Immigration and Migration

2013 could be an interesting year for U.S. policy toward the region. Up first will likely be U.S. immigration reform. The outpouring of support from Latino voters in the November presidential election, helping push Barack Obama to victory, combined with the better organization and more aggressive stance of many pro-immigration advocates may motivate lawmakers on both sides of the aisle to come up with legislative reforms. In fact Obama officials have already stated that they will turn to immigration early this year. The fact that immigrant flows from Mexico are at their lowest level in twenty years (less than one fifth the 2000 numbers) and that the U.S.-Mexico border is more heavily manned and arguably more secure than in the past will help. The biggest questions and debates will revolve around how to deal with the eleven million illegal immigrants currently in the United States and how to structure a new system that avoids creating a similar situation down the road. 2013 could see a deepening of trade and economic ties with the region as well. In the presidential run up both candidates publicly recognized Latin America’s growing potential as a market for U.S. exports. The Trans Pacific Partnership, or TPP, could help turn this rhetoric into reality. These ongoing negotiations between the Asia-Pacific countries of Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam (and possibly Japan and Thailand in the near future) and the Western Hemisphere nations of Chile, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and Canada would, if successful, create a free trade agreement of unprecedented reach. The partnership would provide incentives for establishing and deepening regional supply chains, stretching from Montreal to Santiago. It would also likely shake up the political economy of the region, providing an alternative to the Brazilian economic hub in South America. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the TPP will be U.S. domestic politics. Though members of both parties support free trade, the TPP won’t happen unless Obama regains fast-track negotiating authority—binding Congress to vote up or down on the final agreement without amendments. This year will also see more discussion, and perhaps evolution, in the global approach to fighting drugs. Latin American presidents—whether in or out of office—have become increasingly vocal against the status quo, demanding greater dialogue and new methods. The OAS has agreed to study the issue, and should come out with reports/studies during the year. Others are pushing forward on their own—for instance Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has stated that he will shift from focusing on drug kingpins to reducing violence and crime more generally. In the United States, recent successful referendums to legalize marijuana in Washington and Colorado (along with sixteen states and Washington DC that allow the use of medical marijuana) are changing the national discussion. With public opinion polls showing that roughly 50 percent of Americans support marijuana legalization, Obama and his administration have signaled that cracking down on states that legalize marijuana (and thus go against federal drug law) won’t be a top priority. These international and domestic groundswells provide an opportunity to rethink the current international drug control regime, and perhaps begin moving away from the supply and law enforcement driven model that has dominated the last several decades. Legislative or other actions in these three areas would lead to long term shifts in the human, economic, and security ties throughout the hemisphere, fundamentally changing U.S. relations with many of its neighbors, so keep watching.

In 2012 a big theme for Latin America’s Moment was regional integration. A look at the past two hundred years of integration through today can be found here. These posts look at Latin American countries trading and investing more closely with each other, and this one analyzes U.S.-Mexico integration in particular. Some of the biggest integration initiatives have concentrated on infrastructure: transnational roads and energy projects to facilitate the movement of goods and to connect electricity matrixes. Others efforts have been focused on trade; most notably NAFTA and Mercosur. But despite all of the efforts, The Economist shows that Latin America’s intra-regional trade at just over 20 percent of all exports, much lower than the EU’s 70 percent, or Asia’s and North America’s 50 percent. Integration in Latin America’s governance has also gained attention in recent years, which I address in this blog post. The OAS’s regional influence has languished, challenged by the creation of the Union of South American Nations, or UNASUR, and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America, or ALBA (though not yet at least by the nascent Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, or CELAC). Many dismiss these numerous bodies as merely talk shops, but their response to regional crises have helped keep the conflicts short and relatively violence free. Perhaps the most important, if overlooked, integration in the region has been through its citizens. Through vacations, study abroad, work, and intraregional immigration, Latin Americans are increasingly binding their countries, communities, and economies together. And the face of this moving group is also shifting. While once dominated by low skilled laborers seeking better opportunities, I note here that at least half of today’s migrants to Chile, Mexico, and Panama have twelve or more years of schooling. Internet usage has also broken down barriers between countries, as 129 million Latin Americans tweet at one another, post videos on YouTube, and interact with their neighbors on Facebook. And of course one of the most important stories for the United States has been the arrival of millions of Mexicans immigrants to U.S. cities and towns. Some have questioned whether these immigrants are integrating into mainstream American culture as quickly as previous waves from Europe. But in this post on Mexican assimilation rates for indicators such as English language proficiency and naturalization numbers, it’s evident that this newest group is on pace with their predecessors. Going forward, Latin American integration will remain important. The development and deepening of regional supply chains is one of the best ways to boost Latin America’s global competitiveness. And for Mexico, Peru, and Chile in particular, the Trans-Pacific Partnership—a free trade agreement with the United States, Canada and six Asian economies—would, if passed, bring these nations closer together than ever before.

As new administrations in Mexico and the United States start working together next year, I wrote a Policy Innovation Memorandum for CFR on how best to refocus the security relationship. In short: U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, led by the Merida Initiative, is vital and must continue. But with Enrique Peña Nieto’s inauguration, Mexico’s political landscape is now changing, and the United States must adjust its strategy and support accordingly. Building on the lessons of the past five years, the United States should work with Mexico to implement the nonmilitary programs envisioned in the current Merida framework, in particular supporting and prioritizing Mexico’s ongoing judicial reform, training police officers at the state and local levels, modernizing the U.S.-Mexico border, and investing in local community and youth-oriented programs. To read the full policy innovation memorandum, click here.

Mexico’s incoming president, Enrique Peña Nieto, will meet with President Obama in Washington, DC this week to discuss some of the challenges and opportunities for the two countries. But perhaps one of the most important and difficult issues that the leaders will face is the American public’s overwhelmingly negative view of their southern neighbor. Below is an op-ed that I wrote for USA Today on GSD&M and Vianovo’s new opinion poll and why Americans’ perceptions of Mexico miss some of the country’s recent transformations. The neighbor Americans believe they have to the south, and the Mexico that has developed over the last twenty years, are two different places. As Mexico’s incoming president Enrique Peña Nieto meets with President Obama this week, the biggest challenge facing relations today may be our skewed perceptions. In Americans’ psyches, drugs dominate. When advertising firm GSD&M and Vianovo strategic consultants asked Americans to come up with three words that describe Mexico, nearly every other person answered "drugs," followed by "poor" and "unsafe." Other questions reveal Americans see Mexico as corrupt, unstable, and violent, more problem than partner. Americans had more favorable views of Greece, El Salvador, and Russia. These perceptions reflect the Mexican reality that dominates headlines: soaring crime rates and gruesome murders in a war against drug traffickers. But this window into Mexico overlooks an economic transformation and deepening ties with the United States that reflect a dramatically different country. Canada on the Rio Grande In the past two decades, Mexico has become one of the most open and competitive economies in the world, with trade to GDP (a common measure of openness) reaching 63 percent, surpassing both the United States and China. This trade is dominated by manufactured goods (not commodities), leading to a stronger and more diverse economic base than many of its emerging economy competitors. Though the poll found that over half of Americans still see Mexico as a developing country, it is now a middle class nation. Over the last fifteen years, Mexico’s middle class has grown to encompass roughly half the population. These families own houses and cars, send their two children (on average) to the best schools they can afford and buy the newest products. This transformed economy is also now profoundly integrated with the United States. A study by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that imports from Mexico are, on average, 40 percent "made in America," far more than the 4 percent in Chinese imports. This back-and-forth of parts and products across the U.S.-Mexico border through the expansion of North American supply chains has been good not just for Mexico but also for the United States, revitalizing companies and supporting the jobs of some six million U.S. workers. Mexicans are us With all the recent focus on illegal immigration, people forget that there is a lot more linking Americans and Mexicans. In addition to some five million legal Mexican immigrants, there are thirty million more Americans who claim Mexican heritage. The Latino political heft, pushing President Obama over the top in many swing states, is largely Mexican. If there is a silver lining in the poll results, its skewed view stems from the fact Americans do not know much about their neighbor. And we know it. Just as many of us admit we don’t know when asked questions about Mexico as venture a positive or negative opinion. That acknowledgment from Americans provides an opportunity for newly elected and re-elected presidents, policymakers and businesses to fill that void with a fuller understanding of Mexican realities and the importance of our nations’ growing together.

As Americans vote today, a record 23 million Latinos can head to the polls. Here is a roundup of the candidates’ stated views on immigration, regional security, and trade with Latin America—issues that are often of direct interest for this growing voter bloc, but also will more generally affect all Americans over the next four years. Mitt Romney and Barack Obama diverge most on immigration. For the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country, Romney has indicated that he would not accept a reform that included provisions offering illegal immigrants “amnesty.” And he has also advocated for self-deportation (i.e., making conditions hard enough that people will leave). Though the Obama administration has carried out a record number of deportations, it has also distinguished between those here without papers, and even implemented a policy directive aimed at halting deportations of undocumented youths. Obama supports the Dream Act, which would provide a legislated road toward legalization for young people who fulfill a series of conditions. Romney originally said that if elected he would continue Obama’s directive, but an aide later stated that a Romney administration would in fact replace it, while honoring any visas that had already been issued. For legal immigration the candidates’ views are not so different, and both have advocated streamlining immigration for high-skilled immigrants. On security both praise the Mexican and Colombian governments for their commitment to fighting drug trafficking organizations and disrupting the flow of drugs coming north, and promise to continue financial and training support. But they differ on the threat posed by antagonistic regimes in Cuba and Venezuela. Romney has asserted that Hugo Chávez has created “a destabilizing, anti-democratic, and anti-American ’Bolivarian Revolution’ across Latin America,” and his campaign website states that Fidel Castro will be remembered among the “most reviled despots, tyrants, and frauds.” In contrast, Hugo Chávez, in Obama’s view, has not constituted a national security concern. And Obama has offered travel reforms and other changes alongside pressure toward the Castro government. On trade both candidates call for expanding ties with their southern neighbors. Mitt Romney’s website states that in his first one hundred days in office he would launch the Campaign for Economic Opportunity in Latin America (CEOLA), which would “extol the virtues of democracy and free trade and contrast them with the ills of the model offered by Cuba and Venezuela.” Analysts question the viability of this plan, and in particular Brazil’s interest. Obama has touted signing free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, and the possibilities of the Transpacific Partnership, now under negotiation between eleven countries, including Chile, Mexico, Peru, Canada, and the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Most notable to Latin American observers is the relative inattention paid to the region during this election cycle. As I have argued before, this may not matter to the increasingly important Latino vote, which cares as much or more strongly about domestic issues. But whatever the campaign rhetoric, the next president will need a thoughtful policy toward an increasingly diverse region. For more information on the election and the role of Latino voters, the Americas Society / Council of the Americas provides an excellent list of resources. Happy voting!

A recent Pew Hispanic Center report on trends in Latino voter participation counts a record 24 million Latinos as eligible to vote in November’s presidential election (11 percent of all potential voters). It also finds that Latinos are particularly important in several battleground states. Their rising numbers and geographic concentration suggest that if and how Latinos vote on November 6 could determine the race. While a large voting bloc for several election cycles now, Latinos have yet to fully wield their potential political power. Part of the reason is turnout—few Latinos make it to the polls on Election Day. In 2008 only half of eligible Latino voters cast ballots versus 65 percent of blacks and 66 percent of whites. Latinos are also a heterogeneous bunch with vast differences across the population; for instance the priorities of Florida’s conservative Cuban base are vastly different from Arizona’s predominantly Mexican-American constituency. Complicating political appeals even further, a recent Gallup poll shows that Latinos’ political priorities differ by generation. As shown in the chart below, foreign born Latinos care most about economic growth, second generation citizens focus on unemployment, and third generation members prioritize healthcare. http://www.gallup.com/poll/155327/hispanic-voters-put-issues-immigration.aspx Still, despite these obstacles and divides, 2012 looks to be the year of the Latino voter. In the swing states of Colorado, Nevada, and Florida, Hispanics make up between 13 and 16 percent of the voting population. Looking at past history and current polling preferences, these demographics strongly support the president over his Republican rival. In Nevada a whopping 78 percent of Latinos prefer Obama to Romney, in Colorado it’s 74 percent, and even in more conservative Florida it is 61 percent. Obama’s current lead in these three states (between 1.4 and 3.9 percent) reflects in large part these votes. These three states matter. As the New York Times interactive electoral map illustrates (you can create your own scenarios here), if Colorado, Nevada, and especially Florida swing to Obama (and assuming he prevails in “solid” and “probable” democratic-leaning states), he wins. By contrast, Romney must triumph in these battleground states to have a chance.  The upshot? This may be the year Latinos choose the next U.S. president.

CFR’s Renewing America initiative just released a new report by Alexandra Starr, a fellow at the New America Foundation, titled “Latino Immigrant Entrepreneurs: How to Capitalize on Their Economic Potential.” Through statistics and personal stories, the report explores Latino immigrant entrepreneurs’ growing contributions to the U.S. economy. Contrary to many who assume Latino immigrants just take away American jobs, Hispanic immigrants have played an important role in helping to revive small U.S. towns. While many come to find work, they often create the positions themselves, opening up new restaurants, storefronts, and services that line small-town Main Streets. Big cities are no different. In fact, almost half of New York City’s small businesses are immigrant-run. The report finds that immigrant entrepreneurs often have a distinct advantage due their ability to understand and work within both the United States and their home countries, allowing them to appeal not only to immigrant communities within the U.S. but also to export markets back home. Due in part to these benefits (as well as geography), Mexican immigrants have taken the entrepreneurial lead, starting more new companies (in sheer number) than any other immigrant group. On average Hispanic-run enterprises are small, though 16 percent employ between one and twenty employees (similar to 21 percent of non-immigrant-run small businesses). The report also lays out some of the obstacles Latino entrepreneurs face. They often struggle with limited access to credit, due to their immigration status or their unfamiliarity with non-traditional lenders (e.g. micro-loan organizations). Sluggish visa processing also hinders immigrants’ potential, slowing investment, and, in some cases, leading companies to form or relocate abroad. Starr highlights one such case in her recent Wall Street Journal article, telling the story of Pablo Ambram, an Argentinian entrepreneur. After participating in a prestigious business program in the U.S., Ambram was forced to move his fledgling company, Agent Piggy, back to South America. He found that filing immigration paperwork as the CEO of a small business would have been too costly and uncertain. Political debates often characterize immigrants as workers, rather than as employers. Yet as this report shows, Latino immigrants of all skills sets are increasingly both. The challenge for U.S. policymakers is to encourage this dynamism and to nurture innovative Latino immigrant entrepreneurs, as their successes will benefit not only Latino communities but also the U.S. economy more broadly.

This week it is the Democrats who are putting forth their platform, which can be found in its entirety here. Like its Republican counterpart, the platform is heavily focused on domestic issues (most significantly on the middle class and job creation), leaving little ink for the United States’ relationship with Latin America. When the Democratic platform does address its southern neighbors, the emphasis is two pronged: security and economics. On security the Democratic Party platform for Latin America doesn’t look so different from the Republican one. The Democrats outline their goal of disrupting transnational crime, and their continued support for (the same) allies throughout the region. They also expound on border security, calling the southern U.S. border “more secure than at any time in the past twenty years,” and emphasizing that there are now more border patrol agents “than at any time in history.” Somewhat surprisingly, the Republican and Democratic Party platforms diverge on international trade, with the Democrats far more engaged. Their agenda promises to push the economic frontiers to the south and to “expand free and fair trade in the Americas.” They tout the fact that the United States exports “more than three times as much to Latin America as [it does] to China,” and highlight the passage of the Panamanian and Colombian free trade agreements during Obama’s first term. They also endorse an expansive free trade future, promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the TPP, which envisions a free-trade community encompassing the United States, Mexico, Canada, Chile, and Peru in this hemisphere, along with six Pacific nations (Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam). The other area of interest and great difference between the Democrats and Republicans is immigration. The Democratic platform lays out its strong support for comprehensive immigration reform that includes a path toward citizenship. It also supports the Dream Act, which would allow college age undocumented youths to become legal residents and eventually citizens (upon completion of several requirements), in stark contrast to the Republican position, which not only is opposed, but also supports revoking federal funds for colleges offering in-state tuition to these same youths. While the political climate, current events, and likely congressional gridlock will constrain the next administration’s policies regardless of party, the platforms provide a sense of where the parties’ cores would like to move the country. With respect to foreign policy toward Latin America (as well as domestic policy toward the region’s descendants), overall the Democrats are more focused on the opportunities that the region provides, rather than its potential threats.

With the Tampa Bay Republican Convention underway, the Republican Party platform, in its entirety, has finally found its way onto the internet. The fifty-plus page document touches briefly on all of the hottest election year topics, addressing everything from traditional marriage to Medicare to foreign policy. In regards to Latin America, the Republican Party platform focuses almost exclusively on the two states toward which the GOP has the greatest antipathy: Venezuela and Cuba. On Cuba, the language heralds back to the past, describing the regime as mummified and anti-democratic, and strongly declaring Republican support for Cuban opposition groups. Although the tone is decisively anti-Castro, the platform is less strict than in the past. Quite noticeably, there are no calls for a roll-back of the Obama administration reforms that loosened remittance restrictions and expanded family travel, perhaps because of their popularity with Cuban-Americans. For Venezuela, the GOP’s concerns extend beyond President Chavez’s non-democratic practices. The real threat, as they see it, is the transformation of the country into an “Iranian outpost” in the Western Hemisphere. While the platform explicitly accuses Venezuela of offering safe haven to thousands of Middle Eastern terrorists, it stops short of suggesting what a GOP president would do about this threat. On Latin America’s two biggest economies—Brazil and Mexico—there is close to nothing. Apart from saluting Mexico’s cooperation in the drug war, the more important mention is on energy. The GOP heralds the abundant resources of Mexico, Canada, and the United States and presents a long term vision of North American energy independence. While a good idea, making this a reality depends much more on Mexico’s next president, Enrique Peña Nieto (and his willingness and ability to change the Mexican constitution), than on the next U.S. president. Another issue outlined in the platform that affects Latin America is immigration, and there the GOP takes a tough stance. The platform declares that illegal immigrants “pose grave risks to the safety and sovereignty of the United States,” and unequivocally opposes any programs that might allow undocumented immigrants a path toward citizenship or that would grant in-state tuition to undocumented college students (adding that it would go even further and deny federal funding from schools offering such rates). The posturing stands in stark contrast to Obama’s recent directive and the general Democratic Party position, which provides a means for undocumented youths to stay and gain legal work permits. The GOP platform also calls for securing the rule of law along the border and completing a (double layer) border fence. At least in this first objective, the Republican Party is in line with the Obama administration’s actions over the last four years, which increased the border patrol from 14,900 in 2007 to 21,400 in 2011. Overall, the Republican Party generally seems to see the region (when it considers it at all) as a threat rather than an opportunity. The question remains whether this matters to the descendants of Latin Americans, which make up 16 percent of the U.S. population and may play a decisive role in the November 6 election (especially in swing states such as Colorado, Florida, and Ohio). With little to entice Latinos in regards to immigration or foreign policy, it will remain to be seen whether the GOP can attract their votes based on U.S. domestic concerns alone.

Alongside the tentative formal efforts at economic and political integration, people are also increasingly bringing the region together. A recent uptick in intra-regional movement—through travel, study, and immigration—has allowed Latin Americans to get to know each other better, and in the process bind together both their communities and their economies. Millions of Latin Americans head nearby for their vacations, enjoying Patagonia, Machu Picchu, and the Galapagos Islands, among other places. Brazilians are the most active international travelers (in sheer numbers) with 1.5 million people (30 percent of their travelers) headed to locales in Central or South America. Latin American students are also increasingly studying abroad within the region. More than 50 percent of Chile’s international students were from neighbors (Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador), with most opting to study professions such as business, health, and the social sciences. Immigration too has shifted. Today nearly two thirds of all South American immigrants come from neighboring countries (compared to just a quarter forty years ago). Argentina and Chile have received the most immigrants, with 70 and 90 percent coming from neighboring countries. Whole communities of Bolivians live in Argentina, Brazilians in Bolivia and Paraguay, and Colombians and Peruvians in Ecuador. Further north, over four hundred thousand Nicaraguans live in Costa Rica. These large foreign communities can at times cause tensions—such as the half a million Brazilians (nicknamed braziguayos) living in Paraguay. These mostly agricultural workers immigrated in the 1960s, purchasing some of the best land for low prices, earning the envy and at times ire of Paraguayan natives. Ecuadorians have also clashed with the hundreds of thousands of Colombians living within their borders (which they associate with rising crime rates); a Facultad LatinoAmericana de Ciencias Sociales study reported that 64 percent of Ecuadorians held a bad opinion of Colombians. Along with the size of the flows, the profile of immigrants has also been changing. While once dominated by low skilled laborers seeking better opportunities, at least half of today’s migrants to Chile, Mexico, and Panama have twelve or more years of schooling. In response to the changing flows, many countries have adjusted their policies to allow for foreigners to own land (as in the case of Mexico) or prohibiting discrimination on the basis of origin (as in Argentina). Some countries are even allowing foreign nationals to use their national identity cards next door, waving visa restrictions, and allowing social security and other accrued benefits to be transferred home. While only four Latin American countries allowed dual citizenship in 1990, at least eleven do today. The informal intersections of Latin Americans across the region pressure changes in government policies and drive Latin America’s integration. Assisted by increased travel options, relaxed visa restrictions, and better communication technologies more and more citizens have made the decision to move within the region. Strengthening ties between countries through community networks, Latin America’s people are and will be just as important for regional integration as the formal treaties their governments create.

The integration (once called assimilation) of foreigners into the United States is a long-standing issue. Some fear that today’s immigrants aren’t integrating into U.S. culture and society as past waves did. Mexicans—the largest single group today with some twelve million immigrants—in particular are seen as guilty of maintaining their distance. The late Harvard professor Samuel Huntington summed up these views, writing that Hispanics “threaten to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages,” and generally “lack initiative, self-reliance, and ambition.” Others more sympathetic to Mexican immigrants point to studies that show Mexicans and Mexican-Americans acquire English in similar ways and at similar speeds to previous immigrants. Second and third generations pick up English as fast as—and many faster than—their Italian, German, or Polish predecessors. These supporters also point out that the rules are much stricter than during the great European immigration waves. Still drawn by market forces, their legal limbo keeps them and/or their families in the shadows (making it harder to truly integrate). This camp also denounces the extreme U.S. visa backlog, which can take over a decade (incentivizing illegal entry), and the high number of deportations, which can make Hispanics more fearful of engaging with other sectors of U.S. society. The Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center recently released a report by Senior Advisor David R. Ayón entitled, “The Legal Side of Mexican Immigration.” Using data from the Office of Immigration Statistics (part of the Department of Homeland Security), Ayón measures the integration of legal and legalized Mexicans. He looks specifically at permanent residents in the United States, and the over five million Mexicans that either became legal or came to the U.S. legally since 1985. The study finds that Mexicans are less likely to become citizens than other groups in the past, or than their contemporaries (Vietnamese, Indians, Chinese, Cubans, and El Salvadorans all have higher naturalization rates). Instead, many Mexicans remain legal residents for decades. Of the roughly three million that became eligible to apply for citizenship through the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), more than half have retained their green Mexican passport. The big question is why. Here Ayón’s analysis of the data points to possible answers. He finds that urban dwellers are more likely to become citizens than those who live in rural areas. This suggests that access to services, information, and greater attention from local politicians motivates legal residents to take the next steps. In other words, and flouting the conventional wisdom, urban ethnic enclaves may increase rather than decrease integration. Other factors that seem to matter—and to increase naturalization rates—are increasing hostility toward migrants, stronger law enforcement, and the prospect of higher application costs. Ayón points out that some of the hurdles for many of the 1986 IRCA beneficiaries are about to go down—English tests are not required for immigrants who have been U.S. permanent residents for more than twenty years, or who are over the age of sixty five. Perhaps the coming years will see a jump in naturalization rates for this cohort. Still, even if a lower percentage than other groups, some 1.5 million Mexicans have become U.S. citizens over the last twenty five years. In 2011 alone 94,000 Mexicans naturalized; more, in sheer number, than any other group, and more than double the next two groups—Indians and Filipinos—combined. Also, whatever their status, they are parents to nine million U.S. natives. These immigrants are and will remain a large and growing part of America’s social fabric. Looking at this data, the challenge is to strengthen, not fray, their connection to the United States.