Political Transitions

Announcing Steven A. Cook's new book, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East, which will be published by Oxford University Press in the spring of 2017.

Sarah Collman is a research associate in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. On December 15, South Sudan will have been at civil war for three years. In 2013, just two years after the country seceded from Sudan and gained independence, fighting broke out in the capital between forces loyal to South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. The political struggle between Kiir and Machar dating back to the 1990s, and divisions within the ruling party, quickly devolved into full-scale civil war, pitting tribal groups against each other. Leaders manipulated ethnic identities and mobilized members of their respective tribes. Forces loyal to Kiir were mainly from the Dinka tribe, and were pitted against Machar’s tribe, the Nuer. The death toll of the war in South Sudan is at least fifty thousand people, although the United Nations stopped counting in 2014. Privately, humanitarian officials note this is figure is greatly underestimated. Other news outlets estimate the figure could be as high as three hundred thousand people killed. In three years, the civil war has displaced 1.8 million people internally and caused 1.1 million people to flee the country. Approximately 40 percent of the population faces severe food shortages, and almost 75 percent is dealing with some degree of food insecurity. Needless to say, the situation is dire. In a new Center for Preventive Action (CPA) report, Ending South Sudan’s Civil War, author Kate Almquist Knopf, director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, argues that the only way to save South Sudan is by putting it on “life support.” To ensure the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, she proposes that the United Nations, in coordination with the African Union (AU), establish an international transitional administration to run the country for ten to fifteen years. Instituting a transitional administration, and taking power over the country from current leaders, would be an extreme measure. Almquist Knopf argues, however, that it would provide the “clean break” that South Sudan needs to end fighting between tribal groups, rebuild the economy, strengthen institutions, and heal from three years of civil war and decades of violence. Lessons from other UN transitional administrations—such as those in East Timor, Kosovo, and Liberia—could be applied to shape a more peaceful and inclusive future for South Sudan. Because the United States played a unique role in fostering the country’s independence, it is well-placed to help guide the transition from civil war. As a road map toward establishing an international transitional administration, Almquist Knopf proposes the United States should:                       Foster a negotiated exit for Kiir and Machar, in coordination with South Sudan’s neighbors, using tools such as offering amnesty, pressing the AU to establish a hybrid court, and instituting time-triggered sanctions and an arms embargo through the UN Security Council. Reach out to Kiir and Machar’s core partisans and family members to defuse spoilers and persuade them to accept the UN and AU administration. Conduct sustained high-level diplomacy with South Sudan’s neighbors, other states in the region, and the AU to design the international transitional administration and generate support for it. Conduct a diplomatic campaign with UN Security Council members and donor countries for them to endorse and secure funding for an international transitional administration.   The United States has allocated $1.9 billion in humanitarian assistance to South Sudan since the outbreak of the civil war, and contributes greatly to the UN peacekeeping mission there. The report’s proposed approach would not necessary be more costly. According to Almquist Knopf, investing in an international transitional administration would be more effective than the current U.S. policy approach. It would finally put an end to the violence and offer the people of South Sudan an opportunity to build an inclusive, representative, and legitimate state. Read Kate Almquist Knopf’s Ending South Sudan’s Civil War for a full analysis of the challenges South Sudan faces and how the United States can help foster a transition out of civil war.

Aaron Picozzi is the research associate for the military fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations, is a Coast Guard veteran, and currently serves in the Army National Guard.  A recent victory in the half century conflict in Colombia was marked by an agreement between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC) leader Rodrigo Londono, and President Juan Manual Santos. But as thousands of FARC rebels hand their weapons over to a UN mission, many will be faced with a difficult consequence of the peace—a lifestyle change from fighting for an ideology, to attempting to rejoin society as a former solider. With the folding of the FARC organization comes the question: what will happen to the Colombian cocaine trade that was so closely tied to the rebel group? It is doubtful the dissolution of the FARC will bring an end to Colombia’s participation in global cocaine trade—a business which nets the FARC anywhere from $200 million to $3.5 billion annually, and is responsible for 90 percent of total cocaine used in the United States. Faced with questionable futures and the disappearance of a clear command structure, rebels may continue the lucrative criminal activities they have perfected over years of conflict, but this time they will be separate from the organizational structure the FARC once provided. Colombia has not carried out their war on drugs alone. The United States has played an integral role in the fight, funneling over six billion dollars, $4.8 billion of which went directly to the Colombian military or police, over eight years through the counternarcotics program Plan Colombia. The direct efforts of the United States within Colombian borders, which include military raids and the eradication of coca crops by spraying chemicals, have drawn criticism from neighboring countries and Colombian citizens alike, yet there is a U.S. military option that circumvents many of the chief complaints surrounding U.S.–Latin American foreign policy. To support the FARC stand-down, while congruently fighting the drug trade, the United States can double down on a technique it already employs. In 2015, the Coast Guard stopped 144.8 metric tons of illegal cocaine from reaching its destination through maritime and air interdiction campaigns. These techniques have been employed through cooperative efforts, such as the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) directed Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), a multi-organization group comprising members from all five branches of U.S. military service, multiple agencies within the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Intelligence Community, as well as representatives from various countries, both near and far from the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This group is focused on the eradication of illegal drug trafficking. Continued and increased use of JIATF-S and the U.S. Coast Guard counter-drug teams can help combat the transnational drug trade. Unfortunately, the U.S. Coast Guard is projecting lower interdiction numbers for 2017 due to the U.S Navy’s plan for reducing the number of sea and air assets allocated to JIATF-S mission set. A reduction in dedicated assets will create a more difficult counter-drug operation, yielding fewer interdictions, and opening the door to those who wish to capitalize on the destabilized Colombian drug syndicate. The use of air and sea assets allows the U.S. military to assist Colombia directly, without carrying the stigma of a foreign military incursion. This focus on fighting the Colombian drug trade would also help with the herculean task of reintegrating the estimated 6,000 to 7,000 fighters and 8,500 supplementary civilian supporters from FARC; if the efficacy of the transnational drug trade is reduced, it may dissuade former drug-dealing transitioning FARC members from continuing their involvement. While rebel reintegration programs currently exist in Colombia, they are costly, lengthy, and garner a recidivism rate of roughly twenty five percent. Many rebels know only the militant work required to operate in a jungle combat environment or the illicit activity that financed their operation. During the FARC detente, the United States can increase offshore interdiction activity without evoking feelings of Reaganesque Latin American policy. By reinvesting in maritime and air operations targeting the Colombian drug trade, the United States can continue its efforts without political meddling. These actions can both support the peace plans, while simultaneously protecting the United States from the threats of transnational drug organizations.

One of the leading sources of refugees in Europe is the impoverished east African nation of Eritrea. Many fleeing describe chronic human rights abuses.

Helia Ighani is the assistant director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won a majority of the votes after a landslide election in November 2015, becoming the first fully civilian-led government in Myanmar’s history. Once in power in April 2016, the NLD government released nearly two hundred political prisoners detained by the former military junta government, demonstrating Suu Kyi’s commitment to democratizing the country. However, the new NLD government has not yet attempted to reconcile animosity among Myanmar’s various ethnic groups—in particular, its Rohingya population. Up to 1.1 million Rohingya live in Myanmar, facing serious human rights violations, and thousands have been displaced due to violence with Buddhist nationalists (see CFR’s Global Conflict Tracker for an overview of the sectarian violence in Myanmar). Many have criticized Suu Kyi for refusing to touch the Rohingya issue, including the Dalai Lama. A new Center for Preventive Action (CPA) report, Securing a Democratic Future for Myanmar, highlights this concerns and the importance of U.S. involvement in the country’s transition to democracy. Priscilla A. Clapp, the former chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Myanmar and senior advisor to the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Asia Society, argues that reforms over the past five years have transformed Myanmar “from a country of little strategic interest to the United States into one that promises substantial benefit to core U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and beyond.” Yet, as the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Myanmar Derek Mitchell expressed at a recent CPA event, the “deep reservoir of mistrust in the country must be overcome,” regarding the reconciliation of the recognized 135 ethnic minorities in Myanmar and the “very delicate issue” of the Rohingya minority. Washington has already begun to change its tone on Myanmar. The new U.S. ambassador to Myanmar Scot Marciel said he will continue to use “Rohingya”—considered a controversial term by many hardline Buddhists who refer to the unrecognized population as “Bengali”—when referring to the large Muslim community in Myanmar, despite being asked by the government to not bring up the issue. While Washington hinted that it is considering reversing its sanctions policy toward Myanmar, it is counting on the new government to improve human rights conditions. The Obama administration will decide on whether to continue the sanctions when the underlying legal basis for the program expires next week. Clapp details policy options for facilitating a democratic transition with the NLD government, including U.S. policy recommendations relating to human rights conditions and sanctions on Myanmar. Over the coming year, she recommends that the United States should: • Assist with the establishment of a reconciliation government. • Provide assistance for economic development and conflict mediation in Rakhine State and encourage the new government to give legal status to the Rohingya minority. • Revise the legal structure of remaining sanctions and begin to sunset sanctions specific to Myanmar. • In consultation with the NLD, develop a strategy to expand dialogue with Myanmar’s military.   In the long term, she encourages the United States to: • Expand the purview of U.S. assistance to include capacity-building for government institutions. • Help rebuild the justice system. • Promote economic development at the state level to consolidate peace with ethnic minorities. • Lead a regional effort to find a humane solution to Rohingya statelessness and legal status in neighboring countries. • Promote Myanmar’s political and economic integration into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).   Read Securing a Democratic Future for Myanmar to get Clapp’s full analysis and learn more about Myanmar’s transition to democracy.

Shahin Badkoubei is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. The next twelve to eighteen months will be a critical test of already tense and tenuous relations between Russia and Georgia. What could escalate to a level similar to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea in Ukraine, territorial disputes over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain unresolved since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and are a potential trigger of conflict. Russia has not fulfilled its obligations under the 2008 cease-fire agreement, and continues to push territorial markers in the breakaway regions and grant Russian passports to citizens living there. Upcoming events, including the July Warsaw North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit and Georgia’s parliamentary elections in fall 2016, could escalate tensions or renew confrontation. A myriad of factors threaten to ignite renewed aggression between the two governments as described in a new Center for Preventive Action Contingency Planning Memorandum, “Renewed Confrontation in Georgia.” David Kramer, senior director at the McCain Institute for International Leadership, outlines scenarios that could lead to a Russia-Georgia confrontation, and details U.S. interests in and options for preventing and mitigating further conflict. Kramer’s report asserts that Russian aggression toward Georgia could be precipitated to distract the Russian public from domestic issues, such as its declining economy or blow back from military action in Syria or Ukraine. Russian government rhetoric increasingly mentions Georgia, a sign that Russia may be preparing for military action, Kramer says. Beyond Russia’s border, if the current Georgian Dream (GD) party, which Russia prefers, is poised to lose to the pro-West United National Movement (UNM) in Georgia’s parliamentary elections this October, Russia could flex its strength by imposing economic pressure or stationing troops along the border. Kramer also raises the possibility of aggression instigated by pro-Russian supporters in South Ossetia. Leonid Tibilov, the South Ossetian leader, proposed a referendum to vote on joining Russia. Tibilov and fellow supporters may risk independently taking action to deepen relations with Moscow and separate from Georgia, assuming that Russia will come to their aid. Preventing and mitigating Russian hostility is a priority for Georgia since it is not a member of NATO, nor a U.S. treaty ally, and therefore does not have Article 5 security guarantees. As such, Georgia seeks to enhance its ties with the West. The government is taking the steps to seek eligibility, and hopes that its candidacy will be a topic of discussion at this July’s NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland. However, Russia perceives Georgia’s NATO membership-bid as a threat to its sphere of influence. Should an acceptance be on the horizon, Russia may preemptively respond aggressively to demonstrate Georgia’s lack of territorial control and military capabilities, which are requisites for membership. Conversely, Kramer points to the risk of a NATO rejection, in which case Russia might perceive NATO’s disinterest and feel emboldened to flex its military might towards Georgia. Why should the United States entangle itself in another conflict if its interests seem fairly limited and its relationship with Russia is at its weakest point since the Cold War? A U.S. response to Russian aggression in Georgia risks further deteriorating the U.S.-Russia relationship, as well as increasing regional polarization that could induce another Cold War, Kramer argues. To promote democratic and liberal economic values, the United States has provided $3 billion in assistance to Georgia, which has one of the most pro-American populations in the region. According to Kramer, preventing an armed conflict is critical for the United States to maintain its regional presence and any hope of a Georgian integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Should violence break out, a lack of involvement on behalf of the United States would risk its credibility in the region. A renewed Russia-Georgia confrontation would have rippling effects on neighboring countries and undermine the post-Cold War order, as did Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In addition to U.S. options to mitigate a potential conflict, Kramer outlines a series of preventive recommendations: • State clearly that the door to NATO remains open and that not offering a Membership Action Plan does not mean backing off from the 2008 Bucharest NATO Communiqué, which stated that Ukraine and Georgia would become members. • Encourage greater trade and interaction between Georgia and Russia by urging the removal of Russian trade barriers. • Urge confidence-building measures among officials and civil society groups in Georgia and those in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. • Beef-up the independence of Georgia’s economic and financial institutions to avoid heavy Russian influence and support efforts to develop Georgia’s energy potential. • Bolster deterrence of Russian opportunism and aggression through closer bilateral military ties under the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. To learn more about Kramer’s analysis and policy recommendations, read “Renewed Confrontation in Georgia.”

Tina Huang is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. As the Syrian civil war continues at lower levels of violence, neighboring countries face enduring security threats and international pressures to protect refugees pouring across their borders. In a new Center for Preventive Action (CPA) Contingency Planning Memorandum Update, “Growing Stress on Jordan,” Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and David Schenker, director of the Program on Arab Politics at WINEP, discuss the implications of Jordan reaching its “saturation point” for accepting Syrian refugees. Satloff and Schenker state that the risk of domestic unrest stemming from economic privatization, corruption, and a lack of reform—which was the focus on their 2013 report, “Political Instability in Jordan”—has since diminished, while spillover from the Syrian civil war is an increasing threat. They offer policy recommendations for how the U.S. government can support its partner in the Middle East. The burden of hosting 1.5 million Syrian refugees consumed 17.5 percent of Jordan’s $11.7 billion budget in 2015, contributing to the country’s $2 billion deficit. Since 2011, support for Syrian refugees has cost Jordan nearly $6.6 billion in total. A growing concern for Jordan is security, explain the authors, as there are indications that some refugees are influenced by the self-proclaimed Islamic State and domestic terrorism is on the rise. This has placed additional pressure on an already stressed political system. For example, Jordan’s unemployment rate stands at 12 percent, with nearly 30 percent of its youth looking for jobs. A growing refugee population could exacerbate competition for sparse jobs and intensify existing social tensions. The authors warn that the continued inflow of refugees could “tip the scales,” and conceivably lead to the collapse of King Abdullah’s regime if it is unable to maintain security while supporting the growing displaced Syrian population. Maintaining stability in Jordan is vital to U.S. interests given the country’s commitment to a peaceful solution in Israel, partnership in combating the self-proclaimed Islamic State, cooperation with pro-West strategic orientation, and confrontation of Iranian expansionism. Satloff and Schenker provide several policy recommendations for the U.S. government to protect political stability in Jordan. • Increasing humanitarian assistance by reconsidering its allocation of its $533 million dedicated to refugee support and encouraging European and Arab allies to also invest in Jordan. • Supporting employment opportunities for Syrian refugees by pressing European countries, primarily Germany, to invest in job creation within Jordan. • Increasing defense and intelligence cooperation by equipping Jordan with advanced armed-and-surveillance-drone capability. • Establishing a real safe zone where U.S.-led coalition forces will provide security, shelter, and food to displaced Syrians. To learn more about Satloff and Schenker’s analysis and policy recommendations, read the report, “Growing Stress on Jordan.”

Tina Huang is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. The rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State will be a leading foreign policy issue for the incoming administration. Thus, it is crucial to understand the proposed policies of the candidates. The current results of the primary elections indicate that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and businessman Donald Trump will likely win their party’s nominations. Though both candidates use strikingly similar rhetoric to describe how to counter the Islamic State, a close analysis of the details they each have provided exposes starkly different approaches. First, Clinton and Trump have both stated that they would disrupt the Islamic State’s Internet access and social media presence. During a Republican debate, Trump said, “I would certainly be open to closing areas where we are at war with somebody. I sure as hell don’t want to let people that want to kill us and kill our nation use our Internet.” Similarly, Clinton expressed that her administration would “deny them virtual territory.” The two candidates agree that, to do this, private companies should play a role. Clinton has urged Silicon Valley to “disrupt” the Islamic State by blocking or removing militant websites, videos, and encrypted communication. Trump, more vaguely, has claimed, “we have to get them [Silicon Valley] engaged.” However, other details the candidates have proposed for limiting the group’s online presence differ. Clinton has focused on attacking specific online infrastructure that the Islamic State utilizes to disseminate propaganda and communicate, whereas Trump has suggested he would close undefined “areas” of the Internet where the group is known to operate. He has not expanded on where those “areas” are, which therefore could be interpreted as cutting off specific geographical areas in the Middle East or blocking part of the Internet worldwide. Second, Clinton and Trump both believe that severing funding to the Islamic State is vital to defeating the group. Currently, the Islamic State brings in about $500 million a year from oil revenue, which makes up nearly 38 percent of its annual income. The group’s remaining profits stem from kidnapping ransoms, anonymous donations from governments and individuals, agricultural trade, and taxation. If elected, Trump has claimed he will “take away their wealth…take away the oil…I’d bomb the hell out of that oil field.” Contrastingly, Clinton has argued, “we have to go after nodes that facilitate illicit trade and transaction,” urging the UN Security Council to “update its terrorism sanctions” and “place more obligations on countries to police their own banks.” She directs responsibility toward governments and international organizations to take action that would prevent funds from reaching the Islamic State; whether states will take this initiative is speculative. Lastly, both candidates have expressed support for U.S.-led coalition airstrikes and ground troops to counter the Islamic State, but they differ on the specifics. Trump has advocated employing airstrikes to destroy oil fields, as previously mentioned. During a campaign speech in Iowa, he stated, “I would just bomb those suckers…I’d blow up the pipes…I’d blow up every single inch. There would be nothing left.” Though he suggested he would target the families of terrorists—a statement he later disputed—he did not clarify whether he would use airstrikes for this purpose. Rather, Trump has claimed, “I don’t like talking so specific….I want to be unpredictable.” Clinton, on the other hand, has proposed a three stage counterterrorism campaign that, in addition to targeting the group’s finances and online presence, aims to strip its control over territories in Syria and Iraq by executing a “more effective coalition air campaign, with more allies’ planes, more strikes, and a broader target set.” Looking to their proposals for ground troops, when Trump has been asked if he would send troops to the Middle East, he has provided an ambiguous response such as “I would do whatever you have to do” or “...you’ll need some ground troops.” Trump has said that their purpose would be "to protect the oil," but has not elaborated. Clinton has delineated her plan to take back territory and asserted that “airstrikes will have to be combined with ground forces.” She insisted that Congress should approve the deployment of U.S. special forces, not exceeding one hundred thousand soldiers. Clinton has gone further to explain what these groups should do once they are deployed: “We need to lay the foundation for a second Sunni Awakening” by providing training and support for Sunnis within the region. Clinton and Trump both agree that defeating the Islamic State will require precluding the group’s exploitation of the Internet, hindering its funding, leading an air coalition, and deploying ground troops. However, how they would each go about this and for what purpose differs. Clinton is firm in her position that defeating the Islamic State requires destruction, not containment, and has developed a thorough campaign to reinforce her stance. While Trump has yet to buttress his strategy with details, he should take the opportunity to expand on the specifics of his plan as the primaries continue and, potentially, during the general election debates. If Trump and Clinton compete in the general election, comparing and understanding their strategies for countering the Islamic State is imperative to ensuring the greatest security for the United States during the next administration.

Respected former U.S. diplomats Nicholas Burns and James Jeffrey published a Washington Post op-ed today, calling on the U.S. military to lead the creation of a “safe zone” in northern Syria. The authors propose, “to locate it over twenty-five to thirty miles south of the Turkish border….Its central purpose would be to help local forces drive out the Islamic State and to provide a haven for civilians until the war can be brought to a close.” Burns and Jeffrey further acknowledge some of the difficulties involved with their proposal, admitting that, “the United States would have to deploy U.S. soldiers on the ground inside Syria along the Turkish border in order to recruit the majority of the zone’s soldiers from Turkey and other NATO allies, as well as the Sunni Arab states.” This safe haven would be further protected by a no-fly zone operating primarily out of Turkish airbases. This proposal deserves serious analysis and consideration. However, it is based upon a false claim repeated often by those endorsing interventions into the Syrian civil war: “It would restrict the operations of the rampaging Syrian air force—the largest killer of civilians in the conflict.” This is false, according to data compiled by the Violations Documentation Center (VDC), a nongovernmental organization. The VDC determined that through mid-September 2015, there had been 85,404 civilians killed in the civil war: 28,277 by shootings and mass killings, 27,006 by mortar, artillery, and rocket attacks, and 18,866 by “Syrian Government Air Attacks.” As I wrote in 2013, any military intervention that claims to protect civilians from harm must be based upon how civilians are actually being harmed, not based upon the level of military commitment that can be supported by U.S. domestic politics. Actually protecting civilians from shootings and mortar attacks requires a level of cost, commitment, and risk that is presently unacceptable within the United States. Moreover, even if the United States and some coalition of outside powers decided to protect civilians from the Syrian air force, a no-fly zone exclusively over northern Syria would not achieve this. Both Syrian and Russian air power is (indiscriminately) being used, overwhelmingly along a roughly north-south line running from Aleppo to the Damascus suburbs—territory that would be entirely unprotected from this hypothetical no-fly zone. In fact, according to the VDC, since September 2015, over one thousand civilians, including three hundred children, have been killed by Russian air strikes. Though there is no comparable data, Russia assuredly is killing more civilians with air power today than the Syrian regime. Of course, the no-fly-zone could be extended to protect civilians in the areas where they are being killed, and against the actual perpetrators—i.e., Russia. But this would place the patrolling aircraft at far greater risk of being shot down by antiaircraft missiles, would routinely require that those aircraft operate in close proximity with Russian combat jets flying out of the Latakia Airport, and ultimately would mandate shooting down Russian aircraft that violate the expanded no-fly zone. In reality, the most likely outcome of any no-fly zone over northern Syria would be to further deepen the U.S. military commitment in Syria, and gradually expand the initial military objectives, as happened with no-fly zones in Iraq (regime change), Bosnia-Herzegovina (fifteen-day bombing campaign, plus British and French shelling of Bosnian Serbs leading to diplomatic settlement), and Libya (regime change). One other claim that Burns and Jeffrey make is worth evaluating. They write that the safe zone “would also hinder the use of military power by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah against the resistance.” This could certainly be true for rebel groups operating out of the safe zone, assuming that the United States and coalition partners defend the rebels while they are within the safe zone. Of course, the unresolvable dilemma of declaring a safe zone for civilians to receive humanitarian assistance, and for armed rebel groups to operate out of, is that the safe zone would actually be a war zone. As we know from UN-declared safe zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in sub-Saharan Africa, combatants will use it to rest, recruit, and recover, thereby placing all civilians residing there at grave risk. Humanitarian interventions that claim their objective is the protection of noncombatants should be based upon the realities on the ground. Moreover, they should not make harm to the noncombatants—who the intervention was intended to save in the first place—more likely. The real concern with Burns and Jeffrey’s ambitious proposal is that it neither reflects what is happening in Syria today, nor would likely reduce the overall level of violence (from all sources). Whether it would significantly increase the likelihood of a brokered diplomatic outcome that ends the brutal five-plus-year civil war is difficult to assess without clarifying information of who would participate, and how the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran would react.

Last week, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel gave his first extended interview since resigning as Pentagon chief in November 2014. The curated interview with Foreign Policy is worth reading in its entirety, if for nothing else than the insights into how White House officials and staffers micromanaged Department of Defense decisions; Hagel claims that staffers would call generals “asking fifth-level questions that the White House should not be involved in.” (This would not be the first or last White House charged with this degree of oversight.) However, the most revealing moment of the interview was not an instance of White House micromanagement, but rather indecisiveness. In September 2014, in reaction to the horrific videos of U.S. citizen beheadings released by the self-declared Islamic State, Congress passed legislation mandating that the Pentagon “provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition.” The most critical question regarding this policy decision was not whether the program would be effective—almost immediately nobody inside or outside of the Pentagon thought it would be—but what direct military support the United States would provide to the Pentagon-trained rebels in Syria. As I later wrote, initial, limited support to Syrian rebels could escalate to a Bay of Pigs situation, where the U.S.-backed rebels were easily killed or captured, and subsequently U.S. credibility further eroded. Astutely recognizing that this question was unresolved as the legislation was passed, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) asked at a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) hearing on September 16, 2014, “will we repel Bashar Assad’s air assets that will be attacking [the rebels]?” The then-Pentagon chief replied, “Any attack on those that we have trained and who are supporting us, we will help ‘em.” In his recent Foreign Policy interview, Hagel astonishingly admitted that he improvised on the spot and came up with that highly consequential policy declaration on his own. “We had never come down on an answer or a conclusion in the White House. I said what I felt I had to say. I couldn’t say, ‘No.’ Christ, every ally would have walked away from us in the Middle East.” If this is actually what happened, it is an extraordinary case of strategic negligence by the White House. Whether and to what extent the United States would provide direct military support to the Syrian rebels who the Pentagon overtly trained and equipped was a major component of the anti-Islamic State strategy that President Obama announced just six days earlier. Either Obama had not personally decided before he made his speech or he had left it unresolved or unclear by the time Hagel and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey testified before the SASC. Whether due to negligence or neglect, this was not a policy declaration that any secretary of defense should have made up on the spot. It is one thing for the White House to consciously leave matters unresolved publicly to retain flexibility as a situation unfolds, but this instance of inadequate policy coordination and indecisiveness suggests that the Obama administration had not even made a decision internally. This is another damning anecdote that reflects on the Obama administration’s poorly conceived and implemented approach to the Syrian civil war and rise of the Islamic State.

This blog post was coauthored with my research associate, Amelia M. Wolf. Presidential campaigns are largely consequence-free environments unburdened by the pressures and responsibilities that come with actually sitting in the White House. A candidate can say or pledge to do anything no matter how troubling, costly, or unlikely. The one policy recommendation that every presidential candidate has strongly endorsed during this election cycle—with differing degrees of scope and intensity— is the use of military power. With the sixteen-month war against the self-declared Islamic State stalemated and the percentage of Americans naming “national security and terrorism” the top federal government priority having nearly doubled since April, appeals to force have played an unusually significant role this presidential campaign. This is unsurprising, since military force remains the most responsive, fungible, and destructive foreign-policy tool that a candidate can propose. Unfortunately, the military options put forth may sound tough, but they are rarely articulated in a concrete and actionable manner, which makes it difficult to evaluate the wisdom of the proposals. To capture and better understand the sort of military missions that prospective presidents might pursue once in office, we are publishing the Presidential Candidates Use of Force Tracker. The information relies upon each active candidate’s campaign webpage, interviews, public speeches, and participation in the presidential debates. The candidates appear alphabetically, with each listing containing the military options they proposed, the relevant country or threat, the stated political and/or military objectives, and whether it would be conducted unilaterally or multilaterally. We use direct quotes to assure that the proposed option is not taken out of context, and so readers can judge for themselves the candidates’ seriousness. We include only kinetic uses of force, not shows of force, such as Governor Chris Christie’s pledge to personally fly Air Force One over disputed islands in the South China Sea. The Tracker will be updated over the next year as candidates propose new military options, clarify or state new political and military objectives, and, in some cases, switch their policy recommendations entirely. View the Presidential Candidates Use of Force Tracker below (it requires scrolling to the right), or as a Google spreadsheet.

Bogdan Belei is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. On his way to Rome in 49 BCE, Julius Caesar paused before crossing the Rubicon. With only a single legion under his command, and outnumbered two to one by Pompey’s legions, the general faced the serious threat of defeat if he committed his forces to invade Rome. Ultimately, Caesar led his army to victory and solidified the Roman Empire. But the decision to fight his opposition was driven by the reality that Caesar had only one alternative to victory: surrender. Today, the Obama administration has placed itself in a similar situation in Syria due to its strategy of “degrading and ultimately destroying” the self-declared Islamic State. Likewise, its rigid stance on Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s removal has limited the U.S. flexibility needed to effectively responding in Syria—where the situational environment and range of actors have shifted dramatically since Obama first suggested Assad must “step aside” in 2011. The United States has neither committed the resources, nor demonstrated the political will necessary to eradicate the Islamic State or remove Assad. On its current path, the U.S. strategy is unlikely to foster any political resolution of the civil war. If the Obama administration is willing to rethink its endgame in Syria, there are several realistic strategies for achieving incremental goals that could help stabilize the civil war and limit unnecessary confrontations with U.S. adversaries. First, the United States should end future offensive weapons support to rebels fighting Assad, while encouraging Gulf States, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to do the same. In the four years that U.S. and coalition countries have supplied and trained “moderate rebels,” these forces have not decisively countered the Islamic State, or achieved their goal of deposing Assad. The Pentagon’s disastrous train-and-equip program resulted in groups of U.S.-backed rebels, dispatched July 12 and September 20 respectively, being immediately attacked and disarmed upon entry into Syria. Some fighters have even defected to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. This strategy has not brought the United States closer to its intended endgame, and potential adversaries have subsequently increased their military role in the conflict, further risking escalation. Second, the Obama administration should pursue a political dialogue. Current negotiations at Geneva have fallen short of achieving progress, largely due to the existing military stalemate, and therefore should be reexamined. This would require directly bargaining with Russia and Iran, rather than just bringing them to the table. It’s true that the situation in Syria became more complex with the introduction of Russian airstrikes and heightened role of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in support of Assad, making his ouster by force less likely. However, both Russia and Iran have strategic interests in Syria’s future, and neither Moscow nor Tehran are politically suicidal. Russia’s intervention, at least partially, involves a long-term objective to preserve its access to the warm-ports in Tartus and Latakia and secure an ally in Damascus. Both objectives require some level of stability and Russia may be willing to deescalate its military involvement in exchange for American flexibility on Syria’s political future. Sijbren de Jong, an analyst at the Hague Center for Strategic Studies, has said, “They [Russia] don’t care whether Assad stays or not. They want to secure their interests, and they want to keep access to the Mediterranean for sure.” Iran is arguably more committed to Assad than Russia. Besides being an ally, Syria is a land-route between Iran and Hezbollah, and the Assad regime remains a valuable asset in its regional struggle with Saudi Arabia. But the costs of propping up Assad since 2011 are mounting and Iran may welcome an opportunity for at least partial relief. If the United States can successfully encourage Saudi Arabia to decrease its arms and funding to Sunni rebels, Iran might subsequently be more willing to downscale its engagement as well. Third, given that humanitarian concerns are purportedly at the core of policy discussions, the United States should consider establishing a “safe-zone” on Syria’s northwest border with Turkey. “Safe zones” are intended to serve as humanitarian corridors for civilian populations, and require ground troops, air power, humanitarian aid, and designated territory to be successful. These measures should only be taken once there is progress on the diplomatic front to lessen the likelihood of provocations and potential disaster. Establishing a “safe zone” is preferable to a “no-fly-zone” (NFZ), a designated space where Russian and Syrian aircraft would not be allowed to enter, because it would protect civilians not just from aerial bombardments, but also protect them from ground attacks and bombardments from artillery, rockets, and missiles, and provide them with humanitarian services. A “safe-zone’s” largest challenge would be multilateral commitment. This policy would only succeed with adequate humanitarian aid and ground forces. As witnessed in 1992 when Serbs besieged the UN-backed “safe haven” in Srebrenica, a lack of military enforcement could result in a failure to prevent civilian casualties. France and Turkey have already voiced a willingness to commit military troops to enforce the “safe zone,” in part because the European Union and Turkey have disproportionately suffered from the refugee crisis. A zone implemented as a humanitarian mission with multilateral support would increase the consequences of any provocations or operations in or near the “safe-zone,” and therefore hold Russia and Iran to some international accountability. Winning the peace in Syria will require adjusting U.S. strategy from pursuing an unlikely endgame that would require more resources and military force than is politically feasible, to one of incremental, attainable goals. This would involve ending support to factions fueling the conflict, which would create the necessary space for political dialogue and ultimately allow for cooperation on Syria’s humanitarian crisis. Without de-escalation, there are few realistic paths toward solving Syria’s political future. Caesar and his legion crossed the Rubicon because of two things: the threat of defeat and the reward of the Roman Empire. In Syria, neither awaits the United States.