Corruption

Residents observe a moment of silence for a local leader who died in police custody, during a demonstration in Wukan village on December 13, 2011. The banner reads: "Everyone has a responsibility in fighting corruption and graft." (Stringer / Courtesy of Reuters) It all began with a protest over illegal land sales and rigged elections. According to the investigative Chinese journal Caixin, the local government in Wukan village in southern Guangdong province had earned over 700 million yuan (roughly US$110 million) from selling collectively-owned farmland but it disbursed only 550 yuan (roughly US$86) to each villager. Moreover, the highly unpopular village party secretary and director had rigged the local elections, managing to hold on to power for 40 years as a result.  The villagers had been unhappy about the situation for a number of years and have complained by petition since 2009. However, there was no resolution until they finally took to the streets in September. The good news is that by late November after a few months of protest—some of it violent—the villagers succeeded in ousting the two village leaders. The Chinese media argued at the time that Guangdong, under Party Secretary Wang Yang (a candidate for the Standing Committee of the Politburo in the 2012-2013 leadership transition), was pursuing a new approach to social unrest, one that tried to “balance maintaining stability and basic rights while helping people to express their needs.” The bad news is that the balance still isn’t quite right. In recent days, the Wukan villagers have seized control of the village, demonstrating against the alleged cover-up of police brutality that led to the death on December 11 of Xue Jinbo, a demonstration leader. The Chinese media have also gone dark. There is no more talk about the new way of handling protests. On December 14, the acting mayor of Shanwei City Wu Zili said that in regards to organizations planning to “incite trouble,” the government is determined to crack down on the destruction of public property and the obstruction of official business. The local government is now trying to starve the villagers out by setting up five roadblocks with guards all around the village to prevent food and other resources from coming in and workers from leaving. Eventually the siege will end but the fundamental challenge to Beijing will not. Every year, despite the country’s impressive economic growth, the number of protests grows. By one estimate, Beijing now contends with 180,000 so-called “mass incidents”. The why of these protests is no mystery: the lack of the rule of law, transparency, and official accountability. These are the structural elements that define the country’s political system and allow corruption to flourish. In the Wukan case, the villagers are protesting corruption in both land sales and the electoral process. Whether the protests are over these issues or the environment or defective products, the root cause is the same. Beijing’s take away from the Wukan protest probably won’t be much more than “It’s time to launch another [ineffective] anti-corruption campaign.” The real take away, however, is that it is time to listen to what Premier Wen Jiabao had to say a few months ago in Dalian: “We must govern the country by law… We need to uphold judicial justice…People’s democratic rights and interests prescribed in the Constitution must be protected. The most important ones are the right to vote and to stay informed about, participate in, and oversee government affairs.” Put more bluntly, if the 5th generation* of Party leaders doesn’t listen to Wen and seize the initiative on political reform, it is looking more and more likely that the Chinese people will. *Thank you Yoshihiro Mukaiyama for realizing that I meant the 5th, not 6th generation of Party leaders.  

http://youtu.be/DDisMlwlSgk This is a guest post by Mohamed Jallow. He is an interdepartmental associate at the Council on Foreign Relations and graduate of the CUNY Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies. Mohamed came to the United States as a refugee from Sierra Leone in 2003. Sierra Leone is in the middle of a corruption firestorm after a damaging al-Jazeera investigative report uncovered what appears to be corruption at the highest levels of government, including the vice president. Sorious Samura, the country’s celebrated investigative journalist, broke the story for al-Jazeera after he infiltrated government offices. For two thousand dollars, undercover reporters were granted access to the vice president and other senior government officials who hinted at the possibility delaying the official ban on timber exports and allow the so-called investors to engage in what is clearly an illegal activity. You can watch the entire video here. Corruption is not new in Sierra Leone, and some might say it is a normal part of conducting business there. The report has generated considerable public interest, both in Sierra Leone and in its influential diaspora communities. Many are calling for the resignation of the vice president, Sam Sumana, who is featured in the video apparently talking to the undercover reporters and appears to indicate that he could arrange for a delay in implementing the moratorium on timber exports. Though he personally denied any involvement, two of his close associates where offered money. In a rather bizarre attempt at damage control, Sylvia Blyden, a well-known newspaper proprietor and government insider, released her own documentary, attempting to absolve the vice president of corruption and pinning the blame on his associates. She alleged that the original report is a witch-hunt aimed at bringing the vice president down. In a hastily produced video, she goes to great lengths trying to claim entrapment and accuses al-Jazeera of fabrication. Sierra Leoneans nevertheless are outraged about the entire scandal, and for what they see as graft within a government that made fighting corruption its top priority. The question now is not whether someone should be fired and held accountable, but whether cronyism will once again trump accountability—as it has in the past. There have been similar outcries over the past two years, following a slew of large mining and land deals that were signed without proper vetting or transparency. These concerns are justifiable because the country remains one of the most corrupt in Africa, a fact that is impeding its recovery from the decade long civil war that ended in 2002. To its credit, the government has stepped up efforts to combat corruption, though it will be a difficult battle against entrenched interests. In fact, thanks to an avalanche of reactions from the country’s growing and influential social media community, the government and its anti-corruption agency are now vowing to investigate the matter and bring all those involved to account. For the first time, Sierra Leoneans are foregoing their normal ambivalence toward corruption and want this government, despite its rhetoric, to go after its sacred cows. Failure to do anything about this scandal will spell doom for an otherwise popular president as the 2012 general elections approach.

Mac Maharaj, former South African Minister of Transport, takes the stand at the Hefer commission of inquiry, to prove the spy allegations against the director of Public Prosecutions Bulelane Ngcuka in Bloemfontein November 17, 2003. (Stringer/Courtesy Reuters) The Mail and Guardian, an influential South African weekly, is accusing Jacob Zuma’s press spokesman, Mac Maharaj, of censorship. Maharaj threatened the newspaper with prosecution if it printed a report with accusations that he lied during the investigation of Jacob Zuma’s involvement in a shady arms deal more than a decade ago. The Mail and Guardian went ahead and published parts of the report, which Maharaj responded to by opening criminal charges. It has been announced that those charges will be investigated by the Hawks, an elite police unit. In the meantime, the Sunday Times alleges Maharaj received kickbacks from the French weapons contractor at the center of the arms investigation. The Mail and Guardian was a vocal apartheid critic, and it was established by journalists who had worked for the Rand Daily Mail and other liberal newspapers forced out of business during the later apartheid years. During apartheid, these newspapers would publish articles with censored sentences blacked out, so readers knew the extent to which a story had been censored. The Mail and Guardian repeated this tactic last week with the Maharaj story, thereby making the point that the ANC government was resorting to tactics characteristic of apartheid South Africa. Mac Maharaj is an old-line ANC stalwart from Natal, the center of South Africa’s south Asian population. He was imprisoned with Nelson Mandela and is credited with transcribing the latter’s autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom. The irony of associating him with apartheid-era press censorship would not be lost on South Africa’s liberals and likely was deliberately intended to embarrass him. The Mail and Guardian is a high quality must-read for southern Africa intellectuals, think tankers, and many in the business community. It is highly critical of the Zuma government, as it has been of its predecessors. Like much of the South African press, it is essentially seen as a "white" publication, though it has readers from all racial groups. The South African press is often accused by ANC leaders of being "unfair" and biased against a black government, and this episode should be seen in that context. CFR is closed Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday for the Thanksgiving holiday. I will resume posts on Monday.

State Governors Timipre Sylva of Bayelsa State (L-R), Emmanuel Uduaghan of Delta State and Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers State, meet at the South-South Summit to discuss the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria's Port Harcourt July 26, 2010. (Austin Ekeinde/Courtesy Reuters) The Jonathan government, following the example of other oil-rich states, wants to establish a sovereign wealth fund, and it has deposited a reported one billion U.S. dollars as seed money in it. The New York Times reports that big Wall Street firms are angling to get some of the action. Not so fast. Nigeria’s oil revenue is distributed among the federal, state, and local governments according to a set formula. The diversion of some of that oil revenue into a sovereign wealth fund reduces the amount available for distribution, and the powerful governors are objecting. Some governors are going to court to block the establishment of the fund. Another, the current head of the governors’ conference, is calling for the governors themselves to determine how much of their state’s oil revenue should be deposited in the fund. It is an open secret in Nigeria that governors are largely unaccountable for how they use their state’s oil money allocation. In theory, state legislatures should hold them accountable. But, in many or most cases, legislatures are dominated by the governors’ patronage networks. So, a sovereign wealth fund gores the governors’ ox. And governors are increasingly powerful as the federal government weakens. The federal government could, of course, deposit a percentage of its own share of the oil revenue in a sovereign wealth fund. To be successful, however, will require strict controls over withdrawals – especially for political purposes. Nigeria has an excess crude account, in which all revenue was deposited above a benchmark per barrel of oil. At one point, the account reached 30 billion U.S. dollars, and then dropped to one billion dollars, according to the New York Times. Clearly, there have been raids on the cookie jar. That is a cautionary note for the sovereign wealth fund. A successful sovereign wealth fund, like the excess crude account, is less about finance and more about the quality of governance.

Members of Venezuela's militia and supporters of Venezuela's President Chavez attend a ceremony in Caracas (Jorge Silva/Courtesy Reuters). Today, chances are Hugo Chávez will face off against Henrique Capriles Radonski in the 2012 October presidential elections. The 39-year-old former mayor of Caracas’s Baruta Municipality (2000-2008) and current Miranda state Governor is leading the opposition candidates, and polling just 2 percentage points below Chávez. He is a lawyer who entered politics at the age of 26 to become the youngest member of the Chamber of Deputies until it was dissolved in 1999. Capriles appeals to the non-Chavista Left. Following in Lula’s Brazilian footsteps, he has poured money into education and social programs, drawing strong support among the lower classes as well as from a growing contingent of independent voters put off by the Chávez-centered polarization of Venezuelan politics. Comfortable among slum dwellers and businessmen alike – and unafraid to don Chávez’s signature Veneuelan flag jacket-- the young candidate has won hearts and minds with his intensity and obvious passion. He has also attracted Chávez’s ire. In 2004, he was arrested for “trespassing, intimidation and ’violating international principles’” for his involvement in a protest outside the Cuban embassy in the wake of the 2002 attempted coup. The charges were eventually thrown out and two months after leaving prison he was reelected to his post as mayor with 80 percent of the vote. Yet while a rising star, he faces three major challenges. The first is the divisions within Venezuela’s anti-Chávez opposition. There are other worthy competitors -- Leopoldo López, the former Mayor of Chacao Municipality and Pablo Pérez, another young and dynamic governor of the state of Zulia. While one of these -- probably Pérez -- may give him a run for the nomination, the real test will be whether the opposition can remain united. In the past, their divisions have weakened them perhaps as much as any moves Chávez has made. The opposition’s track record has gotten a lot better. In the 2008 regional elections they were able to come together, winning governorships in 5 of Venezuela’s 22 states (including the two most populous, Miranda and Zulia). The 2010 Congressional run was their best showing yet. By uniting behind candidates chosen either by consensus or in local primaries, they managed to win the popular vote (52%) -- though only  40% of the legislature due to gerrymandering. Signs look good for this coming year, as last month the three major opposition parties signed a pact promising to support the winner in February’s primary. A second challenge is Chávez’s electoral machinations. While the ballot box itself has not yet been in question, the Chávez administration has repeatedly tilted the electoral playing field --  arresting prominent opposition leaders, silencing independent media outlets, and undercutting autonomous institutions such as the National Electoral Council (CNE). The meddling for 2012 has already started, beginning with moving up the election date from December to October 2012. This is likely just the first of many measures to take the wind out of opposition sails. The third, less analyzed challenge is Chávez’s health. At first brush his potential inability to run for reelection should boost the opposition’s chances. But it could make it all the much harder. Left without a popular candidate, hard-line Chavistas might pull the plug on elections all together. Hugo’s brother Adán has already suggested as much, saying recently, “It would be inexcusable to limit ourselves [PSUV] to only the electoral and not see other forms of struggle, including the armed struggle.” Instead of opening up Venezuela’s political system, Chávez’s absence might put an end to Venezuela’s democratic trappings altogether.

Nigeria's former speaker of house of representatives Dimeji Bankole is escorted out of the Federal High Court in the capital Abuja June 13, 2011. (Afolabi Sotunde/Courtesy Reuters) In Human Rights Watch’s newest report, “Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission,” this highly credible NGO takes a break from its more usual investigations into conflict and violence to assess the successes and failures of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)—the agency tasked to investigate and prosecute financial crimes ranging from advanced fee fraud, more commonly known as “419” scams, to money laundering to government corruption. The HRW report should be required reading for those of us concerned about sustainable solutions to seemingly endemic conflict. In Nigeria, as elsewhere, corruption and conflict are inextricably linked. Competition for access to Nigeria’s vast oil wealth through public office has spurred winner-take-all politics, justifying any means. Unemployed youths are hired by politicians to intimidate and fight for them; ethnic, regional, and religious identities are mobilized for political purposes; elections are rigged; bribes are paid; and favors are owed. And the winner truly takes all. As the report notes, Nigeria’s political system is “built to reward corruption, not punish it.” And violence is corruption’s handmaiden. At present, nowhere is this more clear than in the North (and now Abuja). The widespread violence throughout the North culminating in Friday’s bloody attack on the UN headquarters building in Abuja has been attributed to Boko Haram, a fundamentalist Islamic movement. It attacks representatives and institutions of the federal government and venues deemed un-Islamic—police, military, bars, brothels, federal and local officials, and even churches. Boko Haram derives popular support in part from alienation in the North among the grassroots from the federal government, as well as the endemic poverty, that is a manifestation of Nigeria’s corrupt, winner-take-all politics. Read the report here. H/T to Asch Harwood.

Nigeria's former military head of state Ibrahim Babangida, former president Olusegun Obasanjo and former head of state Muhamodu Buhari (L-R) pose for a photograph at the end of a book launch in Minna, north-central Nigeria in this picture taken August 5, 2010. (Afolabi Sotunde/Courtesy Reuters) The public feud between former heads of state Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) and Olusegun Obasanjo (OBJ) is an occasion to reflect on the high price the Nigeria has paid for poor governance. The two have been military colleagues since the Biafra War (1967-1970) and are an integral part of the patron-client system that runs Nigeria. IBB was the military chief of state for eight years, while OBJ was the military chief of state for three years and then the nominally civilian elected president of Nigeria for an additional eight years. Within the Nigerian military, OBJ was senior to IBB, though both are four star retired generals. They are about the same age and both made their fortunes via the access that military power provides. IBB used the occasion of his seventieth birthday to compare favorably his time in office to that of OBJ. More specifically, he said that OBJ had wasted some sixteen billion dollars on power projects. OBJ responded by calling IBB a fool, citing conflicting verses from proverbs about whether he should respond or not. (He chose to do so.) IBB’s initial salvo surprised me because in the past he has said that public condemnation of a senior colleague violates good military discipline Press commentators are having a field day, accusing both "big men" of pettiness, lack of decorum, and of suffering from an "embarrassing disdain for intellectual rigor." One observed that IBB and OBJ are "united in greed and personal aggrandizement," and noted that both are living in "opulence." Others have made the point that poor leadership and bad governance, of which both IBB and OBJ are guilty, are a direct cause of Nigeria’s failure to develop. Yet others are embarrassed for Nigeria by the public spat between "two old men." Other than exposing two of Nigeria’s biggest "big men" as petty and lacking decorum, it is unclear whether there is a larger significance to the spat. Both IBB and OBJ still have links into the military. Both are immensely rich. Both fancy themselves as kingmakers. IBB was an active presidential candidate in 2011, and he may harbor resentments that he failed. OBJ remains president of the ruling PDP’s board of trustees. They are certainly yesterday’s men; the question is whether they think they have a future. It is positive that the spat has led Nigerian commentators to acknowledge directly the country’s abysmal history of poor leadership and bad governance. Confrontation of that reality can only promote better governance in the future.

A U.S. Navy boat patrols the waters of Nigeria's Lagos harbour, March 24, 2009. (Akintunde Akinleye/Courtesy Reuters) Such has been the increase in piracy that London-based insurers Lloyd’s Market Association has listed the waters off Nigeria and Benin in the same risk category as Somalia. However, there are important differences between the piracy in the two regions. In West Africa, piracy tends to be of the “hit and run” variety, where ships are looted, rather than taken hostage, as is the case in the Horn. The Gulf of Guinea pirates also appear to be more violent. In Somalia, there is no effective government authority that can counter piracy, and an international anti-piracy patrol has stepped in to fill the void. In the Gulf of Guinea, there are capable governments and no international patrol. Nigeria President Goodluck Jonathan has promised close anti-piracy cooperation with the government of Benin, probably more affected by the scourge because a significant portion of the state revenue comes from port charges. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has begun to receive extensive media attention, especially in the aftermath of the Lloyd’s Market Association notice. If piracy continues to grow in the Gulf of Guinea, there may be calls for greater involvement by the international community. There is a press report that Nigerian naval officers, representatives of its maritime industry and other groups have already met with U.S. officials. In the past, Nigerian government officials and Nigerian naval officers have been complicit in illegal oil theft (called “bunkering”) in the Gulf of Guinea. Part of the challenge of addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, for local governments and for the international community, will be the culture of impunity that continues to exist with respect to maritime crime in the region.

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni takes Oath of Office during a ceremony at the Kololo Airstrip grounds in the capital Kampala, May 12, 2011. (Edward Echwalu/Courtesy Reuters) Uganda’s walk-to-work demonstrations against the Museveni regime generated international attention and sympathy last April. The brutal police crackdown recalled the early days of the “Arab Spring” above the Sahara, and some questioned whether Yoweri Museveni—Uganda’s president for over twenty-five years—could hold on to power. Activists for Change, a Ugandan opposition movement, will resume demonstrations during August. The April protests were ignited, in part, by a spike in food and fuel prices. Now, however, new figures from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics suggest that the inflation rate, though still the highest in years, stabilized last month. (The overall rate was 15.8 percent, down from 16 percent the previous month; the food inflation rate was 39 percent, down from 44.2 percent.) While high prices continue to be a serious short term challenge in Uganda, over the long term “inflationary patronage” could undermine Museveni’s position. Joel D. Barkan describes the term as the unending increase in the amount of money and related corruption needed to maintain Museveni’s many patron-client relationships. As another expert notes in a new article, Museveni spent one third of the entire state budget—or $1.3 billion—during the single month of January 2011, when Ugandans went to the polls in national elections that Museveni won. The election may have been Uganda’s single most expensive event since independence in 1962. Museveni also spent at least $720 million to buy six Russian Sukhoi  fighter jets—a purchase that Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, the governor of Uganda’s central bank, openly criticized in a recent interview with the Financial Times. While other African leaders use revenue from oil or even foreign development assistance to fund their ever expanding patronage systems, Museveni may not be so lucky. The 2.3 billion barrels of proven reserves in the Lake Albert region of northwestern Uganda will not come online for at least several years. The World Bank  is unlikely to finance the necessary pipeline from the oil fields to Kenyan ports. Overseas direct assistance has also started to wane, with donors understandably concerned about the rule of law and state of democracy. Museveni has proven his political shrewdness over the last three decades, and there has been a tendency to view him as the archetypal Big Man—one who gains power with age. To be sure, Museveni will not leave office any time soon, and his ability to win 68 percent of the vote during the 2011 elections proves his staying power. However, Ugandan patronage politics may prove unsustainable over the next few years. h/t to Charlie Warren

A man arranges Agip drums at an oil station and depot in Nigeria's capital Abuja. (Afolabi Sotunde/Courtesy Reuters) Aaron Sayne, a consultant for the Revenue Watch Institute, has published policy recommendations with background on Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). It is a complex piece of legislation that promises to reform to the country’s energy sector and highlights the potential benefits of greater transparency and accountability. If passed, the PIB—which has undergone at least three iterations in as many years—would directly affect international oil companies (IOCs), investors, intergovernmental relations, and nongovernmental organizations alike. While oil historically provides 80 percent of government revenues and at least 98 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings, the energy sector  has long been characterized by graft, opaque licensing processes, and decreased outputs. The delay over the PIB has unnerved investors and perhaps discouraged new activity by IOCs. Recent developments in the upstream and downstream sectors have also raised concerns. The Nigerian government removed a clause in the PIB that allows for incorporated joint ventures among international firms and the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), leading to some criticism in the local media. One IOC has decided to sell four of its onshore blocks. Deziani Alison-Madueke, Goodluck Jonathan’s controversial oil minister, has been cleared to return to the cabinet and faces renewed criticism over the sluggish passage of the PIB through the National Assembly. In the context of current and longstanding issues in Nigeria’s oil industry, Sayne’s new report provides succinct policy recommendations, with six tangible objectives specifically aimed at improving transparency and accountability. His prescriptions range from creating new regulations of downstream licensing and lifting (during 2008, nearly 70 percent of all government oil revenues changed hands during this process), to increasing the transparency surrounding upstream contracts, to mandating annual audits of NNPC and its subsidiaries. The report is part of a larger five year project called the Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER). Implemented by Revenue Watch Institute, Oxford Policy Management, and the Center for the Study of African Economies, FOSTER began in 2009. Sayne’s report and its useful appendix are available here. A few weeks ago, I also blogged about another piece of legislation in Nigeria, the newly passed Freedom of Information Act, that Sayne notes may also help to improve transparency and accountability in the oil sector. The bill took over a decade to become law, and it is a major step forward. In response to a number of requests I received, I am publishing the text of the law here (pdf).

Kenya's President Mwai Kibaki addresses the nation during celebrations to mark Kenya's Madaraka Day, the 48th anniversary of the country's self rule, at Nyayo national stadium in Nairobi, June 1, 2011. (Thomas Mukoya/Courtesy Reuters) Last Friday, Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki inaugurated the Kenya Open Data Initiative, a free internet platform that catalogs and displays visually numerous government data sets. South Sudan’s independence overshadowed the debut of this important online resource.  Nevertheless, the Open Data Initiative is an important step forward and will allow citizens to monitor Kenya’s public resources against the backdrop of endemic corruption. (Kenya ranked a dismal 154 out of 178 total countries in Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index.) In the past, the Kenyan government’s statistics on health, infrastructure, poverty, water and sanitation, energy, and population trends were seldom publicly available, or they were often subject to delayed releases and/or hosted on outmoded websites. The same is true for many other African governments, and broadband access is still limited across the continent. But for those who do have Internet access in Kenya, the new platform represents an important milestone in government transparency, with highly practical applications for researchers, international development professionals, and local members of civil society alike. The Kenya ICT Board also plans to encourage new users: it will award as many as thirty grants this year to the groups and individuals who provide the most useful manipulations of the data. Huduma (Kiswahili for “service”), another offshoot from the developers of Ushahidi, has already begun to use the data in order to compare aid and the provision of services across different regions in Kenya, making way for open source monitoring and evaluation. Information communications (ICT) applications using the Open Data Initiative are also in development. The Kenya government has demonstrated a commitment to innovation and reform. It remains to be seen whether the ready availability of official information will result in popular pressure against corruption.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addresses the 53-member African Union at the AU's headquarters in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa, June 13, 2011. (Courtesy Reuters/Stringer) There seems to be a new flurry of Obama administration diplomatic engagement with Africa. While it is not necessarily in response to African criticism that President Obama, whose father was Kenyan, does not pay enough attention to sub-Saharan Africa, it highlights the complexities of balancing our sometimes contradictory interests in Africa. Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia, becoming the first secretary of state to address the African Union. The purpose of her trip was to emphasize the Obama administration’s commitment to democracy, good governance, economic development (in particular, the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and public health. Michelle Obama, along with her daughters and mother, will tour the continent from June 21 to 26, with planned stops in South Africa and Botswana. The first lady’s trip to South Africa will emphasize the role of African youth and underscore the country’s democratic transition: she will speak at forum on women leaders in Africa; tour Robben Island, where Nelson Mandela was incarcerated for eighteen years; and meet with South African President Jacob Zuma, among other activities. The trip will bound to have a very high profile in Africa. In Washington, President Obama recently received Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon. Both have oil and the latter has a notoriously poor record on corruption and human rights abuses, contrary to the democracy and good governance agenda highlighted by the first lady and secretary’s African travel, though the White House reports that President Obama raised human rights issues during his latter meeting.

Mexico City traffic police inspect driving documents (Daniel Aguilar / Courtesy Reuters). Nearing Mexico City’s airport on my way to Oaxaca with my husband and brother-in-law a few years back, we had an all too familiar experience. Amid the crawling traffic were eight or ten police officers, systematically pulling over every third or fourth car. Unlucky in the lottery, we duly stopped, half in the road, half up a curb. Our offense was not using our blinker to signal a lane change, even though we hadn’t, of course, changed lanes. After the requisite license showing, some hemming and hawing about having to go to the station to sort things out, and a few long silences, we asked what our ticket would cost, and if we could pay it here. Now more animated, the officer pulled out his black notebook and quoted a price based on a multiple of the minimum wage. After finally working the amount down to roughly $40, we put the pesos into his small notebook and were on our way. Just a hundred yards on, at the next light waiting to make our turn, another policeman approached our car, knocking on the driver’s window. My husband, exasperated at this point, rolled it down a couple of inches and yelled “Ya pagamos!” (We already paid). To which the officer, ever polite, replied “Gracias – buen viaje!” and headed off to talk to the next driver in line. A recent study by Transparency International shows that it wasn’t just our Texas plates that led to this ritual. In the capital, as well as the states of Mexico, Tamaulipas and Querétaro those stopped by the traffic police pay bribes over 80 percent of the time. While these represent the worst, the national average is just under 70 percent (in only four states is it less than half of the time). (Courtesy The Economist / Transparency International) Surveying 15,000 homes across Mexico, the report measures 35 different types of bribery and corruption, from those facing street vendors (23 percent of those surveyed paid a bribe), to people recovering stolen vehicles (25 percent), buying building permits (13 percent), requesting trash collection (22 percent). Perhaps more shocking, 15 percent of the respondents have paid to bring a case to court, while 9 percent speeded up hospital treatments with a financial incentive. Overall, the data are sobering. Mexicans pay some $2.5 billion a year in bribes – no small change. These costs hit the poor the hardest – a regressive tax if ever there was one. While some federal programs - including the postal service and utilities - have been cleaned up; across the board the numbers aren’t improving. Compared to 2007, if anything things are getting worse, with the amounts charged rising ahead of inflation – today, the average fine is $14, up from $12 in 2007. This reality makes life for many Mexicans more difficult. A big cut of their hard earned pesos goes to graft. But it also importantly makes the fight against insecurity and violence all the harder. If law enforcement officials often (if not almost always) prey on citizens in these smaller ways, how can the population trust them enough to work together on the bigger threats to their communities and country?

A worker clears floating garbage on the Yangtze River near the Three Gorges Dam in Yichang, Hubei province on August 1, 2010. (China Daily Information Group/Courtesy Reuters) It has only taken ninety years, but China’s leaders have finally admitted that the Three Gorges Dam is a disaster.  With Wen Jiabao at the helm, the State Council noted last week that there were “urgent problems” concerning the relocation effort, the environment and disaster prevention that would now require an infusion of US$23 billion on top of the $45 billion spent already. Despite high-level support for the project since Sun Yat-sen first proposed it in 1919, the dam has had serious critics within China all along. One of China’s earliest and most renowned environmental activists, Dai Qing, published the book Yangtze! Yangtze! in 1989, which explored the engineering and social costs of the proposed dam. The book was a hit among Tiananmen Square protestors, and Dai spent a year in prison for her truth-telling. In 1992, when the dam came up for a vote in the National People’s Congress, an unprecedented one-third of the delegates voted against the plan. Once the construction began in 1994, the problems mounted.  The forced relocation of 1.4 million Chinese was plagued with corruption; former Premier Zhu Rongji accused the construction companies of shoddy engineering, and little of the pollution control measures that were planned were actually taken. Water pollution skyrocketed in the reservoir. As Chinese officials acknowledged a few years back, “The Three Gorges Dam project has caused an array of ecological ills, including more frequent landslides and pollution, and if preventive measures are not taken, there could be an environmental catastrophe.” It would be easy to argue that the State Council’s admission was too little too late. However, the new transparency matters for at least two reasons. First, it plays into the hands of environmentalists who have been arguing against Beijing’s aggressive plans for additional large-scale hydropower plants. Premier Wen, who has tried to slow the approval process for dams over the past several years, now has a bit more ammunition. Second, any acknowledgement by the Party that mistakes have been made is an important step toward the public’s right to question future policies. Let’s hope that more such transparency is on the way.