Corruption

Anti-government protests could mean humanitarian crisis in Haiti, a country with a long history of instability.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury has formally sanctioned on October 10 members of the Gupta family and associates, who are members of a “significant corruption network in South Africa.” Under the sanction, all Gupta property in the United States is blocked and must be reported to OFAC. All transactions by “U.S. persons” with the Guptas are blocked. In effect, the Guptas are barred from U.S. financial markets—presumably the aspect that will sting them the most. The sanctions are part of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2017. The Gupta brothers—Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh—moved from India to South Africa in 1993. They are credibly accused of massive corruption involving public funds and public office, and the family is now counted as among the richest in South Africa. Ajay is usually regarded as the leader. Their companies are centered on mining and media, and Oakbay Investments, a holding company, is their best known enterprise. They were closely associated with former South Africa President Jacob Zuma, himself now facing trial for corruption. Among other things, one of Zuma’s sons worked for the Guptas. The influence, even control, exercised by the Gupta family over Zuma’s administration was commonly described in South Africa as “state capture.” First under investigation and subsequently facing trial, the Gupta brothers have apparently fled South Africa for Dubai.  The flight of the Guptas and OFAC’s move against them probably strengthens the hand of South Africa's current president, Cyril Ramaphosa. Within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), Ramaphosa is still fighting a rear guard action by Jacob Zuma and his allies as he seeks to implement anti-corruption and other economic reforms. Zuma has remained a powerful political figure, especially among the rural poor and among his fellow Zulus, who constitute approximately a quarter of South Africa’s population.  In a conference call that included reporters, Sigal Mandelker, the under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the U.S. Treasury, acknowledge the role played by South African civil society in the struggle against corruption: “We commend the extraordinary work by South Africa’s civil society activists, investigative journalists, and whistleblowers who have exposed the breadth and depth of the Gupta family’s corruption.” Cooperation between the United States and South Africa against corruption may have a positive spillover to other aspects of the bilateral relationship, which has not been close.  

President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria, on a number of occasions, has stated that Boko Haram is “technically defeated.” The Council’s Nigeria Security Tracker indicates otherwise, and on September 14, the New York Times published an extensive story on the resurgence of Boko Haram. It was accompanied by three pictures on a back page, including one of a child’s scar from an injury sustained during a suicide bombing. While most of the story will be familiar to Nigeria-watchers, there are details that may be new. The greater significance of the story, however, is its placement: the story starts on the front page above the fold. This is where the Times tends to publish what it regards as its most significant stories. The Times and the Washington Post make up the print media most widely read among policymakers. Hence the prominent placement of the story is likely both a cause and effect of the reemerging profile of Nigeria and Boko Haram. According to the Times story, Boko Haram militants now control four of ten zones in northern Borno state, near Lake Chad. They are well armed following raids on military facilities, and now employ the use of sophisticated drones. The military is increasingly on the defensive, holing up in heavily fortified “super camps.” Recalling similar reports during the Jonathan administration, soldier morale is low. They face daily attacks, lack ammunition and medical care, and are seemingly neglected by their superiors. Corruption, of course, likely plays a role. The Buhari government allocates $80 million per quarter for the struggle against Boko Haram, but it is unclear where the money goes.  The Times story, citing an NGO source, also reports on the operation of markets, courts, and health facilities in the territories Boko Haram occupies. It cites a Nigerian vigilante as saying that there are Boko Haram camps within five miles of the Borno provincial capital of Maiduguri, a city with a nominal population of at least a million, though the actual number is likely higher because of the influx into the city of internally displaced persons. But, Maiduguri has a university, an airport, and other attributes of a large African city. The Times notes that there are factions within Boko Haram. That of Abubakar Shekau, referred to colloquially as either Boko Haram or Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), the group's original name, is probably the best known among non-specialists because he orchestrated the Chibok School Girl kidnapping. Another faction, likely similar in size, is the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), reborn out of the split in the group in 2016. It has links to the Islamic State, but among Nigeria watchers there is little consensus as to the significance of those links. Following the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014, international media attention rallied around the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. A ransom was placed on Shekau's head that was greater than that of the leader of the Afghan Taliban, and Western states offered greater military and logistical support for the Nigerian military, particularly in locating the girls. Attention, perhaps understandably, has waned. Some of the girls were released and it appeared that the military had pushed Boko Haram back into the bush. But about one hundred Chibok girls—so say nothing of thousands of other kidnapped girls and boys—are held captive, and the group's at least two factions are again occupying territory. It may appear then, that Boko Haram has reemerged; for the people of the Lake Chad Basin, in fact, they never really went away.

Robert Mugabe, who ruled over Zimbabwe for 37 years, died on September 6. His was an undeniably epic life of glaring contradictions. He was a passionate voice for the liberation of the Zimbabwean people from the injustice and humiliation of white minority rule, but a brutal oppressor when those same people sought to exercise political freedom. For a time he helped to build a widely admired national education system, empowering citizens intellectually but then punishing those who used their intellect to challenge his dominance or question his decisions. He was a fierce nationalist and advocate of “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans” who died in far-off Singapore, having long eschewed the inadequate medical resources of his country’s hollowed-out health system and adopted the elite practice of seeking medical care abroad. He helped to create a state that he then destroyed, and a system that ultimately destroyed him. Finally, he was the indispensable man who became an irrelevance. Once sure that his dominance and the country of Zimbabwe were inextricably linked, his death is of little consequence to that country today. When military officers and leaders in the ruling party ousted Mugabe in 2017, the system of repressive governance that protects a small circle of elites overran its foremost founder, casting him aside in its own interests. Today, the system persists. Opponents of the ruling party are harassed, tortured, and sometimes killed.  For many Zimbabweans, there is little relief in sight from grinding poverty and shrinking opportunities as a consequence of economic mismanagement intended to protect the connected few. The state-dominated media publishes outright falsehoods and wild accusations, often with the aim of instilling widespread fear.  This toxic system is Mugabe’s enduring legacy.

At the end of May, new rules were introduced, to take effect on June 11, that would have severely limited the press’s access to the National Assembly. According to the Nigerian Guild of Editors, the rules are “primitive, undemocratic, and blatantly anti-press and anti-people.” Under the new rules, to cover the National Assembly, a media outlet would be required to have a daily circulation of forty thousand copies or five thousand daily views online. Among other requirements, journalists must also show two years of experience in covering the National Assembly, and be members of the journalists’ union. Commentators had suggested that if the rules had gone into effect, the beneficiaries would be government-owned media because they are larger in readership and are more likely to meet other requirements.  There is speculation that the clerk of the National Assembly, Alhaji Mohammed Sani-Omolori, was behind the new rules. Sani-Omolori is by profession a lawyer and a member of the Royal Family of the Ohinoyi of Ebiraland. He was allegedly angry at media reporting of his six-hour grilling by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), published in mid-May. The EFCC had also seized his passport, and was apparently investigating the way the presiding officers of the National Assembly were elected. That the rules came shortly after the story went public could indicate a connection. Happily, the proposed rules seem to have been withdrawn, however coverage of the swearing-in of members of the National Assembly will still be unusually restricted. Journalists still face an uphill battle. According to Freedom House’s press freedom reports, press freedom has been at the lower end of the “partly free” category since 2002, when Freedom House issued its first grade of Nigeria.  Retaliation against and intimidation of journalists are not uncommon. In Port Harcourt, it has been reported that a journalist was beaten by members of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad for reporting on their alleged beatings of civilians. At the beginning of 2019, members of the military raided the offices of one of Nigeria’s largest circulation newspapers, apparently following coverage of setbacks in the fight against Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa. It was not clear if the raid was ordered by President Muhammadu Buhari, though he did order the security services to vacate the various offices they had occupied.

This is a guest blog post by Anthony Carroll. Anthony is founding director of Acorus Capital, a private equity fund investing in Africa, and a vice president of Manchester Trade Limited, an international business advisory firm. He has over forty years of experience working with Africa and is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Last week, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced on national television the selection of South Africa’s new cabinet. This announcement quickly followed his inauguration to become president after Ramaphosa’s African National Congress (ANC) secured 57.5 percent of the vote in the national elections of May 8, the fifth since the end of Apartheid in 1994. Since the elections there had been much speculation as to the size and content of President Ramaphosa’s cabinet. During his predecessor Jacob Zuma’s presidency, cabinet members were often chosen on the basis of their closeness to Zuma and were his praise singers within the ANC. Also, with thirty-six departments, each with a minister and deputy ministers, there was jurisdictional overlap which detracted attention from substantive tasks and the departments often served as their own magnets for corruption. In order to create more coherence, President Ramaphosa reduced the number of cabinet ministers to twenty-eight. The selection process was a delicate one involving ANC party leadership and Ramaphosa’s executive team, with certain concessions having to be made to the ANC’s old guard, including some Zuma acolytes. However, Ramaphosa’s choices were largely merit-based, broadly representative (50 percent are women) and in harmony with his “New Dawn” initiative of expanding economic opportunity for all South Africans through economic growth rather than redistribution. This is a cabinet in his own likeness and being! It should be noted that the cabinet of President Mbeki also was filled with competent executives who were able to achieve the highest economic growth rates and job creation in the past twenty-five years. The Zuma presidency was a costly detour. Although there was no surprise to see the names of such competent officials as Pravin Gordhan, Ephraim Patel, Naledi Pandor, Lindiwe Sisulu, and Tito Mboweni, Ramaphosa’s selection of Patricia de Lille as minister of public works and enterprises really “put the cat among the pigeons.” De Lille won high marks as an anti-apartheid activist in the Western Cape as a leader of the strident Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). She later departed the PAC and formed the Independent Democrats and eventually merged that into the Democratic Alliance. She was elected mayor of Cape Town in 2011 where she gained high marks for her courage and executive leadership. She was a tireless critic of President Mbeki’s HIV/AIDS denialism and the massive corruption of the Zuma presidency. Despite being the most popular politician in the Western Cape, she was pummeled by DA leadership over allegations of favoritism and inflexibility. After a long but successful battle to clear her name, last year she resigned as mayor, quit the DA party and formed GOOD, a new political party that received 3 percent of the Western Cape provincial vote in the May elections.  De Lille’s selection has many promising aspects. First, she is fearless and has little tolerance for incompetence or corruption. Second, she has executive experience that she will bring to bear in addressing the acute needs for infrastructure development in South Africa. These needs include modernizing ports, airports, roads, and rails to improve South Africa’s ability to grow its economy and in so doing deftly navigate the pitfalls inherent in the country’s federal system. She can also address the woeful status of local and provincial governments to provide the most basic of infrastructure for its citizenry. For example, she could tackle the problem of housing shortages in South Africa’s burgeoning cities and in so doing ameliorate some of the polemics around land redistribution, the “Third Rail” of South African politics.  Last, her appointment provides an opportunity for the U.S. to pivot and develop a more coherent and fulsome political and economic relationship with South Africa. The passage of the BUILD Act will see the creation of a new development finance agency by the US government with $60 billion to finance projects that benefit both the U.S. and South African private sectors. Indeed, South Africa’s sophisticated banking and financial services institutions could provide a solid basis to explore opportunities for financial leveraging that could create mutual benefits. Let’s get the ball rolling.

Part of the basis of Muhammadu Buhari’s street popularity is his modest style of living, at least compared to other members of Nigeria’s elite. As is required by law, in May 2019, President Buhari submitted his asset declaration to the Code of Conduct Bureau. According to Garba Shehu, senior special assistant to the president on media and publicity, there was no significant change in President Buhari’s assets since he last submitted a declaration following his 2015 election as president. This is credible. In 2015, the president’s listed assets consisted of “farms;” five homes and two mud houses; an orchard and a ranch with 270 cows, as well as 25 sheep, 5 horses, and a variety of birds; shares in three firms; plots of land in Port Harcourt and Kano; two cars; and $150,000 in a personal bank account. By contrast, Buhari’s vice president, Yemi Osinbajo, said that he had $1.4 million in his bank account at this time. In a country in which about half of the population lives in extreme poverty, Buhari is well off. His principle private residence in Kaduna is masonry of a size and finish appropriate for a retired army general with no business dealings on the side. Nevertheless, the government’s purchase of an official automobile costing an estimated $170,000 is a reminder of the perks of office.  But, compared to most of Nigeria’s elites, his personal fortune is very modest. Many former presidents and presidential aspirants have wealth in the tens of millions of U.S. dollars, and Nigerians routinely believe that holders of public office exploit their positions to enrich themselves. Buhari has so far largely avoided serious accusations of personal corruption, and his personal anti-corruption credentials remain strong. Political corruption scandals are a dime a dozen in Nigeria, and corruption remains deeply rooted in both the public and private sectors. But if the president is leading by example, media reports indicate that few are following.

Under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, the African National Congress (ANC) improved its performance in the 2019 national elections. The ANC won about 58 percent of the vote, up from 54 percent in the local government elections of 2016, though still a decline from the 62 percent in won in 2014 national elections. It lost seats, but it seems to have, for now, arrested the Zuma-era decline.  By the beginning of 2018, the ANC had removed from office the scandal-plagued Jacob Zuma as ANC party leader and president. The party then elected Ramaphosa, who had orchestrated Zuma’s departure, as its leader and as South Africa’s president. He launched a reform program, “New Dawn,” that promised the renewal of the party, an emphasis on party unity, an end to corruption, and national economic policy designed to address the poverty of the black majority through accelerated economic growth. “New Dawn” was the ANC’s campaign theme in the national elections, though Ramaphosa faced push-back from the still powerful party forces aligned with Zuma. In democratic South Africa, elections matter, and Ramaphosa’s success has consequences. It has led to a realignment within the party in Ramaphosa’s favor. A party instrument, the Integrity Commission (IC), is charged with vetting candidates on the ANC’s electoral lists as to their moral and overall suitability for office. Frequently criticized as “toothless,” nevertheless the IC has accused Deputy President David Mabuza and others associated with Zuma as having “prejudiced the integrity of the ANC.” Accordingly, Mabuza and others so accused have declined to be sworn-in as MP’s until they are able to answer the accusations. Observers had expected that Ramaphosa would reappoint Mabuza as deputy president for the sake of party unity and also following the adage of “keep your friends close and your enemies closer.” He could still do so—the president may appoint up to two ministers, including the deputy president, from outside parliament—though he is more likely to take the opportunity to appoint a different personality less compromised by allegations of corruption. One possibility is Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who narrowly lost a vote for party leader after Zuma, her ex-husband, was pushed out. While she is usually counted in the Zuma camp, she is a formidable politician in her own right, and the ANC emphasizes the importance of gender equality. For Ramaphosa, as deputy president she, too, would fit the adage of “keep your enemies closer.”  The bottom line of this political maneuvering is that Ramaphosa’s hand within the party has been strengthened by the election results, granting him greater freedom to pursue his agenda. We can expect him to continue to renew the ANC and begin to address South Africa’s social and economic problems that were exacerbated by the disastrous nine-year tenure of Jacob Zuma. The Zuma faction is still formidable, but for friends of South Africa, this is good news.

In 2015, Muhammadu Buhari defeated incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan. Buhari ran on two major issues: improving the deteriorating security situation associated with the Islamist insurrection Boko Haram and cleaning up government corruption. In 2019, President Buhari was re-elected, again on an anti-corruption ticket.  Jonathan and his former oil minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke, have long been thought “on the street” to be implicated in the theft of oil revenue. While their associates have had assets seized and are under investigation by British and U.S. authorities, up to now, neither has been charged. But in a court case in London involving international oil companies and the oil block designated OPL 245—thought to be one of the largest untapped reserves in Africa—lawyers for the Nigerian government accused Jonathan and Alison-Madueke with plotting to “receive bribes and make a secret profit.” According to the court filing, “the receipt of those bribes and the participation in the scheme of said officials was in breach of their fiduciary duties and Nigerian criminal law.” The oil block has been at the center of controversy since 1998, when, it is claimed, the oil minister at the time, Dan Etete, essentially awarded it to himself. It has since pulled Royal Dutch Shell and Eni into its orbit, both of which are the subject of an Italian investigation.  All parties are refusing to comment or are denying any wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that Nigerian government lawyers would charge Jonathan and Alison-Madueke with receiving bribes without clearance of some sort from the Buhari presidency. Now re-elected, President Buhari may be emboldened to move against the “big fish” of corruption.

The African National Congress (ANC) has governed South Africa since the end of apartheid and the transition to “non-racial” democracy in 1994. It has won more than 60 percent of vote in every national election since, though its share of the vote has been steadily declining. In a country fractured by race in which blacks—about 80 percent of the population—are much poorer than whites—about 9 percent—race is the largest factor in voting behavior. The ANC is now the black political party, despite its multiracial origins. The formal opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), is white in origin but is seeking to build multiracial support. The third major party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), calls for expropriation of white property without compensation. It is entirely a black party. South Africa’s other racial minorities, specifically coloureds (who regard themselves as a separate race, not a mixed race) and those of South and East Asian origin, tend to support the DA or one of the many minor parties.  During the 2009–2018 presidency of Jacob Zuma, the ANC became increasingly corrupt. Service delivery to the poor declined, and economic growth slowed to all but a standstill. Disillusioned blacks by and large did not vote for other parties. Rather, they did not vote at all. Then Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and reformers within the party finally managed to dislodge Zuma from the party leadership in 2017 and from the presidency soon after in 2018. However, Zuma and his “populist” wing of the party continues to control significant amounts of patronage and enjoys substantial support among the rural poor. The Zuma faction occupies a significant number of the higher places on the ANC electoral list, and it continues to control important aspects of the party’s machinery. This faction has successfully thwarted many of Ramaphosa’s intended reforms.  Among ANC voters, the May election is something of a referendum on Ramaphosa and his reforms. Bandied about are a number of possible scenarios. One, favored by Ramaphosa’s allies, is that if the ANC’s electoral decline is reversed and it increases its share of the vote, his hand will be strengthened against the Zuma faction. Another is that if the ANC loses electoral support, the Zuma faction will be weakened and Ramaphosa will be freer to proceed against it. Still others argue, however, that if the ANC share of the vote declines too much, the knives will be out for Ramaphosa within the party, and he could be replaced by a “populist” of the Zuma stamp. The magic number appears to be 60 percent. If the ANC’s vote share does not fall below that level, the ANC under Ramaphosa’s leadership would seem to be vindicated. If it does, the ANC will have suffered a significant defeat, and the consequences for Ramaphosa could be difficult. However, few observers now expect the ANC’s share of the vote to fall below 60 percent, and the expectation is that the ANC will form the next government; the majority of black voters will not desert the black political party associated with Nelson Mandela and the end of apartheid. However, should it fall below 50 percent, then South Africa would experience coalition government for the first time. The DA would be the likely leader of such a coalition, which would also include minor parties. While possible, that scenario remains unlikely. Nevertheless, the ANC could face black swans, chief among them a precipitous drop in black voter turnout and greater-than-anticipated popular anger at ANC corruption, from which Ramaphosa is not immune. Ramaphosa, as deputy president under Zuma, must have known about the rampant corruption, even if he was not complicit in it.  South Africa’s constitution provides for proportional representation. Voters vote for a party, not a candidate. Each party rank-orders candidates of its list. When the ANC won 62 percent of the vote in the 2015 national elections, the top 249 candidates on its party list—62 percent of 400 total seats—received a seat in the national assembly. Outside experts rate the quality of South Africa’s elections as about the same as those in the United States and Japan. Because the voters choose a party, not a candidate, should a member of parliament leave the party on whose list he was placed, he must resign his seat. Hence, it is unlikely that the ANC would split once elections are completed.

Globa1 Witness, a non-profit corruption watchdog, is reporting that the daughter of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, president of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), purchased an apartment for $7 million in a Donald Trump-developed building in New York. Global Witness and a Lisbon newspaper have traced ownership of the apartment to a shell company owned by Claudia Sassou-Nguesso and involving a money trail including Republic of the Congo contracts awarded to a Brazilian company to a shell company in Cyprus to the purchase of the apartment. An author of the Global Witness report is calling on the Department of Justice to seize the apartment because it was purchased with embezzled money. Separately, the French government is actively investigating Sassou-Nguesso for corruption and has identified 60 million euros of various types of property that the family has acquired in France. Because of the association of the New York apartment building with President Donald Trump’s company and the involvement of the daughter of the president of the Republic of the Congo, the Global Witness story is attracting mainstream media coverage; it has been featured on the first page of the business section of the New York Times. However, the Trump Organization, apparently, had nothing to do with the sale of the apartment to Claudia Sassou-Nguesso. The shell-company purchaser acquired the unit from a third party.  The use of expensive real estate in the developed world for money laundering by the elite in the developing world is an old song. In New York and London, the practice is extensive enough to distort the real estate market in certain neighborhoods. Money-laundering elites create a market for houses and apartments costing tens of millions of dollars; absent such a market, developers might build housing in a different price range. In New York and London, in areas where such mega-million dollar residential properties are concentrated, owners typically will be in residence only a few days or weeks a year, if at all. Otherwise, the units sit empty. Empty units mean, among other things, lack of customers for the numerous small enterprises that a residential neighborhood would otherwise support.  Of course it is odious when these elites, usually from countries that are among the world’s poorest, spend huge amounts of laundered money stolen from the public on residential units in two or three of the world’s most expensive cities. Municipal authorities in New York and London are considering measures to control, even reduce, the construction of these pied-à-terres. The U.S. Treasury Department is now requiring title companies to report on all-cash purchases of high-end real estate in certain New York and Miami neighborhoods. Once corruption goes international, certain laws in sought-after destinations can allow foreign governments to play a positive role. In July 2017, the FBI announced that it would seek the forfeiture and recovery of some $144 million, the proceeds of Nigerian corruption allegedly laundered in and through the United States. In June 2018, Nigeria reached an agreement with a number of countries, including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, for the repatriation of $500 million in looted public funds. Prior to that, over $300 million was agreed to be returned from Switzerland. Much of this wealth was connected to the late Sani Abacha, Nigeria’s former military chief of state. Elite money laundering is an aspect of the pervasive problem of failed leadership and lack of accountability to be found in various parts of the developing world. It is an aspect of the alienation of many elites from the people that they ostensibly lead. 

On February 7,  the Federal High Court in Lagos issued a warrant for the arrest of Ayodele Oke, former director general of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and his wife Folasade following an application by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Just before they were due to appear in court, they apparently left the country for "medical treatment," and the Nigeria media is not reporting where they are now. The EFCC has declared the couple wanted after their failure to respond to a court summons.  They are charged with the theft and laundering of staggering amounts of public money. One of the EFCC charges relates to roughly $43 million, £28 thousand, and ₦23 million—all in cash—that the EFCC found in their apartment in Lagos in 2017 following a raid. Another charge relates to $160 million that the couple allegedly diverted from the Nigerian federal government for their own use.  In 2017, Oke was suspended as director general of the NIA. Vice president Yemi Osinbaijo headed a committee that investigated the incident and recommended to President Buhari that the director general be removed.  Oke is a member of Nigeria’s political class. He studied at Emory University in Atlanta, became a career diplomat, and served as Nigeria’s ambassador to the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations in London. He was appointed director general of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) by then-President Goodluck Jonathan in 2013. The Nigerian NIA is roughly analogous to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States.  President Buhari has made the fight against corruption his signature policy, though critics have accused him of using it as a tool to go after his political enemies. Some media have said that Oke was “close to” Buhari and viewed how the case was handled as important to the president’s anti-corruption bona fides. However, at least in the media, there is little or no evidence of any such close relationship. At the very least, this episode is illustrative of the magnitude of corruption in parts of the upper reaches of Nigerian government.

South Africa’s national elections will take place on May 8. Looking toward that event, the African national Congress (ANC) and its leader, state president Cyril Ramaphosa, is working to improve the party’s image, much besmirched by corruption and mafia-style assassinations. In March, a major power broker of the African National Congress (ANC) in Kwazulu-Natal, Mluleki Ndobe, was arrested for the murder of a rival ANC politician and whistleblower. The deceased, Sindiso Magaqa, had spoken out against public corruption in KwaZulu-Natal. Before he was eventually killed in July 2017, two of those who had supported him speaking out were also murdered. Others who have spoken out are sometimes forced into hiding. The former ANC leader and South African president, Jacob Zuma, is associated with corruption, called “state capture,” and general incompetence, for which he was forced out of power.  Why is Ndobe's indictment so late? Some South Africans speculate that other power brokers within the ANC protected him. In any event, Cyril Ramaphosa, is attempting to reform the party and to marginalize those associated with Zuma. The indictment advances that agenda. But thus far, he has enjoyed only limited success: Zuma’s power base is among the poor and the rural, while Ramaphosa’s is urban and includes the small black middle class. If the ANC does well in the upcoming elections, Ramaphosa’s hand will be strengthened. But, if ANC electoral support declines, the Zuma faction may be resurgent.  Though anti-corruption efforts may sometimes dominate politics, the elephant in the living room is that, since apartheid ended, social and economic change for most South Africans has been disappointing. The white minority still largely controls the economy, while the black majority remains poor; though visible, the black middle class remains small. That reality makes the ANC and Ramaphosa vulnerable and provides the basis for Zuma’s enduring support.  

On February 23, President Muhammadu Buhari was elected to a second term, defeating the chief opposition candidate and former vice president, Atiku Abubakar. As always, there was more violence associated with the elections than received attention in the Western media, but fortunately there was no spike when the Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) announced the results. Despite the elections’ significant shortcomings, most Nigerians appear to accept the results.  Of the eighty million people that registered to vote and the seventy-two million that picked-up their voter registration cards—necessary to cast a ballot—only about twenty-eight million actually voted. This represented the lowest turnout since the restoration of civilian government in 1999. In fact, turnout has been declining since the 2003 presidential election.  The Election About five hours before polls were set to open on February 16, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) pushed the vote back a week. Despite previous assurances that all was going according to plan, INEC blamed the delay on logistical difficulties, especially involving the delivery of voting materials to some 120,000 polling places in a country with very poor infrastructure.  Critics from Nigerian civil society are credibly alleging that the security services kept potential voters away from polls in areas known to favor Atiku Abubakar. There are also allegations of vote buying perpetrated by both camps. According to its statement [PDF], Situation Room, an umbrella of civil society organizations, members of the security services also attempted to intimidate INEC workers during voting and ballot counting. Election Day in many places appears to have been chaotic, with many polling stations opening late.  The Winner According to INEC, President Buhari won by a margin of four million votes. His votes came overwhelmingly from the Muslim north of the country, reflecting his deep popularity among the poor there. He also did well in Lagos and Yorubaland, where he was strongly supported by Lagos kingmaker Bola Tinubu. Atiku carried the south and east of the country, which are the predominantly Christian parts of the country. Voter turnout in the north exceeded 50 percent, compared with only 20 percent in the south and east. Atiku Abubakar’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has released its own tabulation of the vote, showing that Atiku won by some two million votes, and is seeking the overturn of the INEC tabulation by the courts. In the past, all such efforts have failed. More of the Same For many Nigerians, Buhari and Atiku were more alike than different. Both are of the same generation, born before independence and currently in their seventies, and both are seeking to represent a country whose average age is eighteen. Both are Fulani and Muslim, and neither are religious fanatics. While Buhari is generally seen as not personally corrupt, many of those around him are. Atiku, on the other hand, has long been accused of personal corruption. On security, neither have advanced credible new ideas for addressing Boko Haram, militants and separatism in and around the oil patch, or farmer-herder clashes in the middle belt.  For now, Nigerians appear to accept tacitly President Buhari’s reelection, no matter the election’s flaws. Already, some are privately saying that the shortcomings of the election are an indication that democracy as a system cannot address Nigeria’s problems. For friends of Nigeria, the record-low voter turnout and apparent public apathy may be the most consequential feature of the 2019 elections.