Congresses and Parliaments

On January 29, the Nigerian House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on all of the military service chiefs to resign. If they do not, the resolution called on President Muhammadu Buhari to fire them. Earlier, the Senate had also expressed the view that the service chiefs had to go. The House motion appears to be more formal than the Senate’s action. However, both reflect frustration at the resurgence of Boko Haram in the northeast. The road to Damaturu is the only remaining operable road connecting the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri, to the rest of Nigeria. Maiduguri has an international airport, and air travel to other Nigerian cities continue. The service chiefs were appointed by President Buhari in 2015 after he was elected to his first presidential term. Under military regulations, their terms of service expired in 2017, but the President has kept them on. They are Defense Chief Abayomi Olonisakin, Army Chief Tukur Buratai, Navy Chief Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas, and Air Chief Sadique Abubakar. It is unlikely that President Buhari will move against the service chiefs because of the National Assembly. He might, indeed, replace some or all. But, should he do so, it would be for his own reasons. All are personally loyal to the President.  The inability of the security services to defeat Boko Haram is the result of complex factors, not the personal limitations of the service chiefs, whatever they might be. The House of Representatives resolution makes specific reference to Boko Haram and the northeast. However, the breakdown of security is nationwide, and it is becoming a major political issue. Earlier in January, the governors of the states of Yorubaland in the southwest moved to establish a security force to supplement and assist the national police force in the face of a kidnapping epidemic that the Federal government appears powerless to stop. In fact, according to one report, twenty-three states across the country have stood up local security organizations, ranging from neighborhood watches to armed police. 

International Women’s Day affords an opportunity to reflect on the victories and ongoing struggles faced by women around the world. This year, there is much to celebrate—particularly in the realm of politics.

Last month, the British parliament voted to implement a trial of proxy voting for representatives on parental leave, a small step to make political institutions more gender-sensitive.

This post was coauthored by Alexandra Bro, research associate in the women and foreign policy program. Last week, US voters reshaped the face of Congress, pushing women's representation there close to 25% percent for the first time in history. These victories follow an extraordinary rise in female candidates this year, in which 22 women won their party's nomination for the Senate and more than 475 women announced a run for the House. More than twice as many women were elected this year than in the so-called "Year of the Woman" in 1992, which doubled the number of women in Congress on the heels of the contentious confirmation of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, then accused of sexual misconduct. A quarter century later, following the confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh – another Supreme Court nominee accused of sexual misbehavior – history has repeated itself at the ballot box. Read the full article in CNN.com >>

As European voters look for new alternatives, Green parties are making waves across the region. In doing so, they could signal a counterweight to the populist European right and influence national and European climate policies.

In the run up to national elections (scheduled for 2019), there is once again uproar over the size of the compensation paid to Nigerian parliamentarians. This time, it was Senator Shehu Sani, from Kaduna and a member of President Buhari’s All Progressives Congress, who blew the whistle. Shehu Sani said that the salary of Senators is 750,000 naira per month plus allowances of 13.5 million naira per month, for a total package of 14.25 million naira per month. At the current black market rate of 360 naira to the U.S. dollar, that total is slightly less than $40,000 per month, and slightly less than $480,000 per year. (Estimates are that the majority of Nigeria’s population lives on less than $2.00 per day.) The Nigerian media has long reported that Nigerian parliamentarians are the most highly paid in the world. Comparison with compensation paid to U.S. senators and representatives might be instructive. U.S. senators or representatives earns a salary of $174,000 per year. They also receive health insurance, life insurance, and are enrolled in social security. For these senators must pay premiums out of their salary. U.S. senators and representatives, like their Nigerian counterparts, also receive official allowances. This amount varies according to particular circumstances, such as committee chairmanships, and senators receive more than representatives. In 2010, one estimate was that an average senator received $3.3 million in allowances to cover staff salaries, office space, postage, and myriad other expenses. Notably, no lodging per diem is paid. Hence, a member of the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives receives far more in salary and expenses than a member of the Nigerian National Assembly. Furthermore, a Nigerian politician lacks the resources available to a U.S. member of Congress, such as the fully-developed Congressional Research Service or the Library of Congress. That being said, the resources at the disposal of a U.S. member of Congress are closely governed by law and regulation. By contrast, a member of the National Assembly in Nigeria, one of the poorest countries in the world, can largely spend his allowances anyway he sees fit. Not only is parliamentary compensation in Nigeria massive compared to the overall wealth of the country, but it is largely unregulated and subject to abuse.  Levels of parliamentary compensation in Nigeria are so high that there is an understanding that service in the National Assembly is an aspect of patronage/clientage relationships and should be rotated between ethnic group, local region, and religion. This is one reason why, following each national election, more than sixty percent of parliamentarians are new.  

China’s success in the next five years will depend largely on how well the government manages the tensions underlying its complex agenda. In particular, China’s leaders will need to balance a muscular Communist Party, setting standards and protecting the public interest, with an empowered market, driving the economy into the future. MILAN—As the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress has unfolded, much of the focus has been on who will occupy the key positions in President Xi Jinping’s administration for the next five years. But China’s future trajectory depends crucially on another group of leaders, who have received far less attention: the technocrats who will carry out the specific tasks associated with China’s economic reform and transformation. Over the last four decades, China’s technocrats have collectively engineered a miraculous transformation. The current generation, a gifted group of policymakers, will step down in or around March 2018, passing the baton to a new generation. That generation—highly educated, experienced, and, for the most part, successful on their own merits—is prepared to carry China’s economic and social progress forward with great skill and dedication. The question is whether they will have an open field on which to run. One thing is certain: the next generation of technocrats will face very different conditions from those confronted by their predecessors. China has reached a moment of significant uncertainty. Beyond the questions inherent in the process of generational turnover, there has been a dramatic shift in China’s dominant policy framework under Xi. Under Deng Xiaoping—the leader who initiated China’s radical “reform and opening up” in 1978 – the singular policy goal was domestic economic transformation and growth, to be achieved with a collaborative decision-making model that included vigorous internal debate. Deng explicitly ruled out a broader international agenda for China—a dictate that China’s policymakers followed for more than three decades. Since taking power in 2012, Xi has changed this policy framework in several key ways. For starters, he tackled the endemic corruption that had been undermining the credibility of the CCP (and, by extension, China’s governance model), by launching an unprecedented anti-graft campaign that reached the highest levels of the Party’s leadership. Many expected Xi’s anti-corruption campaign to be a temporary initiative, intended to pave the way for implementation of the aggressive economic reforms announced at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee in 2013. Instead, the campaign has become essentially a permanent feature of Xi’s administration. Xi believes that a government’s legitimacy is mainly a function of consistently delivered values, together with economic and social progress, with strict commitment to the public interest taking precedence over the form of governance. While few Western observers have fully recognized this perspective, developments in the West over the last ten years—the 2008 financial crisis, widening income and wealth inequality, and intensifying political polarization—have reinforced this mindset. As a result, Chinese leaders and citizens are more convinced than ever that government by a strong single party is an essential pillar of stability and growth. The focus in the West on the form of governance, as opposed to inclusive economic and social outcomes, is misguided, they believe, because both democratic and autocratic systems can be corrupted. Moreover, China’s economic agenda under Xi has expanded beyond its narrow focus on domestic growth and development to include a concerted effort to expand Chinese influence in the global economy, especially in the developing world. This broad and expanding external agenda generates claims on resources—you can’t be the dominant external investor in Africa and Central Asia without spending a lot of money—while influencing policy choices. For example, state-owned enterprises, including banks, may respond more flexibly than purely private enterprises to a variable mix of public and private incentives and investment returns. Finally, in recent years, China’s policy frameworks have increasingly reflected the inherent tension between the long-standing imperative of ensuring social and political stability and the more modern objective of market liberalization. China’s leadership remains steadfastly committed to protecting the Party’s interests, which it views as coterminous with those of society. For that reason, the CCP continues to focus on upholding order and instilling values in all aspects of Chinese life, maintaining an active presence not only in policy debates, but also in private-sector activities and social affairs. At the same time, the government is seeking to give markets a more decisive role in the economy, unleash the power of entrepreneurship and innovation, and respond more effectively to the needs and desires of a young, educated, and fast-growing middle class. And for good reason: these are the internal engines that have enabled China to achieve 6-7% annual GDP growth amid a difficult structural shift and middle-income transition, carried out in a relatively weak global economy. It is hard to say for sure whether these two objectives are in direct conflict with each other. But there is reason for concern. The kind of dynamic competition that leads to innovation is, after all, far from a centrally guided process, though public-sector choices in areas like basic research do have a substantial impact. Moreover, in both policy making and academia, active debate is indispensable to sorting good ideas from bad ones. Yet while the Chinese system has proved its capacity for high-level internal policy debate among highly trained and experienced participants whose loyalty is not in question, and then act quickly and decisively, China’s leaders remain suspicious of unfettered public debate and commentary. But many complex policy choices—for example, about financial-sector reform and opening up—would benefit from the winnowing process that greater openness affords. Over the next five years, China’s success will depend largely on how well the government’s complex agenda, and the tensions it entails, are managed. To achieve their objectives, China’s leaders will need to strike a delicate balance between a muscular, disciplined, and ubiquitous Party, setting standards and protecting the public interest, and innovative, empowered, and potent markets, driving the economy into the future. This article originally appeared on project-syndicate.org.

As China’s senior Communist Party members anoint its future leaders, President Xi Jinping is poised to solidify his position and power at next week’s party congress.

Gallup put out a poll today that shows most Americans disapprove of President Trump’s recent moves on immigration and refugees. Here’s the chart: The temporary ban on immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries draws the most support, but it tops out at just 42 percent in favor. And if you think Trump’s 43 percent approval rating is low for a president who has been on the job for less than two weeks, you’d be right. A year-and-a-half passed before Barack Obama’s approval rating sank that far, four-and-a-half years before George W. Bush’s did, and six months before Bill Clinton’s did. But as I have noted before, overall poll results are misleading in an age of political polarization. What matters is how opinion breaks down along party lines. So here’s the chart the White House and Capitol Hill are looking at: Democrats oppose Trump’s immigration and refugee moves. Independents lean against them. But Republicans overwhelmingly give them two thumbs up. The lesson from these numbers? As long as GOP support remains high, don’t expect the White House to change course—or for Congress to force it to—even if Democrats, and most Independents, disagree.

I wrote on Monday that Donald Trump’s critics on Capitol Hill will have a hard time challenging his foreign policy choices. An early test of that claim could come in the form of a new bill that would require congressional approval before Trump could relax existing sanctions on Russia. The legislation, which has yet to be introduced, is set to be sponsored by Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), the Senate minority leader, and Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD), the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Schumer said on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos that two other Senate heavyweights, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), will cosponsor the bill. Trump has said he would consider lifting existing sanctions on Russia if the Kremlin agreed to cut its nuclear weapons. The wisdom of trading sanctions relief for arms cuts is debatable, and it’s an idea Trump may never pursue. But as things stand now, if he did he wouldn’t need Congress’s permission. The bill Schumer described would change that. Without seeing the bill’s details it’s impossible to say precisely how it would constrain Trump or how hard those constraints might be to evade or break. But he isn’t likely to sign on to the idea in any event. No president wants to see Congress clip his wings on foreign policy, especially as his administration is just starting. And GOP lawmakers contemplating whether to support the bill will be reminded of one sobering fact: three out of four Republican voters think Trump has taken the right approach toward Russia. So stay tuned.

Donald Trump’s inaugural address showed that he intends to do things differently and to do different things. The biggest changes could come in foreign policy. His address shunned the usual talk about American global leadership. It instead described an America impoverished from bearing the burden for others. Trump’s America will tend to its narrow interests first: “Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration (and) on foreign affairs will be made to benefit American workers and American families.” We will soon see how Trump’s rhetoric translates into actual policies. Perhaps his deeds won’t match his words. Practical realities could lead him to choose policies similar to his predecessors’, even if he insists otherwise. But he could also fundamentally reset the direction of U.S. foreign policy. If so, critics on Capitol Hill will find it difficult to stop him. Some of the reasons why are obvious. The Constitution grants presidents considerably more leeway to act overseas than at home. Presidents alone decide whom to negotiate with and about what. They can nullify treaties, repudiate longstanding commitments, and initiate or sever diplomatic relations. They can assert an independent war-making authority. And as the Iran nuclear deal showed, they can use executive agreements to circumvent the Senate’s treaty-making power. Congress has reinforced the president’s constitutional advantages over the decades by passing hundreds of laws delegating authority to the White House and cloaking many executive branch activities in secrecy. Even where Congress seeks to limit its delegations, presidents and their lawyers usually find ample room to maneuver. So the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed in 2001 to sanction the fight against al-Qaeda now provides the legal basis for the fight against the Islamic State, which didn’t exist at the time and is al-Qaeda’s rival if not its enemy. On top of the formal powers rooted in the Constitution and in law, presidents enjoy what Alexander Hamilton hailed in Federalist No. 70 as the inherent advantages of "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch." The power to initiate events can be the power to define them. Congress certainly can reverse many presidential decisions if it so desires. Doing so, however, requires passing laws. That typically means overriding a presidential veto, a prospect made all the more daunting when the president’s party controls both houses of Congress. Trump’s leverage over Congress benefits from two other factors specific to him. One is his demonstrated willingness to double down rather than retreat in the face of criticism. Presidents frequently recalibrate when opposition to their policies mounts. They choose to conserve their political capital for other fights. But presidents willing to pay the political price for ignoring widespread public disapproval, as George W. Bush did with the surge in Iraq, often get their way. Even more helpful to Trump in carrying the day is what he hopes to accomplish overseas. Discussions about executive-legislative battles over foreign policy generally assume Congress is reining in an activist president. James Madison’s belief that the power of the purse is “the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people” reflects that assumption. And as the recent demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership attests, Congress is at its most powerful when presidents need its consent to act abroad. But much of Trump’s foreign policy agenda looks to be about doing less and not more. He’s questioning the value of American alliances and foreign commitments rather than looking to deepen or extend them. And Congress historically has found it difficult if not impossible to get presidents to embrace initiatives that don’t interest them. Barack Obama’s dismissal of congressional calls to do more in Syria is only the most recent example of this longstanding dynamic. In short, Congress is far better positioned to constrain than to compel. None of this is to argue that Trump will always have his way on foreign policy. All presidents face institutional constraints. And all presidents decide that some battles with Congress aren’t worth fighting. However, if Trump does choose to give life to the vision he laid out in his inaugural address, his critics on Capitol Hill will be reminded just how powerful presidents can be.

The publication on November 2 of the South Africa Public Protector’s report on “state capture” by the president and his cronies, the Gupta family, would seem to indicate Jacob Zuma’s direct involvement in corruption. The publication has created a media stir, with the quality Western media devoting more extensive coverage to it than is usual. Yet, the report does not contain a “smoking gun,” but rather calls for an extensive (and well-financed) formal investigation. There is speculation that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) is moving toward the removal of Zuma from office. Such speculation underestimates Zuma’s sources of strength within the security establishment, among certain provincial governors, and the persistence of his patronage network. Indeed, arguably the public protector’s report has generated more excitement abroad than at home, where its broad outlines were already known. Nevertheless, the report is yet another in a string of mostly legal reversals since December 2015 that have progressively weakened Zuma’s political strength. Zuma has lost the support of erstwhile allies ranging from at least some of the party apparatus, known as ‘Luthuli House,’ after the party’s headquarters in Johannesburg, the South African Communist Party, and some of the large trade unions. One ANC elder statesman after another has called on Zuma to resign or for his removal otherwise from the presidency. Even if subsequent investigations of Zuma do produce a “smoking gun,” which is entirely possible, his removal from office by impeachment in parliament is unlikely. The ANC, despite dramatic losses in the August 2016 local government elections, retains a huge parliamentary majority, and many of the MP’s are close to the president. He survived yet another close call today, November 10, 2016, when ANC parliamentarians refused to vote him out of office. The story appears to be different within the ANC. Many party chieftains view the August 2016 elections as a wake-up call, and see the party’s reverses as a lack of confidence in the Zuma administration. Others deeply resent the influence of the Gupta’s over the president, his appointments, and his policies. Others resent Zuma’s apparent corruption, still others are genuine democrats and resent his seeming assault on South Africa’s constitutional institutions. Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, the president is not directly elected. Instead, he (or she) is chosen by the victorious party, and is usually the head of said party. The party could, therefore, remove Zuma as the president of the ANC. Were it to do so, following the precedent of Thabo Mbeki who Zuma defeated as party president in 2007, he would be expected to resign the presidency. In effect, the party would recall Zuma from the presidency. A party effort to topple Zuma would most likely occur at the party’s national convention. The next is scheduled for December 2017. However, it could be moved forward. If that happens, the likelihood that Zuma will not finish his term increases.

Byron Holland is president and CEO of the Canadian Internet Registration Authority, which manages the .ca domain. Like many foreigners, I follow U.S. politics closely. What happens in Washington, DC on trade, economics, foreign policy, and security matters can often have ripple effects across the world. This is also true with respect to internet policy, and like many who work in the internet industry, I am getting increasingly concerned by some of the news coming out of Washington. I find the rhetoric surrounding the IANA stewardship transition mind-boggling. How is it possible that the IANA transition, a process that will protect the internet from being captured by authoritarian governments, is being presented as a plan for government takeover of the internet? It reminds me of Orwellian doublespeak where war is peace and freedom is slavery. Only this isn’t fiction and the consequences could be detrimental to the interests of the United States and its closest friends. The IANA stewardship transition is a crucial step in the evolution of the internet. While some people in Washington would have you believe the opposite, the transition will protect the internet from capture by Russia, China, Iran and others. I fear the transition is being used as a pawn in a play for political gain. The fact is, no government can take over the internet. To say otherwise is not just misleading, it’s simply untrue. This is not how the internet was designed, and it’s not how the internet works. The people who actually built the internet—those that know it inside and out—are the ones who worked on the plan to transition oversight from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to a multistakeholder body. They all agree that the plan, which received NTIA’s approval, is in the best way to protect the free and open internet. This plan was not written by governments, and it is not a part of a grand conspiracy to give the internet away to Russia or China. Some of the best and brightest people that help the internet run smoothly, including many Americans, put this plan together with the continued security and stability of the internet in mind. The IANA stewardship transition has become a distraction from the real fight for internet freedom. I was in Dubai at the World Conference on International Telecommunications in 2012 when the United States and its allies successfully prevented the United Nations from trying to take control over parts of the technical operations of the internet. Like-minded nations stood side-by-side with their American counterparts again at the United Nations in 2015 when, through the process to review the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society, we were successful in protecting internet freedom. If history tells us anything, it is that this fight will have to be fought again. Now we’re facing a flurry of activities to block the very action—the IANA stewardship transition—that will continue to allow us to protect the free and open internet. Blocking or delaying the transition at the eleventh hour can only weaken the U.S. position at forums where authoritarian regimes—Russia, China, Iran, and others—are actively continuing their fight for control over the internet. Some of our allies, the countries that have stood side-by-side with U.S. delegations fending off those authoritarian regimes, may not be there for us when the next fight happens. They have participated in the two-year process to see the transition completed, and for the United States to now halt the process at the eleventh hour puts that support at risk. The truth is, there are a number of nations who are actively seeking to exert their interests over the internet. Unfortunately, too many people in Washington are putting politics ahead of protecting it. This IANA stewardship transition process must be allowed to proceed as planned. We need to let the contract between the NTIA and ICANN expire, and let the multistakeholder community carry on. A free and open internet depends on it.

Responding to reports that Russian hackers stole voter lists in Arizona and Illinois, federal officials are scrambling to help states protect voting systems from cyberattacks in the next sixty days. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson has warned election officials in all fifty states that voting systems could be compromised and offered federal support. Private cybersecurity firms have offered assistance on a pro bono basis as have a large number of white hat hackers. Yet the enormity of the challenge raises questions about the effectiveness of making voting systems immune from cyberattack before election day. According to the New York Times, some 9,000 jurisdictions have a role in overseeing voting. An accurate count of the number of polling places, let alone the numbers and types of voting machines does not exist. While the National Institute of Standards and Technology has issued guidance on securing them (hint: don’t connect them to the internet), the ability of election officials to thwart an advanced and dedicated adversary like Russia is limited. Even disconnecting systems is no panacea. If Russia were motivated enough, a Stuxnet-like piece of malware could be introduced into systems. More likely than not, Russia will not go to those lengths. Instead of a multiyear campaign carried out by the FSB, the Kremlin is more likely to employ some of its favorite patriotic hackers to conduct less sophisticated but still disruptive attacks. As former National Security Council official Richard Clarke and others have hypothesized, Russia could create chaos on election day simply by deleting voters from voter lists. These individuals would be forced to cast provisional ballots, causing delays at voting lines and throwing into doubt early election results. In short, fortifying our voting system so it will deflect any attempts by Russia to interfere with it are likely to fall short. Instead, Russia must be deterred from making the attempt. That begins and ends with Congress. Normally, the standard operating procedure following the leaked details of an FBI investigation would be some strong words at a White House press briefing, possibly followed by a formal rebuke from the State Department. Given the partisan nature of the issue and President Obama’s outspoken support for Secretary Clinton, Moscow is likely to interpret his administration’s threats as empty. Meddling in the election could, after all, replace the current commander-in-chief with someone who continues to praise Putin. That is why Congress must take the first step in coordination with the Obama administration. Congress should issue a resolution condemning interference in our election by cyber or other means, accompanied by a joint statement of the leaders of the House and Senate. The resolution should make clear that the United States will regard any foreign attempt to interfere with the outcome of the election as a hostile act. It must be clear that Congress will support the use of all instruments of national power in response to any attempt. At press briefings, when reporters ask if Congress would support military action against Russia, Congressional leaders should refuse to take any responses off the table. The resolution must demand that Russia provide assistance to the FBI in investigating the two known incidents and actively pursue investigations into other incidents. It must be clear that Washington will hold Moscow responsible for any attacks on the election coming out of Russia. The actions of patriotic hackers will be treated as if they were launched by Putin from his desktop computer. Failure to assist in investigations will be taken as evidence of culpability. While Congress is issuing a clear, bold and public rebuke of Russia, the Obama administration should covertly deliver a less diplomatic but chilling message. Rolling up known Russian intelligence infrastructure (both cyber and human), targeting Putin’s reportedly vast wealth and that of cronies, and building up military forces in Russia’s near abroad should all be on the table. The goal of this campaign must be to achieve escalation dominance over Russia. Efforts to secure the voting system from cyberattack should no doubt continue. Investments in technology to protect these systems and make them more secure could reduce or remove the threat in future election cycles (block chain holds some promise here). But in order for the United States to deter Russia, Russia needs to understand that the United States is willing to put more at risk to protect the sanctity of its elections than Russia is to disrupt them.