Corruption

On July 23, there was an effort to murder two of Nigeria’s prominent Muslim leaders, Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi, a cleric with a large personal following, and Muhammadu Buhari, former head of state. The attempts were two separate operations, though they appear to have been timed close together, in the former northern regional capital of Kaduna. The attempt against Sheikh Bauchi occurred when a bomb exploded near the square where he was scheduled to give an end-of-Ramadan sermon. Less than two hours later, a suicide bomber drove a vehicle into former head of state Buhari’s convoy as he was passing through Kaduna. Though Boko Haram has not claimed responsibility, both targets had been publicly critical of the group. Bauchi declared Boko Haram to be “non-Islamic,” and there have been earlier attempts on his life. Buhari, too, has published writing opposing Boko Haram, which has issued death threats against him. On the other hand, the two also have other enemies. Both Bauchi and Buhari survived the attempted murder, but the media estimates at least eighty-two others were killed, mostly bystanders and small traders. Presuming Boko Haram was the perpetrator, the attack highlights an important aspect of the Boko Haram conflict. Among other things, it is a civil war within northern Nigerian Islam. Bauchi and Buhari are part of the Sufi-influenced, broadly tolerant Islam that has been traditional in northern Nigeria and includes most of the Islamic establishment. It fully embraces modernity (if not secularism), western education, and the Nigerian nation-state. It cultivates positive relations with Christians. Boko Haram, on the other hand, is fundamentalist and advocates a literalist reading of sacred texts. It is broadly part of the Salafist tradition of Islam. (To state the obvious, most Salafists do not embrace the violence of Boko Haram.) For Boko Haram, Muslims who embrace the secular state and western education are false Muslims who should be killed. Christians should be killed or driven out. Nevertheless, Muslims have supplied the largest percentage of Boko Haram’s victims. Buhari will be well known to Americans who watch Nigeria. He was military head of state from 1984 to 1985. Alone among Nigeria’s chiefs of state, both military and civilian, he attempted to address Nigeria’s corruption root and branch, and his methods could be rough and extra-legal. Accordingly, he was deposed by Ibrahim Babangida in 1985. Buhari’s current lifestyle is austere and uncorrupt. He is probably the most popular politician with the “street” in the North. He was a presidential candidate in 2003, 2007, and 2011, and may be so again in 2015. Ironically, this potential victim of radical Islam is himself often viewed with suspicion in the Christian south as a Muslim fanatic, which is far from the truth.

On July 14, the New York Times carried the obituary of Umaru Dikko, a former Nigerian minister accused of corruption who was once the subject of a kidnap attempt. On July 15, it carried an obituary of Nadine Gordimer, the South African author who became a major anti-apartheid icon. Dikko is a figure now largely of historical interest. Gordimer is regarded as one of the giants of twentieth century literature and is likely to be read far into the future. Corruption in Nigeria is an old story. Shehu Shagari was elected president in 1979, following decades of military rule. Umaru Dikko was his campaign manager. As president during one of Nigeria’s periodic oil booms, Shagari launched ambitious housing, infrastructure, and agricultural projects which, it was widely believed, were also nests of corruption. When oil prices fell, many of the projects were suspended, but the allegations of corruption and poor governance remained. Following flawed elections in 1983, the Shagari administration was overthrown on New Year’s Eve 1983 in a military coup led by Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari launched a fierce anti-corruption campaign. The Buhari government accused Dikko of stealing millions of dollars from a rice distribution program. Dikko fled to London. There, in July 1984, he was kidnapped by a team of Nigerians and alleged former Israeli Mossad operatives, put in a box, and taken to an airport where he was to be shipped back to Nigeria as “diplomatic baggage” to face charges of corruption. The British authorities, alerted by Dikko’s secretary, discovered the plot, delayed the flight, and freed Dikko. Despite the fact that the Nigerian government denied any involvement, British public opinion was outraged. A nasty diplomatic crisis ensued, with each country tit-for-tat expelling diplomats. The bilateral relationship between Nigeria and the United Kingdom was suspended for two years. In August 1985, Buhari was overthrown in a military coup by Ibrahim Babangida. However, he remains one of Nigeria’s most powerful northern politicians. Dikko, too, after a period of residence in London, returned to a political career in Nigeria. He served as chairman of the disciplinary committee of the ruling People’s Democratic Party, which is headed by current president Goodluck Jonathan. Buhari has been an unsuccessful candidate for the presidency in 2003, 2007, and 2011. Especially in parts of southern Nigeria, his Islamic faith is suspect, and he is seen as authoritarian, reflecting his rigorous anticorruption campaign while he was chief of state. In the public mind, whether justified or not, he remains associated with the Dikko kidnapping attempt. It is hard to imagine a greater contrast between Dikko and Nadine Gordimer, though they were of the same inter-war generation. Gordimer was born in 1923; Dikko in 1936. Dikko was a Muslim from the north, the son of a traditional ruler, and part of the Sultan of Sokoto’s connection. Gordimer, like many of the white opponents of apartheid, was Jewish, the daughter of a Latvian father and an English mother. She wrote more than two dozen works of fiction in addition to literary criticism and political essays. Her fiction was a devastating inquiry into the consequences of apartheid. Three of her novels were banned at one time or another by the apartheid government. She was awarded the Booker Prize in 1974 and the Nobel Prize for literature in 1991. She was a member of the African National Congress and, according to the Guardian, supported the armed struggle. Nelson Mandela spoke highly of her fiction and after his release from Robben Island, they became friends. However, toward the end of her life she became a fierce critic of the ANC’s corruption, its attempts to curb whistle-blowing, and, in general, what she saw as a betrayal of its ideals. She, in turn, has been accused of racism, of being a white liberal of little relevance to South Africa’s black majority. The provincial government of Gauteng (Johannesburg) banned one of her recent novels from its public libraries. Like any great literary figure, Gordimer belongs to the world, as well as her South Africa. She is also much better known than Dikko. That is why I have given Dikko more space here.

The Nigerian Daily Independent recently published remarks by Mutiu Sunmonu, the managing director of Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC). The remarks provide insights into Nigeria’s oil industry. Sunmonu said that Nigeria lost over three hundred thousand barrels of crude a day to oil theft, “deferment,” and illegal refining in 2013. Sunmonu confirmed that the federal government takes over 98 percent of the revenue generated by oil producing firms in Nigeria. So, the three hundred thousand barrels per day represent a loss to the Nigerian government of billions of dollars. On the highly controversial issue of oil spills, Sunmonu said that “third party interference” (involving sabotage, illicit tapping of pipes to extract oil, etc.) accounts for 75 percent of oil spillage incidents. Illegal refining of oil and the transport of illegal oil also results in the discharge of oil into the environment. Sunmonu attributed about 15 percent of the spills to “operational spill,” caused by corrosion, equipment failure, or human error. He said that incidents of oil spills resulting from sabotage and theft increased from 137 in 2012 to 157 in 2013. Whatever the cause, Sunmonu said Shell had cleaned up 85 percent of sites that had been identified in 2013 as being in need of “remediation.” Sunmonu’s remarks highlight that it is the Nigerian government that remains the overwhelming beneficiary of oil production, and that its revenue is most negatively impacted by interruption in oil production no matter the cause. This governmental dependency on the oil sector emphasizes the risks the federal government faces should the Niger Delta, where the oil is located, become unstable.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The devastating yet disorganized fury and violence over the past eighteen months in the Central African Republic (CAR) has caused the collapse of the state and defied traditional conflict labels and international quick-fixes. A new report from Thierry Vircoulon at the International Crisis Group is therefore a welcome call to address the causes of the current crises, not the symptoms. The crises are complex and multilayered, but most draw from a single source. In the words of Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign strategist James Carville: “It’s the economy, stupid!” Vircoulon identifies two aspects in particular that led to the current crises: a predatory state and an illegal economy. Numerous Central African governments have developed the state institutions, such as they were, toward a single purpose: self-enrichment and perpetuation of power. Gaining access to the diamond economy became the main motivation for seeking and holding political power. The timber, ivory, and gold sectors were also lucrative, but controlling the diamond trade was crucial to holding power. Central Africans outside the elite political circles turned to illicit economies, black markets, and smuggling routes—often under the overall management of government ministers or family members, or nascent rebel warlords—to survive. Many of the Seleka commanders who swept to prominence during Djotodia’s short presidency had long had control of parts of the diamond mines in the northeast and management of the poaching and smuggling corridors between Sudan, Chad, and northern CAR. Once in power, they moved quickly to consolidate control over the mines, forests, and game parks in the south and west. These had traditionally been under the control of the southern-based president and his networks. Seleka extended smuggling and poaching networks across the nation, connecting their own northern networks with existing networks in the south and west. In the capital, shipments of ivory tusks, illegally harvested timber, and illicit diamonds seized by ministers either disappeared entirely or resurfaced later, resold on the black market. Vircoulon identifies the current transitional government under President Catherine Samba-Panza as a fleeting but golden opportunity to restructure the CAR’s institutions and economy so the country can move forward as fundamentally more stable. Samba-Panza seems to genuinely want fundamental reform, and she cannot run in the elections she’s tasked to organize, which removes her, at least slightly, from the patronage influences. Neither keeping or creating peace on the ground, nor elections will end this crisis, but, Vircoulon advocates, a peacekeeping operation with the correct mandate, clear stabilization strategy, adequate resources, firm UN leadership, and a long term agenda could be the tool through which the country reinvents itself. This mission should be a series of interventions structured around an “ethical reconstruction project” whereby the transitional government concentrates on combating official predation activities and institutional structures that allow and even encourage it, while the international organizations and allied nations secure the natural resources, and stabilize and reconstruct the nation. Focus should be on ensuring that the nation’s natural resources are secure, regulated by the government, but used for national benefit rather than remaining under the control of private hands and small groups. Simultaneously there needs to be job creation with a focus on infrastructure, agriculture, and livestock so the CAR can sustainably develop and feed itself in the future.

In the lead-up to the World Cup and through the first games, Brazilians have taken to the streets in protest. In this post for Daniel Altman on ForeignPolicy.com, I look at why these demands for change could help Brazil overcome its many domestic problems. The post begins: World Cup controversies in Brazil are supposed to be about team selection and tactics, but this year they’ve focused on much bigger issues: jobs, poverty, public services, and corruption. Past tournaments have been a boon for governments hoping to distract their people—and the world—from exactly these kinds of issues. Could this one be different? Major sporting events in Latin America have a history of both illuminating and eliding larger homegrown problems. The 1968 Olympics in Mexico City was preceded by massive protests and the ignominious slaughter of hundreds of students in the capital’s downtown, revealing the ugly authoritarian side of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) regime. And the 1994 World Cup hadn’t even finished when Andrés Escobar, having scored an own goal in a match against the United States during Colombia’s brief campaign, was murdered upon his return to Medellín, then the world’s cocaine capital. You can read the rest of the article here.

This post was co-authored by John Campbell and  Jim Sanders. Jim was a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are their personal views. The weekend news from Nigeria has been dominated by former central bank governor Lamido Sanusi’s elevation to emir of Kano. Kano is usually considered the second or third in the hierarchy of Nigeria’s traditional Muslim leaders. The emirate system in Nigeria does not operate according to primogeniture, so Sanusi, as a member of the family that provides the emir of Kano, was eligible for the position. His chief rival was the late emir’s eldest son. Sanusi long ago broke with the administration of Goodluck Jonathan, which suspended him as governor of the Central Bank following Sanusi’s allegations that parastatals had failed to transfer funds to the Treasury. His candidacy as emir of Kano was supported by the chieftains of the opposition party, the All Progressives’ Congress (APC). According to the Nigerian media, prominent APC politicians, including former Lagos governor Bola Tinubu, current Lagos governor Babatunde Fashola, and former minister Nasir el-Rufai, were in Kano working on his behalf. The true kingmaker was likely the APC governor of Kano state, Rabiu Kwankwaso. Following the announcement of Sanusi’s elevation, there were riots in Kano, likely by supporters of the governing People’s Democratic Party. Sanusi’s selection was a matter of elite politics, at the intersection between the state and the traditional world of the emirs. But, if much less glamorous than an emir of Kano and the politics of his selection, what is going on beneath the surface within the military may be of greater long-term importance to Nigeria’s stability. In the past few weeks, as the military is increasingly stressed by its failing campaign against Boko Haram and its inability thus far to free some three hundred kidnapped school girls, there have been media-reported incidents of soldiers firing on officers. There is also an emerging scandal over officers appropriating land intended for barracks for their own, private purposes. The most recent scandal was reported by the Daily Trust. It comes at a time when those below a senior officer rank are already angry with the upper echelons over the corruption that has put soldiers in harm’s way against Boko Haram without sufficient equipment. Commentators write about a fractured military. They probably expect this fracturing to be along ethnic, religious, and regional lines—especially because of the possibility of sympathy with Boko Haram among some military elements. However, the divisions between allegedly "business" minded senior personnel and the less well-off lower ranks are greater and far more important right now. Over the years, there has been commentary on conditions in military barracks, and it is not a pretty picture. So it should not be surprising that the personnel living in them are reluctant fighters. Arguably, what these soldiers fight for is their own survival, while some of their superiors are out trying to make money—businessmen first, soldiers second. The senior ranks of Nigeria’s military get nervous when they sense volatile sentiments stirring down below. We may be in such a period now, with unpredictable consequences.

Boko Haram operatives often wear Nigerian military uniforms, use weapons from Nigerian armories, and have attacked military facilities where gates were mysteriously left unlocked. The Nigerian military is as fractured along ethnic and religious lines as other parts of Nigerian society. Hence, many Nigerians think that Boko Haram has penetrated successfully the Nigerian military. Leadership, a respected Abuja daily associated with opposition to the Jonathan government, reported on June 3 that fifteen senior military officers including ten generals have been tried by court martial and have been found guilty of providing information and ammunition to Boko Haram. The newspaper cites unnamed military sources, one of whom it says alleged that the generals were also in cahoots with some northern politicians to make the country ungovernable. Leadership’s military sources provide no names of the accused, including the ten generals. Moreover, the newspaper also reports that it has been unable to confirm the story from the defense headquarters spokesman. According to Leadership, the spokesman did say “a lot is happening. Those suspected are being tried, and this is why it is difficult to confirm or deny the story. But whenever the final verdicts are taken on these trials, the press would be briefed by the appropriate officers.” Subsequently the defense headquarters has gone further in denying the story: “no general in the Nigerian Army was under court-martial... The defense headquarters wishes to state categorically that there is no truth whatsoever in the report published in a section of the media.” Other newspapers carried the story and attribute it to Leadership. They provide no further details. So what is going on here? The belief that certain elements in the upper reaches of the military in collusion with northern politicians are using Boko Haram to make the northern part of the country ungovernable in the run-up to the 2015 elections is widely held, especially in the southern part of the country. If the court martials are taking place, and if they are credible, then there would, indeed, be evidence of some military collusion with Boko Haram, if not necessarily with northern politicians. But the "ifs" are important here. Assuming trials are taking place, and the defense spokesman reference to “a lot is happening” would seem to indicate that some sort of military judicial process is underway, despite statements to the contrary, the issue would be their credibility. That remains to be seen.

This is a guest post by Kate Collins, Associate Director, Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, who lived and worked in Malawi in 2012-2013.  Malawi is currently witnessing a political drama that will prompt Americans to recall the days of hanging chads in Bush vs. Gore. On May 20, Malawi held tripartite presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections. The vote was chaotic, accompanied by spasms of violence unusual for this quiet southern African country. Some urban polling centers were torched by angry crowds, and the army was dispatched to keep order. The elections were also marred by logistical hurdles that are part and parcel of working in Malawi. Even urban polling stations with good access to infrastructure saw bungled ballot delivery, rescheduled polling, and officials counting votes by hand at night in the dark. Early results found an upset for the sitting president, Joyce Banda. The Malawi Electoral Support Network predicted that Peter Mutharika was on track to win the election with 36 percent of the vote, trailed by Lazarus Chakwera with 28 percent, followed by Joyce Banda with only 20 percent. With the writing on the wall, Banda and her party cried fraud. Banda alleged “serious irregularities” in the polling. Particularly concerning were reports from polling stations where candidates won more votes from a given location than there were registered voters. Malawi’s electoral commission acknowledged the anomalies and ordered a recount. Before the recount results were released, Banda annulled the election and scheduled a new one. The twist? In the next round of elections, Banda would not stand as a candidate. While some angry citizens took to the streets, party and electoral commission leaders went to court. Over the weekend, Malawi’s high court ruled that President Banda could not annul the election. The court instead directed the electoral commission to announce the compromised result of the initial vote tabulation and conduct a recount. Malawi now faces weeks ahead of political uncertainty and likely unrest as the candidates and electoral commission continue to resolve their differences in court. This is an unwelcome diversion from the most pressing problems in Malawi, a country where about half the population of 15 million lives in extreme poverty. An ugly subtext of corruption helps make sense of this political intrigue. Peter Mutharika, the candidate likely to win the 2014 election, tried to wrest power from then vice president Banda in 2012 when the sitting president died in office. The coup failed. Once in office, President Banda arrested Peter Mutharika for the attempted coup. Now President Banda looks likely to lose her presidency to Peter Mutharika through the ballot box, and she too risks a prison sentence. Banda’s administration is under investigation for a multimillion dollar embezzlement scandal. Under a Mutharika administration, she faces a very real prospect of jail time. Some analysts suggest that Banda’s election maneuvering was designed to keep Mutharika out of power, and instead install a friendly government that would keep her from prison. The unfolding crisis does reveal a note of optimism about the strength of institutions in a young African democracy like Malawi. Malawi has only twenty years of democratic history to buttress this election. Even young Malawians remember when their country was ruled by a dictator who regulated every aspect of life from farming patterns to hairstyles. Today Malawi’s courts are playing a neutral role in arbitrating the conflicts, even though President Banda’s husband is a retired chief justice. The Malawian military has refused to intervene in this constitutional crisis, just as it refused two years ago when Peter Mutharika asked the military to stage a coup. The military, which relies on the U.S. for training and support, is maintaining peace but unfailingly avoids politics. Many in Washington will be dismayed to see President Banda fall from her pedestal. When Banda became Africa’s second female president, she was rightfully feted across the West for her brave record as human rights crusader and her willingness to tell tough truths to the Malawian people. President Obama invited her to Washington in 2013 as an example of the best of African leadership. At the least, she is on her way out of office. At the most, she may have orchestrated a crisis to keep herself out of jail. Supporters will be sad to see her go without delivering the turnaround Malawi sorely needs. They should take heart in the resilience of Malawian democracy and institutions, tested for the second time in two years, and so far standing up to the trials of outsized political personalities.

South Africa goes to the polls on May 7. The South African media has been describing the elections as likely to be “the closest since the coming of democracy in 1994.” Liberation icon Nelson Mandela is dead; the ruling African National congress (ANC) is associated with corruption, poor service delivery in the townships, and a cozy relationship between its leaders and big business. President Jacob Zuma is dogged with scandal. Liberation icons such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former ANC minister Ronnie Kasrils have abandoned the party. These are also the first national elections in which the “Born Frees”–those born after 1994–can vote. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) is energized, and for the first time there is left-wing alternative, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). All this makes for a crowded playing field. Yet polling data, such as it is, suggests that little will change. The ANC currently holds about two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. It is likely to retain a huge majority, even if not two thirds of the seats. The DA may increase its number of seats, and the EFF may enter Parliament. If it does, it will be the first time there has been a genuinely left wing party in Parliament. Observers will be watching voter turnout, which has been slowly falling; low turnout is likely to hurt the ANC. The DA remains a party predominately of whites, Coloureds, and Asians; it has been reaching out to the black middle class, necessary if it is to reach a higher threshold, but its infiltration there is as yet unknown. Observers will be paying close attention to how the party does in black middle class neighborhoods in Johannesburg. The EFF remains a wild card; its most prominent leader, Julius Malema, is irresponsible and has been expelled from the ANC. But, he advocates expropriation without compensation of white-owned property. Up to one-third of South African blacks support such a position–according to polls. But the overwhelming majority of all races favor any redistribution of property to be conducted according to the rule of law–not the way Robert Mugabe seized white-owned farms in Zimbabwe. The Metal Workers Union could be a key to significant political change during the next round of national elections, in 2019. It has withdrawn its support from the ANC. It is wealthy and strong. It appears to be moving toward establishing a genuine labor party. If it does so, there would then be a responsible left-wing party that could pose a significant challenge to the ANC in the townships. Over the next five years the DA may be able to attract more black voters by choosing more black leaders. And, after five more years in office, the ANC may become more sclerotic. But, for now, my bet is that the ANC will not fall below 60 percent of seats in Parliament, the DA will increase it seats but only by a small margin. The EFF will enter parliament, but with only a handful of seats. But, as Rebecca Davis writes in the Daily Maverick, “anybody claiming to be able to predict with certainty how this country’s citizens are going to vote should be treated with more than a little skepticism." So, she consulted three astrologers. Predictably, they were all over the map.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. This week’s “Weekly Incidents” infographic illustrates violence in Nigeria in three separate time frames. Each emphasizes that violence in the country is varied both in terms of the actors who perpetrate it and the geographical spread. The infographic is embedded below and can also be found here. Learn About Tableau The heat map records two main centers of violence: in the Middle Belt where sectarian violence where farmers and herdsmen clashed in at least three separate incidents in Adamawa and Taraba states; in the north, Boko Haram and the security forces clashed at a military base, killing an estimated forty-four people, and Boko Haram also killed two All Progressives Congress (APC) officials in Borno. In addition to these incidents however are armed gunman attacks in the north and south in which a five-year-old child died and a vigilance chief was shot. Another suspected kidnapper was also burned to death in Ogun state. The Weekly Incidents also shows violence trends by perpetrator over the past four months. Between January and April, March was by far the most violent month, including the attack on Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri and the subsequent shooting of over eight hundred people detained in the barracks. There has been comparatively little conflict between Boko Haram and the security services in the other months in 2014 thus far. The final graphic this week shows the trend line of violence since the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) began in May 2011. The graphic shows an increase in the pace of violence dating back to the third quarter of 2012. It increases again significantly in the first quarter of 2013, and dramatically again between the third quarter of 2013 and first quarter of 2014; which shows the current levels of violence. The information in the NST is indicative rather than definitive of the real numbers killed in violence in Nigeria. The trends depicted however are accurate. Accurate numbers can be extremely difficult to obtain in Nigeria, especially in hard to reach and insecure places. This is dramatically demonstrated in the wide ranging discrepancies and misinformation on the kidnapping of the Nigerian school girls from northern Borno state. The schools girls were kidnapped on April 15, and the incident is recorded in that week’s infographic. The number of those taken ranges from seventy (government sources) to over three hundred (the school and parents of the victims). Such a range makes all available information suspect other than the admission that more is unknown than known.

Robert Mugabe, the poster boy for bad governance in Africa, said last month that Zimbabweans were behaving “like Nigerians” with respect to bribes and corruption. This, he implied, is not a good thing. The administration of Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan was apparently enraged. On April 11, the Nigerian Foreign Ministry called in the senior Zimbabwean envoy in Abuja to protest, characterizing Mugabe’s comments as “vitriolic and denigrating.” According to the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN). The ministry’s statement continued, “not only does it not reflect the reality in our country, but to come from a sitting president of a brotherly country is most unkind and very dishonorable.” Transparency International’s well-regarded “Corruption Perception Index” lists Nigeria as 133 out of 175 countries, and Zimbabwe at 157. The country ranked one (Denmark and New Zealand tied) is considered the least corrupt, that listed 175 (Somalia, Afghanistan, and North Korea tied) as the most corrupt. So, Mugabe is wrong: Zimbabwe is more corrupt than Nigeria. Nigeria faces the Boko Haram insurrection in the north, ethnic and religious conflict in the Middle Belt, and the prospect of renewed insurgency in the oil patch. Zimbabwe remains an international pariah and faces unresolved succession issues. Nigeria may feel especially stung by Mugabe’s comments because it prides itself on the assistance it provided to southern African liberation movements in the days of apartheid in South Africa and Ian Smith’s white-ruled Rhodesia. But, perhaps it is also a useful distraction for both countries to quarrel over which is the more corrupt than to face their numerous other internal challenges.

South Africa’s Public Protector stated in a recent report that taxpayer money funded improvements to Nkandla, President Jacob Zuma’s private estate. The public protector found this “unconscionable, excessive, and caused a misappropriation of public funds.” President Zuma made his first public comment on March 31, in remarks carried by a TV station. He said, “I never did anything wrong.” In effect, he is blaming his subordinates within the governing African National Congress (ANC). That isn’t resonating with at least some of the South African public. For example, former ANC minister Pallo Jordan writes that “even though it has many commendable achievements in healthcare, education, and social security, the record of [Zuma’s] administration is littered with scandal.” Current deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe is calling on the administration to implement the Public Protector’s recommendations, including that Zuma repay a percentage of the cost of the improvements to Nkandla. Some blogosphere comments, especially from the townships, are considerably more heated. For example, one wrote, “It is not fair that some of us live in shacks, homeless, and we see a person living in a home that cost more than R200 million. Even worse, a president, ai! Some kids are taught under trees, no clinics and other things, and he takes so much money. It is not fair.” It is widely believed that the funds used at Nkandla had been budgeted for urban housing for the poor. On the other hand, the ANC Youth League, now allied with Zuma, has denounced the public protector. But, secretary general of the ANC Gwede Mantashe sharply criticized the Youth League for their comments. In a strong affirmation of South Africa’s institutions of accountability, he said, “the ANC reaffirms its support and confidence in the institutions established by our Constitution to protect and strengthen our democratic order. The Office of the Public Protector is an integral component of this machinery.” The Public Protector functions as a public ombudsman. The current incumbent, Thuli Madonsela, is known for her independence, integrity – and fearlessness. Conclusions from this episode: Zuma has been in trouble before because of corruption; Nkandla fits the pattern. Motlanthe’s statement illustrates that South Africa’s institutions of accountability are the strongest in Africa. And the ANC as a whole is far from willing to compromise those institutions to save Zuma embarrassment. Will Nkandla sway the electorate in next month’s general elections? Probably not by much. Voting in South Africa is governed by proportional representation, and remains largely a racial census, with most black Africans supporting the ANC. Indeed, it is almost unimaginable that the ANC will lose a majority, though opposition parties may gain ground at its expense. The next government of South Africa will be an ANC one. But, the ANC’s share of the total vote might fall from its current 66 percent. If it should fall below 60 percent, Zuma would be in deep trouble with his own party. The ANC removed his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, when it concluded that he was too distant from the ANC constituency. It could do so again.

This is a guest post by Jim Sanders, a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are his personal views and do not reflect those of his former employers. Northeastern Nigeria increasingly resembles the world depicted in the 1985 film, To Live and Die in LA. Directed by William Friedkin, the story is about Secret Service agents’ pursuit of a counterfeiter. In the process, differences between criminals and law enforcement personnel nearly disappear. A reviewer observes that the criminals have more of an inner life than the law enforcers, whose actions are “endlessly self-consuming,” leading to “meaningless death and brutality.” A “contradictory moral universe” emerges “where the wrong people die and redemption is an illusion.” So, too, in Maiduguri, Nigeria. According to IRIN, the lines between soldiers and Boko Haram attackers are increasingly blurred. Soldiers sent to help civilians are accused of human rights violations, even torture. A New York Times’ report on the recent killings at Giwa Barracks on March 14, suggests that what occurred was a slaughter of the innocents; the majority of the 500 killed were “not proven insurgents.” Nor does it seem likely that the increasingly horrific realities on the ground will change soon. IRIN notes the difficulty in gaining access to areas in need and states where, “very few local NGOs or civil society organizations are responding to needs in the north.” Such horror in Nigeria parallels that in Central African Republic. Nihilism in the northeast looms as an outgrowth of corruption in the heart of Nigeria’s political system. Central Bank governor Lamido Sanusi was “removed just as he was shifting his inquiry to where the money [the missing $20bn] has allegedly gone,” the Financial Times revealed last week. Vested interests, it appears, moved to protect themselves from exposure. A central theme in Friedkin’s work is that, “nothing can be relied upon in this world. Women turn out to be men, good guys behave like bad guys, people are not who they claim to be, partners betray each other, money could be real or fake, and death comes when you least expect it.” These are conditions Nigerian writer Ben Okri may have anticipated when a character in his novel The Famished Road exclaims, “the sun bared the reality of our lives and everything was so harsh it was a mystery that we could understand and care for one another or for anything at all.”

On March 18, governors from Nigeria’s north and Middle Belt met with U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice and other U.S. officials at the White House. The governors come from states where economic development is slow or non-existent and includes those where the radical, Islamist insurgency “Boko Haram” is active. Following the meeting, the White House issued a typically bland statement: “Rice and the governors discussed the need to bring an end to the violence and insurgency in northern Nigeria; create broad-based economic opportunity in the north and throughout Nigeria; protect and respect human rights; strengthen democratic governance; and ensure that the 2015 election in Nigeria are free and fair.” The Guardian (Nigeria) published a read-out of the meeting on March 23 with a different flavor. It cites “authoritative sources,” who almost certainly were Nigerian. The Guardian states that Governors Murtala Nyako (Adamawa state), Rabiu Kwankwaso (Kano state-the largest state in Nigeria by population), and Kashim Shettima (Borno state-a major center of Boko Haram), perhaps among others, were highly critical of President Goodluck Jonathan and his administration. The Guardian devotes the most space to Governor Nyako’s remarks. It reports that the governor accused federal security agencies of colluding with the backers of Boko Haram to perpetuate the conflict. He said the security services facilitated the flow of arms and information to Boko Haram. The real kicker was his accusation that the motivation behind the collusion was to reduce the voting power of the North East in the upcoming 2015 national elections and (in the words of the Guardian) “to keep the region perpetually underdeveloped.” Nigeria’s ambassador to the United States, also present, is reported by the Guardian to have strongly objected to Nyako’s attack on the president. The Guardian reports that the ambassador was supported by at least two other governors, both of whom are members of Jonathan’s Peoples Democratic Party. Nyako, Kwankwaso, and Shettima are members of the opposition party. The Guardian is a leading Nigerian newspaper with a national circulation. Its report of the White House meeting is credible. Given the horrific nature of Boko Haram violence, it might seem extraordinary that a governor would accuse the security services of collusion with it. However, many of my northern contacts say much the same thing as Nyako. Similar accusations were made about security service collusion with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) before and after the 2007 elections. It was widely said that the security services wanted to keep the MEND insurgency going because it ensured a steady flow of federal funds into the security services–from which they pocketed a percentage through various forms of corruption. I have insufficient information to comment on the veracity of Governor Nyako’s accusations, any more than I was able to comment on alleged security service collusion with MEND. However, that many Nigerians find such accusations credible, at the very least, is evidence of the profound lack of trust between the Abuja government and its citizens.

There is an apocryphal story that in France, King Louis XVI’s queen Marie Antoinette was once told, “Madame, the people have no bread.” To which she replied, "then let them eat cake." The reality behind the story was of a self-centered court widely perceived as isolated from the French people. The French Revolution followed shortly after. A report issued by South Africa’s national ombudsman, Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, brings Marie Antoinette to mind. After a two year investigation she has issued a report finding that President Jacob Zuma’s expenditure of some $23 million on his Nkandla estate allegedly for “security enhancements” was “inconsistent with his office.” Among other things, "security enhancements" included a swimming pool, described as fire-fighting equipment. Her 444-page report urges Zuma to repay “a reasonable percentage of the cost of the measures.” The $23 million is several times the amount spent on the security of the residences of national icon Nelson Mandela. President Zuma has responded that he will study the report and respond in “due course.” Thuli Madonsela has an enviable reputation for independence and probity. The story is carried in the New York Times, March 19, 2014. The real kicker in the Times story is near the end. “Money to complete the work was diverted from inner-city regeneration projects.” Here is where the “cake” comes in: diverting money from inner-city deprived areas for a private compound smacks of isolation from the realities of South Africa, and especially from the natural constituency of the ruling African National Congress. National elections are on May 7 this year. Up to now, South African voting patterns have largely been along racial lines, with the 80 percent of the electorate that is black voting overwhelmingly for the ruling African National Congress. However, the party and Jacob Zuma are increasingly seen as isolated, incompetent, and corrupt. There is speculation that while the African National Congress will retain its parliamentary majority, the percentage of seats in parliament that it holds will fall substantially below its present control of two-thirds of the seats. Should the ANC percentage fall below 60 percent that would be an earthquake in South African politics. There is speculation that if the party representation falls below 60 percent, it will remove Zuma from his position as party leader—and, likely, the presidency. It would be a ”revolution”–of sorts. Watch that space.