• Development
    Emerging Voices: Elana Beiser on Freedom of the Press and Development
    Emerging Voices features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This article is from Elana Beiser, senior editor at the Committee to Protect Journalists. She discusses the importance of press freedom for development and how it could fit in a new set of global development goals. As successors to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) begin to take shape, many supporters of development agree that democratic governance should be part of the plan. Big questions remain about what, specifically, to target in the interest of achieving that broad goal, and how to measure progress. Freedom of the press is a good place to start. Democratic governance is roughly defined by the UN Development Program (UNDP) as institutional responsiveness to the needs of ordinary citizens; access to the judiciary and public administration; and capacity to deliver basic services. Such objectives cannot be achieved and sustained without independent media that are free to inform the citizenry, uncover abuses, and report on institutional failures or the people affected by them. Unfortunately, in many countries the press remains far from free—and indeed, under attack. The motive behind attacks on the press— intimidation—is what creates the broader media climate. A person who jails, harasses, sues, threatens, beats, or shoots at a journalist is not only trying to silence him or her, but also sending a warning to his or her colleagues: keep quiet, or else. Inaction by government perpetuates this frigid environment. CPJ tracks prosecutions in murder cases and publishes an annual Impunity Index, which calculates the number of unsolved journalist killings in relation to each country’s population. Essentially, it’s a measure of political will to protect journalists—and it inevitably highlights countries, such as Pakistan and Russia, where government actors are implicated in some journalist murders. When the press is free and independent, by contrast, it can serve a range of essential societal objectives. These include chronicling progress toward all development goals and holding leaders to account for promises they have made to promote education, environmental sustainability, gender equality, health, and poverty eradication (to take examples from the MDGs). Had the media in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, or Syria had the freedom to report—without fear of reprisal—on pollution, corruption, and people excluded from economic growth, the Arab Spring may have come as less of a shock to the international community. How would press freedom be measured within the development goal framework? My organization, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), offers one model. CPJ uses a case-driven approach to compile a mosaic of press freedom violations in each country. We document journalist detentions, prison sentences, physical attacks, lawsuits, legislative changes, censorship, Internet blocks, newsroom raids, abductions, threats, escapes into exile, and deaths, including murder. Regarding the latter, we disaggregate the data by gender, news beat (politics, crime, corruption, conflict), medium (print, Internet, television, radio), job (camera operator, broadcaster, reporter, editor, blogger), and suspected perpetrator (government official, criminal group, military, or paramilitary). A recent UNDP paper highlights four potential approaches to an MDG successor goal for democratic governance: national targets with national indicators, regional targets with national indicators, global targets with national indicators, and global targets with global indicators. As for the idea of using national indicators, relying on national governments to quantify the independence and freedom of their own press corps is a non-starter; repressive authorities have a fundamental conflict of interest in reporting their own acts of repression. For instance, Turkey says it is committed to free expression but holds more journalists in jail than any other country; the government denies that any are behind bars because of their work, but CPJ’s close examination of the evidence shows otherwise. As for regional targets, the UNDP paper notes that existing regional charters could facilitate agreement. But regional bodies tasked with supporting freedom of the press and other human rights can be vulnerable to the angry whims of members resistant to criticism. Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa, for example, is pushing to severely weaken the mandate of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the human rights monitoring body of the Organization of American States) and the special rapporteur for freedom of expression, who has denounced Correa’s criminal libel lawsuits against newspaper executives and noted that some Ecuadoran laws contradict international standards on freedom of expression. That leaves us with a global approach to targeting and measuring press freedom—and this is only fitting. Freedom of the press is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And as CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon has pointed out, our age of globalization has rendered local information vital to the whole world. Pollution of water and air by American businesses doesn’t stop at U.S. borders. Substandard Chinese manufactured goods could be exported anywhere. A website taken offline by a denial of service attack originating in Vietnam is inaccessible to all. Many governments may resist being held to international benchmarks on press freedom, but this and other aspects of democratic governance are more than ever a global development concern.
  • Rule of Law
    World Justice Project Rule of Law Index
    Today the World Justice Project releases its Rule of Law Index rankings for 2012. The WJP Rule of Law index assesses countries’ performance on the nine areas of: limits on government power, corruption, security, fundamental rights, open government, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice, and informal justice.  The scores are built from assessments of the general public (1,000 respondents per country) and local legal experts. “The outcome of this exercise is one of the world’s most comprehensive data sets measuring the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law—not in theory but in practice,” says the report. By relying on real surveys of real citizens, this effort makes an important contribution to deepening our understanding of how the rule of law is experienced (or not experienced) by ordinary citizens around the world. With the growing global consensus that governance matters, I predict this index will play an important role in shaping the goals, targets, and indicators for the post-2015 development agenda.
  • Rule of Law
    The Paradox of Property Rights and Economic Development
    Recent weeks have seen simmering property rights conflicts around the world: Burmese citizens marching in protest against the government’s seizure of their lands for a hotel zone; Vietnamese villagers contesting the confiscation of their land for an EcoPark satellite city project; and violent clashes breaking out in Panama City over a controversial law allowing the sale of state-owned land in the port city of Colón—Latin America’s largest duty-free zone. Worldwide, marginalized groups (women, ethnic minorities, and the poor) often face high property insecurity, even when the property rights of foreign investors and domestic elites are secure. This is a pressing development challenge today on almost every continent. Just this year, property rights conflicts from Liberia to Indonesia to Myanmar to Ethiopia have revealed the potentially negative impact on vulnerable groups of growth-enhancing land acquisitions and foreign investment, which can exacerbate disparities between the rich and the poor and intensify food insecurity and resource scarcity—even while bringing macroeconomic growth. These facts present a puzzling paradox. Since Adam Smith penned The Wealth of Nations over two centuries ago, it has been the conventional wisdom that strong property rights are a prerequisite for growth and economic development. Yet throughout history, land expropriation and property insecurity for marginalized groups has actually led to growth—although at the cost of these vulnerable groups. The enclosure of the commons in seventeenth century Britain, broadly acknowledged to have reduced overgrazing and increased agricultural investments on newly enclosed land, improved the property rights security of landed elites but eroded the property rights of small and medium cottagers who previously had rights to the newly enclosed commons. Increasing the security of private property rights for the gentry required expropriating the property of smallholder farmers and pastoralists. In a forthcoming article in the Brooklyn Journal of International Law, I find that, statistically across countries, members of marginalized groups often face significantly higher property insecurity than foreign investors and domestic elites. Although secure property rights for the majority, elites, and foreign investors are positively related to long-run development, property rights for marginalized groups are not. Macroeconomic growth can occur in the presence of significant property insecurity for marginalized minorities. These research findings are based on a new bottom-up measure of property insecurity, which exposes inequalities in the property rights of different groups. Eighteenth century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that the enshrinement of property rights in any social contract was, in essence, “a grand theft perpetrated by the rich, clever, and strong on the less well-off.” Law is not impartial, but instead reflects distributions of power. In resource-rich Myanmar, the national economy relies heavily on the extraction of natural resources such as copper, timber, and hydroelectricity. But despite its resource wealth, Myanmar is Southeast Asia’s poorest country, with nearly one-third of the country’s 60 million people living below the poverty line. These rural poor face high levels of property insecurity. Plans to expand a large copper mine near Monywa in northwestern Myanmar have sparked widespread community demonstrations—some with over a thousand participants—against the mine’s expansion. Operated by the Chinese-owned Wanbao Mining (a subsidiary of a Chinese arms manufacturer) and Myanmar’s military, expanding the mine would require the purchase of huge tracts of land and the forcible relocation of dozens of villages. Destruction of the villagers’ agricultural livelihoods will almost certainly spur Myanmar’s macroeconomic growth through the development of the extractive industries sector, but will also severely threaten the incomes and food security of thousands of Myanmar’s poorest citizens. These cases present difficult challenges for policymakers. If aggregate macroeconomic growth is the goal, then policymakers may wish to ignore (or encourage) the expropriation of land and resources from marginalized groups in order to reallocate these resources into the hands of more productive investors. But if the objective is broad and inclusive economic development that prioritizes poverty reduction, then policymakers may need to better protect the property rights of all social groups. These trade-offs are made even more complicated by conflicts that can arise from property insecurity—the challenge I explore in my next post.
  • Rule of Law
    A Global Trust for Rule of Law
    The rule of law is critical for people to have a meaningful opportunity to thrive. Still, for billions of people around the world today, the rule of law exists on paper but not in practice. Even though a theme for the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Panel in fall 2012 is rule of law, various UN programs devoted to rule of law have not had a transformative impact. Traditional intergovernmental institutions will never offer enough to achieve systemic change. To supplement them and achieve what they alone cannot, the United States should take the lead to forge a more nimble partnership with public, private, and nonprofit sectors and establish a Global Trust for Rule of Law ("Global Trust"). Similar to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria ("Global Fund"), a diverse board of donor states, philanthropists, rule of law experts, and civil society representatives would run this Global Trust. Its purpose would be to build developing nations' capacity to implement rule of law and unleash the potential of marginalized groups worldwide, promoting not only human dignity but, crucially, global economic growth. The Problem "Rule of law" consists of procedures giving all people in a society meaningful access to justice, unimpeded by corruption or discrimination. It is needed not only for people to enjoy basic liberties, but most important to fully tap their capabilities to flourish economically. Consider how much more of an economic miracle India could be if disadvantaged castes enjoyed full access to justice, instead of facing discrimination and even bonded labor. So too would Arab nations be more economically dynamic (and stable)—on a broader foundation than fossil fuel resources—if they did not discriminate against women as workers and entrepreneurs. Moreover, establishing a trustworthy, predictable legal context is a magnet for increased foreign investment. For all these reasons, rule of law will galvanize a society's economic growth. Numerous laws and treaties have been adopted guaranteeing rights. Yet developing countries need international help to implement rule of law. The world's preeminent "human rights" institutions do not focus on rule of law. The UN Human Rights Council has only a limited capacity-building mandate, the International Criminal Court (ICC) focuses on accountability after atrocities have been committed, and the European Court of Human Rights does not address the absence of fundamental legal or law enforcement institutions within states. Over forty UN entities working in 110 nations on programs dedicated to rule of law in the past twenty years have not yielded systemic change. Nor have those of the World Bank and other international financial institutions acting alone. Because private sector and civil society assets will never be fully integrated into efforts of traditional institutions beholden to member states and their lowest-common-denominator agendas, a quantum leap in rule of law requires mobilizing other important partners. Time for a Global Trust Leveraging the respective capabilities of developed and developing countries, international institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector actors, a new Global Trust for Rule of Law could spur that leap. Its primary function would be to provide grants and technical advice to NGOs and governments dedicated to enlarging access to legal rights and rule of law capacity where both are weak. It should be a cooperative partnership helping nations asking for help. Among other activities, it would support projects to train lawyers or prosecutors, help citizens gain access to justice institutions, and spread public awareness about corruption. Labeling this entity a "trust" would evoke not only a fund but the very confidence in rule of law that societies need to develop both politically and economically. Governments and multilateral institutions offer convening power and seed money as partners. With a huge stake in predictable rule of law, businesses must also be integral partners, and they will motivate states to seek the Global Trust's help given the prospect of increased business investment. An alliance solely of NGOs would raise as many suspicions from illiberal governments about outside meddling as would these other actors, without the benefits they offer. While the UN is insufficient as an implementer, it can provide a Global Trust legitimacy in the eyes of Egypt, China, and others through its definition of rule of law based on procedural consistency and judicial independence rather than necessarily Western-style democracy. The UN secretary-general's report Delivering Justice establishes: "The United Nations defines the rule of law as a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated. . . . It requires . . . legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency." The Global Trust should draw lessons from two models: the Global Fund and the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF). The Global Fund demonstrates the value of mobilizing the resources and comparative advantages of foundations and the private sector, rather than giving lead responsibility to a single UN entity with vested interests (in this case, the World Health Organization, or WHO). Likewise, the lesser-known UNDEF shows the importance of a framework insulating budgets from the narrow priorities of member states, while still offering the legitimacy of a highly respected body. Most important, UNDEF evinces the wisdom of supporting nimble non-UN implementers and civil society organizations, which are guaranteed a role in at least 85 percent of its grants. Scaling up this model, the Global Trust should prioritize civil society actors, concentrating its work in nations where governments welcome its help and where progress will be most likely. Structurally, the Global Trust should also mirror the Global Fund and UNDEF. It would have an autonomous governing board composed of representatives from developed and developing countries, the UN and international financial institutions, NGOs, relevant foundations, representatives of the private sector, and civil society institutions. A regional representation allotment would allay concerns about a Western bias. Funding from and decision-making influence of any single donor—including the United States—would be limited (e.g., a 10 percent ceiling), with no veto power for any board member. A technical committee of experts across cultures charged with evaluating grant applications would report to the board. Like those of the Global Fund and UNDEF, Global Trust grants would be performance based and disbursed in stages once benchmarks are met. To avoid the kinds of corruption and misappropriation charges that have dogged the Global Fund, the Global Trust's board would need to appoint the strongest of inspectors general to ensure grants are properly appropriated and projects are proceeding on time and within budget limits. In a trust designed to fight corruption and impunity, accountability will be essential to its credibility. The many potential grantees might include, for example, the Bachpan Bachao Andolan group in India, which champions children's freedom from onerous labor. Another might be the American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative. This program trains justice sector professionals, helps local institutions that provide pro bono legal assistance to the poor in some fifty countries, and supports government–civil society partnerships in developing countries with high corruption, such as Nepal and El Salvador. Building Backing for a Global Trust With other powers and private actors unlikely to do so, the United States should broker consensus on structures and provide seed funding for a Global Trust. It should cohost a meeting with a major rising power—such as Brazil, Indonesia, or Turkey—based on the latter's desire to be a leader and model. There will be governments, even democratic ones, loath to let the Global Trust give grants to organizations within their borders. These skeptical states can be convinced this partnership is premised on helping the disadvantaged and unleashing economic potential (not ousting governments). A procedural definition of rule of law and limits on any actor's donations and influence will demonstrate that the Global Trust cannot be a Trojan horse for U.S. parochial aims. Reluctant states may come to cooperate as they observe successes where states welcome the Global Trust's help. The amount of seed money needed to get the effort up and running would be relatively modest—perhaps as low as $140 million (the amount given to the State Department's bilateral "democracy fund" last year). Based on the experience of the Global Fund—with which donors have repeatedly employed a wait-and-see-what-the-United-States-gives strategy—a significant initial pledge by the United States would be critical in leveraging other resources. Given the difficult budgetary environment and skepticism of foreign aid in the United States and Europe, will legislatures support this initiative? There may be greater flexibility for developed countries to provide seed money than conventional wisdom suggests. Since the financial crisis, U.S. pledges to the Global Fund have actually increased. Likewise, in March 2012, cash-strapped Japan offered $340 million to the Global Fund, its largest donation ever. To be sure, the White House will need to persuade Congress that an investment in the Global Trust would have an enormous multiplier effect in prosperity, pluralism, and peace, compared to dollars spent elsewhere. And it would. Conclusion Weak rule of law in the developing world deprives countless people of legal rights and, hence, an opportunity to thrive economically. A Global Trust for Rule of Law could begin to close the gap between rights that exist on paper and those that can actually be enjoyed. Drawing on the Global Fund and UNDEF as models of best practices and effective partnerships, a Global Trust, autonomous of any one state or the UN, would cultivate rule of law capacity-building projects in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and other developing regions by supporting deserving proposals from states and civil societies. It would quickly become a nimble catalyst to build trust in access to justice and economic opportunity in those societies. So too would it inexorably accelerate global economic growth. Investing in such a trust would be a high-value bargain.
  • Rule of Law
    Legal Empowerment, Governance, and Development
    A new consensus has emerged in recent years that good institutions—especially the fair and predictable rule of law, and accountable governments that effectively serve their citizens—are prerequisites for sustainable and inclusive growth.  In this view, getting governance right is an integral part of reducing poverty. Yet most of the development policy initiatives designed to improve governance in poor countries with weak institutions are aimed at “capacity building” from the top down. For example, the U.S. Partnership for Growth and Millennium Challenge Corporation, both of which make good governance a cornerstone of their economic development strategies, provide assistance to developing countries to build government administrative capacity in election administration, service delivery, public financial management, and tax collection, while simultaneously setting governance benchmarks to assess the performance of these recipient governments. This focus on government systems, while critically important, sidesteps the heart and soul of accountable governance—the ability of impacted communities to advocate and organize on their own behalf, to demand that elected officials deliver on promises, and to represent themselves in courts so laws are fairly enforced in practice as well as in theory. Into this breach have stepped a new generation of law and development practitioners, who are now pioneering an emerging strategy of legal empowerment. Legal empowerment, according to the nonprofit organization Namati, “is about the capacity of all people to exercise their rights and to participate in the process of governing.” Namati has opened 16 community-based paralegal offices in Sierra Leone since 2009, more than doubling the number of paralegals providing free basic justice services in the country. Namati explains that “paralegals use advocacy, mediation, organizing, and education to assist citizens in finding concrete solutions to instances of injustice.  Like primary health workers, community paralegals are close to the communities in which they work and deploy a flexible set of tools.” Likewise, the World Bank Justice for the Poor project is working with traditional landholders in Vanuatu to improve the transparency and accountability of the land leasing process, in order to ensure that customary rights holders, and especially women, are not pushed off their land by shady backroom land deals. This approach aims to give poor rural landholders a voice in the process that determines how land is allocated, in order to protect the interests of poor and vulnerable groups who might otherwise be pushed aside by more powerful interests. The evidence that governance matters for economic development is overwhelming. But technocratic interventions and capacity building for bureaucrats are not enough. Good governance also requires the empowerment of impacted communities, so they can hold officials accountable by representing their own interests at the ballot box, in the streets, and in the courts. Justice for the poor requires that the poor have a voice. By building capacity from the bottom-up, legal empowerment initiatives are working to build that capacity and voice.
  • Rule of Law
    Emerging Voices: Stanislav Markus on Bottom-Up Property Rights
    Emerging Voices features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This article is from Stanislav Markus, assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago. Markus outlines his findings from a recent article on how firms in Russia and Ukraine can use bottom-up methods to protect their property rights in a weak state environment. Secure property rights constrain governmental and private predation, enable capital accumulation, improve worker productivity, enhance credit availability to the private sector, and facilitate stock market development. There is a solid consensus that secure property rights constitute one of the fundamental drivers of development. But how do property rights become secure in the first place? Many studies from the global south addressing this issue focus on Africa’s failed states and the potential of rural communities to delineate and protect property rights in the absence of state support or interference. Other literature invokes, for example, medieval Europe, which faced the opposite problem of modern Africa: not too little state, but rather an unrestrained Sovereign. Yet this conceptual bifurcation of failed versus domineering states applies poorly to much of the developing world where states are weak but not failed. This insight has profound implications for the nature of predation and the process through which the property rights of private firms can be secured, as I argue in a recent issue of World Politics. In weak states, the state ruler is unable (even if willing) to make credible commitments to property rights on behalf of lower-level state agents, due to a severe lack of accountability within the state bureaucracy. At the same time, state agents are sufficiently empowered to engage in expropriation in their public capacity (unlike in failed states), while being unable to constrain private predators. Forms of such expropriation may include a corrupt municipal court issuing an injunction paid for by a firm’s competitor; a policeman harassing retailers to collect bribes; a local official pressuring a firm to give a job to his relative lest the company lose its operating license; and so forth. I argue that in response to the challenges posed by weak states, owners can enforce their property rights without resort to mafias by forming alliances with stakeholders such as foreign actors (including investors, governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and media), community residents, and employees. These stakeholders can impose costs on the potential aggressors through diverse political strategies, allowing firms to defend their property rights not only from private predators but also from the state. My article evaluates this “bottom-up” theory of secure property rights statistically with data from an original survey of firms in Russia and Ukraine, and also uses case studies to demonstrate the causal mechanism. My main argument is that a weak state can be disciplined by non-state actors. Oleyna, a firm producing vegetable oil in the Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk, provides an example. The firm’s property rights were attacked by the financial-industrial empire Privat Group, which paid the local law enforcement to help expropriate a 60 percent equity stake in Oleyna through a fabricated legal case. It is Oleyna’s stakeholders who came to the rescue. The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Oleyna’s key creditor, helped the firm organize a joint press conference that generated a tremendous media response. Oleyna’s employees defended the majority owners by writing a letter to the upper executive state organs. Oleyna also capitalized on its community involvement to generate local public support. Through its stakeholders, Oleyna created substantial pressure on the local government to stop assisting the raiders. As a result, the fabricated case against the firm was dropped by the prosecutor’s office. Without political support, the raiders lost interest and did not resort to some criminal tactics they had threatened. Oleyna’s case is not exceptional, as my earlier study of Russian corporations with foreign stakeholders shows. Sometimes, organized communities and labor can also prevent a physical confrontation, as in the case of the Ukrainian plant NZF where, in 2005, the workers faced down a cordon of special police forces who were trying to implement a politically motivated takeover of NZF. Firms create alliances with stakeholders by engaging in benefit transfers to outside stakeholders; such benefits include various forms of corporate social responsibility, favorable investment terms, etc. Such alliances pool resources and effectively outsource the task of property rights enforcement to third parties. Alliance members can make the expropriation itself or its consequences more expensive and hence less profitable for the aggressors. In the case of state predators, for example, domestic firms and foreign investors allied to the target enterprise can impose costs through investment withdrawal. Alternatively, electoral pressure, public protests, or behind-the-scenes lobbying by the allies of the target firm can make a difference. Vocal support of the owners by the community where the firm is located also makes collusion between private predators and the local government less likely. State expropriators below the top executive level are particularly sensitive to negative publicity, as it can trigger their demotion in the bureaucracy. In sum, secure property rights can emerge through a process with substantial bottom-up initiative by the potential victims of expropriation, rather than a single top-down act by the state executive, as conventional wisdom suggests. My bottom-up stakeholder model has profound implications for development, since development is unthinkable without secure property. While state institutions are commonly treated as the sine qua non of secure property rights, their establishment typically involves substantial resources and shifts in norms on the part of rulers and bureaucrats alike. As a result, the realistic timeframe for generating such institutions may be measured in decades or even centuries, not years. Bottom-up stakeholder alliances present a prime case of "second-best institutions." They may be less desirable than an impartial and effective state, but since this ideal is often unattainable, they can be the best way to launch developing economies onto an evolutionary path toward secure property rights.
  • Rule of Law
    Property Rights, Growth, and Conflict
    The conventional wisdom has long held secure private property rights to be a critical ingredient of economic growth. At a micro level, secure property rights generate growth by incentivizing efficient levels of investment and ensuring that land and other resources are neither over- nor under-utilized; reducing transaction costs and allowing the reallocation of resources to more efficient users; and facilitating access to credit and the conversion of dead assets into investment capital. At a macro level, secure private property rights—as an essential pillar of individual liberty—create political accountability, which in turn leads to economic policies that are broadly growth-enhancing rather than narrowly beneficial to powerful, rent-seeking elites. Yet, as I argue in a forthcoming paper, economic development has historically also often involved the expropriation of land and resources from marginalized minorities, and the reallocation of these resources into the hands of more politically powerful constituencies and investors with access to capital. The dispossession of Native Americans from their land was a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of large plantations and the widespread establishment of small freehold farms for white settlers throughout the United States in the first two centuries of the nation’s history. The Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole tribes suffered wholesale legal expropriation by the Indian Removal Act of 1830. By 1840, over 50,000 Native Americans had been forcibly relocated from the American Southwest, opening 25 million acres for settlement. Later, 14,000 Cherokee men, women, and children were marched overland, at gunpoint, by the U.S. Army in the summer of 1938. The widely lauded secure private property rights enjoyed by yeoman American farmers in the nineteenth century were made possible by the property insecurity of Native Americans. At the same time, insecure property rights can foster anti-government grievances, motivating dispossessed groups to rebel and increasing the likelihood of armed conflict. This complex relationship between property insecurity, growth, and conflict is readily apparent in the violent separatist conflict that engulfed Bougainville, Papua New Guinea from 1988 to 1997. Traditionally, land in Bougainville was collectively owned through matrilineal clan lineages, with use rights shared by all members. Copper was discovered in Bougainville in the mid-1960s, and the PNG government claimed the minerals, selling the Panguna copper mining concession to Bougainville Copper Ltd., a subsidiary of Rio Tinto Ltd. The government forcibly relocated entire villages, and excluded Bougainville from the revenue-sharing agreements it negotiated with Rio Tinto. The prioritization of the state’s and the corporation’s property rights at the expense of the Bougainvilleans’ initially generated high economic returns: from 1972 to 1989 the Panguna mine contributed 16 percent of Papua New Guinea’s GDP and 44 percent of its exports. However, in 1988, the convergence of grievances regarding the effects of mining, the inequitable allocation of revenues, and long-standing political exclusion provoked a group of marginalized Bougainvilleans to attack a number of Rio Tinto’s buildings, destroying the mine’s power supply. The PNG government responded with a military crackdown. This fueled an ethno-nationalist rebellion with separatist aims, which intensified through the 1990s. By 1996 over 15,000 civilians and combatants had been killed in the conflict, and another 60,000 people displaced. The war also brought the economy to a standstill, inciting a severe fiscal crisis by the mid-1990s. In Bougainville the initial growth produced by prioritizing elites’ property rights was ultimately undermined by violent conflict. This all suggests that economic growth can occur when the property rights of the majority of the population are secure but marginalized minorities face a high risk of expropriation—because land is reallocated into the hands of more politically powerful constituencies and investors with access to capital and other complementary productive inputs. However, the potentially growth-enhancing effect of forced displacement and resettlement can be tenuous, as property insecurity suffered by marginalized groups might generate violent conflict, which reduces growth. So if aggregate economic growth is the sole objective of policymakers, they may wish to ignore (or even encourage) the expropriation of land and resources from marginalized groups and the reallocation of these resources into the hands of more productive investors. But aggregate economic growth does not necessarily mean inclusive economic growth: those with the least power and voice may be left out and left behind by growth-enhancing policies that strengthen the property rights of some but weaken the property rights of marginalized groups. And if avoiding armed conflict and civil war is the primary goal, then special care should be taken to safeguard the property rights of marginalized groups—even if this means slower economic growth in the short-term.
  • Human Rights
    What's Next for Chen Guangcheng?
    Play
    (Note: Mr. Chen's remarks are provided through interpreter.) JEROME COHEN: Well, it's time to begin now, on a notable precedent: I understand the council has never done a program where everything from now on is in a foreign language. We've had visitors who have spoken in a foreign language, but the presider, et cetera, has spoken in English. We hope it will work. We're delighted to have your interest. It was just nine years ago this week that I met Mr. Chen and Mrs. Chen here. I told the State -- I told the State Department people I was too busy to meet them. This man had never studied law. I hadn't finished grading my exams. I had to go to China. But they said, this is somebody you're going to want to meet. So I said, half an hour only. And we ended up talking about four hours and became good friends. And later in the year when I went to China, he came up to Beijing, the Tsinghua Law School, then he invited my wife and me down to their humble village in Shandong province. It was an enlightening experience, and we have been friends since, although for seven years until May 19th, we hadn't seen each other. Well, we're going to begin. Please turn off all electronic devices, including vibrators. Otherwise, we'll have some interference. We're dependent on electronics here -- (laughter) -- for the translation. I think before beginning, I just want to ask Ms. Vin (ph) to stand up. She has been Mr. Chen's adviser. She's gone through hell for many years for him. She's a highly intelligent person, and she may want to participate. (In Chinese.) OK. Yeah, thank you. (Applause.) (Through interpreter.) So let's start now, shall we? My first question: Right now what is your most pressing question? CHEN: I think that what I'm most concerned about -- it's also the most important question -- is the state of law in China. It's still very much being trampled on. And more specifically, after I left my home in Shandong, the local authorities there have been having -- retaliating against my family in a frenzied way. Please think about this. Our central government more than once has stated that I'm a free person; I'm a legal citizen. And I -- it was very normal for me to leave Shandong. After I left Shandong, the local authorities have very -- the deputy secretary in charge of law and order got 30-odd hired thugs with axe handles and busted their way into my -- the home of my elder brother and his son, kicked open their door and retaliated against their family members. I understand that they were very severely beaten, and the axe handles -- they were, like, pickaxe handles -- when -- they broke the axe handles as they were beating him. And the latest incident -- and so I have is that even my nephew's clothes were torn off, and his head, his arms -- he was injured all over. He was still bleeding three hours after the -- and that kind of situation, my nephew really had no choice but to take a kitchen knife and fight back. And think about this. In the middle of the night, and totally against China's constitution, they broke into a home, harmed people and then robbed him. They took away my brother's communications equipment, including his cellphone. These are all illegal activities. Nobody is going after them for that. But my nephew, who was about to be killed if he didn't fight back, is now being accused of intentional killing. Is there any justice? Is there any rationale in any of this? So this -- the moral standards here are at rock bottom because any person of conscience would say this is wrong. And as far as I understand, this retaliation is continuing. And yesterday the lawyer asked again to meet with my nephew and was again refused. And when I -- my friends who helped me leave Shandong are also still coming under pressure, even though I'm legal. What's wrong with them helping me leave Shandong? So if there's no legal question, why are they treated so illegally? So is this authority that can rise above the law to justify all these illegal activities? There's no -- there's no justice in this. But this is still continuing. And I think that is the most important thing right now. And I think it's something that more people need to care about, that it's a very pressing and important issue. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) But right now -- how is your brother and your nephew? What's the latest news? CHEN: The latest news is that my brother returned to Shandong but he's still under tremendous pressure. They haven't told me specifically what kind of pressure, but he told me very clearly that he's under intense pressure. And he's been limited in his freedom to leave the village. More specifically, what I know is that my nephew is still in a detention center. His lawyer cannot meet with him, and no information -- we can't get any information on him. And I -- as -- I understand that keeping him isolated from his lawyer probably suggests that he may be tortured and they're just trying to hide that fact by not letting him meet anyone. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) Have you asked the Chinese government if they can look into your problems in the past? Can you accuse them? What is their response? CHEN: After I left Shandong, through various channels I raised this very legitimate request of our central government. When I was in the Chaoyang hospital the central government several times sent representatives to contact me. And I, likewise, told them about the kinds of illegal harm that was done to my family over the last seven years. We talked in considerable detail. And more than once they very clearly, explicitly said to me that for these many years, the kinds of cruel and inhuman behavior that my family was subjected to in Shandong will be investigated; that if it violates Chinese law, they will seek truth from facts and publicly deal with this. They gave me this promise more than once. They stressed it. And I also asked that my lawyer should be involved. And they gave and answered me (affirmative ?). So I still hope that the central government will be able to live up to their promise and investigate this. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) The Chinese leaders now always say China cannot accept the Western-style democracy, Western politics. What do you think of that? CHEN: Well, I've heard more than once that we can't just copy Western democracy. My first sense is, they're right. It's true; we cannot just copy Western democracy. Some Western countries, they have -- they still have aristocrats and royal families. We can't do that. But we also need to learn Eastern democracy -- Japan, South Korea. And China, what's wrong with us having our own democracy? Taiwan has democracy too. I still remember -- there's an ancient Chinese phrase -- (off mic) -- yes, we learn from what is good, and what is bad we try to avoid. I think Confucius said that. I don't think we should differentiate between what's us and them. You know, if it's good, just learn from it. If it's bad, don't take it. I don't care where it comes from. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) What is your purpose in coming here? What do you want to do there? What do you want to study? And what do you want to do besides studying? What is -- how's your English? CHEN: I think I have (had ?) two things since I came here. So the last seven years I haven't had a weekend. So both for my body and my mental health, I need some rest. Also, the last seven years I've also been illegally isolated from the rest of the world, and my knowledge is way behind the developments in the world. I need to replenish my knowledge. Also, I think that -- I think I have some understanding of the law in China, but -- basic understanding -- but in terms of how that law's actually enforced, I have my own particular insights. And I know that -- I want to know what are the differences between English and American law versus continental law, so I can have some comparisons. And also, what role does law play in the society? Why is it that although everybody has laws, in some societies law does function, and some societies act as if we can have law; maybe we can do without it. COHEN: What is the difference? CHEN: Particularly, one special concern of mine is laws that protect disabled people. And when I study, I hope I can -- I understand that in New York, you have some people who specialize in laws of the disabled and people who are revising these laws. I'd love to be involved in that process. And I want to combine my studies with that. I don't think it's good just to study in the abstract in an office. I think we need to learn also from what's going on in the world, keep up with latest developments, because then my studies are more practical, more feasible. But in order to do that, I need to lay a good foundation -- my English, for instance. So right -- that's going to take some time. I'm studying. Maybe next week I will be able to study it more systematically. But this is all going to take time. Everything I want to do takes time. But I want to work hard. COHEN: Besides domestic laws, there is also international law, international civil laws, international human rights laws. Are you interested? CHEN: Yes, of course. International law -- I think international laws and conventions, China has already signed, like conventions against torture, about civil and political rights. These are universal values that have been accepted by most people around the world. These are basic norms of behavior, and I don't think China is an exception. So I think that they should be norms for our behavior. We should respect them. We should affirm them. But how these are going to be integrated with Chinese law, that will help blur these differences between domestic and international law. And I think international law will play a greater and greater role, and so I'm very interested in it. And I do hope to see how British and American law can -- and compare it with Chinese law and make (some ?) comparisons. COHEN: The -- China's government always says foreigners shouldn't intervene in Chinese domestic affairs. And they feel that your case is a domestic episode, and foreigners have no business of questioning or investigating it. CHEN: Well, I think there's international law. There's the question of where the boundaries between that and domestic law is. Take a family. We say, well, OK, family business is my own business. I don't want outsiders meddling in my family business. But then it depends on what is going on in your family. If -- let's say if either a husband or wife is abusing the other in an abnormal way, or even getting to the point of violence, then perhaps you've gone beyond the limits of what is a family norm, and outsiders do have a right to be involved. And international relations are governed by international law. I think international law should play a role in that if you go beyond the norms, if you are behaving inappropriately towards your own citizens, your own people, I think international law should have some constraining ability. COHEN: I know when you first got involved in the litigation, you were very interested in protecting rights of the disabled, because you yourself have a disability. Can you tell us what is your attitude on this? How did you become interested in law? CHEN: Oh, that's a long story. I think it started in 1990 or '91. I was still living in the village. I was just starting to study. And then -- after the Chinese law for the disabled was promulgated in 1991, it had very clear regulations for rural villages and how they were supposed to ensure the rights of the disabled. But the problem is the law was printed and then it was put in someone's drawer and it was never enforced. And I had some personal experience of that. So I started talking to some of the departments concerned, including the Federation for the Disabled and other government departments. Let's say the issue of tax exemptions. I talked with them many times with no result, and the Federation for the Disabled also didn't seem to have a very clear stand on this. And they didn't have any method to deal with it. So then I went to some lawyers. And the lawyers said, well, a case like this, first of all, there's no economic payback, and also, legally it might be difficult. So they weren't really interested in taking the case on. And so after a very long time, I tried all kinds of methods and I found that the other methods didn't seem to work, so I said, OK, law should be -- it should have the power to be enforced, so we disabled people should use the law to uphold our own rights. So I gradually went down the path of using law to fight for my rights. But in the beginning -- I thought things went well at the beginning, and many other disabled people started telling me about some illegal treatment that they had been subjected to. So then we started slowly going down the road of using litigation to fight for our rights. I should say overall that -- I don't want to go into details, but all I can say is the path got more and more difficult the further time we went, particularly the litigation. But if we want to fight for the rights of the disabled, (the first thing ?) -- the local governments are just acting illegally. They are demanding taxes, fees, all kinds of charges illegally. And these have to be dealt with through administrative litigation, but in China this is the most difficult kind of litigation. So it was step by step, but I gradually got interested in law and the question of how the rights of other people were being violated. So that was how I started. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) Now you're here, and I think you're lucky, because New York happens to be preparing to revise its laws regarding disabled people. We hope to improve our laws. We want to get better treatment to disabled people. Are you interested in being involved in that kind of legislation, in government work? CHEN: Well, of course I'm very interested, but I don't know to what degree I could be involved, because the sense I have is that, you know, people are saying, well, you know, outsiders shouldn't be involved in domestic affairs. And I think in an academic sense there should be no distinctions between countries, so I think it's something we can talk about. And I think -- I hope that in helping the progress of Chinese law that, you know, the -- smart people from all over the world will help improve our laws. I think that's good for everyone. That's sharing of knowledge. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) I should give the members here a chance to ask questions. Many people are very interested. COHEN: (In English.) (Off mic.) Please keep your questions short, or your comments, and we'll try to make the most of this discussion. Please stand, wait for the microphone, identify yourself and then speak out. And I should say we have a wonderful interpreter here who will help with the questions and maybe some of the answers, Ms. C.J. Wong (ph) from Yale University, who's been a great help to us. And we have a wonderful simultaneous interpreter who's back there, Ms. June May (ph), who's the best in the business. (Applause.) Ken -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch. Mr. Chen, let me first just say how much we all admire your courage and your willingness to stand up for principle despite great personal risk. My question starts with the fact that by the Chinese government's count, there are 90(,000) to 100,000 incidents of public unrest every year in China, most a product of corrupt local officials who could be brought to court by lawyers like you. But after initially -- (pausing for translation) -- COHEN: Go ahead. QUESTIONER: But after initially tolerating efforts to bring corrupt officials to court maybe five or six years ago, there has been a real crackdown on legal efforts of that sort. So I'm wondering if you could generalize from your case as to why the Chinese government has turned sour on these legal efforts? CHEN: I feel that the basic reason why all these incidents happen is because society is not being fair. The method that they use -- exert pressure, suppress everything, suppress all the problems -- sort of, if I put a lid on all these questions -- all these problems, then they don't exist. And the result is that the more you try to keep the lid on, the bigger the problems get. And I'm clear about this from my own experiences in the last six or seven years. The law situation in China has deteriorated. Last year, for the deputy party secretary in charge of law and order to say: I don't care what law is, we're going -- we can use illegal measures; I do as I please. That's a very good example. I remember, you know, Confucius had a very famous sentence: That if you cannot act fairly, who do you expect to act fairly? And we've had a lot of Confucius Institutes outside of China. So if you're not behaving properly, how do you expect other people to behave properly? If you would lead -- you're supposed to be in charge of law and order, as the party secretary -- and if you're not going to observe the law, how do you expect people to observe the law? What a terrible role model you are. So I think that's horrible. I think we have to deal with question reasonably, openly, and resolve the problems. And then society will be stable. COHEN: (In Chinese.) (Laughter.) COHEN: (Through interpreter) -- give other people a chance to ask questions. COHEN: (In English.) Susan Shirk, you have -- (Cross talk.) CHEN: There's so much I have to say. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Susan Shirk from University of California, San Diego. When you petitioned Premier Wen Jiabao, you framed it as a loyal critic in a very Chinese style. And you detailed the stability maintenance efforts and corruption on a local level, and you asked the central government to intervene to solve the problem. How did you think about how to frame your request to Premier Wen? And do you have any -- do you believe that the central government actually knew of what was going on in Linyi? And do you have any expectations that if not this group of leaders, but perhaps the group that will come in next fall will actually do something about not just Linyi, but the security efforts -- excessive security efforts in other villages, too? CHEN: I think of course they know what's going on at the local level. But also, I'm also sure that they don't know completely what's going on, because under the present circumstances, they just hear a lot of reports, but they don't have that many channels for directly communicating with their people. Even direct channels are probably being blocked. So what they hear is probably -- to some large degree, is also very biased or very partial in nature. Oh, one more thing. I think nobody can stop the progress of history. I don't care if it's the central government. Whether the central government wants move forward, ahead or backwards, it's going to be forced to move forward, you know. Marx said the productive forces determined productive relationships. So if the government wants -- the central government wants to do it, of course they can do it. But it will take time, and it will need support from the people. COHEN: (Off mic) -- get through everything, then to Elliott (sp). QUESTIONER: (Through interpreter.) (Inaudible) -- to the United States -- (inaudible) -- does not come out and just go home. What will you do in the U.S.? What role can you play in the U.S.? CHEN: Let's not do assumptions. I think we can see that the central government is letting me come to the U.S. to study. That is unprecedented, regardless of what they did in the past. As long as they're beginning to move in the right direction, we should affirm it. We shouldn't be just in this habitual habit of challenging what they're doing. You know, if somebody has always been doing good and they do something wrong, you should say, oh, you did that wrong. But if they've always been doing something wrong, and now they're doing something right, we should say yes, you did that right. And I think we deal very factually like that and not have assumptions. If we just have -- do assumptions, we're going to have a lot of problems. All kinds of issues are going to come up. So they made a promise to me that they're going to thoroughly investigate the Shandong authorities. I'm waiting because there's such a big difference between what the central government is saying and what the locals are saying. So I'm waiting. We also need to supervise and urge them, press them to do what they promised. COHEN: Here we have from Berlin, from Elizabeth Pond, who's a journalist and author -- and her question is: How important is the condemnation by the -- of the Tiananmen massacre by the 1989 Beijing mayor, Chen Xitong? CHEN: I think that -- the question is who exactly is controlling society's resources. Whoever is in control is the person who should be responsible for the problems in society. If you control all the resources in your hands and you won't assume the responsibility, that makes no sense. So it's like my case. The local party secretary is also -- is both the supervisor and also the administrator. And based on my experience, I can give you an example. Last year there was this problem. The party secretary is the number one person. He's also the number two person as he can give orders. But he has -- he needn't assume any responsibility. If you're going to sue someone, you can only sue number two; you can't get at number one. And I think that makes no legal sense at all. The second thing is the question the -- who's high in the hierarchy. Last year, Chang Xingpai (ph), who is our party secretary, in October he wanted me to move to a prison. And then when there were so many people concerned about this, then in November he said, oh, our -- I don't agree with -- my superior said they wanted to do this, but I'm being forced to do this. I have no choice; I'm just following orders. And I said to him -- I said, so you're saying if they tell you to be a robber, you're going to be a robber? And he just smiled. So I think in so many cases, these administrative orders -- if they have no legal basis, they're not being corrected. And that's a very serious problem. This question you asked me just now -- it's so similar to my problem from my experiences. The central government needs to -- with the case of Tiananmen, they also need to handle it as my case: just study it, get the facts out and stop trying to put a lid on it -- stop, you know -- COHEN: Yes, please. QUESTIONER: Hello, Mr. Chen. I'm Ron Tiersky from Amherst College. Since (we put ?), we could say that there are two places that change could come about in China. One place is from the outside, whether outside people outside the party in China or pressures from abroad. But there's a second place that change could come, which is from inside the party itself. The -- we talk about "the party"; we talk about "the regime." I would like to know to what extent do you see a struggle going on, particularly within the top leadership, between, you know, the old-style communists and what we might call, I don't know, national patriots or people with something -- some ideas like your own? MR. : Oh, was there any -- CHEN: I think in any system, it's -- there's no monolith. Everybody knows that. Also, as I was saying just now, in China, everything is in a state of historic transition. And at this time international concern is very important. You mentioned external forces just now. I said, if it's sincere, if it's responsible, if it's out of the desire to help, I think that's very important. But in the end, the development of civil society in China and how to have it function well after it's established -- that's going to depend on the Chinese people. If the Chinese people don't care about how their own society operates, what -- how can that society function? On that issue, I want to make a point very clear. Many people -- especially if it's a big problem, many people -- they want -- they want to move the mountain in one week. That's not realistic. We have to move it bit by bit and start with ourselves. If everybody would do that, then maybe the effect would be very good. But you can't expect it to happen overnight. COHEN: (In English.) Thank you very much for your comments. You are not the only lawyer who has been detained or abused by Chinese authorities. During the past several years, dozens of lawyers have been detained, and some have been tortured. What can American lawyers, American law firms, American businesses doing work in China do to help change that situation? CHEN: Well, of course they can be very good help. I think there's no doubt about that. But I think the most important type of help has to go into the grass-roots lawyers. That -- for instance, in the rural areas -- need to have exchanges with them, have some contacts with them. Beginning in the '90s, I know that many democratic countries have had law dialogues with China -- (inaudible) -- and also, let's say, helping with training programs for procurators and others in the legal profession. That's been very helpful. The problems now is, it's not that there are no laws; it's that we have laws, but they're not being well-enforced. That's the first question. The second question is the judicial agencies. They themselves are not being told to enforce the law. They're being told to do things illegally, and they're not being -- they know that what they're being told to do is illegal, but they have no choice. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) But the question is, what can American lawyers do? If the American lawyers know what a situation -- what can foreigners -- should they be doing something? Do you have any suggestions? CHEN: Well, yes, of course I think they can do something. As I said, you can -- you can have contacts with Chinese rights lawyers. Try to at least find out from them what the facts are, because in China seeking truth from facts and liberating thinking is written into our constitution. It's also written into the constitution of the charter of the Communist Party. So if you do it on the basis of seeking truth from facts, I think it can help move things forward. COHEN: He needs a mic -- yeah. QUESTIONER: Yeah, thank you. My name is Roland Paul; I too am a lawyer. I'd like to ask you a question about your flight to the embassy. When you fled to the American Embassy, did you know that you would be able to get into it and did you -- did you time your flight knowing that there was a large, very high-level American mission, including the secretary of state and the secretary of Treasury, going to China? And it was reported that you first said, I want to stay in China, and then you changed your mind and said, I want to come to the United States. Why did you change your mind? Thank you. CHEN: Well, first I should say I don't like the term "fleeing" to the U.S. Embassy, because at that time I was only taking refuge. There's actually -- in Chinese law, there's a definition of taking refuge. As to whether or not -- I didn't know there was a strategic dialogue going to happen because I had been cut off from communications with everyone. I was just isolated from the rest of the world. So that was a total coincidence. As to whether the U.S. was going to take me in, this was the way it was. The U.S. holds itself up as embodying democracy and human rights value. If -- what would it mean if they refused to take me in? I think you can all imagine that. I think, on the surface, it seems to be a diplomatic question; but the question is, do you -- do you try to save someone who's in danger for his life? COHEN: (Through interpreter.) (Off mic) -- after getting into the U.S. embassy -- (inaudible) -- you went to the hospital and then you changed your mind -- (inaudible) -- tell us -- (inaudible.) CHEN: While I was in the embassy, I said I didn't want to leave China because I -- what I meant was I didn't want asylum. That was the -- after the diplomatic agreement was reached between China and the U.S. and the central government guaranteed my personal safety -- in other words after I left the U.S. embassy -- I enjoyed those rights that the government guaranteed me and so one of those rights is the freedom to travel in and out of China. Now you feel I changed my mind, but I don't feel I changed my mind. I'm here to study. Now that I have that guarantee of my right, I can do so. I think the -- maybe if you feel there were changes, it was because the time was so short. If I had waited six months and said, now I want to go abroad to study, you would have thought nothing of it. But because it happened so quickly, you know, people think something happened. But I think -- I do want to go back to China and then come out again to study. As long as they will guarantee me what -- my rights as a citizen, that's normal. QUESTIONER: This is David Phillips with Columbia University. Mr. Chen, what is your view about the self-immolation of Tibetans? Do you think that the laws and regulations on the protection and promotion of Tibetan identity are adequate and what can be done to better enforce them? CHEN: I think you have to look at it this way: for such a long time, regardless of what they illegally detained me or abusing me, the word they often used was they said I was a traitor. They said I betrayed my country. And I think the term "traitor" has a long historical background. And what it means is they have forgotten that -- you know, the term in Chinese, it means a betrayal of the Han people. But you know, that very term means that they forgot that there are people in China other than Han people, that it's -- you know, only people who have forgotten the other ethnic groups would use that word. And so I think the problem now is that they're not looking at Tibetans as a fraternal ethnic group. So I think all the ethnic groups need to see each other as brothers and sisters. And everybody should be treated equally. And I think that would solve the problem. That's my own personal view. Now, any ethnic group, like a person, if it's right they're being trampled on, it -- you will instinctively have a reaction. No doubt about that. COHEN: (In English.) Yes, sir. Please. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Tony Wilson (sp), Standard Chartered Bank. I wonder, Mr. Chen, if you could comment on the Bo Xilai situation, if you're able to, and what changes, if any, we may see coming from it. CHEN: Well, I'm sure there will be developments. There's no question about that. In fact, it's -- the case is already developing now. But the Bo Xilai incident reminds me of another incident. If I remember rightly, I think it was either '08 or '09 in Shandong, we had somebody at the level of a vice governor in Shandong province, out of his own interests, in order to keep a cover-up on what he had done -- and he had a mistress who he had kept for 13 years. So he used a remote-controlled bomb by one of his henchmen to blow her to pieces. So Bo Xilai is not an isolated case. We had something like that in Shandong, and I'm sure that was not the only case in Shandong. And Shandong needs to be dealt with very carefully and thoroughly. So if the central government were to look -- doesn't control party members and doesn't control officials, they'll lose control. COHEN: Obviously, and that link relates to what he wrote yesterday in the Times: Lawlessness is involved in that case too. The party leadership says, we're handling everything according to law. But the world knows Bo Xilai has never yet gotten to the hands of a legal official. He's totally in the custody of the Communist Party discipline inspection commission. Oh, there's a link here. Yes, next (our ?) question, please. QUESTIONER: Nick Brant (sp) with Lazad (ph). Thank you for your comments. I wonder if you could tell us how optimistic you might be about whether or not we will see genuine democracy in China in your lifetime. COHEN: He's only 40. CHEN: I'm very optimistic because I think it would be giving too much time to say "in my lifetime." I think even over the last few years as the information age has developed so quickly, China's society has all gotten to the era where you don't want something known, you better not do it. So people are using all kinds of means to disseminate information. Can you really do cover-ups? No, that possibility is diminishing. So for officials to ride on top of the constitution -- and I think that possibility is less and less likely to be accepted by the people. So I think China will be changing very quickly, but it requires everybody to be involved. COHEN: Please. QUESTIONER: I'm Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. Corporations over the last decade and more have moved into China because it's a very good market and also because they can produce items there more cheaply than in the U.S. But what kind of citizenship should American corporations have in China? Do they have a role to play in promoting human rights both in general and also in how workers are treated, particularly in workers' right to organize unions? CHEN: I think you should ask foreign corporations that question. That would be more appropriate, because if you must have me say something, I can -- I can only approach it from another angle. Somebody who is penniless and somebody has a hundred thousand, they're in very different positions. Someone who has a million and is also very -- not that different from somebody who has a billion, because once you've solved your basic livelihood, the next thing you need is going to be a spiritual life. I think that would be my answer. QUESTIONER: Mr. Chen, "mihao" (ph). Welcome to New York. I am Minky Worden from Human Rights Watch. I hope you will have a chance to get a good night's sleep while you're here. And I wanted to ask -- in your New York Times piece today you say that China has many laws, but no rule of law. Isn't the real problem that the Chinese Communist Party is not yet -- is still above the law, is not yet subject to the law? And what is the process for ensuring that Chinese Communist Party can eventually be subject to the law, as citizens are? CHEN: I think that Article 5 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China says at the beginning that the country should be ruled according to law and to build a country with rule of law. Article 5 is that all political parties, all social organizations should -- et cetera -- all have to operate within the limits of the constitution. That is to say Article 5 is already clearly telling us that there are legal provisions. So why should these -- party -- why should the party not observe the law? I still have to study that. Their monitoring of the party -- there's not enough monitoring by the people. If they break the law, they don't get into a lot of trouble. They may -- they can break the law because they can get away with it. If breaking the law brings you a lot of problems, then they will control themselves. COHEN: (In Chinese.) CHEN: Taiwan has already been through that in the '80s. Maybe this is something -- a stage that every society needs to pass through. COHEN: (In English.) It's 1987 of becoming a democratic state, having been a highly dictatorial party-controlled legal system. And they've done it without a revolution. They've done it peacefully. That's why he mentioned earlier Taiwan is worth studying. But yes, please. CHEN: Interests cannot be protected by the law -- those interests in the law -- the legal -- QUESTIONER: I'm Caroll Bogert. I'm a little embarrassed to be the third person from Human Rights Watch asking a question. (Laughter.) Can you tell us how you did inform yourself in the period of time in Linyi? You mentioned you were in a kind of information blackout, but you do seem to know some things about what's been happening in your country. And how easy is it or how important is it for Chinese citizens -- netizens, as they are called -- to get over the great firewall in China, to inform themselves accurately about events in your country and abroad? CHEN: Well, first of all, I did get very little information. You think I knew something. Partly it may be because I wanted to find out as much as I could. The second thing is, when I was able to get information, I would use -- make full use of that opportunity. If I had always had free access to information, perhaps I could answer questions better. But in terms of netizens, in terms of the general Chinese public, in terms of their broad participation, in terms of their getting information from many sources through many channels, that will play a very important role in China. We have a saying that if you only hear one side, you will be kept in the dark. You will only be enlightened if you hear all sides. So you need comparisons. You can only make correct -- come to correct conclusions by getting as much information as possible. I think the simplest (phrase ?), if you don't want people to be able to see something, that means you're afraid of something. If you did the right thing, why would you be afraid of letting people know? Why would you be afraid of others commenting on it? Why would you not want people to know about it? So I hope that the netizens won't have to go through a firewall and still get a lot of information. And that tells you about another problem, that you cannot suppress the basic goodness that in the human -- that is in human nature. I think that goodness will come out to the fore more and more and society will care and more about these -- this is unavoidable. COHEN: Yes, please. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Mr. Chen, your experience has shed light on the human rights situation. So this is a more general question: Do you believe that it will serve to open up the Chinese society? Will they be better on human rights or worse? And if they're watching this program today and reading your op-eds, for example -- which I imagine they both do -- will they react positively and try to change things or shut things down? Thank you. CHEN: This makes me think of something else, regardless if it's my case or other violations of human rights or cases of humans rights -- (inaudible). I think maybe people in the outside know more about this. But what I want to know is although there's so many -- such cases, so many examples, and yet when you look at the human rights situation, you still see that there are people pushing the human right -- but you still don't see the real picture of human rights in China. The human rights condition of your ordinary people in those cases may be even more numerous than you're aware of. But as for your second question, what will the -- you think that the central government may know about this program, and -- (inaudible) -- I think they will have a correct response because they were very clear in May. I think that is right in front of us. Otherwise I wouldn't be here talking to you if they hadn't made the correct decision. So I think liberating our thinking is in our constitution. I think they will do it. But local authorities, they're very backward, and I think it's going to take more time to change them. QUESTIONER: Mr. Chen -- (in Chinese). My name is Martin Flaherty. Among other things I'm with a group called The Committee to Support Chinese Lawyers, which Jerry and Bob Bernstein are involved with as well. My question is, you've talked about law firms and business more generally. What are things that the United States government should and should not do to promote the rule of law in China? CHEN: Well, they can try harder. (Laughter.) Why? Because we see that if you try harder many things can be done. At least a lot more can be done than is being done right now. Now maybe there may be many other aspects. I know that it's a very complicated thing, this diplomacy between big countries. But no matter how you put it, human rights is a very basic human value. If this very -- if you can't even care about these such fundamental human values, the other interests are very superficial by comparison. We say in China, you don't want to care only about the branches and forget about the core. You're an ordinary Chinese citizen, but you wouldn't understand the situation in rural villages. What -- you know the attitude of the ordinary -- so from the viewpoint of the ordinary Chinese, would you -- what would they like to see the American government to do? If you can't talk about it now, maybe in a year's time. I'll answer your first question. People in China's villages, they're all very good people. A rational society, a law-abiding society would allow people to very naturally show their innate goodness. If you turn it around right now, if you try to show your goodness, you may be in danger. When you look at how many people are getting beaten up in the -- (inaudible.) How a -- (Crosstalk.) COHEN: (In English.) And I want to thank -- (applause). CHEN: Thank you. (Applause.) I just want to offer one last word. As I see it in this world, there is nothing that is impossible. If you want to do it you can think of a way to do it. There is nothing -- there is no such thing as a difficulty that cannot be overcome. I don't know what you think of this, but I think that every person, if you try hard, you can do so much better than I can. COHEN: Oh, it's already done. Good. All right, thank you very much. (Applause.) (Note: Mr. Chen's remarks are provided through interpreter.) JEROME COHEN: Well, it's time to begin now, on a notable precedent: I understand the council has never done a program where everything from now on is in a foreign language. We've had visitors who have spoken in a foreign language, but the presider, et cetera, has spoken in English. We hope it will work. We're delighted to have your interest. It was just nine years ago this week that I met Mr. Chen and Mrs. Chen here. I told the State -- I told the State Department people I was too busy to meet them. This man had never studied law. I hadn't finished grading my exams. I had to go to China. But they said, this is somebody you're going to want to meet. So I said, half an hour only. And we ended up talking about four hours and became good friends. And later in the year when I went to China, he came up to Beijing, the Tsinghua Law School, then he invited my wife and me down to their humble village in Shandong province. It was an enlightening experience, and we have been friends since, although for seven years until May 19th, we hadn't seen each other. Well, we're going to begin. Please turn off all electronic devices, including vibrators. Otherwise, we'll have some interference. We're dependent on electronics here -- (laughter) -- for the translation. I think before beginning, I just want to ask Ms. Vin (ph) to stand up. She has been Mr. Chen's adviser. She's gone through hell for many years for him. She's a highly intelligent person, and she may want to participate. (In Chinese.) OK. Yeah, thank you. (Applause.) (Through interpreter.) So let's start now, shall we? My first question: Right now what is your most pressing question? CHEN: I think that what I'm most concerned about -- it's also the most important question -- is the state of law in China. It's still very much being trampled on. And more specifically, after I left my home in Shandong, the local authorities there have been having -- retaliating against my family in a frenzied way. Please think about this. Our central government more than once has stated that I'm a free person; I'm a legal citizen. And I -- it was very normal for me to leave Shandong. After I left Shandong, the local authorities have very -- the deputy secretary in charge of law and order got 30-odd hired thugs with axe handles and busted their way into my -- the home of my elder brother and his son, kicked open their door and retaliated against their family members. I understand that they were very severely beaten, and the axe handles -- they were, like, pickaxe handles -- when -- they broke the axe handles as they were beating him. And the latest incident -- and so I have is that even my nephew's clothes were torn off, and his head, his arms -- he was injured all over. He was still bleeding three hours after the -- and that kind of situation, my nephew really had no choice but to take a kitchen knife and fight back. And think about this. In the middle of the night, and totally against China's constitution, they broke into a home, harmed people and then robbed him. They took away my brother's communications equipment, including his cellphone. These are all illegal activities. Nobody is going after them for that. But my nephew, who was about to be killed if he didn't fight back, is now being accused of intentional killing. Is there any justice? Is there any rationale in any of this? So this -- the moral standards here are at rock bottom because any person of conscience would say this is wrong. And as far as I understand, this retaliation is continuing. And yesterday the lawyer asked again to meet with my nephew and was again refused. And when I -- my friends who helped me leave Shandong are also still coming under pressure, even though I'm legal. What's wrong with them helping me leave Shandong? So if there's no legal question, why are they treated so illegally? So is this authority that can rise above the law to justify all these illegal activities? There's no -- there's no justice in this. But this is still continuing. And I think that is the most important thing right now. And I think it's something that more people need to care about, that it's a very pressing and important issue. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) But right now -- how is your brother and your nephew? What's the latest news? CHEN: The latest news is that my brother returned to Shandong but he's still under tremendous pressure. They haven't told me specifically what kind of pressure, but he told me very clearly that he's under intense pressure. And he's been limited in his freedom to leave the village. More specifically, what I know is that my nephew is still in a detention center. His lawyer cannot meet with him, and no information -- we can't get any information on him. And I -- as -- I understand that keeping him isolated from his lawyer probably suggests that he may be tortured and they're just trying to hide that fact by not letting him meet anyone. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) Have you asked the Chinese government if they can look into your problems in the past? Can you accuse them? What is their response? CHEN: After I left Shandong, through various channels I raised this very legitimate request of our central government. When I was in the Chaoyang hospital the central government several times sent representatives to contact me. And I, likewise, told them about the kinds of illegal harm that was done to my family over the last seven years. We talked in considerable detail. And more than once they very clearly, explicitly said to me that for these many years, the kinds of cruel and inhuman behavior that my family was subjected to in Shandong will be investigated; that if it violates Chinese law, they will seek truth from facts and publicly deal with this. They gave me this promise more than once. They stressed it. And I also asked that my lawyer should be involved. And they gave and answered me (affirmative ?). So I still hope that the central government will be able to live up to their promise and investigate this. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) The Chinese leaders now always say China cannot accept the Western-style democracy, Western politics. What do you think of that? CHEN: Well, I've heard more than once that we can't just copy Western democracy. My first sense is, they're right. It's true; we cannot just copy Western democracy. Some Western countries, they have -- they still have aristocrats and royal families. We can't do that. But we also need to learn Eastern democracy -- Japan, South Korea. And China, what's wrong with us having our own democracy? Taiwan has democracy too. I still remember -- there's an ancient Chinese phrase -- (off mic) -- yes, we learn from what is good, and what is bad we try to avoid. I think Confucius said that. I don't think we should differentiate between what's us and them. You know, if it's good, just learn from it. If it's bad, don't take it. I don't care where it comes from. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) What is your purpose in coming here? What do you want to do there? What do you want to study? And what do you want to do besides studying? What is -- how's your English? CHEN: I think I have (had ?) two things since I came here. So the last seven years I haven't had a weekend. So both for my body and my mental health, I need some rest. Also, the last seven years I've also been illegally isolated from the rest of the world, and my knowledge is way behind the developments in the world. I need to replenish my knowledge. Also, I think that -- I think I have some understanding of the law in China, but -- basic understanding -- but in terms of how that law's actually enforced, I have my own particular insights. And I know that -- I want to know what are the differences between English and American law versus continental law, so I can have some comparisons. And also, what role does law play in the society? Why is it that although everybody has laws, in some societies law does function, and some societies act as if we can have law; maybe we can do without it. COHEN: What is the difference? CHEN: Particularly, one special concern of mine is laws that protect disabled people. And when I study, I hope I can -- I understand that in New York, you have some people who specialize in laws of the disabled and people who are revising these laws. I'd love to be involved in that process. And I want to combine my studies with that. I don't think it's good just to study in the abstract in an office. I think we need to learn also from what's going on in the world, keep up with latest developments, because then my studies are more practical, more feasible. But in order to do that, I need to lay a good foundation -- my English, for instance. So right -- that's going to take some time. I'm studying. Maybe next week I will be able to study it more systematically. But this is all going to take time. Everything I want to do takes time. But I want to work hard. COHEN: Besides domestic laws, there is also international law, international civil laws, international human rights laws. Are you interested? CHEN: Yes, of course. International law -- I think international laws and conventions, China has already signed, like conventions against torture, about civil and political rights. These are universal values that have been accepted by most people around the world. These are basic norms of behavior, and I don't think China is an exception. So I think that they should be norms for our behavior. We should respect them. We should affirm them. But how these are going to be integrated with Chinese law, that will help blur these differences between domestic and international law. And I think international law will play a greater and greater role, and so I'm very interested in it. And I do hope to see how British and American law can -- and compare it with Chinese law and make (some ?) comparisons. COHEN: The -- China's government always says foreigners shouldn't intervene in Chinese domestic affairs. And they feel that your case is a domestic episode, and foreigners have no business of questioning or investigating it. CHEN: Well, I think there's international law. There's the question of where the boundaries between that and domestic law is. Take a family. We say, well, OK, family business is my own business. I don't want outsiders meddling in my family business. But then it depends on what is going on in your family. If -- let's say if either a husband or wife is abusing the other in an abnormal way, or even getting to the point of violence, then perhaps you've gone beyond the limits of what is a family norm, and outsiders do have a right to be involved. And international relations are governed by international law. I think international law should play a role in that if you go beyond the norms, if you are behaving inappropriately towards your own citizens, your own people, I think international law should have some constraining ability. COHEN: I know when you first got involved in the litigation, you were very interested in protecting rights of the disabled, because you yourself have a disability. Can you tell us what is your attitude on this? How did you become interested in law? CHEN: Oh, that's a long story. I think it started in 1990 or '91. I was still living in the village. I was just starting to study. And then -- after the Chinese law for the disabled was promulgated in 1991, it had very clear regulations for rural villages and how they were supposed to ensure the rights of the disabled. But the problem is the law was printed and then it was put in someone's drawer and it was never enforced. And I had some personal experience of that. So I started talking to some of the departments concerned, including the Federation for the Disabled and other government departments. Let's say the issue of tax exemptions. I talked with them many times with no result, and the Federation for the Disabled also didn't seem to have a very clear stand on this. And they didn't have any method to deal with it. So then I went to some lawyers. And the lawyers said, well, a case like this, first of all, there's no economic payback, and also, legally it might be difficult. So they weren't really interested in taking the case on. And so after a very long time, I tried all kinds of methods and I found that the other methods didn't seem to work, so I said, OK, law should be -- it should have the power to be enforced, so we disabled people should use the law to uphold our own rights. So I gradually went down the path of using law to fight for my rights. But in the beginning -- I thought things went well at the beginning, and many other disabled people started telling me about some illegal treatment that they had been subjected to. So then we started slowly going down the road of using litigation to fight for our rights. I should say overall that -- I don't want to go into details, but all I can say is the path got more and more difficult the further time we went, particularly the litigation. But if we want to fight for the rights of the disabled, (the first thing ?) -- the local governments are just acting illegally. They are demanding taxes, fees, all kinds of charges illegally. And these have to be dealt with through administrative litigation, but in China this is the most difficult kind of litigation. So it was step by step, but I gradually got interested in law and the question of how the rights of other people were being violated. So that was how I started. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) Now you're here, and I think you're lucky, because New York happens to be preparing to revise its laws regarding disabled people. We hope to improve our laws. We want to get better treatment to disabled people. Are you interested in being involved in that kind of legislation, in government work? CHEN: Well, of course I'm very interested, but I don't know to what degree I could be involved, because the sense I have is that, you know, people are saying, well, you know, outsiders shouldn't be involved in domestic affairs. And I think in an academic sense there should be no distinctions between countries, so I think it's something we can talk about. And I think -- I hope that in helping the progress of Chinese law that, you know, the -- smart people from all over the world will help improve our laws. I think that's good for everyone. That's sharing of knowledge. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) I should give the members here a chance to ask questions. Many people are very interested. COHEN: (In English.) (Off mic.) Please keep your questions short, or your comments, and we'll try to make the most of this discussion. Please stand, wait for the microphone, identify yourself and then speak out. And I should say we have a wonderful interpreter here who will help with the questions and maybe some of the answers, Ms. C.J. Wong (ph) from Yale University, who's been a great help to us. And we have a wonderful simultaneous interpreter who's back there, Ms. June May (ph), who's the best in the business. (Applause.) Ken -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch. Mr. Chen, let me first just say how much we all admire your courage and your willingness to stand up for principle despite great personal risk. My question starts with the fact that by the Chinese government's count, there are 90(,000) to 100,000 incidents of public unrest every year in China, most a product of corrupt local officials who could be brought to court by lawyers like you. But after initially -- (pausing for translation) -- COHEN: Go ahead. QUESTIONER: But after initially tolerating efforts to bring corrupt officials to court maybe five or six years ago, there has been a real crackdown on legal efforts of that sort. So I'm wondering if you could generalize from your case as to why the Chinese government has turned sour on these legal efforts? CHEN: I feel that the basic reason why all these incidents happen is because society is not being fair. The method that they use -- exert pressure, suppress everything, suppress all the problems -- sort of, if I put a lid on all these questions -- all these problems, then they don't exist. And the result is that the more you try to keep the lid on, the bigger the problems get. And I'm clear about this from my own experiences in the last six or seven years. The law situation in China has deteriorated. Last year, for the deputy party secretary in charge of law and order to say: I don't care what law is, we're going -- we can use illegal measures; I do as I please. That's a very good example. I remember, you know, Confucius had a very famous sentence: That if you cannot act fairly, who do you expect to act fairly? And we've had a lot of Confucius Institutes outside of China. So if you're not behaving properly, how do you expect other people to behave properly? If you would lead -- you're supposed to be in charge of law and order, as the party secretary -- and if you're not going to observe the law, how do you expect people to observe the law? What a terrible role model you are. So I think that's horrible. I think we have to deal with question reasonably, openly, and resolve the problems. And then society will be stable. COHEN: (In Chinese.) (Laughter.) COHEN: (Through interpreter) -- give other people a chance to ask questions. COHEN: (In English.) Susan Shirk, you have -- (Cross talk.) CHEN: There's so much I have to say. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Susan Shirk from University of California, San Diego. When you petitioned Premier Wen Jiabao, you framed it as a loyal critic in a very Chinese style. And you detailed the stability maintenance efforts and corruption on a local level, and you asked the central government to intervene to solve the problem. How did you think about how to frame your request to Premier Wen? And do you have any -- do you believe that the central government actually knew of what was going on in Linyi? And do you have any expectations that if not this group of leaders, but perhaps the group that will come in next fall will actually do something about not just Linyi, but the security efforts -- excessive security efforts in other villages, too? CHEN: I think of course they know what's going on at the local level. But also, I'm also sure that they don't know completely what's going on, because under the present circumstances, they just hear a lot of reports, but they don't have that many channels for directly communicating with their people. Even direct channels are probably being blocked. So what they hear is probably -- to some large degree, is also very biased or very partial in nature. Oh, one more thing. I think nobody can stop the progress of history. I don't care if it's the central government. Whether the central government wants move forward, ahead or backwards, it's going to be forced to move forward, you know. Marx said the productive forces determined productive relationships. So if the government wants -- the central government wants to do it, of course they can do it. But it will take time, and it will need support from the people. COHEN: (Off mic) -- get through everything, then to Elliott (sp). QUESTIONER: (Through interpreter.) (Inaudible) -- to the United States -- (inaudible) -- does not come out and just go home. What will you do in the U.S.? What role can you play in the U.S.? CHEN: Let's not do assumptions. I think we can see that the central government is letting me come to the U.S. to study. That is unprecedented, regardless of what they did in the past. As long as they're beginning to move in the right direction, we should affirm it. We shouldn't be just in this habitual habit of challenging what they're doing. You know, if somebody has always been doing good and they do something wrong, you should say, oh, you did that wrong. But if they've always been doing something wrong, and now they're doing something right, we should say yes, you did that right. And I think we deal very factually like that and not have assumptions. If we just have -- do assumptions, we're going to have a lot of problems. All kinds of issues are going to come up. So they made a promise to me that they're going to thoroughly investigate the Shandong authorities. I'm waiting because there's such a big difference between what the central government is saying and what the locals are saying. So I'm waiting. We also need to supervise and urge them, press them to do what they promised. COHEN: Here we have from Berlin, from Elizabeth Pond, who's a journalist and author -- and her question is: How important is the condemnation by the -- of the Tiananmen massacre by the 1989 Beijing mayor, Chen Xitong? CHEN: I think that -- the question is who exactly is controlling society's resources. Whoever is in control is the person who should be responsible for the problems in society. If you control all the resources in your hands and you won't assume the responsibility, that makes no sense. So it's like my case. The local party secretary is also -- is both the supervisor and also the administrator. And based on my experience, I can give you an example. Last year there was this problem. The party secretary is the number one person. He's also the number two person as he can give orders. But he has -- he needn't assume any responsibility. If you're going to sue someone, you can only sue number two; you can't get at number one. And I think that makes no legal sense at all. The second thing is the question the -- who's high in the hierarchy. Last year, Chang Xingpai (ph), who is our party secretary, in October he wanted me to move to a prison. And then when there were so many people concerned about this, then in November he said, oh, our -- I don't agree with -- my superior said they wanted to do this, but I'm being forced to do this. I have no choice; I'm just following orders. And I said to him -- I said, so you're saying if they tell you to be a robber, you're going to be a robber? And he just smiled. So I think in so many cases, these administrative orders -- if they have no legal basis, they're not being corrected. And that's a very serious problem. This question you asked me just now -- it's so similar to my problem from my experiences. The central government needs to -- with the case of Tiananmen, they also need to handle it as my case: just study it, get the facts out and stop trying to put a lid on it -- stop, you know -- COHEN: Yes, please. QUESTIONER: Hello, Mr. Chen. I'm Ron Tiersky from Amherst College. Since (we put ?), we could say that there are two places that change could come about in China. One place is from the outside, whether outside people outside the party in China or pressures from abroad. But there's a second place that change could come, which is from inside the party itself. The -- we talk about "the party"; we talk about "the regime." I would like to know to what extent do you see a struggle going on, particularly within the top leadership, between, you know, the old-style communists and what we might call, I don't know, national patriots or people with something -- some ideas like your own? MR. : Oh, was there any -- CHEN: I think in any system, it's -- there's no monolith. Everybody knows that. Also, as I was saying just now, in China, everything is in a state of historic transition. And at this time international concern is very important. You mentioned external forces just now. I said, if it's sincere, if it's responsible, if it's out of the desire to help, I think that's very important. But in the end, the development of civil society in China and how to have it function well after it's established -- that's going to depend on the Chinese people. If the Chinese people don't care about how their own society operates, what -- how can that society function? On that issue, I want to make a point very clear. Many people -- especially if it's a big problem, many people -- they want -- they want to move the mountain in one week. That's not realistic. We have to move it bit by bit and start with ourselves. If everybody would do that, then maybe the effect would be very good. But you can't expect it to happen overnight. COHEN: (In English.) Thank you very much for your comments. You are not the only lawyer who has been detained or abused by Chinese authorities. During the past several years, dozens of lawyers have been detained, and some have been tortured. What can American lawyers, American law firms, American businesses doing work in China do to help change that situation? CHEN: Well, of course they can be very good help. I think there's no doubt about that. But I think the most important type of help has to go into the grass-roots lawyers. That -- for instance, in the rural areas -- need to have exchanges with them, have some contacts with them. Beginning in the '90s, I know that many democratic countries have had law dialogues with China -- (inaudible) -- and also, let's say, helping with training programs for procurators and others in the legal profession. That's been very helpful. The problems now is, it's not that there are no laws; it's that we have laws, but they're not being well-enforced. That's the first question. The second question is the judicial agencies. They themselves are not being told to enforce the law. They're being told to do things illegally, and they're not being -- they know that what they're being told to do is illegal, but they have no choice. COHEN: (Through interpreter.) But the question is, what can American lawyers do? If the American lawyers know what a situation -- what can foreigners -- should they be doing something? Do you have any suggestions? CHEN: Well, yes, of course I think they can do something. As I said, you can -- you can have contacts with Chinese rights lawyers. Try to at least find out from them what the facts are, because in China seeking truth from facts and liberating thinking is written into our constitution. It's also written into the constitution of the charter of the Communist Party. So if you do it on the basis of seeking truth from facts, I think it can help move things forward. COHEN: He needs a mic -- yeah. QUESTIONER: Yeah, thank you. My name is Roland Paul; I too am a lawyer. I'd like to ask you a question about your flight to the embassy. When you fled to the American Embassy, did you know that you would be able to get into it and did you -- did you time your flight knowing that there was a large, very high-level American mission, including the secretary of state and the secretary of Treasury, going to China? And it was reported that you first said, I want to stay in China, and then you changed your mind and said, I want to come to the United States. Why did you change your mind? Thank you. CHEN: Well, first I should say I don't like the term "fleeing" to the U.S. Embassy, because at that time I was only taking refuge. There's actually -- in Chinese law, there's a definition of taking refuge. As to whether or not -- I didn't know there was a strategic dialogue going to happen because I had been cut off from communications with everyone. I was just isolated from the rest of the world. So that was a total coincidence. As to whether the U.S. was going to take me in, this was the way it was. The U.S. holds itself up as embodying democracy and human rights value. If -- what would it mean if they refused to take me in? I think you can all imagine that. I think, on the surface, it seems to be a diplomatic question; but the question is, do you -- do you try to save someone who's in danger for his life? COHEN: (Through interpreter.) (Off mic) -- after getting into the U.S. embassy -- (inaudible) -- you went to the hospital and then you changed your mind -- (inaudible) -- tell us -- (inaudible.) CHEN: While I was in the embassy, I said I didn't want to leave China because I -- what I meant was I didn't want asylum. That was the -- after the diplomatic agreement was reached between China and the U.S. and the central government guaranteed my personal safety -- in other words after I left the U.S. embassy -- I enjoyed those rights that the government guaranteed me and so one of those rights is the freedom to travel in and out of China. Now you feel I changed my mind, but I don't feel I changed my mind. I'm here to study. Now that I have that guarantee of my right, I can do so. I think the -- maybe if you feel there were changes, it was because the time was so short. If I had waited six months and said, now I want to go abroad to study, you would have thought nothing of it. But because it happened so quickly, you know, people think something happened. But I think -- I do want to go back to China and then come out again to study. As long as they will guarantee me what -- my rights as a citizen, that's normal. QUESTIONER: This is David Phillips with Columbia University. Mr. Chen, what is your view about the self-immolation of Tibetans? Do you think that the laws and regulations on the protection and promotion of Tibetan identity are adequate and what can be done to better enforce them? CHEN: I think you have to look at it this way: for such a long time, regardless of what they illegally detained me or abusing me, the word they often used was they said I was a traitor. They said I betrayed my country. And I think the term "traitor" has a long historical background. And what it means is they have forgotten that -- you know, the term in Chinese, it means a betrayal of the Han people. But you know, that very term means that they forgot that there are people in China other than Han people, that it's -- you know, only people who have forgotten the other ethnic groups would use that word. And so I think the problem now is that they're not looking at Tibetans as a fraternal ethnic group. So I think all the ethnic groups need to see each other as brothers and sisters. And everybody should be treated equally. And I think that would solve the problem. That's my own personal view. Now, any ethnic group, like a person, if it's right they're being trampled on, it -- you will instinctively have a reaction. No doubt about that. COHEN: (In English.) Yes, sir. Please. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Tony Wilson (sp), Standard Chartered Bank. I wonder, Mr. Chen, if you could comment on the Bo Xilai situation, if you're able to, and what changes, if any, we may see coming from it. CHEN: Well, I'm sure there will be developments. There's no question about that. In fact, it's -- the case is already developing now. But the Bo Xilai incident reminds me of another incident. If I remember rightly, I think it was either '08 or '09 in Shandong, we had somebody at the level of a vice governor in Shandong province, out of his own interests, in order to keep a cover-up on what he had done -- and he had a mistress who he had kept for 13 years. So he used a remote-controlled bomb by one of his henchmen to blow her to pieces. So Bo Xilai is not an isolated case. We had something like that in Shandong, and I'm sure that was not the only case in Shandong. And Shandong needs to be dealt with very carefully and thoroughly. So if the central government were to look -- doesn't control party members and doesn't control officials, they'll lose control. COHEN: Obviously, and that link relates to what he wrote yesterday in the Times: Lawlessness is involved in that case too. The party leadership says, we're handling everything according to law. But the world knows Bo Xilai has never yet gotten to the hands of a legal official. He's totally in the custody of the Communist Party discipline inspection commission. Oh, there's a link here. Yes, next (our ?) question, please. QUESTIONER: Nick Brant (sp) with Lazad (ph). Thank you for your comments. I wonder if you could tell us how optimistic you might be about whether or not we will see genuine democracy in China in your lifetime. COHEN: He's only 40. CHEN: I'm very optimistic because I think it would be giving too much time to say "in my lifetime." I think even over the last few years as the information age has developed so quickly, China's society has all gotten to the era where you don't want something known, you better not do it. So people are using all kinds of means to disseminate information. Can you really do cover-ups? No, that possibility is diminishing. So for officials to ride on top of the constitution -- and I think that possibility is less and less likely to be accepted by the people. So I think China will be changing very quickly, but it requires everybody to be involved. COHEN: Please. QUESTIONER: I'm Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. Corporations over the last decade and more have moved into China because it's a very good market and also because they can produce items there more cheaply than in the U.S. But what kind of citizenship should American corporations have in China? Do they have a role to play in promoting human rights both in general and also in how workers are treated, particularly in workers' right to organize unions? CHEN: I think you should ask foreign corporations that question. That would be more appropriate, because if you must have me say something, I can -- I can only approach it from another angle. Somebody who is penniless and somebody has a hundred thousand, they're in very different positions. Someone who has a million and is also very -- not that different from somebody who has a billion, because once you've solved your basic livelihood, the next thing you need is going to be a spiritual life. I think that would be my answer. QUESTIONER: Mr. Chen, "mihao" (ph). Welcome to New York. I am Minky Worden from Human Rights Watch. I hope you will have a chance to get a good night's sleep while you're here. And I wanted to ask -- in your New York Times piece today you say that China has many laws, but no rule of law. Isn't the real problem that the Chinese Communist Party is not yet -- is still above the law, is not yet subject to the law? And what is the process for ensuring that Chinese Communist Party can eventually be subject to the law, as citizens are? CHEN: I think that Article 5 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China says at the beginning that the country should be ruled according to law and to build a country with rule of law. Article 5 is that all political parties, all social organizations should -- et cetera -- all have to operate within the limits of the constitution. That is to say Article 5 is already clearly telling us that there are legal provisions. So why should these -- party -- why should the party not observe the law? I still have to study that. Their monitoring of the party -- there's not enough monitoring by the people. If they break the law, they don't get into a lot of trouble. They may -- they can break the law because they can get away with it. If breaking the law brings you a lot of problems, then they will control themselves. COHEN: (In Chinese.) CHEN: Taiwan has already been through that in the '80s. Maybe this is something -- a stage that every society needs to pass through. COHEN: (In English.) It's 1987 of becoming a democratic state, having been a highly dictatorial party-controlled legal system. And they've done it without a revolution. They've done it peacefully. That's why he mentioned earlier Taiwan is worth studying. But yes, please. CHEN: Interests cannot be protected by the law -- those interests in the law -- the legal -- QUESTIONER: I'm Caroll Bogert. I'm a little embarrassed to be the third person from Human Rights Watch asking a question. (Laughter.) Can you tell us how you did inform yourself in the period of time in Linyi? You mentioned you were in a kind of information blackout, but you do seem to know some things about what's been happening in your country. And how easy is it or how important is it for Chinese citizens -- netizens, as they are called -- to get over the great firewall in China, to inform themselves accurately about events in your country and abroad? CHEN: Well, first of all, I did get very little information. You think I knew something. Partly it may be because I wanted to find out as much as I could. The second thing is, when I was able to get information, I would use -- make full use of that opportunity. If I had always had free access to information, perhaps I could answer questions better. But in terms of netizens, in terms of the general Chinese public, in terms of their broad participation, in terms of their getting information from many sources through many channels, that will play a very important role in China. We have a saying that if you only hear one side, you will be kept in the dark. You will only be enlightened if you hear all sides. So you need comparisons. You can only make correct -- come to correct conclusions by getting as much information as possible. I think the simplest (phrase ?), if you don't want people to be able to see something, that means you're afraid of something. If you did the right thing, why would you be afraid of letting people know? Why would you be afraid of others commenting on it? Why would you not want people to know about it? So I hope that the netizens won't have to go through a firewall and still get a lot of information. And that tells you about another problem, that you cannot suppress the basic goodness that in the human -- that is in human nature. I think that goodness will come out to the fore more and more and society will care and more about these -- this is unavoidable. COHEN: Yes, please. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Mr. Chen, your experience has shed light on the human rights situation. So this is a more general question: Do you believe that it will serve to open up the Chinese society? Will they be better on human rights or worse? And if they're watching this program today and reading your op-eds, for example -- which I imagine they both do -- will they react positively and try to change things or shut things down? Thank you. CHEN: This makes me think of something else, regardless if it's my case or other violations of human rights or cases of humans rights -- (inaudible). I think maybe people in the outside know more about this. But what I want to know is although there's so many -- such cases, so many examples, and yet when you look at the human rights situation, you still see that there are people pushing the human right -- but you still don't see the real picture of human rights in China. The human rights condition of your ordinary people in those cases may be even more numerous than you're aware of. But as for your second question, what will the -- you think that the central government may know about this program, and -- (inaudible) -- I think they will have a correct response because they were very clear in May. I think that is right in front of us. Otherwise I wouldn't be here talking to you if they hadn't made the correct decision. So I think liberating our thinking is in our constitution. I think they will do it. But local authorities, they're very backward, and I think it's going to take more time to change them. QUESTIONER: Mr. Chen -- (in Chinese). My name is Martin Flaherty. Among other things I'm with a group called The Committee to Support Chinese Lawyers, which Jerry and Bob Bernstein are involved with as well. My question is, you've talked about law firms and business more generally. What are things that the United States government should and should not do to promote the rule of law in China? CHEN: Well, they can try harder. (Laughter.) Why? Because we see that if you try harder many things can be done. At least a lot more can be done than is being done right now. Now maybe there may be many other aspects. I know that it's a very complicated thing, this diplomacy between big countries. But no matter how you put it, human rights is a very basic human value. If this very -- if you can't even care about these such fundamental human values, the other interests are very superficial by comparison. We say in China, you don't want to care only about the branches and forget about the core. You're an ordinary Chinese citizen, but you wouldn't understand the situation in rural villages. What -- you know the attitude of the ordinary -- so from the viewpoint of the ordinary Chinese, would you -- what would they like to see the American government to do? If you can't talk about it now, maybe in a year's time. I'll answer your first question. People in China's villages, they're all very good people. A rational society, a law-abiding society would allow people to very naturally show their innate goodness. If you turn it around right now, if you try to show your goodness, you may be in danger. When you look at how many people are getting beaten up in the -- (inaudible.) How a -- (Crosstalk.) COHEN: (In English.) And I want to thank -- (applause). CHEN: Thank you. (Applause.) I just want to offer one last word. As I see it in this world, there is nothing that is impossible. If you want to do it you can think of a way to do it. There is nothing -- there is no such thing as a difficulty that cannot be overcome. I don't know what you think of this, but I think that every person, if you try hard, you can do so much better than I can. COHEN: Oh, it's already done. Good. All right, thank you very much. (Applause.)
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