Politics and Government

Political Transitions

  • Defense and Security
    You Might Have Missed: Israel-Palestine Death Toll, Iraq Drone Strikes, and Afghan Civilians
    Media Availability with Secretary Hagel at Eglin AFB, Florida, U.S. Department of Defense, July 10, 2014. SEC. HAGEL: A lot of questions always come with any possibility or decision whether to take strikes or not. So those are all questions that are being asked and factors are being—are put into the process. And those are still options. Q: But what sorts of questions do you mean? SEC. HAGEL: Well, let’s start with the impact of strikes. What do you believe you can accomplish? Where would you strike? When would you strike? Who would you strike? Once you start strikes, are you prepared to sustain strikes over a long period of time or -- or short period of time? Those are just the first set of questions that have not only impact issues and questions, but long term implications. (3PA: Last week, I pointed out that while numerous U.S. officials have called for air strikes, these demands have not been matched by a clear justification or articulation of what they are intended to achieve.) Joshua Mitnick and Sara Toth Stub, “Gaza Death Toll Rises Sharply as Israel Escalates Attacks,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2014. The longest operation began in December 2008 and lasted 22 days, ending in a cease-fire and the deaths of at least 1,166 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, according to the Israeli human-rights group B’Tselem and the Israeli Foreign Ministry. A weeklong fight in 2012 left 167 Palestinians and six Israelis dead. (3PA: Since this article was published, an additional 18 Palestinians were reportedly killed. Therefore, only have 1,434 Palestinians and 19 Israelis have been killed since the Israeli-Gaza wars in 2008, but in the last two Israeli military operations, 55 percent and 52 percent of Palestinians killed were non-combatants.) Remarks by Secretary Hagel at a Troop Event, Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, U.S. Department of Defense, July 9, 2014. Make no mistake—and this country should not make any mistake on this, nor anyone in Congress—this is a threat to our country. This is a force that is sophisticated, it’s dynamic, it’s strong, it’s organized, it’s well-financed, it’s competent, ISIL. And it is a threat to our allies all over the Middle East. It’s a threat to Europe. It’s a threat to every stabilized country on Earth, and it’s a threat to us. So it is clearly in our interest—when I talk about protecting American lives in America, I also said protecting our interests. And ISIL may not appear to be an imminent threat to the United States. It is a threat to the United States. It is a threat, a clear threat to our partners in that area, and it is imminent. And I think you look further in that—in that area in the Middle East to see what’s going on, in Syria, in Lebanon, what’s going on in Israel today, the Gaza Strip, Libya, Egypt, there—there is hardly a stable country in that—in that area of the Middle East. Barbara Starr, “Pentagon considers how to target ISIS leader in drone strike,” CNN, July 9, 2014. The possibility comes as part of the U.S. military effort to gather intelligence on so-called "high value targets" in Iraq and continues to collect intelligence for targeting airstrikes in Iraq. The targets fall into three categories, the officials said. They include information for striking "high value targets" like al-Baghdadi; protection of key infrastructure such as the Haditha Dam; and blunting major ISIS offensives against Baghdad. Airstrikes by either drones or manned aircraft would have to be approved by the President. (3PA: Last week, I pointed out that while numerous U.S. officials have called for the deployment of drones, these demands have not been accompanied by justifications, and there is still no precise goal for the deployment.) Doug Cameron, “Cut Weapons Now, but Then What?Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2014. In peace time, the Navy fires around 100 a year for testing, though when conflicts arise that number shoots up quickly: almost 300 Tomahawks were fired during the Gulf War in 1991, and more than 150 during the 12-day campaign to oust Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi’s government in 2011. All told, 2,300 have been fired in combat. “Afghanistan Midyear Report 2014: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” United Nations, July 2014. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 4,853 civilian casualties, (1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 injured). UNAMA attributed 74 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements, nine per cent to Pro-Government Forces (eight per cent to Afghan national security forces, one per cent to international military forces) and 12 per cent to ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces in which a civilian casualty could not be attributed to a specific party… UNAMA documented 1,901 civilian casualties (474 civilian deaths and 1,427 injured) from ground engagements alone. Of the 1,901 civilian casualties from ground engagements, UNAMA attributed 52 percent (270 civilian deaths and 718 injured for 988 civilian casualties) to Anti-Government Elements and 14 percent (74 civilian deaths and 200 injured for 274 civilian casualties) to Pro-Government Forces. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by Anti-Government Elements – the second highest cause of civilian casualties – also killed and injured Afghan civilians at unprecedented levels. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 1,463 civilian casualties (463 civilian deaths and 1,000 injured, a seven per cent increase from the same period in 2013 and the highest recorded number of civilian deaths and injuries from IEDs since 2009. Targeted killings accounted for nine per cent of all civilian casualties. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 428 civilian casualties (263 civilian deaths and 165 injured) from targeted and wilful killings (or attempts to kill), a 10 per cent decrease from the same period in 2013. (3PA: Revisit my blog post to see an analysis of the UN’s data on the 17,558 civilians killed in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2013, now rising to 22,411 when including data for the first six months of 2014.) Micah Zenko, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32:4, 2009, pp. 615-649. In the Zagros Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, a Kurdish terrorist organization—Ansar al-Islamwas running a training camp near the village of Khurmal, where it was reportedly producing cyanide gas, toxic poisons, and ricin for terrorist attacks by its affiliated cells in Britain, Germany, France, and Italy.2 The US military developed a combined air-ground operations option that anticipated striking the camp on 4 July 2002. That option was unanimously supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and proposed to the White House. According to General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the planned operation to destroy Khurmal ‘would have been challenging, but doable’.3 General John Keane, the US Army’s representative on the Joint Chiefs, recalled the proposed option as ‘very doable from a military perspective’.4 If there ever was a clear instance for the Bush administration to execute its post-9/11 national security policy, this was it. Yet, despite the alleged threat from Ansar al-Islam, and a reliable option to use preemptive force to defeat it, President Bush chose not to utilize limited force…(p. 616) Although largely overlooked or forgotten, the Bush administration’s claims in 2002 that WMD were being produced at Khurmal turned out to be highly accurate. An American sensitive-site exploitation team deployed to Khurmal uncovered chemical hazard suits, atropine injectors, and Arabic-language manuals on how to make chemical munitions. Tests also revealed traces of cyanide salts, ricin, and potassium chloride, all deadly toxins.107 An investigative report by the Los Angeles Times, which both examined documents and computer files seized at Khurmal and was informed by interviews with US and Kurdish intelligence operatives, found no evidence that Ansar al-Islam was connected to Hussein’s regime, but was able to prove that the group ‘was partly funded and armed from abroad; was experimenting with chemicals, including toxic agents and a cyanide-based body lotion; and had international aspirations.’ (p. 640) (3PA: It’s been reported that Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters located two suspected sites related to Saddam Hussein’s WMD program—one containing 40 kilograms of uranium, and another former chemical weapons complex, potentially containing mustard gas and sarin. Some analysts believe this is evidence of WMDs existing in Iraq before the invasion in March 2003. However, as I detailed in the case study on the decision not to bomb the Ansar al-Islam camp in Khurmal, there was an additional site where WMD-like toxins and poisons were being developed.) “‘International Terrorism’ Being Taught in OU Classroom,” ADA Evening News, May 5, 1977, p. 7C. Primarily, [Stephen] Sloan explains, more rigorous passport controls coupled with intelligence information on suspected terrorists is needed. “What do you have to do to get a passport?” Sloan asks. “You pay your two dollars and send your picture into a travel agency and you get a passport. Well, dammit, Atila the Hun could get a passport!”… And the role of media needs to be addressed, he says. Electronic communications make it possible for a small band of terrorists to demand “instant global publicity” for their causes. On this point, the study group recently held a seminar for Oklahoma newsmen and state and federal officials on how to work together when terrorism strikes. “Terrorism is traditionally the weapon of the weak,” he adds. “And it’s extremely cost effective in a modern technological age. For instance, it’s one thing for a band of insurgents to knock off a rural official, but it’s quite another when a small group can knock out the electronic grid of a large modern city.”  
  • Conflict Prevention
    Guest Post: What’s in Store for Kashmir Under Modi?
    Anna Feuer is a research associate in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state and a historical flashpoint for separatist violence, terrorism, and border tensions, has enjoyed relative peace since 2010. However, recent incidents—including a violation of the Indo-Pakistani ceasefire that holds on the Line of Control (LoC) and a controversy surrounding Kashmir’s special constitutional status— point to the many stresses that could spark renewed unrest in the contested territory. External threats from Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based, anti-Indian militant group committed to jihad in Kashmir, and the ongoing risk of military conflict with Pakistan compound Kashmir’s insecurity. India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, should seek to reduce Kashmir’s vulnerability to these pressures by addressing Kashmiris’ longstanding domestic grievances, including militarization of the region, economic stagnation, and the preservation of Kashmir’s legislative autonomy. Modi should start by altering the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir so that it applies only to the LoC. According to Human Rights Watch, AFSPA, which grants special powers to Indian armed forces in “disturbed areas,” protects soldiers from prosecution for abuses and violates international human rights law. The previous prime minister, Manmohan Singh, pledged to repeal the law but failed to overcome the army’s opposition. Recently, however, the Ministry of Defense may have signaled a change in attitude, indicating that the time has come for “a strategic shift from merely invoking control mechanisms to addressing conflicts at various levels.” (Defense Minister Arun Jaitley was more evasive during a trip to Srinagar last weekend.) Repeal, or at least reform, of the law would do much to  reassure Kashmiris concerned with human rights and militarization. As elsewhere in India, Kashmiris are deeply worried about unemployment and economic stagnation. Recognizing that some Kashmiris may understand socioeconomic issues, like they do security issues, in the context of their troubled relationship with New Delhi, the Modi administration should keep economic development at the center of its approach to Kashmir, and avoid communally-driven policies that could divert attention from economic goals. Kashmiri traders are hopeful that the new government will revitalize trade across the LoC , though the Pakistan army’s opposition may make this impossible. Finally, Modi should downplay his party’s commitment to eliminating Article 370, the constitutional provision that grants Kashmir significant autonomy. While the BJP and its ideological affiliate, the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, maintain that Article 370 stokes separatistism and hinders Kashmir’s full integration into India, many Kashmiri Muslims perceive Article 370 as a lifeline that preserves their political voice in a Hindu-majority nation. (Whether the provision provides for substantive autonomy is another issue; presidential orders since 1950 have ensured that most Union laws apply to Kashmir.) Some have suggested that the BJP may attempt to consolidate its support in Hindu-dominated Jammu by hastening the repeal of Article 370. However, as analyst Jonah Blank points out, Modi’s sweeping election victory gives him “the political space to reach out to Indian Muslims” and potentially soften the BJP’s hardline stance on Kashmir’s special status. Modi should not attempt to quietly dilute Kashmir’s special status without officially removing the provision; past efforts to weaken the state’s autonomy have not gone unnoticed by separatist leaders. The Modi administration has already committed itself to the return of Kashmiri Pandits, Hindu Brahmins displaced during the Kashmiri insurgency of the late 1980s and 1990s. But the time is ripe to address the many other enduring issues that could exacerbate communal tensions and secessionist violence in Kashmir; as reporter Myra MacDonald has pointed out, Pakistan’s deteriorating security situation makes it less and less desirable for Kashmiris who are seeking peace, stability, and economic opportunity. By taking steps to reform AFSPA, encourage economic development, and “douse the sparks” produced by the Article 370 controversy, Modi can demonstrate his concern for Kashmiris’ longstanding grievances. However, if Modi pursues the Hindu nationalist positions that characterized his tenure as chief minister in Gujarat and colored his campaign speeches, he risks a return to the insecurity that has plagued Kashmir for much of its recent history.
  • United States
    What Would Air Strikes in Iraq Achieve?
    Demands by current policymakers to use military force are rarely accompanied by a specific objective of what it is intended to achieve. In the binary debate about what to do in Iraq, several policymakers have called for air strikes with some assertion of why and what they would accomplish. See below for an early collection and judge for yourself the validity of their claims. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC): “I think American airpower is the only hope to change the battlefield equation in Iraq.” Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC): “There is no scenario where we can stop the bleeding in Iraq without American air power.” Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV): “[Airstrikes] might be the only way we can give some support so they can regroup, so the Iraqi Army can get itself together.” Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV): “They’ve suggested maybe air strikes. That’s something I think would be more receptive if we think that we can get the rest of the United Nations involved with us to try to help them defend themselves.” Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL): “U.S. should consider use of drones with hellfire missiles if Iraq nears collapse.” Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-IL): “We’ve got to get involved with airstrikes, stiffening the spines of the Iraqis.” Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA): “If we don’t want to see an Iraq with large swaths of territory under militant control, and we shouldn’t, we should answer Iraqi requests to target these al-Qaeda terrorists with drone strikes.” Sen. John McCain (R-AZ): “We should explore all the options in air power, get a team over there to advise them.” However, McCain later countered this statement, saying, “I am not calling for air strikes.” (3PA: Interestingly, McCain is not calling for air strikes even while he describes Iraq as an “existential threat to the security of the United States of America.”) Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD): "I think we ought to use the same formula that we used when we took out Moammar Gadhafi in Libya…We have unique resources that no other country has, especially in the air. Intelligence and the ability to find where things are. I think the governments need to get together, because this is getting very serious." Rep. Mike Rogers (R-MI): “I would not be opposed to strikes—if it’s part of a holistic plan.” Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH): “We will be weighing all options. I’m not ruling anything in or out at this point.” Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): “We are going to have to take some sort of action against this radical group. That is not the choice before us. The choice before us will be whether we take action now, or we take action later.”
  • United States
    Time to Rethink Syria
    Julie Anderson is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. After three years of recurring conflict, an estimated 162,000 people killed (10,000 in the last two months), and millions displaced, international policies to stem the violence in Syria have been a clear failure. These efforts hit a new low on May 13 when United Nations (UN) mediator Lakhdar Brahimi resigned from his post, citing frustrations with the diplomatic process and the lack of common ground from which to build a negotiated solution. As the Syrian government, opposition forces, and international powers, particularly the United States and Russia, continue to stake out entrenched positions, and the regime prepares for sham elections in June, many have questioned if the Syrian conflict is ripe for a mediated solution. Brahimi’s resignation is the latest in a series of roadblocks that hinder peace negotiations. Domestically, the June elections, which will likely result in a new seven year term for President Bashar al-Assad, threaten the possibility of future negotiations. Brahimi stated repeatedly that if elections proceed they will signal to the opposition parties a lack of commitment from the government to reform. This will likely cause the opposition to refuse to rejoin the negotiating table given that their stated terms for taking part in a deal include Assad being removed from power. Complicating matters is the fractured nature and increasing radicalization of Syrian opposition groups like Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and the al-Nusra Front, posing a challenge to determining which parties, and who within them, should have a seat at the negotiating table. Regionally, powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, and Israel exert their influence, either directly or indirectly, on both the peace process and the ongoing violence, treating the conflict in Syria as a proxy war for regional hegemony. At the international level, the United States and Russia cling to fixed positions on both the future makeup of the Syrian government, as well as how to engage (or not engage) with Iran. This dynamic is exacerbated by the deepening rift between western countries and Russia over the ongoing political crisis in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea Given the current dynamic, the UN must take a step back and strategically refocus its peacebuilding efforts. As Brahimi wisely recognized, a third round of talks at present would bring about little change. Brahimi’s resignation is unfortunate as it signals the depth of the divide between the negotiating parties. However, the silver lining is that it provides the UN mediation team time and space to craft a new strategy.  In order to break the deadlock, this strategy should be two pronged. First, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s office and the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), which manages conflict mediation efforts, should focus on influencing Russia, the United States, and regional powers that can exert influence on the regime or opposition forces to play a more constructive role. Quoting a U.S. official in its June 2013 Syria report, International Crisis Group said: “what was once a Syrian conflict with regional spillover has now become a regional war with a Syrian focus.” The mediation effort ignores this reality at the peril of its own irrelevance. If the Assad regime ever comes to the negotiating table in good faith, it will be at the urging of its backers, primarily Russia and Iran. The UN team must pressure these countries to accept that any future solution will include changes to the Syrian power structure. Only once Russia and Iran accept this can they begin to influence the regime to do the same. Their vested economic interests in the country give them an incentive to facilitate an end to the conflict sooner rather than later.  Additionally, while activity in Ukraine has strained Russia’s relationship with the United States and European Union, it has also stretched their resources thinner, possibly providing an incentive to seek an earlier solution to Syria’s conflict. Simultaneously, the UN team should work to exert similar influence over the United States and Western powers, which have established equally unrealistic positions. These countries must accept two facts: 1) Iran must be offered a seat at the table, and 2) any brokered solution will include Assad. For the West to continue to draw a line in the sand on Iran’s participation in talks undermines the entire peace process. Iran’s interests in Syria are deep, and if they are not included Iran will simply find other ways to ensure its objectives are met, evidenced by the recent Wall Street Journal report that Iran has recruited thousands of Afghan refugees to fight in Syria, offering five hundred dollars per month and Iranian residency to help the Assad regime. Second, the UNDPA should enlist Track II mediators to engage in diplomatic efforts with the regime and the opposition. Official channels are not making progress, but that does not mean there is no progress to be made. Organizations like the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue and the International Institute for Sustained Dialogue should be encouraged to form ties with both opposition leaders and members of Assad’s regime and pro-regime forces. Track II efforts have already taken place, including a meeting in Geneva in April with government officials, former government officials, civil society leaders, and opposition leaders from Syria and Syrian diaspora communities. UNDPA could do more to quietly encourage these interactions, which bring together lower ranking officials who are less likely to hold inflexible positions and viewpoints, by facilitating meetings, or convening with Track II organizations to make sure they have access to the same level of information as the mediation team. With the humanitarian crisis deepening, international attention shifting away from Syria, and relations between influential powers like the Russia and United States deteriorating, it is clear that the strategies of the last three years have not and will not work. As Brahimi departs the mediation team, the UN must take this time to revamp its strategy if it wants to make progress.
  • Egypt
    Egypt's Solvency Crisis
    Introduction Egypt is experiencing a deep economic crisis. The country's foreign currency reserves are less than half of what they were before the January 2011 uprising, threatening Egypt's ability to pay for food and fuel. Egypt's budget deficit is 14 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and its overall debt, which is the result of accumulated deficits, is more than the country's economic output. In this difficult economic climate, roughly 45 percent of Egyptians live on less than two dollars per day. Inflation, which reached as high as 12.97 percent after the July 2013 military coup, is currently at 11.4 percent. Tourism revenue—traditionally a primary source of foreign currency along with Suez Canal tolls and remittances from Egyptians working abroad—is less than half of what it was in the last full year before the uprising. Foreign direct investment has dried up outside the energy sector. Unemployment remains high at 13.4 percent. Among the unemployed, 71 percent are between fifteen and twenty-nine years old. This economic weakness makes it politically difficult to address the problems that contribute to a potential solvency crisis because the necessary reforms will impose hardship on a population that is already experiencing economic pain. Despite these problems, the state of Egypt's economy has received less attention since the July 2013 coup d'état because of an influx of financial support from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. Yet Egypt's economy remains shaky and the threat of a solvency crisis lingers. Indeed, the continuation of violence, political protests, and general political uncertainty—even after planned presidential and parliamentary elections—along with a hodgepodge of incoherent economic policies, all portend continuing economic decline. This in turn could create a debilitating feedback loop of more political instability, violence, and economic deterioration, thus increasing the chances of an economic calamity and yet again more political turmoil, including mass demonstrations, harsher crackdowns, leadership struggles, and possibly the disintegration of state power. The Contingency Insolvency is the inability of an entity—a person, corporation, or country—to meet its financial obligations to lenders. It comes in two forms: balance sheet insolvency and cash flow insolvency. The former occurs when an entity has total liabilities whose value exceeds that of its total assets. Egypt is at greater risk of experiencing the latter, meaning that it cannot meet specific obligations as debt payments are due, and thus defaults. Although its causes were different, Greece's sovereign debt crisis that began in 2009 provides a baseline comparison of a heavily indebted country that had periods of macroeconomic performance, but ultimately was unable to meet its obligations. The overall picture of the Egyptian economy is deeply worrying. Egypt's foreign currency reserves stand at approximately $16 billion to $17 billion, not all of which are liquid. This means that Egypt is just above the $15 billion critical minimum threshold of foreign reserves, which is the amount required to cover costs of food and fuel for approximately three months. Chart 1. Egypt's Foreign Exchange Reserves Due to the unsettled and violent political environment, tourism dropped sharply in 2013. In early 2014, Minister of Tourism Hisham Zazou told the newspaper Al-Hayat that "2013 was the worst year on record for Egypt's tourism industry." Foreign and domestic investment also declined, in comparison to the five years before the January 2011 uprising. In addition, Egypt's central bank announced a cut in interest rates with little warning in late 2013, as part of an effort to spur domestic investment. This makes good economic sense, but the move is also potentially inflationary, putting pressure on the currency and foreign reserves as well as on Egyptian consumers. Government debt is 89.2 percent of GDP and overall debt is more than 100 percent of GDP. It is important to note that the national debt and fiscal deficit are particularly problematic for Egypt because of its debt rating (even though it was recently upgraded from CCC+ to B-). Unlike the United States, Germany, or Canada, each of which has significant levels of debt, it is costly for Egypt to finance its deficit and debt through borrowing. As a result, Egypt has financed its deficit through domestic borrowing from public sector banks and the central bank. According to Fitch Ratings, "bank claims on the government account for 67% of total bank assets." Immediately following Mohammed Morsi's ouster, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Kuwait committed $12 billion to Egypt. The Gulf countries have committed an additional $8 billion as of early 2014. The Egyptians can also tap into an $8.8 billion grant from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that dates back to the 1990s. This assistance is intended to provide budget relief, replenish foreign currency reserves, finance construction projects, pay for the production of medicines, and make petroleum resources available (though fuel rationing continues). For all of these resources, however, Gulf assistance has provided Egypt with only a bare minimum of relief. For example, there is still an estimated annual $10 billion gap in financing the government deficit. There are two reasons why infusions of more money from foreign donors will not fix Egypt's economic problems. First, by financing new spending with grants from the Gulf, Egypt is merely shifting fiscal problems into the near future. Second, receiving more assistance only masks problems that are rooted in irrational and conflicting economic policies. These policies—including food and fuel subsidies, a still-robust state-owned sector, and a tax policy that does not produce enough revenue—are the primary reasons why the government burns through anywhere from an estimated $1 billion to $1.5 billion of its reserves per month paying for critical needs and defending the currency. The policies place significant pressure on the government's budget. Subsidies, for example, account for 29.67 percent of the government's expenditures. Chart 2. Egypt's Subsidies Yet, the prevailing political uncertainty in Egypt makes it difficult for the government to undertake meaningful reform. The rigidity of Egypt's system of subsidies, for example, is a critical component of the Egyptian social safety net and an important means of political control. Making fundamental changes to subsidies risks mass demonstrations similar to the 1977 Bread Riots, which erupted after Anwar Sadat proposed alterations to food subsidies consistent with recommendations from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite pledges to reduce the government budget deficit to 10 percent of GDP (it reached 14 percent of GDP in 2012–2013), Egyptian officials have increased spending, including on a stimulus program and the introduction of a minimum wage for public sector workers. Yet, it will be difficult to reduce the deficit while pursuing expansionary fiscal policy. The new minimum wage of $172 per month will put further pressure on the budget. Likewise, additional economic stimulus packages will also increase the deficit. It may very well be that an expansionary fiscal policy is necessary, but the Egyptians do not have the means to finance it. In addition, despite much discussion of subsidy reform and some rather modest headway in means-testing energy subsidies, the effort to address this major problem is more theoretical than real. Distortions in the markets for bread, fruit, and vegetables also persist, but are unlikely to be addressed for political reasons. This type of ad hoc policymaking seems aimed more at temporarily mollifying various interests than establishing economic sustainability and is a sign of the leadership's inability to arrest Egypt's economic decline. The foreign reserves problem is exacerbated by Egypt's sensitivity to changes in commodity prices, given that it is a net importer of oil and natural gas and the world's largest importer of wheat. Consider, for example, a run-up in wheat prices, which are critically important given the Egyptian government's commitment to subsidizing bread. An external shock such as drought, extreme heat, wildfires, political instability, or some other cause of a poor harvest in the major global producers—the United States, Canada, Australia, Ukraine, and Russia—would result in a substantial increase in the global price of wheat, placing an additional burden on Egyptian finances. Another potential shock is the rapid depreciation of the Egyptian pound, resulting from any number of factors including the central bank's decision to cut interest rates, a move by foreign donors to decrease (though not end) their financial assistance to Cairo, or an unforeseen political event that encourages Egyptians to change pounds into dollars. With limited foreign reserves at its disposal, Egypt's central bank would be hard-pressed to defend the currency, resulting in inflation. Under these circumstances, Egypt might be forced to print money, which would compound the inflationary pressures associated with depreciation. No single event alone would trigger a solvency crisis, but multiple political and economic factors already present could potentially make Egypt default. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait seem willing to underwrite Egypt with few conditions or limits. Yet, Gulf support may not be sustainable over the longer term, if Egypt's financial needs prove to be greater than anticipated, if political rifts develop with Cairo, if the priorities of the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis change, or if any of the three Gulf states face budgetary or political pressures of their own. A reduction or suspension of the aid would certainly precipitate a solvency crisis. The most likely trigger for insolvency, however, is the continuation of current economic policies, which place significant and ultimately unsustainable pressure on the country's finances. Egyptians may enjoy a respite with an upcoming presidential election and the false sense of "turning the corner" it might provide. As the Egyptian government continues to pursue incoherent fiscal and monetary policies, the foreign reserves situation will deteriorate, rendering Egypt insolvent. The onset of this crisis may be long in the making, but its effects will likely be felt quickly. Egyptians would once again be unable to buy fuel, medicine, basic foodstuffs, and other important goods. Such a situation could potentially bring large numbers of people into the streets in opposition to the government. Given the tendency of Egypt's internal security services to respond to demonstrations with too much force—which encourages people to join protests—rallies could spread throughout the country. This revolutionary bandwagon could overwhelm the government, but this time it may be even more difficult for the military to maintain stability and its control of the state. The Gulf states would likely again provide financial support to Cairo to avoid this outcome. However, infusions of aid will neither resolve nor mitigate the adverse effects of economic policies that have led to the solvency crisis. Warning Indicators The following warning indicators should help U.S. officials and other observers determine whether Egypt is facing an imminent solvency crisis: The government tightens currency controls. Should the government prevent individuals and firms from transferring certain amounts of hard currency out of Egypt, it would be a clear signal that Egyptian officials are concerned about the country's solvency. Beginning in January 2014, individuals can transfer up to $100,000 in hard currency out of the country, which is a relaxation of previous controls established during the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces–led transitional period after former president Hosni Mubarak's ouster that limited transfers to $100,000 over a lifetime. Egyptian officials have left open the possibility of changing exchange-rate controls in 2015. A tightening of restrictions would preserve foreign currency, but at the expense of scaring away current and potential investors. The government restructures its debt, forcing banks to buy debt instruments. Restructuring government debt would require the Egyptian government to force banks to exchange old debt for new debt or to impose new taxes on their returns. Imposing debt restructuring on the banks would place additional pressure on Egypt's financial sector. In addition, the extent to which authorities are forcing banks to buy bonds and treasury bills to finance the deficit, or the Central Bank of Egypt is financing government purchases, indicates that the country is nearing a solvency crisis. Egypt's arrears rise. Observers should pay careful attention to Egypt's arrears. A rise in Cairo's overdue debts is perhaps the clearest indicator that Egypt is headed toward insolvency. A rise in arrears may be the result of settling certain obligations before others, but it does indicate that default is a strong possibility. Egypt suddenly demonstrates an interest in an International Monetary Fund standby agreement. The Egyptian government is counting on Gulf assistance to float the economy. In addition, an IMF standby agreement is a politically difficult proposition for Cairo. Thus, although signing a deal with the Fund seems—from the outside—to be prudent, it is politically difficult. Under these circumstances, a sudden Egyptian interest in negotiating with the IMF would indicate that Cairo is worried about its solvency Implications for U.S. Interests Insolvency in Egypt would damage U.S. interests, threatening the safety of American citizens and U.S. property while putting U.S. business assets at risk. The largest American investor in Egypt, the Houston-based oil exploration and production company Apache Corporation, reduced its exposure to Egypt by bringing on Sinopec as a partner in late 2013. Egypt's total share of Apache's overall production declined from 26 percent to 16 percent. Other large multinationals such as Coca-Cola continue to operate in Egypt with little disruption, but an economic crisis and the concomitant political instability might negatively affect those firms. Breakdown in Egypt would also affect U.S. forces and military posture in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy places a premium on expedited transit through the Suez Canal. In addition, multiple daily U.S. Air Force overflights through Egyptian airspace en route to the Gulf could be curtailed or halted as a result of an Egyptian collapse. Finally, the United States and other interested parties, including European and Gulf states, would confront a major humanitarian crisis in Egypt, which would have trouble securing basic necessities for its eighty-six million people. An economic collapse triggered by insolvency and the subsequent political fallout in Egypt would also threaten Israeli security. The northern Sinai, where the military is fighting a low-level insurgency, has become a staging ground for attacks on Israel's southern cities and towns. If one of those attacks killed or injured large numbers of Israelis, it would force the Israelis to respond, potentially compromising the Egypt-Israel peace treaty—a pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Preventive Options Although the United States has its own fiscal problems, it can still pursue several discrete measures that could help prevent a solvency crisis and potentially stave off Egypt's economic collapse. Provide loan guarantees. The United States, European Union (EU), and Asian allies could pool resources and provide loan guarantees for Egypt. The United States has successfully pursued a similar policy in Jordan. Loan guarantees offer two primary benefits to donors and recipients: they are an effective way of leveraging large amounts of money with a limited commitment of resources—unless Egypt defaults—and they allow Cairo to borrow on commercial markets at significantly lower interest rates than a country with a B- rating would otherwise be able to obtain. Recognizing the sensitivity in the United States to offering the Egyptians what some consider a "blank check," there would need to be a prior agreement with Cairo that the loans would be used for Egypt's greatest needs, specifically food, fuel, and medicine. There are also some practical problems associated with loan guarantees. The loan guarantees involve expenditures that would require authorization from the U.S. Congress and subsequent spending cuts to offset the resources spent guaranteeing loans for Egypt. In addition, even with the backing of the United States, Europe, China, Japan, South Korea, and other global economic actors, Egypt's ability to borrow on commercial markets with its poor rating represents a significant challenge. Relieve the debt. Egypt's foreign debt is $47 billion as of the end of January 2014, of which $3.5 billion is owed to the United Sates. This external debt is relatively small as a percentage of GDP compared to domestic debt. Still, it could send an important signal to other holders of Egyptian debt if the United States took steps to relieve Cairo's financial burden. In 2011, the United States sought to "swap" Egypt's dollar-denominated debt for payment in Egyptian pounds that would then be used to pay for programs like education and youth employment. This scheme was dropped over objections from the Egyptian government. But the Obama administration proposed a debt swap for good reasons—specifically, to encourage Egyptians to invest in areas that were in dire need of resources and would benefit Egypt in the future. Given developments over the last three years and the state of the economy, relieving Egypt's debt to the United States is still prudent. It is important to note that debt relief, like loan guarantees, requires congressional authorization and spending cuts to offset this assistance, though it would be less than the amount of the debt. Pay down domestic debt. The United States should encourage the Egyptians to use foreign assistance to pay down public domestic debt, which stands at $240 billion, instead of increasing expenditures on subsidies, a minimum wage, and a stimulus package that Cairo has no way to finance. Keep the lights on. Although not as acute as they were in the spring and early summer of 2013, fuel shortages and blackouts in Egypt continue. In early June 2013, the Saudis and Egyptians signed an agreement to share energy by linking the two countries' power grids. This is a step toward relieving shortages, but the project will take two to three years to complete. Gulf fuel transfers since the coup have helped mitigate the problem, but demand remains high and Egypt's production of natural gas has declined. Rather than leaving the issue to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, the United States could establish a consortium of international donors to facilitate Egypt's import of the natural gas necessary to generate electricity, freeing up money in the budget to focus on longer-term threats to Egypt's economic stability. Once again, the U.S. Congress might be reluctant to assist Egypt in this manner given the need for budget cuts with any new expenditure. Mitigating Options In the event that Egypt defaults on its debts, the United States has several options to alleviate the consequences and reduce the likelihood of a political collapse in the country and its attendant strategic and humanitarian problems. Support the military. In the event of a solvency crisis and its attendant political consequences, it is likely the military would intervene in politics. The United States should offer political and diplomatic support to the senior command to prevent Egypt from becoming a failed state. This means recognizing any new government that results from such an intervention and using Washington's diplomatic clout with allies in the region, Europe, and Asia to do the same. It will also entail additional economic support. American support for the Egyptian military, along with Washington's response to the 2013 coup, is controversial in both Egypt and the United States. The unpleasant fact, however, is that the armed forces remain the only truly national institution Egypt has. Its civilian political class lacks dynamism, and its other government ministries barely function and command few resources. In the event of insolvency, the officer corps will be the only relatively organized and coherent force capable of preventing a descent into chaos. Provide immediate infusions of financial assistance. The United States could establish an Egypt Contact Group so that wealthy countries can extend immediate financial assistance to Egypt. The Group would include the United States, EU, major Asian countries, and the Gulf states. As noted above, Egypt could potentially experience a solvency crisis even with assistance from wealthy countries in the Gulf, which is why it is incumbent on the rest of the world to marshal even greater resources to refloat the Egyptian economy. Restore food aid. Food aid to Egypt ended in 1992; it could be started again. Egypt is particularly sensitive to changes in the global price of wheat. Indeed, between 2009 and 2011, food insecurity in Egypt increased by 3 percent. Economic collapse would only increase food insecurity. Recommendations The United States has limited diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal to help the Egyptians. Even if Washington could bring billions to bear on Egypt's economic difficulties, it would do little to mitigate the underlying economic problems that place the country at risk of a solvency crisis. It is up to the Egyptians to undertake reforms to forestall this outcome. Given the fact that the Egyptians have done little in this regard, a solvency crisis is entirely plausible. Consequently, the United States has a strategic responsibility to do what it can in Egypt to prevent the causes of insolvency and its attendant political consequences. In addition to implementing the preventive measures outlined above, the Obama administration should do the following: Work with the U.S. Congress to support Egypt with additional aid. There is resistance in Congress to increasing aid to Egypt. But the $250 million in economic support funds is a paltry sum given Egypt's needs. Again, additional funds will not by themselves resolve Egypt's economic problems, but they will give Egyptian policymakers time to undertake politically controversial reforms. Ideally, the United States would condition this new assistance on much-needed economic reform. This is unlikely to work given that Gulf aid is available without explicit prerequisites, which is why Washington should focus its diplomatic efforts on convincing wealthy Arab states and others to encourage Cairo to undertake meaningful reforms. Still, the Obama administration and legislative branch should take a long view of Egypt; while the status of Egypt's Copts, the government's commitments to human rights and democracy, and Egypt's relations with Israel are important, they are secondary to a solvency crisis that threatens Egypt's collapse, which would surely affect all of the issues over which Congress has expressed concern. Establish an interagency Egypt crisis monitoring group. The U.S. State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and Treasury Department should increase their surveillance of the Egyptian economy in order to better prepare the government to respond to an Egyptian crisis. This interagency group would be particularly important given that the Egyptian government tends not to be forthcoming with accurate economic data. The United States should share its information and findings with friendly governments that are also committed to preventing an Egyptian solvency crisis. Push others to do their part. The United States should prepare for the moment when Egypt's economic problems overwhelm even Gulf-based aid and use its diplomatic clout in other parts of the world to secure additional assistance for Egypt. Countries in Asia and Europe are understandably reluctant to commit resources to Cairo without Egyptian policy reform, which is why Washington should also encourage Egyptian officials to resume negotiations with the IMF. The Fund should play an important role in assisting the next government to redraw Egypt's social contract in a way that is both politically acceptable at home and can command the strong support of the rest of the world. Central to the plan is the development of a bridge to a new system that better targets subsidies while providing a safety net for those who no longer qualify for subsidized goods and one that establishes a transparent and regular mechanism of price and subsidy changes, thus reducing their political toxicity. This means that foreign donors will need to accept a slower reduction in subsidies than under a conventional IMF program in order to increase the likelihood that Egyptians can make headway on reforms in a coordinated and more coherent manner. Conclusion Egypt is perilously close to becoming insolvent. Despite Gulf assistance, the combination of the country's economic needs, the legacies of Cairo's incoherent economic policies of the past along with their continuation today, the political challenges to economic reform, and the potential for exogenous economic shocks all make a solvency crisis a significant possibility. The United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf, Europe, and Asia should be prepared for this outcome. Increased attention to this issue among policymakers and plans to prevent or mitigate the consequences of Egypt's default are focused principally on infusions of additional aid. This will certainly help Egypt to purchase food, fuel, and other critical goods, but external aid will not resolve the problem. At best, it will give Egyptian policymakers some breathing room and thus an opportunity to undertake economic reforms.
  • United States
    Syria Civil War Total Fatalities
    This blog post was coauthored with my research associate, Amelia M. Wolf. Estimates released today by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) portray a different picture of the civil war in Syria than U.S. policymakers and media convey. SOHR’s estimated death toll reinforces the point made in an article published on ForeignPolicy.com in September 2013, when they last released updated data: most of the reported deaths in Syria have not been committed by forces under Bashar al-Assad’s command. Additionally, the involvement of various individuals and groups in the conflict has broadened greatly since SOHR’s September 2013 estimate. Despite the potential bias and the methodological challenges it faces, SOHR has unrelentingly compiled casualty data since the start of the conflict in Syria more than three years ago. While the United Nations (UN) last updated its estimated death toll in July 2013 at 100,000 killed, and has since stated it will no longer provide updates, SOHR’s update released today estimates a total of 150,344 people killed since March 2011. SOHR’s estimates are presented below. There are two noticeably provocative elements of SOHR’s estimates. First, while estimates for rebel force casualties were a separate category in SOHR’s previous estimates, SOHR has now included rebel force casualties (24,275) within civilian casualties, totaling 75,487. Above, rebel forces have been listed separately, which reveals that, according to SOHR’s estimates, more pro-regime forces than civilians have been killed during the Syrian civil war. This does not lessen the severity of the conflict’s tremendous impact on civilians. Moreover, SOHR’s estimates are subject to error. While SOHR estimates that about 7, 985 children have died, other organizations such as the Oxford Research Group have much higher estimates over 11,000. Additionally, the conflict has resulted in at least 2.5 million Syrian refugees, according to the UN Refugee Agency. However, there has been a common misconception during the past two decades leading many to believe that about 90 percent of war victims are civilians, a claim made in Uppsala University’s 1991 report, “Casualties of Conflict.” While attention to the impact of war on civilians has been a positive result of this claim, the claim itself is unreliable and has been repeatedly challenged. It should be no shock that more combatants may have been killed during the Syrian conflict so far. Second, foreign combatants—including fighters from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and western fighters, among others—were counted separately for the first time in the April 2014 estimates, and account for almost 7.5 percent of the total, at 11,220 casualties. The increase of foreign fighters, particularly Western, and the radicalization of the Syrian civil war has been of great concern to U.S. policymakers in recent months. Just this past month, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) authored a bill that would restrict Americans traveling to Syria and imprison violators for up to twenty years. Understanding the conflict in Syria will require greater dissection of death toll statistics by analysts and a reevaluation by policymakers and the media of how they portray the conflict. While regime forces are not victims as they remain willingly and actively in combat, the reality of the conflict dynamics should guide U.S. policymakers in how they craft policies to address the conflict and protect civilians from harm.
  • International Organizations
    You Might Have Missed: Ukraine, Rep. Mike Rogers, and Drones
    Jeanne Whalen and Alan Cullison, “Ukraine Battles to Rebuild a Depleted Military,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2014. In recent weeks Mr. Yarema has turned to Washington and NATO for help, but with little luck so far. Ukraine’s military lacks much of an air force, and if fighting breaks out he expects that Russia would be able to pound Ukrainian ground troops with impunity. In meetings with U.S. senators and Western diplomats, he says he asked for help establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors so that his troops could at least count on some zones of safety... (3PA: When a foreign government or opposition group wants low-risk U.S. military involvement, the no-fly zone has become the default request. Revisit my piece in the Atlantic for more on this trend.) “Concluding observations on the fourth report of the United States of America,” UN Human Rights Committee, March 2014. Targeted killings using unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) The Committee is concerned about the State party’s practice of targeted killings in extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) also known as ‘drones’, the lack of transparency regarding the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal justification for specific attacks, and the lack of accountability for the loss of life resulting from such attacks. The Committee notes the State party’s position that drone strikes are conducted in the course of its armed conflict with Al- Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces and in accordance with its inherent right of national self-defense and are governed by international humanitarian law, as well as by the Presidential Policy Guidance that sets out standards for the use of lethal force outside areas of active hostilities. Nevertheless, the Committee remains concerned about the State party’s very broad approach to the definition and the geographical scope of an armed conflict, including the end of hostilities, the unclear interpretation of what constitutes an “imminent threat” and who is a combatant or civilian taking a direct part in hostilities, the unclear position on the nexus that should exist between any particular use of lethal force and any specific theatre of hostilities, as well as the precautionary measures taken to avoid civilian casualties in practice (arts. 2, 6, and 14). The State party should revisit its position regarding legal justifications for the use of deadly force through drone attacks. It should: (a) ensure that any use of armed drones complies fully with its obligations under article 6 of the Covenant, including in particular with respect to the principles of precaution, distinction and proportionality in the context of an armed conflict; (b) subject to operational security, disclose the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal basis for specific attacks, the process of target identification and the circumstances in which drones are used; (c) provide for independent supervision and oversight over the specific implementation of regulations governing the use of drone strikes; (d) in armed conflict situations, take all feasible measures to ensure the protection of civilians in specific drone attacks and to track  5 and assess civilian casualties, as well as all necessary precautionary measures in order to avoid such casualties; (e) conduct independent, impartial, prompt and effective investigations of allegations of violations of the right to life and bring to justice those responsible; (f) provide victims or their families with an effective remedy where there has been a violation, including adequate compensation, and establish accountability mechanisms for victims of allegedly unlawful drone attacks who are not compensated by their home governments... “Death Sentences and Executions 2013,” Amnesty International, 2014. Executions were recorded in 22 countries during 2013, one more than in the previous year. As in 2012, it could not be confirmed if judicial executions took place in Egypt or Syria. The overall number of reported executions worldwide was 778, an increase of almost 15% compared with 2012. As in previous years, this figure does not include the thousands of people executed in China; with the death penalty treated as a state secret the lack of reliable data does not allow Amnesty International to publish credible minimum figures for China...   Rep. Michael Rogers, “A Special Message from Rep. Rogers,” March 27, 2014. What other job on earth could take you from sitting in the CIA Director’s office helping to plan the operation to kill Osama bin Laden one week, to traveling to the far reaches of the tribal areas of Pakistan where few Americans have ever been the next, to meeting with a protester in Ukraine who had his ear cut off standing up to Vladimir Putin’s goons the next?... (3PA: Why would the House Intelligence Committee Chair help to plan the operation that killed Bin Laden? And who oversaw his planning activities? A few more of Rogers’ notable statements include: “I think the Chinese got everything they needed they need out of Snowden. The Russians have now gotten everything they need out of Snowden. And the next I think — chapter in this book is somewhere in the Latin America one of these countries who is antagonistic to the United States, who is an adversary to the United States, using this as a public relations tool.” (CNN, July 7, 2013) “We did this in the 1930s. We turned it off–1929 the Secretary of State, at that time, where we were collecting information to protect America said you know we should do this. This is unseemly. Turned it off. So that led to a whole bunch of misunderstandings that led to World War II that killed millions and millions of people.” (CBS, November 3, 2013) “Everybody agrees that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.” (Business Week, March 17, 2013) “China is a rational actor…Iran is not a rational actor.” (New York Times, March 3, 2013).)
  • Defense and Security
    You Might Have Missed: Cyberattacks, Asia Pivot, and the U.S. Military and Human Rights
    Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “DoD Official: Asia Pivot ‘Can’t Happen’ Due to Budget Processes,” Defense News, March 4, 2014. “Right now, the pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it can’t happen,” Katrina McFarland, assistant secretary of defense for acquisition, told Aviation Week’s Defense Technologies and Requirements conference in Arlington, Va… After this article was posted online, McFarland clarified her statement through a DoD spokeswoman that the pivot will still continue. “This a.m. when I spoke at a conference, I was asked a question about the budget, that will be officially released today, and how it relates to our pivot to Asia. I was reiterating what [Defense Secretary Chuck] Hagel said last week: That the shift in focus to the Asia-Pacific requires us to ‘adapt, innovate, and make difficult (budgetary and acquisition) decisions to ensure that our military remains ready and capable.’ That’s exactly what we’ve done in this budget. The rebalance to Asia can and will continue.” Siobhan Gorman, “Panel Probes Split Over Ukraine by U.S. Spy Agencies,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2014. On Friday evening, Mr. Rogers issued a statement from his office, saying it appeared the Russian military "now controls the Crimean peninsula." The next day, Obama administration officials were voicing the same general conclusion. Mr. Rogers said he wouldn’t characterize the issue as an intelligence failure but said some analysts "came to the wrong conclusion." Dion Nissenbaum and Julian E. Barnes, “Standoff With Russia Fuels U.S. Defense Spending,” Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2014. Pentagon officials scoffed at the idea that their spending plan represents a retreat from the world. "There is no retreat from the world," one defense official said. "The sun rises and sets on literally hundreds of countries where American troops are operating or are based." (3PA: There are 195 countries in the world.) “U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY2015 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2014. SEN. KING: When is a cyberattack an act of war? Any ideas? GEN. ALEXANDER: I think that’s a political decision, a policy-level decision. And I think it comes down to what is the impact of such an attack. In cyberspace, some of the attacks will be not observable and, therefore, not a big attack. It would almost be like a show of force. Think of it as a blockade. So in cyber, you’re going to have the whole spectrum that we have in the physical space now in cyberspace. And I think we’re going to have to learn. But I would submit that, if it destroys government or other networks to a point that it impacts our ability to operate, you’ve crossed that line. Now, that’s a policy decision, not mine. What we would do is recommend where those lines are. I think those things that are less than that, that are blocking communications or doing something, think of that as the old jamming, electronic warfare, now in cyber. Probably less than. But it could get to an act where you want that to stop because of the impact it’s having on your commerce. So those are issues thatwhat we’ll call the norms in cyberspace need to be talked through on the international level. I think that’s one of the things that we’ve pushed. I think the administration is pushing those norms. I think it has to go a lot further. People need to understand it. And it gets back to some of the earlier discussions about do we understand exactly what we’re talking about here by norms in cyberspace. (3PA: It is difficult to understand, after reading the response to Sen. King’s question, when, precisely, a cyberattack would be an act of war.) “The Posture of the U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Transportation Command,” House Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2014. ADM. MCRAVEN: We need to be prepared to conduct direct action when those threats have a clear and present danger to the United States or to our interests… (3PA: Note that this is yet another new description for when the U.S. military can conduct direct action—the doctrinal term for operations including targeted killings. As Obama said last May: “We act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat.”) “The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command,” House Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2014. GEN. JOHN KELLY: In 2011, we got 172 metric tons of cocaine before it ever reached shore in Honduras or Latin America. Last year, 2012, because of a lack of assets, 152 tons. That’s 20 tons that get by us20 more tons. This year that just finished, 132 tons. It’s all about ships, ISR and not many ships. Typically today we have on station four ships, one of which is a British oiler. The key point, that can fly a helicopter. That British oiler in six months will get 20 to 30 tons of cocaine that’s flowing into the United States. But it’s almost a scientific equation: less ships, less cocaine off the market. And by the way, when I get it, I get it inand it’s an interagency process, DEA, DOJI mean, it’s just not DOD doing this. In fact, we’re to a large degree in support of the effort. But at the end of the day, we get all of this tonnage. We spend 1.5 percent of the counternarcotics budget; we get, again this year—or last year we got 132 metric tons, zero violence, we get the two to five tons at a time. Once it’s ashore and on its way up through Mexico, it’s virtually in the United States. And no matter how hard our very, very heroic Border Patrol and law enforcement people in the United States work, best case, they’ll get 30 tons in the course of a year, with unbelievable violence, as you well know, done against our country, our citizens. At the end of the day, at the end of the year, year after year, 40,000 Americans die from these drugs. Every year it costs America $26 billion a year to go after these drugs from a law enforcement point of view, costs America $200 billion in primarily health care costs. For a fraction of that, in fact for 1.6 percent of that, I can get the vast majority of drugscocaine, to use an exampleflowing up from Latin America… GEN. KELLY: I would tell you, a lot of people talk about human rights in the world. The U.S. military does human rights. We will not work with someone who violates human rights in Latin America, and I think that goes around the world… GEN. KELLY: And the profits that come out, just the drug profits that come out of the United States, something to the tune of $85 billion a year, of which only 1 billion (dollars) is required to keep the drug flow going; the rest of it is just profit. Their biggest problem, franklyand our interagency, the Department of Treasury, FBI, Department of Justice is getting after thistheir biggest problem is taking $85 billion worth of U.S. currency and laundering it. Graham Warwick, “Rapidly Evolving Threat Drives Pace of EW Development,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 17, 2014. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are emerging as potential players on the electronic battlefield. “SWaP [size, weight and power] is the first determinant of what goes on a UAS,” says Palombo. “We have done demos with the Marine Corps and General Atomics on a Reaper. With a small multi-spectral payload on a UAS you can get closer to the threat. The standoff requirement is less, so lower power is needed.” The SWaP constraint is fundamental, says Antkowiak. “In highly constrained environments like UAS, persistence is key. The more power you need for the payload, the less time you have on the battlefield,” he says. “The mission can be done on anything if you start with small building blocks. We have done it on UAS as small as the Bat,” Northrop’s medium-altitude tactical unmanned aircraft, Palombo says. “As experience with UAS grows, the mission will morph and networks will become much more important. Then UAS can swarm and defeat anything,” says Freidman, adding they will not always be small. The Navy’s planned Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (Uclass) system will explore how EW interfaces with an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform to provide a broader view of the battlespace, he says.
  • Egypt
    Egypt's Turbulent Transition
    Podcast
    Michele Dunne, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Michael Wahid Hanna, senior fellow at the Century Foundation, discuss Egypt's turbulent transition, the prospects for stabilization and economic progress in the country, and possible U.S. foreign policy responses toward the ongoing political crisis.
  • Political Transitions
    You Might Have Missed: FAA UAV Roadmap, Salaries of Congress, and Blackwater
    Despite Challenges, Africans Are Optimistic about the Future,” Pew Research, November 8, 2013. The world’s two leading powers, the U.S. and China, enjoy mostly positive images in Africa. Both nations receive higher favorability ratings in Africa than in the other regions included in the 2013 survey. Across the eight African nations, a median of 73% express a positive opinion of the U.S., while 65% hold this view about China. Globally, the U.S. generally gets higher marks than China on this question. Pew China v US Favorability “Press Release – FAA Releases Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Roadmap,” Federal Aviation Administration, November 7, 2013. The Roadmap outlines the FAA’s approach to ensuring that widespread UAS use is safe, from the perspective of accommodation, integration, and evolution.  The FAA’s main goal for integration is to establish requirements that UAS operators will have to meet in order to increase access to airspace over the next five to 10 years. The Roadmap discusses items such as new or revised regulations, policies, procedures, guidance material, training and understanding of systems and operations to support routine UAS operations. The FAA plans to select six UAS test sites to begin work on safely integrating UAS into the airspace.  These congressionally-mandated test sites will conduct critical research into how best to safely integrate UAS systems into the national airspace over the next several years and what certification and navigation requirements will need to be established. (3PA: Read the full UAS Roadmap and the UAS Comprehensive Plan.) Ida A. Brudnick, “Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Reactions and Historical Tables,” Congressional Research Service, November 4, 2013. Table 1 provides a history of the salaries of Members of Congress since 1789…The salaries shown are the payable salaries, indicating the rate actually paid to Members of Congress. “Rogers: NSA Intelligence Collection Stops Threats,” CBS News Face the Nation, November 3, 2013. We did this in the 1930s. We turned it off--1929 the Secretary of State, at that time, where we were collecting information to protect America said you know we should do this. This is unseemly. Turned it off. So that led to a whole bunch of misunderstandings that led to World War II that killed millions and millions of people. Scott Shane, “No Morsel Too Miniscule for All-Consuming N.S.A.,” New York Times, November 2, 2013. One N.S.A. officer on the Lashkar-e-Taiba beat let slip that some of his eavesdropping turned out to be largely pointless, perhaps because of the agency’s chronic shortage of skilled linguists. He “ran some queries” to read intercepted communications of certain Lashkar-e-Taiba members, he wrote in the wiki, but added: “Most of it is in Arabic or Farsi, so I can’t make much of it.” Nasser Mehsud, “Tribesmen Target U.S. Drone After TTP Chief’s Killing,” Newsweek Pakistan, November 2, 2013. Tribesmen opened fire on a U.S. drone over Pakistan’s tribal belt Saturday where Pakistani Taliban commander Hakimullah Mehsud was killed by a drone strike a day earlier, residents and officials said. (3PA: This is the first well documented exmple of local villagers directly sustained fire at a U.S. drone.) Peter Hamby, “Review: ‘Double Down,’ on the 2012 election, by Mark Halperin and John Heilemann,” November 1, 2013. But there’s still click-bait aplenty: Obama meditating on drone strikes and telling his aides that he’s “really good at killing people… Scott Fitzsimmons, “Wheeled Warriors: Explaining Variations in the Use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq,” Security Studies 22:4, 2013. This article engages one of the most widely discussed but poorly understood aspects of the Iraq War: the use of violence by private security companies. It explains why, despite sharing several important characteristics…the personnel who worked for Blackwater, the chief protector of US State Department employees in Iraq, killed and seriously injured far more people than their counterparts in DynCorp. The article argues that Blackwater’s personnel killed and seriously injured far more people in Iraq than their DynCorp counterparts because Blackwater maintained a relatively bellicose military culture that placed strong emphasis on norms encouraging its security teams to exercise personal initiative, proactive use of force, and an exclusive approach to security, which together motivated its personnel to use violence quite freely against anyone suspected of posing a threat. If the trends established during the Iraq and Afghan Wars continue, then private security companies will see extensive employment in future conflicts. These findings, consequently, have implications that extend beyond the Iraq War and the particular firms under study. Indeed, they indicate that governments and other future clients should analyze the military cultures of the firms vying for their business and use the results as a basis for deciding which firms to hire and, to a great extent, represent them in unstable conflict zones. “Dracunculiasis (guinea-worm disease): Situation and Trends,” World Health Organization. In 1986, 3.5 million new cases were estimated to occur annually. Based on active village-based searches, 892,055 cases were reported to have occurred in 1989. By 2010, as a result of the intensive efforts to eradicate dracunculiasis, the annual incidence was brought down to 1,797 cases, a reduction of more than 99% since 1989…Dracunculiasis is on the verge of eradication. WHO has now certified 187 countries and territories as free of dracunculiasis or as having interrupted transmission or being an area where transmission never occurred. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, U.S. Senate, 2013. Subtitle B—Targeted Lethal Force Oversight SEC. 312. UNCLASSIFIED ANNUAL REPORT ON THE USE OF TARGETED LETHAL FORCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. (a) REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT.—For each year, the President shall prepare and make public an annual report that sets forth the following: (1) The total number of combatants killed or injured during the preceding year by the use of targeted lethal force outside the United States by remotely piloted aircraft. (2) The total number of noncombatant civilians killed or injured during the preceding year by such use of targeted lethal force outside the United States. (b) TARGETED LETHAL FORCE DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘targeted lethal force’’ means the act of directing lethal force at a particular person or group with the specific intent of killing those persons. (c) EXCEPTION.—A report required by subsection (a) shall not include— (1) any use of targeted lethal force in Afghanistan prior to the end of combat operations by the United States; or (2) any use of targeted lethal force in a foreign country described by a future declaration of war or authorization for the use of military force.  
  • Political Transitions
    You Might Have Missed: Drones, Syria, and Technology
    Allegation of U.S. Spying on Merkel Puts Obama at Crossroads,” New York Times, October 24, 2013. “This was colossally bad judgment — doing something because you can, instead of asking if you should,” said one career American official with long experience in Europe. A senior administration official declined to say what Mr. Obama knew or did not know about monitoring of Ms. Merkel’s phone, but said the president “doesn’t think we are in the right place.” “Rep. Smith: Armed Drones ‘No Perfect Instrument,’ but Welcomes DoD Shift,” Military Times, October 24, 2013. “Whenever we do a targeted strike…we need to, at least, explain why. We can reveal what we want to reveal,” Smith said bluntly. “We can reveal enough to say, ‘This is why we hit this person, and it was self-defense’.” “The administration—every administration—seems to think it should share nothing,” Smith said. “I think the administration believes…we gave a speech, we explained it…and now leave us alone, we’re going to go back to work,” “Former Defense Secretary Gates Warns Against Lure of Drone Warfare,” Washington Post, October 23, 2013. “Remarkable advances in precision munitions, sensors, information and satellite technology and more can make us overly enamored with the ability of technology to transform the traditional laws and limits of war,” Gates said in a speech to a group of current and former soldiers, according to a copy of his prepared remarks. “A button is pushed in Nevada and seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Kandahar.” Too often, Gates said, U.S. defense experts have come to view war as a “kind of video game or action movie. . . . In reality, war is inevitably tragic, inefficient and uncertain.” “Army Lets Air Out of Battlefield Spyship Project,” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2013. Near the height of the Afghanistan war, the Pentagon spent $297 million on a seven-story blimp-like aircraft—as long as a football field—that would hover over the war zone for weeks at a time, beaming back crucial intelligence. Last month, the Pentagon quietly decided to sell back the sophisticated spyship to the British company that built it for $301,000 — a fraction of its investment. “Obama’s Uncertain Path Amid Syria Bloodshed,” New York Times, October 22, 2013. Jordanian officials were even offering to allow the C.I.A. to use the country as a base for drone strikes in Syria — offers that the Obama administration repeatedly declined. President Obama had signed a secret order in April—months earlier than previously reported—authorizing a C.I.A. plan to begin arming the Syrian rebels. But the arms had not been shipped, and the collapse of rebel positions in western Syria fueled the atmosphere of crisis that hung over the June meeting. Yet after hours of debate in which top advisers considered a range of options, including military strikes and increased support to the rebels, the meeting ended the way so many attempts to define a Syrian strategy had ended in the past, with the president’s aides deeply divided over how to respond to a civil war that had already claimed 100,000 lives. “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda,” Human Rights Watch, October 22, 2013. The US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are estimated by research groups to have carried out 81 targeted killing operations in Yemen: one in 2002 and the rest since 2009. The strikes by drones, warplanes or cruise missiles by various counts have killed at least 473 combatants and civilians. These attacks, one from 2009 and the rest from 2012-13, killed 82 people, at least 57 of them civilians. At least four of the strikes were carried out by drones, a fifth strike by either drones or warplanes, and a sixth one by cruise missiles releasing cluster munitions, indiscriminate weapons that pose unacceptable dangers to civilians. (3PA: Amnesty International also published a report on the same day. The HRW and AI reports are invaluable, but the policy window in DC for reforming drone strike policies is closed. The Senate and House intelligence committees should invite HRW and AI to brief them on their drone strike investigations.) “USAF Leader: QDR Process Helps DoD See Vulnerabilities,” Defense News, October 19, 2013. Maj. Gen. Steven Kwast: The facts are that it costs more money to put up a CAP [24-hour combat air patrol] than it does to have a squadron of F-16s. It costs more people to man a CAP than it does to man a full squadron. The data link is vulnerable. The machine is vulnerable. The command and control is vulnerable. So we have built into it the one thing you don’t want to build into any military approach, and that is vulnerability. Right now, we’re on a path that you want to be able to see everything, anywhere, all the time. Can we really afford to be able to watch every nook and cranny of the globe 24/7? We can’t even process the information, let alone distill it into decision-quality data. “Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030,” The Defense Science Board, October 2013. In the future, increasingly technically capable and economically strong adversaries are likely to develop counters to some or all of the foundation technologies on which the U.S. has come to rely. The advantages provided by capabilities such as GPS, internet-based network communications, satellite reconnaissance, and stealth aircraft will be diminished, and in many cases, eliminated. To maintain superiority, it will be necessary for the military to develop new capabilities or tactics, techniques, and procedures to continue to be effective…(pg. viii) With more capable adversaries, the unfettered access to their homeland that the U.S. has exploited in its recent wars may no longer be achievable. This concern is the motivation for much of the Department’s interest in anti-access and area denial capability. Existing bomber and missile systems that can penetrate adversary defenses from long range are expensive, limited in fleet size, and may need to be reserved to achieve vital strategic effects…(pg. xv) Bespoke Materials A substantial expansion of research could produce meaningful playoffs in the design and fabrication of custom materials for a variety of Department of Defense applications. Examples include lasting materials that can generate any wavelength, detector array materials and associated optics for sensing from ultraviolent through infrared, structurally embedded radio antennae, high-strength lightweight materials, ultra-efficient solar cells, biocompatible materials, and cost-effective nanostructures for microelectronics, to name a few. Thought-based Machine Control Research is in its infancy on devices and systems for facile human-machine interfaces without physical contact, either exclusively via transmitted thoughts or aided by microelectronic implants. Systems currently exist to control computer curosrs and joysticks via concentrated thought. Portable Compact Fission to Provide Megawatt Power Levels Power availability is an essential enabler for a variety of defense missions. Portable fission reactor concepts are being considered or developed today that are designed to operate with low-enrichment fuel to minimize proliferation concerns. The negative thermal coefficient in this design means that neutron moderation decreases with increasing system temperature, leading to an inherently safe design without potential for thermal runaway or meltdown. (appendix B)
  • Political Transitions
    You Might Have Missed: Japanese Drones, Shutdown, CIA in Syria
    John Hudson, “U.S. Rules Out a New Drone War in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 3, 2013. In 2013 alone, Iraq is averaging 68 car bombings a month. The United Nations reports that 5,740 civilians were killed since January, which is almost two times more deaths than recorded in all of 2010. Despite the staggering numbers, the U.S. isn’t about to open up a new drone war in Iraq. An administration official tells The Cable the use of lethal drones has not been discussed nor is it even under consideration for Iraq. "The administration got us out of Iraq, which is seen as an accomplishment for the administration. So any ramping up of activity back in Iraq would go against that success," Joseph Quinn, an instructor at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, told The Cable. "They might also be weary of what in the military we call ‘mission creep.’ It starts with drones, but where does it end?" [Iraqi ambassador to the U.S. Iraq Lukman] Faily, speaking with The Cable today, declined to say if the Iraqis ever made a request for drones in the first place, but he did say they would continue asking for more assistance from the United States.] (3PA: It is a positive sign that President Obama has decided not to authorize drone strikes in Iraq because it would be a terrible idea.) Greg Miller, “CIA Ramping Up Covert Training Program for Moderate Syrian Rebels,” Washington Post, October 2, 2013. The CIA is “ramping up and expanding its effort,” said a U.S. official familiar with operations in Syria, because “it was clear that the opposition was losing, and not only losing tactically but on a more strategic level.” The CIA’s mission, officials said, has been defined by the White House’s desire to seek a political settlement, a scenario that relies on an eventual stalemate among the warring factions rather than a clear victor. As a result, officials said, limits on the agency’s authorities enable it to provide enough support to help ensure that politically moderate, U.S.-supported militias don’t lose but not enough for them to win. Islamist factions have taken advantage, luring fighters away with offers of better pay, equipment and results. A spokesman for the ISIS said the group had added 2,000 Syrian recruits and 1,500 foreign fighters over the past two months. “What happens when some of the people we trained torture a prisoner?” said a former senior U.S. intelligence official familiar with agency operations in the Middle East. Even if the CIA can produce records to defend its training program, “we’re going to face congressional hearings,” the former official said. “There is no win here.” (3PA: This is a predictable outcome. America’s unwillingness to attack Syria is reflected in the level of military force officials and policymakers are willing to employ.) “Defense Ministry Working on Protocol to Shoot Down Encroaching Drones,” Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2013. The Defense Ministry is planning a new protocol to deal with foreign unmanned aircraft that approach Japan’s airspace, like the Chinese military drone that ventured near the disputed Senkaku Islands last month. The protocol will include provisions for “necessary measures,” or shooting down a drone, if it continues to violate Japan’s airspace and poses a serious and immediate danger to the lives and property of the Japanese public, sources said. Officials will work out measures to deal with drone-specific issues and incorporate them into the “rules of engagement,” which set specific protocols on the use of arms. Michael Peck, “Global Cybersecurity Spending to Reach $94B,” Defense News, October 1, 2013. Global cybersecurity spending will reach $94 billion between 2013 and 2023, according to a new study by market research firm ASDReports. This makes the U.S. the largest market for cybersecurity firms, followed by Europe at $25 billion, Asia-Pacific at $23 billion, the Middle East at $22.8 billion and Latin America at $1.6 billion, according to an ASDReports announcement. Michael D. Shear, “On Day 1, Parks Close, Workers Stay Home and ‘Panda Cam’ Goes Dark,” New York Times, October 1, 2013. Officials informed lawmakers that about 72 percent of the intelligence community’s civilian work force were furloughed. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, angrily denounced the shutdown as “the biggest gift that we could possibly give our enemies.” Charles Clover, “Russia: A Return to Arms,” Financial Times, October 1, 2013. But now Russian arms dealers are prioritising a new client: the Russian state itself. Last year Russia’s defence spending soared 25 per cent and this year Moscow’s expenditure is set to overtake that of the UK and Japan, according to analysis by IHS. That would make Russia the third largest arms buyer in the world, spending $68.8bn in 2013, trailing only China ($131.7bn), and the US, which spends more on defence ($637.8bn) than the next 10 countries combined. As a percentage of economic output, Russia’s defence expenditures are scheduled to rise from 3.2 per cent in 2013 to 3.8 per cent by 2016. This is much higher than in other big emerging markets such as India (2.6 per cent), Turkey (2.3 per cent) and China (1.9 per cent), according to research by Renaissance Capital, the Moscow-based investment bank. Sam Fellman, “How Doing More with Less is Hurting Sailors—and the Navy,” Navy Times, September 30, 2013. “Listen, if we went to war with China today — and you can print this — I think it would take us 10 days to destroy their Navy," said retired Cmdr. Bryan McGrath, a former destroyer commanding officer who has worked as a consultant with Cropsey. Steven Aftergood, “To Fix U.S. Intelligence, Shrink It?” Secrecy News, September 30, 2013. “Something that’s worth considering,” another CIA analyst said, “is completely counterintuitive, which is to make the CT [counterterrorism] community smaller, not larger. I think there are far more people at CIA HQ now than when we defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War. What the hell?”
  • Political Transitions
    You Might Have Missed: Syria, Drones, Gender Citation Gap
    Contracts: Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense, September 12, 2013. General Atomics - Aeronautical Systems Inc., Poway, Calif., has been awarded a $12,844,738 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the MQ-9 stationary targeting improvements. This contract action is for the development and delivery of an improved targeting capability with the Lynx synthetic aperture radar (SAR) on the MQ-9 platform to allow for a more streamlined approach to targeting and quicker decision making by the crew. Gerald F. Seib, “McCain Passionately Defends Syrian Opposition,” Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2013. “The Syrian people are moderate,” [McCain] said. “The Syrians are not going to stand to be governed by al Nusra and foreign fighters. They’re not. They’re the most highly educated, most literate nation in the Middle East. And to somehow believe they are going to fall prey to al Qaeda and al Nusra is not a possibility.” (3PA: According to UNESCO and World Bank estimates, Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians, have higher literacy rates.) 6th Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations, September 11, 2013. Government and pro-government forces have continued to conduct widespread attacks on the civilian population, committing murder, torture, rape and enforced disappearance as crimes against humanity. They have laid siege to neighbourhoods and subjected them to indiscriminate shelling. Government forces have committed gross violations of human rights and the war crimes of torture, hostage-taking, murder, execution without due process, rape, attacking protected objects and pillage. Tony Perry, “If Ordered to Strike Syria, Navy is Ready, Admiral Tells Sailors,” Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2013. "My philosophy is: Don’t try to impress someone from China with Chinese food," [chief of naval operations Adm. Jonathan] Greenert said. Joel Achenbach, “Obama’s Syria Push Scrambles Hill Alliances,” Washington Post, September 10, 2013. He could use an “aye,” for example, from Rep. Trent Franks, the Arizona Republican and far-right conservative. But here’s Franks, in a subterranean corridor, emerging Monday night from a high-level briefing on Syria: “It just seems that everything the president touches in foreign policy, he injects it with chaos and death.” Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Officials Identify Extremist Groups in Benghazi Attack,” Washington Post, September 10, 2013. In the past four months, as crises have erupted and terrorist threats led the department to temporarily close embassies and consulates in 20 countries, the official said, military forces have been moved around to respond quickly “70 to 80 times.” Tom Vanden Brook, “Strike to Degrade Syrian Forces Would Still be Limited,” USA Today, September 8, 2013. A second senior official, who has seen the most recent planning, offered this metaphor to describe such a strike: If Assad is eating Cheerios, we’re going to take away his spoon and give him a fork. Will that degrade his ability to eat Cheerios? Yes. Will it deter him? Maybe. But he’ll still be able to eat Cheerios. New York Times/CBS News poll, September 6-8, 2013. (3PA: This is the highest recorded percent of Americans that believe the United States should not take a leading role in solving international conflicts.) Daniel Maliniak, Ryan Powers, and Barbara F. Walter, “The Gender Citation Gap in International Relations,” International Organization, August 2013. A look at our data reveals that women in IR do, in fact, cite their work significantly less than men…Among those single-authored articles, male-authored articles have 0+4 self-cites on average, while articles authored by one woman self-cite 0+25 articles+ Looking at only coauthored articles reveals a similar pattern, where those written by two or more men cite themselves more than women.
  • United States
    Would the Syria Deal Be a Coercive Diplomacy Success?
    In the past three days, the Syrian government made an unprecedented acknowledgment that it possesses a chemical weapons program, and that it will place them under the supervision of United Nations (UN) inspectors. As Syrian foreign minister Walid Moallem stated on Monday: “We are ready to reveal the locations of the chemical weapon sites and to stop producing chemical weapons and make these sites available for inspection by representatives of Russia, other countries and the United Nations.” This remarkable shift occurred after President Obama declared on August 31 that he would conduct limited strikes against Syrian regime targets, after receiving congressional authorization. Subsequently, the Obama administration has repeatedly claimed that it was only the credible threat of force that compelled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to reportedly agree to the initiative that had been discussed between American and Russian diplomats for months. On Tuesday, Secretary of State John Kerry claimed: But for the threat of the use of force, they have never even admitted they have [sic].  Now, they’re not only admitting they have them, but they say they’re prepared to try to live up to some international standards. That is only happening because we have shown them that we are prepared to do what is necessary to hold them accountable. Yesterday, White House spokesperson Jay Carney was more definitive: It was the credible threat of U.S. military action that led to the opening of this diplomatic avenue. There is no other explanation behind this rather remarkable change of position by the Syrians and no other explanation behind the decision of the Russians to seek a diplomatic resolution to the problem of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile…I think there’s no question based on what the Russians have said, and the Syrians said, and what we know that the credible threat of U.S. military action precipitated this. And I’m not sure what other source you ascribe it to or it could possibly be.  I don’t think there any doubt that this credible threat of force has produced this change in dynamic. Also yesterday, State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki was repeatedly questioned by Matt Lee of the Associated Press: QUESTION: -- The crux of this whole argument – both the White House and you have made this – that it was the credible threat of U.S. force that created this diplomatic opportunity…How do you know that? Is that just your assumption, or have the Russians and the Syrians somehow communicated to you that this is in fact the case? And the reason I ask this is because it is rare…for someone from any podium, this one or the White House or – to ascribe motivation to foreign governments. The answer is always, “Well, I can’t read their minds. I have no idea what they’re doing – they’re doing what they’re doing.” How do you know that force, the threat of force, was the main factor here, or the only factor? MS. PSAKI: What I can say is that there’s no question that the interest and willingness to engage on this particular issue that the Secretary had spoken about Foreign – with Foreign Minister Lavrov about on several occasions in the past increased as the threat of force, as discussion of that, as the decision by the President was made public and became more likely. QUESTION: Okay. But it’s an assumption. It’s not like Lavrov said, “Ooh, the threat of force is what got us to – got me to move.” MS. PSAKI: Well, those two lines are certainly factual, so I would of course allow you to make your own decision. It is too early to know if a negotiated deal to place Syria’s chemical weapons under international control will succeed, and there will not be a clear answer for some time given the need to pass a UN Security Council resolution, as well as ensuring operational and technical hurdles. However, for foreign policy watchers and international relations scholars, it matters whether Syria can be considered a successful case of coercive diplomacy. If the lesson that one concludes from the past week is that threatening force works, then presumably officials and policymakers in Washington will call upon this strategy in the future, perhaps with Iran over its nuclear program. The question that Matt Lee asked— “How do you know that?”—is one that scholars have difficulty answering with any certainty.  How do you prove causation in coercive diplomacy, especially when the coercer wants to claim credit to demonstrate resolve to future target states, and the coercee wants to deny it was compelled to do something that it would not have otherwise done? Claiming with total certainty—as the Obama administration has done—that it was only the threat of force that led Assad to change his position is dangerous since any judgment is subjective and would be made with incomplete information. Moreover, it diminishes any role that positive inducements could have played in conjunction with the military threats. Russia could have warned Syria that it had to acknowledge its chemical weapons program and place it under international inspection, or Russia would withdraw its essential economic and military support. Alternatively, Russian officials could have told Assad that if he complied with this demand Russia would increase its support, thus helping to assure that he remained in power. Furthermore, Assad could have believed that the reported three-day cruise missile barrages would have been vastly more expansive and lethal than was assumed in Washington policy circles, and would have been just the first steps of a military campaign to ensure regime change. When a greater-than-threatened use of force is used to achieve the desired political objective, coercive diplomacy has not worked. As international relations scholar Robert Art wrote: “Wherever one draws the line between limited and full-scale use, if the coercer has to cross that line to achieve its objectives, then, by definition, coercive diplomacy has failed.” As two major studies of how the U.S. threatens force demonstrated, coercive diplomacy only works roughly 30 percent of the time. They also show that coercion (making an adversary change their behavior) is much more difficult to achieve—especially over extended periods of time—than deterrence (attempting to maintain the status quo by discouraging an adversary from initiating a specific action). Finally, Art also provided an important caveat that policymakers should bear in mind if they think coercive diplomacy should be applied to future adversaries, say Iran: Next to outright war, however, coercive diplomacy represents the most dangerous way to use a state’s military power because, if coercive diplomacy fails, the state that tried it then faces two stark choices: back down or wage war. The first risks loss of face and future bargaining power; the second, loss of life and military defeat.
  • Egypt
    Mubarak Still Rules
    This article was originally published here at ForeignPolicy.com on Wednesday, August 14, 2013.  My friend, the late Hassan El Sawaf, was correct. When I spoke to him on the evening of February 11, 2011, he was exuberant. After years of a lonely and personal struggle against Hosni Mubarak’s rule, the dictator was suddenly gone. A new era had begun. The prospects for democracy had never seemed so bright. Freedom cast Hassan in a new light: unburdened with the weight of Egypt, my normally serious and at times dour friend let himself laugh. Yet within 36 hours of Mubarak’s flight to Sharm el-Sheikh, Hassan’s mood had darkened with sudden disillusion. He distributed one of his many commentaries to a long list of friends and followers that read in part, "I believe a big conspiracy is being perpetrated against the people of Egypt.... [Egyptians] are convinced the interim government will really keep its promises and steer them peacefully to the democracy everyone so valiantly fought for. Egypt will remain a military dictatorship indefinitely. How I wish I am wrong." Back in those heady days, it was easy to discount Hassan’s missive as revolutionary hangover. This was the fear instilled in someone with an intuitive understanding of the cynicism of Egyptian politics. Yet if there is any question of Hassan’s prescience, today’s attack on the pro-Morsy sit-in at Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque should put that to rest. Egypt is as far away from the revolutionary promise of Tahrir Square as it was in November 2010 when Mubarak staged perhaps the most fraudulent parliamentary election since they began in the late 1970s. Continue reading here...