is not about oil,” says Tanya Gilly-Khailany, director of democracy programs at the Washington-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. “It’s the place of their ancestors that they want to go back to. It has sentimental value.” Some Kurds have called the city “our Jerusalem.” Regardless of the referendum’s outcome, which is expected to go in the Kurds’ favor (the issue of Kirkuk’s future boundaries is less certain), O’Leary says some form of power-sharing arrangement will be required to make room politically for the city’s diverse population of Turkmen, Christians, and Arabs. Which Kurds will remain influential in Iraqi politics? Jalal Talabani, Iraq’s current president, may keep his position, experts say. “He has the natural charisma and legacy of being an overall unifier,” says Howar Ziad, the Iraqi ambassador to Canada. Talabani had threatened to withdraw his candidacy unless given more powers, partly to counterbalance the growing influence of the UIA. The Kurds say they are not involved with the UIA’s selection process for prime minister, but experts say they favor Adel Abdul Mahdi, Iraq ’s finance minister and member of the Shiite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), over current Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who heads the UIA’s Dawa Party and has had testy relations with Talabani. Under the constitution, most executive powers go to the prime minister. While Ziad does not predict this constitutional rule will be formally amended, he foresees a “gentlemen’s agreement” to transfer more authority to the president. What rights did Kurds win under the constitution? Kurds voted overwhelmingly in favor of Iraq’s constitution in October’s referendum. That is because of the number of concessions Kurds won during the drafting process. For example, they were able to secure Kurdish, in addition to Arabic, as Iraq’s official language. Phrases on Iraq’s Arab identity were watered down (Kurds, though predominantly Muslim, are not Arabs), as was the role of religion (most Kurds are secular). Other important concessions include: Stronger regional authority. The constitution gives the federal government authority over foreign affairs, finance, trade, and other issues. All other powers go to regional governments. Whenever a dispute between local and federal law arises, the constitution gives priority to regional authorities. Sunnis have sought to overturn this clause of the constitution, but with both Shiites and Kurds behind it, experts say the issue of federalism will not likely be amended. Rights to future oilfields. Although “oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi people,” experts say this applies only to existing oilfields. Revenues from future oilfields would ostensibly be collected by regional authorities. Sunnis, many of whom reside in Iraq’s oil-scarce center, have protested, fearing they may fall behind economically. Galbraith says their claims are overblown because of Iraq’s uneven development. “In terms of revenues, the north and south have been vastly underdeveloped compared to the center,” he says, “so these regions will be catching up.” The constitution further provides some form of compensation for regions “unjustly deprived” of oil revenues under Saddam Hussein’s rule, which includesKurdistan. Recognition of Kurdistan’s existing laws. Laws passed byKurdistan ’s regional government since 1992, including all contracts and court decisions, are recognized. Kurds say this includes production sharing agreements (PSAs) signed between Kurdistan’s government and outside oil firms. Sunni Arabs disagree, claiming the constitution does not validate all Kurdish laws and agreements. What steps have Kurds taken toward asserting greater autonomy? Much to the chagrin of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, Kurds have made a number of recent moves to assert greater autonomy in the north. These include issuing visas, establishing a ministry of foreign affairs, and circumventing the Ministry of Oil by negotiating directly with foreign energy firms. Jonathan Morrow, legal adviser with the United States Institute of Peace, says these actions are nothing new and are allowed under Iraq’s constitution. Kurds “have made no secret of maintaining their own relations with foreign governments, and it’s not as if Kurds are suddenly entering talks with oil companies.” O’Leary says Kurds are not allowed a ministry of foreign affairs, per se, but can constitutionally operate a ministry of external relations and have Kurdish representatives in Iraq’s embassies and missions abroad. Why do Iraq’s Kurds want more autonomy? Because of their sense of victimization, experts say. “Kurdish identity is born out of a century of betrayal, brutality, and disappointment,” wrote former CFR Fellow David Phillips in a June 2004 Wall Street Journal op-ed. In Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which recognizes self-determination, Kurds were promised regional autonomy, but they never won their rights. Later, under Saddam, Kurds were killed and displaced en masse from their homes. As many as 1.5 million Kurds were emptied out of Kurdish villages during the so-called Anfal campaign of the late 1980s. At Halabja, thousands were killed by chemical weapons in 1988. Proponents of federalism say this strategy of self-rule will defend against future discrimination of Kurds. “The danger has been eighty years of centralized dictatorship,” Galbraith says. “ Iraq has been a scene of great violence as Sunni Arabs have sought to hold it together by force.” What is Turkey’s stance on a semiautonomous Kurdistan in Iraq? Generally, Ankara has discouraged Kurds in the region from pushing for greater autonomy as it might encourage Turkey’s 6 million-plus restive Kurds to rise up and demand independence. That position has shifted in recent years, experts say. According to Qubad Talabani, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent a letter last year to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani supporting for the first time the concept of federalism. For one, Turkish businesses have close ties to Kurdistan. Turkey has actively promoted oil firms to negotiate production-sharing agreements with Iraq’s Kurds, while other Turkish firms have built two new airfields and are involved in a number of public-works projects in the region. Also, Turkey realizes that “a de facto independent Kurdistan” in Iraq no longer poses a security threat to Turkey, Galbraith says. If anything, Turkey supports a buffer zone toIraq, which has grown less stable. On the other hand, some Turkish nationalists may protest if Iraqi Kurdistan incorporates Kirkuk, a city ruled by Turkey until 1923. What will be the role of Kurdistan’s armed forces in the new government? Kurdistan’s local ministry of interior will retain control over the regional peshmerga forces. There is a law, supported by Iraq’s constitution, which bans the deployment of Iraq’s army on Kurdistan. A small number of Kurdish battalions will be incorporated into Iraq’s security forces but will be stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan. Most experts envision Kurdish forces policing Iraq’s north, Shiite forces policing the south, and a mixed force in the middle.

Multiethnic states, whether they are empires of diverse nationalities like the former Soviet Union, former colonies like Nigeria and Indonesia, or conglomerations of native and immigrant peoples like Canada and Brazil, share a history of ethnic and political tension that sometimes threatens to spiral out of control. Recent history has seen several such states implode, including Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Others, like Czechoslovakia’s component parts, have parted ways more peacefully. Still others—Russia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Sudan—struggle along with occasional, often violent bouts of separatism. Iraq, too, is a multiethnic state. Its newly approved constitution has raised questions about its ability to hold together in the face of ethnic and religious tensions. Cfr.org’s Claire Calzonetti asked Robert D. Kaplan, a prominent international journalist, correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, and author of several books on international affairs including Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, to explain why some multiethnic states succeed where others fail. Do multiethnic states typically fall apart?No. In fact, the U.S., Canada, and Singapore are all examples of successful multiethnic states. I think when we use the term multiethnic states, what we’re really talking about are multiethnic states in a third world or underdeveloped, weakly governed environment. Or, a multiethnic state that’s been governed by some autocratic ruler and is in process of change away from autocracy. When we worry about "will it fall apart", it’s those situations we’re talking about. Do you see a relationship between economic development and the success of a multiethnic state?I would say more institutional development. I don’t judge governments as much by whether they’re democratic or autocratic as much as I judge them by how well-governed they are institutionally. And, to make a long story short, I think multiethnic states can make the transition from autocracy to liberal regimes provided the groundwork is laid. Slow is fast. Slower transitions tend to be better than overnight cold-turkey ones.Are there examples of that?Yes. What is a bad cold-turkey transition from autocracy to democracy is a multiethnic state? Russia. Had the ex-Soviet Union had a few years of [Soviet President] Mikhail Gorbachev’s capitalist-trending, lite-authoritarianism, rather than go overnight from a hard soviet state to [President] Boris Yeltsin’s democracy, I think the average Russian would be better off today. Had Gorbachev’s transition lasted a decade longer, I think it would have been better for everyone. Another bad example, of course, is the former Yugoslavia, which did not have the advantage of a slow transition, really. It went from a very calcified Communist system to the breakup of the state. And the breakup of the state was facilitated by an election that brought to the floor very nationalist, ethnically oriented leaders. Now, a good transition, a better transition that went unnoticed was, I think, Romania. Because after [Romanian dictator] Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown, Romania did not go overnight into a full democratic system. It had about six or seven years of a neo-Gorbachev regime under President Ion Iliescu, who basically governed like a reformed Communist rather than a democrat. I think that slow transition drastically reduced the possibility of ethnic war between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians. And now Romania is really moving ahead. It’s making progress. Iliescu was president again but he was a different kind of person than he was the first time. And that goes totally unnoticed. Most people think Romania was just more backward and racist. I don’t believe so. I think it was a sure transition. What else do you see as other preconditions helpful in keeping a state together?Obviously economic development. But something else is important. It’s that when all the major problems in a state have been agreed upon—like what the borders are, which ethnic group, if any, controls what territory, and what resources—then you can have the luxury of a weak democracy and all new democracies are by definition weak. They tend to be run by minority governments and inexperienced politicians, which are often badly in need of money and finances, which lead to corruption. Once the major issues have been settled, the country has the luxury of a weak democratic system that can then debate what it can consider to be major issues but in fact are minor issues, like the budget and things like that. The real major issues, the borders and ethnic relations, have already been settled.What methods do governments use to hold states together? Has federalism or centralism proved a better way of governing?In general, to me, one of the definitions of real democracy is decentralization, not having too much power in the center. I think that if you look at places that are either bad democracies or not democracies at all, you get overly centralized systems. So, if that’s the choice, federalism or strong central government, I would say federalism. But remember that it’s not always that easy. Take Turkey for example. The Kurds are not just in the southeast, you have huge Kurdish concentrations in the major cities in the west, Izmir and Istanbul. So, it’s not just a matter of federalism. What it is a matter of is getting tax payers’ money and real power outside of Ankara all around the country. That is the real test of democracy: Can it become weaker in the center and stronger at the edges?What other methods do governments use to hold states together?Well, they use force. And that is something we want to use as little of as possible. But force is still—remember, if there is no authority, there is no freedom for anybody. So, a central government has to be willing and able to use force and its force has to be respected if there is going to be any sort of civil society.Can the United States as a superpower do anything to hold multiethnic countries together? Is there an example of a time when the United States has had a good effect on a multiethnic country?I think every situation is different. It really is. If I remember correctly in the former Yugoslavia, we believed that the state should and had to be held together. Had we believed that the state was past holding together, we might have gotten involved at a much deeper level earlier on in negotiating the terms of the breakup, it would not have led to civil war. However, there are other instances where you don’t want the state to come apart. You want to keep it together. Again, slow transitions either way tend to be more peaceful. In Iraq now, everyone is saying that if the state breaks up it means the failure of United States policy. I think they’re missing something. If the state breaks up suddenly in the near term, that means the failure of United States policy. But, if it’s a result of democratization over the next ten years, if Iraq were to become more and more federalized, weaker and weaker at the center, and more and more on the ground in three separate entities and it happened gradually and peacefully, it would not be a failure for United States policy. In a future Middle East, I think we’re going to see, like in Europe, more regions and less strong, hard, overly centralized states. So, a quarter century from now, Iraq being in effect three region states where it could happen organically and peacefully would be a fine solution.What is the likelihood of that?I don’t know. I simply don’t know. I am encouraged by the events of the last few days, the elections very much. But who knows what next week will bring?What are the implications for Iraq?Any future of Iraq means a much less centralized state than the one under Saddam [Hussein]. Saddam’s state was like those in Eastern Europe before [Soviet leader Joseph] Stalin died, before de-Stalinization commenced in the mid-1950s. And anyone who looks at what individual east European states in the late forties and early fifties knows what I’m talking about—a level of central control to such a degree it was like a vast prison yard. So we are going to get a weaker center which mathematically translates into more power for Kurds and Shiites. That we can assume. The question is, How do we help that, how do we make that more of a soft landing for the Sunnis? I think a soft landing here is really what we’re looking for, a gradual weakening of the center that doesn’t lead to outright civil war. Which, we have not seen yet. And I think that if Nobel Peace Prizes were given to people who actually deserve them, the Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani would have won it this year for the incredible restraint he’s shown in the face of a lot of violence and provocation.Are religious differences tenser than differences in ethnicities, or vice versa?It’s hard to generalize. Rather than give you a stock statement, let me use the example of Pakistan, which is really central to this whole discussion. Pakistan is kind of a nuclearizing Yugoslavia in the making, meaning it’s divided up by ethnic groups that are regionally defined. In other words, they’re not all mixed together, they live in separate regions. And, Islam has been used to try to create a kind of unifying ideology for the country the same way that Communism—[Josip Broz] Tito’s Communism attempted to be a unifying ideology for Yugoslavia. And I think that Islam as a unifying ideology for Pakistan will not work and has not worked.Do you have examples of successful multiethnic states vs. those who are unstable?No, because a place that may be successful in one decade may be unsuccessful in the next and vice versa. All this is in flux, I don’t like to say that these are successes, these are failures. Well, some successes we know, like Singapore is multiethnic and a success. But remember Singapore is not a model because it’s small. It’s a city-state; it doesn’t have territory to govern. Singapore is just an exception; it’s not a model for anything.What is the difference between multiculturalism, melting pots, non-racialism, assimilation, etc.?I think these are all just words. And we’ve become prisoners of language in many senses. If you look at the old city of Jerusalem, you have Armenians, Arabs, Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs, you have Jews. I don’t know that they all liked each other, but for periods in recent history they’ve gotten along. So, it’s not necessary that people like each other, it is necessary that they get along and that there is some kind of adjudicating process that is considered legitimate that they all respect.What about the future of Russia?Russia went from extreme authoritarians to extreme democracy. I think Russia’s destiny is to be something in between. While we are uncomfortable with President Vladimir Putin because of his autocratic tendencies, I think Russians are much more comfortable with him than they were with Yeltsin. We did not have to live under the chaos of the 1990s, they did. So I think Russia is gradually working its way to some sort of a mixed regime. Depending upon which way it falls, it could be more noxious or less noxious.

This publication is now archived. IntroductionRelations between Iraq and its Arab neighbors have worsened in recent weeks, highlighted by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s September 5 criticism of Arab leaders for failing to express sympathy or offer aid in the wake of the August 31 stampede that left nearly 1,000 Iraqi Shiites dead. “We stood with our Arab brothers in their hard times,” Talabani told reporters, referring to recent terrorist attacks in Egypt; he called their silence “gross negligence.” The stampede marked the largest one-day death toll since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.Talabani was also responding to criticism from Arab leaders about Iraq’s newly drafted constitution, experts say. Amre Moussa, secretary of the Arab League, of which Iraq is one of the founding members, admonished Iraqi leaders for failing to meet Sunni demands to include a provision in the constitution calling Iraq an Arab state as well as an Islamic country. Talabani, a Kurd, says such a provision is unnecessary and unfair to Iraq’s religious and ethnic minorities. “The other [Arab constitutions] do not have this text…Why do they not make such a demand from Sudan? Why this insistence on demanding it from Iraq? They know Iraq is a multinational country,” Talabani said. Iraqi leaders have also criticized their Arab neighbors for not establishing diplomatic missions in Baghdad. U.S. and Iraqi leaders say restoring their presence would help bolster the new government’s legitimacy. But Arab leaders say deploying diplomats to Iraq is still too dangerous, particularly after an Egyptian and two Algerian diplomats were slain by foreign insurgents in July. Arab foreign ministers are slated to hold a meeting in Cairo October 1 to address, among other issues, restoring full-fledged diplomatic relations with Iraq . Foreign financing of the Iraqi insurgencyIraqi leaders have recently accused neighboring Arab states, especially Jordan and Syria , of abetting the Sunni-led insurgency in Iraq by allowing Baathist sympathizers to finance insurgent activity from abroad. In Jordan, for instance, many of these finances flow from relatives of Saddam Hussein, who “have huge sums of money.” They “are supporting political and media activities and other efforts to revive the Baath Party,” Laith Kubba, a spokesman for Iraq ’s prime minister, told the New York Times August 22. Jordan’s King Abdullah, one of the United States’ staunchest allies in the region, has not commented publicly about the accusations but claims his country has been tough on terrorism by securing its long border with Iraq and clamping down on extremist organizations based in Jordan. Jordanian officials have arrested several members of the al-Haramein Brigades and al-Qaeda in Iraq , the terrorist group led by Jordanian-born Abu al-Zarqawi that was allegedly behind the August 19 Katyusha rocket attack that nearly struck a U.S. warship in a Jordanian port. The financing comes largely from private, not public, sources, experts say. “I suppose if Saddam had lots of money outside of Iraq, it’s just a guess, maybe some of this money is used to finance the Baathists,” says Reuven Paz, an Israeli terrorism expert. “As to Iraq’s Islamic [insurgency], I suspect it comes from private Saudi sources.” Still, some Iraqi leaders suspect the authorities in these Arab states are turning a blind eye to the flow of funds. “There’s no reason for these states to support [this financing] except for their general sympathy for their fellow Sunnis,” says Jeffrey White, Berrie Defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Some experts say Iraq’s charges against Jordan are overblown. The country has begun to curb the activities of its large Iraqi community of Baathist sympathizers. “The Jordanian government is looking much more closely at [Saddam’s] family and restricting them and their activities,” says Joost Hiltermann, Middle East project director at the International Crisis Group. But more could be done, says Daniel Glaser, deputy assistant secretary of terrorist financing and financial crimes at the U.S. Treasury, who urged Jordan in July to enact tougher laws against money laundering and develop better financial intelligence. Arab views on Iraqi federalismMany of Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors are uneasy about Iraqi federalism—the division of power and wealth between its regions and Baghdad. Moussa, who heads the Arab League, called the constitution’s clauses on federalism “dangerous” and “a recipe for chaos.” Some Arab leaders fear the splintering of Iraq into oil-rich regions run by Kurds in the north and Shiite clerics in the south. “The mainline view [in the Arab world] is Iraq should stay together and stay an effective political unit,” White says. “Their concern is that Kurdish autonomy and potentially Shiite autonomy will leave some kind of rump of a state left over [for Sunnis].” Other Arab leaders are worried by what they perceive as Iran’s growing influence over Iraq’s Shiite leadership, experts say. Earlier this year, King Abdullah of Jordan warned Iraq ’s leadership against creating a “Shiite crescent,” stretching from Iran to Lebanon. “The Jordanians fear the new Iraqi government has been taken over by Iranian sympathizers and is basically a proxy for Iran,” Hiltermann says. “They fear radical Shiites of the [Ayatollah] Khomeini brand are going to take over the Gulf and its oil. Keep in mind Jordan has no oil.” Arab views on Iraqi insurgencyA small but visible number of the insurgents in Iraq hail from Arab states in the region, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. Some Iraqi leaders have accused these states, particularly Syria, of not doing enough to shut down the insurgency’s “underground railroad” over Iraq’s borders, White says. “No question Syria has a good idea of what’s going on. It’s a question of using the powers of a police state to chase down and extradite those involved in the insurgency.” Jordan, for example, is doing much more to stem the flow of insurgents—and financing—into Iraq than Syria, despite the fact that “the Jordanian state is weaker than the Syrian state,” says Daniel Byman, senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. “The Jordanian security forces are very organized and they do their best to protect the border from any attack from Jordanian soil either toward Israel or toward Iraq,” Paz says. Hence, most smuggling of insurgents into Iraq—and U.S. combat missions designed to stop it—is occurring along the Iraq-Syria border. There appears to be widespread sympathy among the Arab people for Iraq’s Sunni insurgency, experts say, particularly in Jordan, with its sizable population of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees largely hostile to U.S. foreign policy in the region. “Jordan is a very important base for the development of local jihad,” Paz says, but argues that average Jordanians do not support the Sunni or foreign jihadi insurgents in Iraq. A July poll by the Pew Research Center, however, found that Jordan was the only Middle East country where support for suicide bombings against civilians, in Iraq or elsewhere, has risen. Another Pew poll released in June found just 21 percent of Jordanians had a favorable impression of the United States.