Modi Meets Trump, With Tanvi Madan

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox. I'm Jim Lindsay, the Mary and David Boies Distinguished Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. This wecek's topic is Modi meets Trump. With me to discuss how U.S. relations with India are likely to evolve in the wake of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi's meeting last week with Donald Trump is Tanvi Madan. Tanvi is a Senior Fellow in The Center for Asia Policy Studies in the Foreign Policy program at The Brookings Institution. Her work explores India's foreign policy and especially its relations with China and the United States. She's the author of Faithful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations during the Cold War, and the host of The Global India Podcast at Brookings, which I highly recommend. Tanvi recently wrote an article for Foreign Affairs titled India is Hoping for a Trump Bump. Tanvi, thank you for joining me on The President's Inbox.

MADAN:
It's great to be back on the podcast with you, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Tanvi, we are talking in the shadow of the recently wrapped up meeting between Narendra Modi and Donald Trump. Can you give me a forty-thousand foot sort of recap of what we think happened in those conversations?

MADAN:
I think if you think about this visit, one thing to remember is how unusual, even unprecedented, it has been for an Indian prime minister to come to the U.S. this early into an administration. And I think what laid behind it is India's attempt to do two things, some brush clearing, which is essentially to try to avoid any flare-ups as we've seen with other American partners and allies, and also to lay the kind of groundwork for future progress in the relationship. So that was the brush clearing. I think the second thing you saw is an attempt to try to do some tone and agenda setting for the next four years of the relationship, both bilaterally and vis-â-vis groupings like The Quad that has Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.
You saw this from an Indian perspective as trying to do these two things. I think from President Trump's perspective he was trying to both reestablish, as India was, his relationship he developed with Prime Minister Modi in his first term, and he thinks very highly of him, and he said that repeatedly, but also to try to get some things out of India. He particularly, I think, has been quite focused on the trade element. He calls India the Tariff King, and he wants a trade deal, something we had again and again, but I think the other aspect of kind of the big picture view of this is two countries who have over the last about twenty five years increasingly got closer and closer in different dimensions, and both sides in some senses trying to keep that train going, though I think both coming at it from slightly different points of view. I think for India, very much still the strategic point of view and for Trump much more transactional.

LINDSAY:
Tanvi, how much should we make of this personal element between Modi and Trump? In the past, they've met and given each other bear hugs. Is that something significant that is likely to ease U.S.-Indian relations? Or is that something that at the end of the day is beside the point?

MADAN:
I think what we've seen from the first Trump term and even during the course of this visit is that it is extremely helpful, but I think it's also not all that in the sense that it allows, it kind of facilitates the two countries getting over some humps that with other allies or partners, if President Trump doesn't like those leaders, you see how that actually ends up affecting what he does and says publicly, but also whether or not he's willing to make exceptions and deals. And the other thing that I think it helps do, so in some senses it helps you avoid the bumps, but it also, I think, then helps set that tone for the rest of the government, whether it's the cabinet level or working levels, that this is actually a country and a person that President Trump actually feels quite positively about, and so the default is to say yes, not necessarily no.
So I think it matters, but you also saw during the course of the visit that you nonetheless saw President Trump repeatedly criticize India's tariff rates and call for a trade deal. You could tell that was what was top of his mind, and he also laid out some other expectations of India, as he does for other allies and partners, which is things like defense deals or defense purchases or kind of more energy purchases, oil and liquefied natural gas, in India's case from the U.S. so I think it's helpful, but it is one of those necessary but not sufficient factors.

LINDSAY:
On the trade front, Tanvi, India runs a forty-five billion surplus in trade of goods, and that increased about five percent from 2023 to 2024. Did Prime Minister Modi come to Washington with some specific concessions on the trade front? I have heard that the Indians have slashed tariffs on the import of motorcycles from the United States, something that has been a particular concern to President Trump over the years.

MADAN:
I think you saw India take a three-pronged approach to the trade issue. One was to anticipate this criticism. They were dealing with it in the first Trump term. India was hit by some steel and aluminum tariffs like every other country, but also some specific constraints. The U.S. removed the generalized system of preferences status that India had and they were negotiating a mini trade deal, which never quite came to fruition, but this problem wasn't new. So one thing India did was anticipate this criticism and lower certain tariffs, the ones you mentioned. There were others that were somewhat more kind of amusing for the first time they were ever mentioned in a U.S.-India joint statement, tariffs on bourbon, for example. More access for duck meat into India, and you could see that that was something that lowering of tariffs in India's annual budget that was announced even before.
I think the second thing, the second prong you saw, was India come up with certain deals that they were offering which will go some way into even if not directly reducing the trade deficit that will in at least President Trump's mind they hope, will help him see that India is bringing value to the relationship and specifically to the bottom line. You see that in terms of some indication that India will be buying additional defense equipment that it wants from the U.S. including maritime reconnaissance aircraft, potentially Stryker combat vehicles, and even Javelin missiles, which will be potentially also co-produced in India. And President Trump even floated the idea that down the line the pathway might be open for Indian purchases of F-35 Fighter aircraft, though I think that if it ever actually materializes is much more of a long-term play so it was kind of defense purchases.
I think you saw India also say that it would purchase oil and natural gas and you saw them highlighting, and perhaps urging their companies to highlight, how much investment Indian companies are bringing into the U.S. and particularly highlighted those in red states or swing states. And the third prong, other than anticipating and lowering tariffs, bringing deals, the third was agreeing to what they have described as negotiations to result in a mutually beneficial bilateral trade agreement that also has a timeline, which it's going to be done according to the two sides by fall 2025 when President Trump is expected to go to India for the Quad Summit.
And I think that timeline is important because I think the Trump Administration is indicating it wants to see actual movement. What this could help India do is maybe head off some of, if there's progress between now and April, is maybe head off some of those reciprocal tariffs that otherwise no doubt India would be hit with. Maybe not all of them, but at least if they can show some progress, head off some of those tariffs that will hurt them quite badly if they go into effect.

LINDSAY:
Tanvi, how likely do you think it is that Washington and New Delhi could strike a significant trade agreement between now and the fall? I will note that historically India's approach to negotiating trade agreements has been very tough bargaining, very slow movement. You're talking about putting something together in a little more than six months.

MADAN:
I think it will be tough, there's no doubt about it for the reason you say. I think American and Indian trade negotiators are also probably some of the toughest negotiators in the world. I think the other thing that has happened that makes this complicated is the U.S. is actually much more like India these days on trade, kind of more protectionist than it used to be, thinking about the kind of political economy. Voters have indicated that that's something they care about as well, and so I think you going to find that both sides will have to kind of, this is a stretch goal, and it might not be a very ambitious trade deal, but I think they will want to show, have something to show for it. Part of the things that might actually make it, though, worth doing nonetheless is in many ways India-U.S. trade is actually quite complementary. The toughest things will be things like market access for agricultural products, but even there we've seen some change.
And so I think part of it is going to be how much do both sides' negotiators get a message from their political leadership that they just have to get over, you know, the kind of nickel-and-diming and focus on that big picture of a relationship that could be doing a lot more. They laid out, they said, you know, "We want five-hundred billion." I think trade in goods is about one-hundred and twenty-billion dollars, there's a lot of services trade, and they threw out a number of five-billion dollars as a goal of trade by 2030. Now, mind you, in 2013, that's what then Vice President Joe Biden said the goal should be. So this has been a no-brainer for both sides, but it is going to be tough. I do think if there was ever one going to be done, it's probably now.
The one other incentive Prime Minister Modi might have is India's economic growth rate's still higher than most major economy, if not the highest, but it started to slow that growth. They haven't seen the kind of FDI, foreign direct investment, from American companies and other multinational corporations that they would like to see given the China Plus One diversification opportunity, and you see a prime minister also that has to create jobs. This was a message from the last election. And then, finally, he has a political window of opportunity. There's only one state election in India between now and April-May 2026.
So he has the political wind at his back at the moment. If he does want to, for India's own sake, not just for the Trump Administration, want to send a signal that India is open for business and liberalizing. This could be the time to do it, so I think we will get some deal. It's not going to be easy. It will not necessarily be ambitious, but if it's going to happen, this is probably the window we'll see it happen if ever.

LINDSAY:
Well, one constraining factor, Tanvi, on the American side is going to be the role of the United States Congress. Any significant trade deal will require congressional approval, and that is easier said than done since there is no pre-delegated trade negotiating authority existing right now. And that would tend to limit how ambitious any agreement could be on the U.S. side, but let's talk a little bit more about defense. And I take it that, as you noted, there was a lot of talk about India increasing its purchases of U.S. military equipment, was significant that President Trump floated the idea of allowing India to buy F-35s. They are the cutting edge in jet fighter technology.
Only a select few number of countries are allowed to purchase that technology, but I will also note that that technology is really expensive. And so, from the Indian point of view, how realistic do you think it is to see a sizable increase in India's purchase of U.S. military equipment given India's fiscal constraints, but also given the fact India has a longstanding military relationship with Russia? Much of the Indian military runs on Russian weapons, and so you need to sort of keep that pipeline alive, even if you just have to spare parts to repair things. You can't junk your whole military establishment overnight, so help me right-size expectations about what could happen in the U.S.-India defense relationship.

MADAN:
I think, Jim, for all the reasons you laid out, this is why there's a lot of skepticism that India would actually buy the F-35 if it was actually offered more kind of wholesomely or fulsomely as the case may be, but I do think you have already seen, and if there continues to be strategic convergence between the U.S. and India, and perhaps we will talk about it, if you see that convergence continue, what you will see is India along several lines increase its cooperation on the defense and security and technology side with the U.S. It is one of the most remarkable aspects of the relationship, more so than if you'd asked twenty, twenty-five years ago what was going to be the driving force or aspects of this relationship, most people would have probably said economic ties.
And it's really been this defense and security side of the relationship that has been the driving force and, in part, driven itself by this shared concern about a rising China's assertiveness. And so will there be more purchases? Yes, because India does want to purchase more American equipment. It does consider it top of the line, but the other thing that has changed is the fact that you have now American companies willing to co-produce in India, even if not entire platforms, they have made India part of their supply chains and it suits American companies because they are near their market. There are now joint ventures that have the ability to produce these components and, potentially, it might open up certain export opportunities from India for American companies at a cheaper rate.
And so you've seen things like the tails of every C130 in the world now is produced at a facility in India, and so this is what I mean by you'll have defense sales, yes, but it's defense co-production. It is technology transfers. It is cooperation in these spaces in areas like cyberspace, you know, kind of old traditional space, but also now undersea domain awareness, maritime domain awareness, interoperability, but also now undersea domain awareness, maritime awareness, interoperability between U.S. and Indian forces.
India exercises more militarily with the U.S. than any other country. I think we'll see that continue. There was some intriguing, though, additional insights into what we might see in the next few years to deepen areas of cooperation, more security cooperation amongst the Quad countries. They've already been planning to have some shared strategic airlift capabilities in region, but there was also some reference to perhaps maritime patrols together. This would be pretty significant, and then we've seen, I think, on the technology side, a whole range of kind of joint work together on innovation between startups, between the two private sectors, including on autonomous vehicles of all sorts.
So I think what you're seeing is now a relationship that's really gone beyond the defense trade to include technology, corporation, co-production, and if not actual operational cooperation in a contingency, at least getting the ability to do that if the case might be. But you're right about right-sizing expectations. That last thing I mentioned, which is will the two countries actually come together in a contingency? We've seen the U.S. help India when it was facing some challenges from China at the border, but there are other contingencies, South China Sea, Taiwan, that I think will need to be discussed between the two countries.

LINDSAY:
Tanvi, a third major issue that President Trump and Prime Minister Modi discussed was immigration. Can you give me a sense of what the readout is there? Against the backdrop of what I understand was outrage in India earlier this month when a U.S. military flight brought back deportees who were in shackles.

MADAN:
The two aspects of the immigration issue between India and the U.S. these days, and I say these days, but these aren't new and they have been coming up. One is the aspect of legal migration and the second is these kind of illegal immigrants, undocumented migrants, or the new term I heard from Secretary Rubio was irregular migration from India to the U.S., which has been growing in a pretty staggering fashion in terms of folks crossing, especially the northern border, so from Canada in the last few years.

LINDSAY:
India is now the largest source of migrants outside of Latin America.

MADAN:
That's right, and so it used to be these were visa overstayers, but now you've had people coming and there's a whole network, it's called The Donkey Route, or in India, they call it The Donkey Route. It's so big, there's actually a Bollywood movie streaming networks. I think what you have. It's so there's actually a Bollywood movie on this that you could probably find on one of the kind of streaming networks here. I think what you have with there's been two kind of linked approach that you've see India and the U.S. take.
This is another area where Prime Minister Modi's government preemptively understood this was going to be an issue that President Trump cares deeply about, something he's promised his voters. And so they said that they were willing to accept a number of, thousands of deportees, back as long as they could verify that they are Indian citizens, and so that willingness. Now, there were also deportation flights from the Biden Administration, but where you've seen a little bit more of a complication is the Trump Administration for domestic purposes has been not just highlighting these, shooting videos of these, but also using military aircraft.
India has not and will not criticize President Trump publicly. That is a approach, they took in the first Trump term. What I suspect they might have conveyed to the Trump Administration is, you know, kind of help-us-help-you take more of these deportees by maybe taking a different approach. Don't put them in shackles. Maybe don't use military aircraft and maybe don't have videos of them now that you've got what you need on that side of it. So we'll wait to see. There are a few more deportation flights that we'll see and so we'll see if that has had an impact. They might even say that, you know, one of the reasons Prime Minister Modi can do things with the U.S. is because he knows that the Indian public is fairly positive about the U.S., but you don't want those sentiments to change, but it makes it easier for him to buy things like more oil and gas if Indian public is not objecting to it or at least Indian companies to do that.
So I think that illegal immigration side is being handled that way, which India is saying, "Well, so we'll take these back deportees," and saying, "We do not support it." I think the other thing that the administration will expect, and Modi has said he's willing to do, is actually crack down on some of these agents who are facilitating these routes. I think just very quickly on the legal migration side-

LINDSAY:
H-1B visas?

MADAN:
...the H-1B high skilled visas, but also the work component of student visas, OPTs that you get, these optional practical training. And I think on this, it's actually quite interesting. There is, as some of your listeners and viewers you might know, very visible debate and loud debate between parts of the Trump base. You have a tech MAGA base led by Elon Musk who are very important of these H-1Bs. I believe he himself was on one at one point and he said he's going to go to war on this issue.

LINDSAY:
As did Steve Bannon.

MADAN:
As did Steve Bannon, and Steve Bannon is more reflective, you know, in some ways of the traditional MAGA view on this, which Stephen Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, has been on the other side of this debate saying, "Actually, we want to cut down on these migrants," that there are too many. You've had others publicly of that group saying that there are too many Indians or Indian Americans in Silicon Valley. That's something that Steve Bannon had said in the first Trump term.
And, you know, it's led to some pretty kind of racist invective that we've heard from the right, which is also given the right in India some pause because they thought they could make common cause with the right wing in the U.S. So I think they've realized the limits of that, but what I think India is hoping is that the Musk view will prevail, and President Trump himself has been very supportive of the H-1B program thus far. And we'll see if he changes as he sees changes in his base's view on this.
The other thing that I think India has done, which is why it might be linked to that agreement that we talked about, whether or not it might not even be described as a trade agreement for the reasons you mentioned, the congressional side. You could see them say an economic cooperation agreement that includes this aspect of legal migration because the other point that Prime Minister Modi has made is that it actually is mutually beneficial to have legal migration that help contribute to innovation in the U.S., and help create jobs in the U.S., and opening the door for more Americans to go to India. Alyssa Ayres, former Senior Fellow at CFR, and I believe still-

LINDSAY:
Still an adjunct senior fellow?

MADAN:
...still an adjunct, has made this point for years. It's not just at the working level. There are the skewed kind of ratio between the number of Indian students coming here, which is now over three-hundred thousand and a few thousand Americans going to India. That needs to change. And so I think you'll see India also saying, "We'll facilitate that as well."

LINDSAY:
Tanvi, the readout from the Trump-Modi meeting was as notable for what we didn't hear about as what we did hear about. I didn't hear very much about Gaza, I didn't hear very much about Ukraine or about Iran. I believe the Indians continue to buy oil from Iran. Also, no real comment about U.S. charges that an Indian official tried to arrange an assassination of a Sikh leader here in the United States. Were there understandings reaching those issues that, you know, we haven't heard about? Or were they just topics that they decide to check on the margins because there are some significant differences between the two capitals?

MADAN:
I think it seemed clear from the press conference, but also other things we heard around the visit that they did discuss many of these issues. I think on Russia-Ukraine, Prime Minister Modi probably conveyed what he has heard from both President Putin and Zelenskyy, the Indian and Ukrainian national security adviser spoke not so long ago. So you've seen, kind of, India say if all sides want them to be helpful, they're happy to do that. And that is something, you know, Prime Minister Modi in one press appearance has also said.
He is very happy to see President Trump's effort to bring the war to an end, and that, you know, he repeated his saying to Putin, "This is not a time of war," and said India would be helpful. I think the other aspect where you would have seen on the kind of crisis side, they clearly did talk about the Middle East. It's not clear how much it was about the current crisis. It's very clear that they did intend to continue some of the initiatives from the Biden Administration, that themselves came out of the Abraham Accords that was signed during the Trump Administration.
And during the Biden Administration, there were two things, the I2U2, which is India, Israel, UAE, U.S. dialogue, and the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor that in some ways because of the Israel-Gaza conflict has been stalled. So you saw some discussion about both of those. India's position on Gaza is very clear. They have not been drawn out by their own press on what they think about President Trump's proposals, but India's position on Gaza has been quite clear or a Palestinian state.
They de facto, I mean, they not just believe in a two-state solution, they have foreign office consultations with what they call The State of Palestine, and Modi became the first Indian prime minister to go to Ramallah as well, so less and kind of more broadly about a Palestinian state. This is something that India has stuck to even though they have not criticized President Trump. And then very quickly on the issue of Iran, India actually ended up complying with U.S. Sanctions on Iran, but they're watching that quite closely. I think the-

LINDSAY:
Well, the Trump Administration is talking about tightening those.

MADAN:
... yes, though what would be interesting to, I think, folks in India is that while they've seen some of the kind of traditional hawkish language on Iran, they never want to see instability in the Middle East. They've got nine million Indian citizens there and a lot of their oil and natural gas comes from there, but they are, I think, I suspect also intrigued by President Trump saying, "I am open to a deal with Iran." And so India has no interest in seeing Iran as a nuclear weapon state, but I think they would be intrigued by this idea that President Trump would be willing to talk to Iran, something they actually do. And they have passed messages not just between Russia and Ukraine, but also between various parts of the Middle East.
Finally, on the question of, you know, these allegations of this murder-for-hire plot, I think if you read between the lines, you saw that it is something that came up in the joint statement itself. You see this aspect of more law enforcement cooperation. In the U.S. case, the senior administration official made clear that President Trump believes in the safety of every American citizen, and that remained the case to make clear that the U.S. had red lines about U.S. sovereignty. But you also saw that the U.S. side clearly exceeds some more Indian concerns about separatist calls from the United States that India has been concerned about.
I think, though, it should probably be clear to the, kind of, Indian side that because of free speech rules here, there's also limits to what the U.S. can do about calls for things versus action. So I wouldn't be surprised if we saw the federal investigation into the attack on the Indian consulate in San Francisco to kind of bear fruit at some point, but also sending a signal that anything that will constitute actual violence would actually be prosecuted by the U.S. So I think both sides, this is now in the judicial process, the actual case, but I think neither side wants to make this a major issue. They want to manage it, but they also want to make sure it doesn't come back up and affect the relationship in negative ways down the line.

LINDSAY:
Tanvi, I'd like to go back to the forty-thousand foot level in terms of U.S.-Indian relations. You have written that New Delhi wants greater alignment with the United States, but it also wants greater autonomy, so are we looking at increased cooperation or disappointment in the years to come?

MADAN:
I think one of the things with a Trump Administration is the Trump bar is somewhat different in terms of expectations. He wants more deals. He's not necessarily focused on what India might do or not do in a Taiwan contingency, even though other members of his administration might be focused on that. So I think the expectations might be different. I do think you'll continue to see India invest in this relationship aligned with the U.S. because it knows that it needs the U.S. for several Indian objectives, including its security and ensuring a multipolar Asia, including India's economic and technological transformation, and to even ensure India's desire to play a larger role in the world stage, and in some ways even to ensure Indian autonomy because today the biggest constraint on India's autonomy perhaps is kind of a rising and resurgent China and not the U.S., as people used to think in India in the 1980s.
And I think it's on that subject, though, that there will be some questions about the Trump Administration's approach, which might shape what India is willing to do with the U.S., but also might drive that continued desire to be autonomous or maintain some degree of autonomy. And that is kind of this question that they, I think, have about what President Trump's China approach is going to be. I think during the visit you heard a very dire question to President Trump about what he thought about India and the U.S. working together to counter China. And he instead turned around and said that he actually liked Xi Jinping and then he wanted to do a deal with him and that, why doesn't everybody just get along? He offered to mediate between China and India, and that would have caused some concern in India because they actually want a U.S. that is competing with China.
And there were a couple of other occasions where President Trump kind of demurred from saying that he wanted to compete with China. I think the other thing was also, you know, he threw out this idea of a Russia-China-U.S. summit again, and that's something India would not want to see because for them, it's they don't mind the spheres of influence world if it's them, the major power in South Asia, but a Russia-China-U.S. Summit to them would indicate that they're not one of the influencers.

LINDSAY:
They don't have a place at the table.

MADAN:
Yep, they're then considered part of China's sphere, so I think you will see them try to align even, I wouldn't be surprised if you had Prime Minister Modi behind closed doors, try to shape President Trump's views of China, but I think they will continue to try to build up their own capabilities and to maintain an array of diversified portfolio partners, which we'll include. And watch for them to deepen dives with the Middle Eastern countries with other American partners in Asia and allies, Australia and Japan in particular, and with some Middle Eastern major powers, in part to hedge against some of that uncertainty about the U.S. And finally, I think this is one reason they will continue to seek to try to stabilize and set that floor to their relationship with China.

LINDSAY:
On that enlightening note, I will close up this episode of The President's Inbox. My guest has been Tanvi Madan, Senior Fellow at Brookings and host of the podcast Global India. Tanvi, as always, it's great to chat.

MADAN:
Great to chat with you, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The President's Inbox at Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Spotify, wherever you listen and leave us a review. We love the feedback. The publications mentioned this episode and a transcript of our conversation are available on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on cfr.org. As always, opinions expressed on The President's Inbox are solely those of the host or of our guests, none of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's episode was produced by Justin Schuster, with recording engineer Elijah Gonzalez, and Director of Podcasting, Gabrielle Sierra. This is Jim Lindsay. Thanks for listening.