Heads of State and Government

The National Executive Committee (NEC) of South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) met March 19-20. Among issues discussed was President Jacob Zuma’s relationship with the wealthy Gupta family, which critics accuse of “state capture,” that is, exercising undue influence over presidential, high level appointments and government contracts for their own benefit. For many in South Africa, the relationship between President Zuma and the Gupta family has become the face of corruption. Concern about corruption is a major political issue in the run up to local and municipal elections that will take place between May 18 and August 16. Indeed, according to South African media, the NEC also discussed the upcoming elections in Johannesburg and Pretoria, where the ANC faces stiff competition from the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), which has also called for Zuma’s resignation over corruption. Following the NEC meeting, party secretary general Gwede Mantashe said that there had been “frank and robust discussions” of the Guptas. But, he continued, “The appointment of ministers and deputy ministers is the sole prerogative of the President of the Republic, in line with the Constitution. To this end, the ANC continues to confirm its full confidence in our president.” In what might be seen as a damning comment, he also said that the NEC had not discussed Zuma standing down from the presidency. At its weekend conference, the NEC directed the ANC to investigate the relationship between the president and the Guptas. It also issued an invitation to party members to present to Mantashe’s office evidence of any Gupta family impropriety. Meanwhile the Office of the Public Protector, the constitutionally-mandated government ombudsman, has requested additional funding from the Treasury to investigate the Guptas. The involvement of the Public Protector has been requested by the Roman Catholic Dominican Order and DA leader Mmusi Maimane. The Public Protector earlier demonstrated her political independence from the ANC and the administration by finding that Zuma had improperly authorized public money to be spent on his private estate. The South African Communist Party (SACP), closely allied to the ANC, is also weighing-in. In a speech on March 21, the SACP second deputy general secretary, Solly Mapila, publicly called for the president to end his ties with the Guptas and welcomed the ANC investigation. According to the Daily Maverick’s Ranjemi Munusamy, Mapila characterized the relationship as “contaminated.” The Oliver and Adelaide Tambo Foundation, the Nelson Mandela Foundation, and the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation–the memorials to the heroes of the anti-apartheid struggle–have sent a joint letter to the NEC expressing “deep concern” about “state capture.” According to the Daily Maverick, an ANC spokesperson characterized the conversation with the foundations as “cordial, frank, and robust. He also said that there would be follow up conversations. As  Munusamy comments, that would indicate that the foundations are not going to let the issue go away. Munusamy also notes that the NEC mandated investigation gives the ANC a means to deal with the Gupta issue which, up to now, it has largely ignored. She also observes that the enhanced scrutiny of the president makes a cabinet reshuffle less likely. Like a cat with nine lives, Zuma has survived challenges ranging from credible rape charges (he was acquitted) to being fired by a sitting president. He may yet survive the Guptas. If the ANC does better than it currently expects in the upcoming elections, he may recover his political footing.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 12, to March 18, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   March 13: Nigerian soldiers killed seventeen Boko Haram insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. March 13: A clash between rival vigilante groups resulted in the deaths of seven in Gombi, Adamawa. March 14: Boko Haram killed fifteen in Askira/Uba, Borno. March 15: Boko Haram killed five in Askira/Uba, Borno. March 16: 2 suicide bombers killed themselves and twenty-five others at a mosque in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. March 16: Cameroonian soldiers killed twenty Boko Haram insurgents in the town of Djibrila in northern Nigeria. March 16: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram insurgents in Damboa, Borno. March 16: Four Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and one Nigerien military commander in Diffa, Niger. March 16: Nigerian police killed eleven bank robbers in Lagos State, Lagos. March 17: Fulani herdsmen killed fifteen in Buruku, Benue.

Brazil’s drama has escalated at breakneck speed. On March 4, former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was detained for questioning. On March 8, construction magnate Marcelo Odebrecht was sentenced to nineteen years in prison for his role in the Lava Jato scandal. On March 9, state prosecutors in São Paulo filed a motion for Lula’s arrest, and on March 13, an estimated three million Brazilians hit the streets in the largest anti-government protests of recent years. On March 15, the plea bargain signed by Workers’ Party (PT) senator Delcídio Amaral was approved by the country’s high court, the Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF), revealing accusations against President Rousseff’s confidante and minister Aloizio Mercadante, against erstwhile government allies Vice President Michel Temer and Senate President Renan Calheiros, against opposition leader Aécio Neves, and even against Rousseff herself, who is alleged to have pushed judges to tamper with the ongoing investigation. Yesterday, March 16, spontaneous protests broke out in several cities after a wiretap was released of Lula and Rousseff discussing his appointment as presidential chief of staff, with protesters interpreting the conversation as obstruction of justice and an effort to ensure Lula special standing in a high court that has long been deferential to politicians (ministers, including the chief of staff, can only be tried in the STF). The speed with which the crisis has developed is reminiscent of another chaotic March, more than a half century ago, which culminated in the military coup of March 31, 1964. Today’s military is thankfully content to remain in its barracks, but although the democratic regime seems secure, the Rousseff administration is in deep trouble. A variety of well-informed observers are predicting Rousseff will be unseated. The arrest of Rousseff’s campaign manager, the charges against Lula, the turning of Senator Amaral, the likelihood of further explosive plea bargains within the next month, and the weakening of support from the PT rank and file all bode poorly for Rousseff. Stock markets have risen and the Brazilian real has strengthened, perhaps unreasonably, on the belief that any new government will be an improvement on the Rousseff administration’s disastrous economic record. But although the government is teetering, Rousseff’s removal is far from a done deal. The odds are still too close to call: a single revelation from the Lava Jato investigation could tip the balance at a moment’s notice. But the obstacles to removing Rousseff are significant enough to suggest that the crisis may still play out for some time, despite the tumult of the past few weeks: Legitimacy: As I noted last week, a central concern driving the calculations around Rousseff’s fate is “legitimacy.” Impeachment is more of a political process than a legal one, and the opposition is both divided and uncertain about how to proceed. The Workers’ Party has skillfully pushed a narrative about the conservatism of the media and the coup-mongering (golpismo) of the opposition parties (including Neves’ PSDB and the DEM, with its historical ties to the authoritarian regime). This narrative gives the opposition pause, and this hesitation has only been exacerbated by the ham-handed prosecutorial overreach by São Paulo state prosecutors last week, which allowed Lula to pose as the victim of a targeted onslaught, and led some Brazilians to question the legitimacy of the ongoing (and multiple) prosecutions of wrongdoing under the PT. Yesterday’s decision by Judge Sérgio Moro, presiding over the Lava Jato case, has generated controversy about potential judicial bias: the wiretap had been lifted by Moro several hours before the taped call, and although the conversation was suspect, it also suggested that the Lava Jato case has taken a more political turn. Meanwhile, none of the opposition has been particularly brave about leading the anti-Rousseff charge, except for Chamber President Eduardo Cunha, who is himself neck-deep in scandal and therefore not the best advocate for a procedurally legitimate impeachment. Street protests and the PMDB: Sunday’s protests sought to pressure Congress. In a secret vote on the impeachment process in December, Rousseff was able to garner 199 votes, only 28 more than she needs to block impeachment. The calculation is that the government has a hardcore bloc of about 125 supporters who are unlikely to switch sides, but the remainder are fair-weather friends, who may melt away if public disapproval is vehement enough. The PMDB is central to this calculus. Ominously, it has put off a decision about whether to support the government until April. But the protests may have less of an impact on changing the PMDB’s posture than many think. The Sunday protests remained a largely upper middle class phenomenon, heavily concentrated in the wealthy southern states, whose PMDB politicians were already largely in the pro-impeachment camp. Protesters reacted angrily to the presence of opposition politicians at Sunday’s march in São Paulo, forcing a hasty retreat by Aécio Neves and others, and suggesting that riding the political wave of impeachment may be fraught with peril. The events of recent weeks have exacerbated fissures within the PMDB: the Lava Jato investigation seems to be getting closer to many PMDB heavyweights, including Vice President Temer, which affects their ability to concentrate on organizing the party; and the PMDB is a fractious party of mutually jealous rivals, many of whom can be peeled away by a government willing to dispense goodies, such as the increasingly pressing renegotiation of state debts. This susceptibility to government pressure may be even more marked in the Senate, where governors’ concerns carry even greater weight, and may become more pronounced in coming months, now that Rousseff has hired a politically-savvy chief of staff. It is no coincidence that one of Lula’s first announced objectives is to begin a discussion of state debts. The path of removal: Rousseff has ruled out resignation, which leaves only two democratic avenues for removal. Impeachment is the most obvious, in part because it would be the most legitimate. Cunha intends to begin selection of the impeachment committee today. But a second path would be for the electoral court (TSE) to void the 2014 election, on the basis of campaign finance violations. Although Gilmar Mendes will soon become the president of the TSE, and he is not known for his love of the PT, TSE removal of the president would be an institutional innovation by a historically timid body. The TSE has traditionally turned a blind eye to almost all campaign finance violations, and over the past thirty years, it has removed only a handful of lower-level politicians for electoral wrongdoing. Furthermore, any TSE decision would likely be appealed up to the Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF), which would not necessarily agree with the TSE, and in any case, would string out the decision. The day after: Politicians deciding whether to support impeachment are also thinking about the day after. Already, there are allegations pending against every single politician in the line of presidential succession: Vice President Michel Temer, Chamber President Eduardo Cunha, and Senate President Renan Calheiros. Delcídio Amaral’s testimony even raises a cloud over the fourth in line, STF President Ricardo Lewandowski, as well Rousseff’s rival in the 2014 race, opposition leader Senator Aécio Neves. If the selection of a new president were thrown to the Congress—which it would be unless Temer survived or Rousseff and Temer were removed before the end of 2016—there are very few politicians who are both unsullied by allegations and simultaneously capable of pulling together the governing coalition needed to approve any meaningful reform that might jumpstart the moribund economy. Timing: The impeachment and Senate trial of Fernando Collor took seven months from start to finish. Next month, sitting politicians in both the Rousseff cabinet and the Congress will have to step down if they wish to run in October’s municipal elections. This is likely to lead to considerable turnover, muddying the impeachment calculus, and perhaps ensuring that any final decision comes in 2017, with only two years left in the Rousseff administration. Will it be worth the effort, especially if the justification for impeachment is weak, and the likelihood that the new government could turn things around is remote? Will it be worth the effort to join an impeachment drive driven forward by an unsavory Congress, only to replace Rousseff with an equally scandal-ridden Temer or Cunha administration? Justification: Impeachment is all about politics, and although the Lava Jato investigation seems to be marching inexorably toward the upper rungs of the political establishment, there is as yet no smoking gun against Rousseff that would tip the scales. There is evidence of massive campaign violations, confirmation of the kickbacks that helped convict Odebrecht, and allegations of government meddling in the courts. Yesterday’s wiretapped conversation with Lula also puts Rousseff in an unpalatable position, but the presidential palace has claimed that there was good justification for the conversation. Because of the legitimacy concerns noted above, none of these, as yet, seems sufficient to generate the momentum needed in the final push for impeachment, especially in the context of a rudderless, divided, and increasingly discredited opposition.

I had the pleasure yesterday morning of sharing the stage with Brian Winter, vice president of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas and editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly, to talk about Brazil for Foreign Affairs’ Brazil Economic Summit. We discussed the ongoing corruption probes, President Dilma Rousseff’s chances of survival, and the possibility and paths for recovery. You can watch our discussion here.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a federation of labor unions, played a crucial role in the struggle against apartheid. It provided much of the personnel that mobilized voters for the African National Congress (ANC) from the country‘s first “all-race” elections in 1994 up to now. COSATU, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the ANC form the coalition that governs the country. COSATU and SACP contest elections as part of the ANC. Conventional wisdom holds that the leadership of COSATU is increasingly distant from the laboring and unemployed masses, just as is President Jacob Zuma and the top ANC political leadership. (Unemployment in South Africa is variously estimated in the range of 25 to 50 percent, depending on the demographic.) The unions that make up COSATU are increasingly white-collar and based in the public sector, rather than blue-collar employees of private enterprises. By and large, the unions do not advocate low-wage, low skill policies that might reduce the very high levels of unemployment that drive poverty. COSATU is internally divided because of personal rivalries, but also over principle. The most salient division of the latter is between those in the federation that want closer ties to the ANC and SACP political leadership, and those who want to maintain greater distance. In general, those who favor distance want a more radical and aggressive labor movement. Here, as is often true elsewhere in South Africa, the SACP and the ANC political leadership are essentially conservative in outlook. Zwelinzima Vavi, a former General Secretary of COSATU who lost an internal power struggle and was fired in 2014, has announced that he will lead a “workers summit” in March, to be followed by the organization of a new federation in May that will rival COSATU. According to the media, current COSATU affiliates that are likely to join the new federation include the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA)--usually identified as the largest and richest trade union, the Food and Allied Workers Union, the South African Football Players Union, and the Public and Allied Workers Union of South Africa. Vavi is saying that the new labor federation will not be affiliated with any political party. However, there has been speculation that a new, “responsible” left-wing party based on trade unions such as NUMSA, will emerge before the national elections of 2019. It would challenge the ANC and also the Economic Freedom Fighters—a radical party that on occasion uses non-democratic methods, such as the disruption of the sitting of parliament. A new labor federation might generate such a “left-wing but responsible” political party. The emergence of two, rival labor federations at best will contribute to the general opening up of South African political life, so long dominated by the ANC and the politics of racial identity. However, it could also result in more labor militancy with consequences difficult to foretell.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 27, to March 4, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. <a href=’#’><img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https://public.tableau.com/static/images/NS/NSTWeeklyFeb227-Mar4/WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard/1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /></a>   February 27: Nigerian troops cleared a Boko Haram camp in Dikwa, Borno, killing thirty-seven insurgents. February 27: Unknown gunmen killed five and kidnapped one in Ahoada East, Rivers. February 29: Three female students were abducted from their school by gunmen in Lagos State. March 3: Ethnic clashes in Kosofe, Lagos resulted in the deaths of eight. March 4: Continued ethnic clashes in Kosofe, Lagos resulted in the deaths of an additional four people. March 4: Nigerian soldiers repelled a Boko Haram attack in Bama, Borno, killing five insurgents. March 4: Nigerian troops attacked Boko Haram camps in the Alagarno Forest in Borno, killing five insurgents.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 20, to February 26, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. <a href=’#’><img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https:&#47;&#47;public.tableau.com&#47;static&#47;images&#47;NS&#47;NSTWeeklyFeb220-26&#47;WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard&#47;1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /></a>   February 22-25: Over the course of four days, sectarian violence led to the deaths of three hundred in Agatu, Benue. February 22: Unknown gunmen killed seven in Birnin Kebbi, Kebbi. February 23: Nigerian soldiers clashed with followers of ex-militant leader Solomon Ndigbara in Gokana, Rivers. Two soldiers, two militants, and one civilian died. February 23: Pirates attacked a vessel off the coast of Brass, Bayelsa, kidnapping two sailors. February 23: Six were killed in a gang war in Ibadan, Oyo. February 24: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack on Dikwa, Borno, killing twenty-six militants and losing one soldier and one member of the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF). February 26: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of four in Ibi, Taraba. February 26: Cameroonian and Nigerian soldiers killed ninety-two Boko Haram insurgents in Bama, Borno. Two Cameroonian soldiers were also killed.

The African National Congress (ANC) is a big tent. Politically, under that tent is the Congress of South African trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Both run candidates for office as ANC, not under their own label. The Secretary General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe, is also a former chairperson of the SACP. The relationship between the ANC and the South African state can be ambiguous. Some within the ANC see the two as essentially coterminous, as was the case with the Communist party and the former Soviet Union. Others, however, see the two as separate, just as governing parties in other democracies are separate entities, and a ruling party of today can be the opposition tomorrow should the electorate so choose. Especially among the opposition parties, civil organizations, and the non-ANC media there has long been concern that South Africa is too much governed from Luthuli House, the ANC party headquarters in Johannesburg, rather than the administrative seat of government, Union Buildings, in Pretoria. Yesterday’s blog post discussed Mantashe’s accusation that the U.S. embassy in Pretoria was engaged in trying to bring about “regime change” through exchange programs and the highly effective response by the U.S. ambassador using humor and sarcasm. To no surprise, the Environmental Affairs Minister Edna Molewa said on February 23 that the ANC was not happy with the ambassador’s response to Mantashe. She said that if the situation had been reversed, “I would go to the Luthuli House of the U.S. and have a discussion. As the ANC leadership we are going to do that. We are going to have engagement to clarify these things. It will still happen, but at the right time.” (There is, of course, no American equivalent of Luthuli House.) As her reference to Luthuli House indicated, she went on to say that the Mantashe episode is a ruling party issue – not the governments. She went on to say that from the government’s perspective, “our relations with the U.S. are going well.” At least two other ministers have also pointed out Mantashe’s accusation had come from the ANC, not the government. The telecommunications minister characterized Pretoria’s relations with Washington as “very cordial.” The Zuma government appears to be distancing itself from Mantashe’s ludicrous accusations while not alienating elements within its ruling coalition. More broadly, this episode may indicate that as the ANC weakens, so too may Luthuli House.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 13, to February 19, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. &amp;amp;lt;a href=’#’&amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;lt;img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https:&amp;amp;amp;#47;&amp;amp;amp;#47;public.tableau.com&amp;amp;amp;#47;static&amp;amp;amp;#47;images&amp;amp;amp;#47;NS&amp;amp;amp;#47;NSTWeeklyFeb213-19&amp;amp;amp;#47;WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard&amp;amp;amp;#47;1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /&amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;lt;/a&amp;amp;gt;   February 11-14: Over the course of four days, Nigerian and Cameroonian troops killed 162 Boko Haram insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. Two Cameroonian soldiers were also killed. February 13: Nigerian troops killed "many" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. February 13: Boko Haram killed twenty-two in Biu, Borno. February 15: Boko Haram killed six in Madagali, Adamawa. February 16: Electoral violence led to the deaths of three in Ondo, Benue. February 16: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of two in Bassa, Plateau. February 16: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram insurgents in Mafa and Dikwa, Borno. February 16: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram insurgents in Biu, Borno. February 17: Nigerian troops killed "a number" (estimated at ten) of Boko Haram insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. February 19: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and twenty-two others in Meme, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected.

In a thoughtful article, the Wall Street Journal notes parallels about popular concern that refugees mask terrorists in Europe, the United States, and Cameroon. U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump and many governors and local officials have objected to the resettlement in the United States of Syrian refugees on the grounds that they have not been adequately screened for terrorists. In Europe, there is widespread fear of attacks by self-proclaimed Islamic State  fighters posing as refugees. In Cameroon, there has been a significant inflow of Nigerians fleeing Boko Haram. According to the Wall Street Journal, there have been more than forty Boko Haram suicide attacks over the past nine months in Cameroon. Many of the Boko Haram suicide bombers have been women, and there is fear that Nigerian women in Cameroon could use the refugee flow as a disguise. It is impossible to know how many Nigerians have fled to Cameroon.There is a large refugee camp, Minawao, which holds some 53,000 people, and is growing. As is the case with Kenyan refugee camps housing Somalis, Cameroonian officials are concerned that Minawao is becoming a security risk, even a Boko Haram base. The camp is unfenced and residents come and go freely, particularly at night. The Wall Street Journal  article also reports that Cameroonian officials gather Nigerians who are not registered, and then deports them to safer parts of Nigeria. There, no longer legally refugees, they become part of the population of two or three million internally displaced Nigerians.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 6, to February 12, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. &amp;lt;a href=’#’&amp;gt;&amp;lt;img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https:&amp;amp;#47;&amp;amp;#47;public.tableau.com&amp;amp;#47;static&amp;amp;#47;images&amp;amp;#47;NS&amp;amp;#47;NSTWeeklyFeb6-12&amp;amp;#47;WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard&amp;amp;#47;1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;   February 6: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of fifty in Maru, Zamfara. February 6: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of twelve in Buruku, Benue. February 9: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and fifty-eight others in Dikwa, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. February 10: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and eight others in Nguetchewe, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. February 10: Nigerian troops killed "some" Boko Haram insurgents (estimated at ten) in Kaga, Borno. February 11: Cameroonian soldiers killed twenty-seven Boko Haram insurgents and lost two of their own in Gwoza, Borno. February 11: Boko Haram killed four in Konduga, Borno.

This post was coauthored with Brad Glosserman, executive director at Pacific Forum CSIS. The cycle of negativity surrounding Japan-South Korea relations since the Abe-Park era began in early 2013 has at times eclipsed North Korea as a source of angst among observers of Northeast Asia. Even the modest improvements that accompanied commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic normalization in June 2015 were tinged by frustration over the two governments’ failure to move forward on the comfort woman issue. The main problem involved the acknowledgement of Japanese responsibility for the coercion of girls and women to provide sexual services to the military in imperial Japan, and this disagreement spilled over into other issues in the two countries’ relationship. It was especially surprising, then, that Abe Shinzo and Park Geun-hye cut a deal on December 28 to resolve the comfort woman issue. The agreement reached followed more than a dozen rounds of consultations between the two governments, a process that unfolded under intense media scrutiny and ever-growing suspicion of the other side’s intentions. President Park made resolution of the issue a condition of “re-normalization” of relations with Japan, while Prime Minister Abe and many of his supporters appeared increasingly frustrated and fatigued by the inability of the two sides to move past this and other historical issues. In his statement regarding the comfort women agreement—one of two released simultaneously by the foreign ministers on both sides—Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio said that Abe, as the “cabinet prime minister of Japan,” extended his “heartfelt apologies and remorse to all those who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.” He acknowledged that “the honor and dignity of many women were severely injured with the involvement of the Japanese military” and that, “[f]rom this perspective, the Japanese government fully realizes responsibility.” Japan will provide 1 billion yen (approximately $8.3 million) from the government budget to fully finance a foundation, run by the Korean government, to support the comfort women. The two countries agreed that the settlement is “final and irreversible” as an issue between the two governments as long as Japan faithfully follows through with its promise, and the two governments agreed to refrain from criticizing each other over the issue in the international community, including at the United Nations. South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se also said the settlement is final and irreversible as long as Japan keeps its promises. As part of the deal, the South Korean government “acknowledged the Japanese government’s concerns” over a statue erected in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul that honors the comfort women. The commitments by both leaders are to be commended as acts of political leadership and statesmanship of the sort that we called for last year in our book, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash. Abe, a man widely believed to harbor personal doubts about the validity of the comfort women claim, who insisted that all legal claims were settled in the 1965 agreement to normalize relations between the two counties, and who repeatedly said that Japan (and the world) should look forward rather than back, plainly acknowledged Japanese responsibility, and opened the Japanese purse to assuage some of the pain. Park is also brave in her pursuit of justice and finality between governments and to seek support of the Korean public for a solution to difficult issues that, in the personal view of many victims, can never be forgiven. A Korean Realmeter poll taken following the agreement showed that the deal was initially opposed by 51 percent of Koreans and supported by 43 percent, while Japanese polls such as a mid-January Asahi poll have shown strong support (63 percent supporting and 19 percent opposing) for the settlement in Japan. Divided Korean public opinion over the agreement places great pressure on both Japanese and Korean governments to move forward with implementation if the agreement is to be sustainable. In fact, the Park administration needs to show tangible progress on implementation to keep the issue from becoming a political football during upcoming National Assembly elections. Ironically, the Park administration will only be successful in winning public support for the deal if it receives support and cooperation from the government of Japan in two critical aspects. First, Tokyo must quickly fund the foundation as a first step. Ideally, the government of Japan would take initial steps to allocate funding for the Korean-operated foundation prior to the April Korean National Assembly elections so as to prevent the agreement from becoming a political football in that campaign. Second, the Abe administration must marginalize voices within Japan who, for their own reasons, seek to prevent the agreement from moving forward. A critical step is a zero-tolerance policy among Japanese Cabinet members and top party and government officials toward statements or acts that challenge this agreement. Yes, Japan is a democracy, and there is freedom of speech and religion, but Prime Minister Abe (and his successors) should demand full and complete compliance by anyone who accepts a senior post in his party or government. Tokyo appears to be taking this line. When conservative lawmaker Sakurada Yoshitaka, a member of the ruling LDP, said earlier in January that the comfort women “were prostitutes by occupation” and that people have been “heavily misled by propaganda work treating them as if they were victims,” he was forced to apologize for and retract the remarks. Japan could even go further by acknowledging that the comfort women statue is a valid tribute that memorializes the experience of the victims rather than merely demanding its removal. Ultimately, any evidence of foot-dragging or backsliding by the Abe administration in moving forward will only motivate those who are opposed to the agreement. In this respect, there are two immediate challenges. The first is the comfort women statue. Constructed by civil society groups, the Seoul government has limited leverage to deal with it. The statue could be forcibly removed, but the justification, legal or otherwise, would be thin. Despite the split in Korean reactions to the agreement, polls show strong public support for keeping the statue in its current location. Support will remain high unless Japan provides the Korean government with funds to establish the foundation. Any effort within Japan to reverse the sequence of actions implied in the agreement would likely to be fatal to it. Ultimately, success in dealing with the statue will depend on the second challenge—winning support for the agreement from the comfort women. This task has been made even more difficult by the way the deal was concluded. Understandably, negotiations were conducted in secret. But in doing so, the most important constituency, the comfort women themselves, was blindsided by the announcement of the agreement. They had no input into the process and have complained about being victimized once again. The challenge of outreach to the comfort women has been made worse by the fact that South Korea’s Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs was the primary point of contact for the comfort women within the government, but was not included in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Blue House-led negotiations with Japan. The Park administration must do its best to win over the comfort women while building broad public support for reconciliation with Japan. The best way to do this would be for those women to be deeply engaged in the process of establishing the new foundation; it must be seen as theirs, rather than an instrument of the Korean government. In reality, there is a limit to what governments can do, since confession and repentance, as matters of the human heart, cannot be resolved irreversibly or with finality by governments. Scott Snyder and Brad Glosserman are coauthors of The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States. This article has been abridged from a longer analysis published in The Diplomat. The views presented in this piece are their own and do not represent those of the institutions with which they are affiliated.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 23, to January 29, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. <a href=’#’><img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https:&#47;&#47;public.tableau.com&#47;static&#47;images&#47;NS&#47;NSTWeeklyJan23-29&#47;WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard&#47;1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /></a>   January 24: Boko Haram killed one in Tarmuwa, Yobe. January 24: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of thirty in Grie, Adamawa. January 25: Four Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and thirty-one others in Bodo, Cameroon. January 25: Cameroonian troops hunting Boko Haram insurgents killed forty civilians in Gwoza, Borno. January 27: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and fourteen others in Chibok, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. January 27: Police killed five civilians during a clash in Ifedore, Ondo. January 28: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and four others in Kerawa, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. January 29: One suicide bomber killed themselves and seventeen others in Gombi, Adamawa.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from to January 16, to January 22, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   January 18: A suicide bomber killed himself and four others at a mosque in Nguetchewe, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. January 18: Nigerian troops killed ten Boko Haram insurgents in Marte, Borno. January 18: Police killed eight pro-Biafra protestors in Aba, Abia. January 18: Unknown gunmen kidnapped twelve in Nembe, Bayelsa. January 20: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram insurgents in Damboa, Borno. January 20: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram insurgents in Marte, Borno. January 20: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack, killing three insurgents in Biu, Borno. January 21: Nigerian troops killed eight Boko Haram insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. January 21: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram insurgents in Dikwa, Borno. January 21: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram insurgents in Askira/Uba, Borno. January 22: Nigerian troops killed ten Boko Haram insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. January 22: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and a third was shot in Maiduguri, Borno.