The Renewed Fighting in Gaza, With Steven Cook

LINDSAY:
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Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is the renewed fighting in Gaza.

With me to discuss the collapse of the temporary ceasefire and Gaza and the future of the conflict between Israel and Hamas is Steven Cook. Steven is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies here at the Council and a columnist at Foreign Policy magazine. He recently wrote "This War Won't Solve the Israel-Palestine Conflict" for Foreign Policy. Steven, thanks for coming back on The President's Inbox.

COOK:
It's a pleasure to be back with you, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Okay. A lot of breaking news happening in the last several days. So let's begin with, sort of, the biggest, which is the collapse of the ceasefire. And what did the temporary ceasefire actually achieve?

COOK:
So the pause ... I think people are reluctant to use the word ceasefire, which has taken on a meaning in this conflict that the Israelis want to avoid. The pause led to the release of hostages that Hamas was holding—mostly women and children, although there was Thai and Filipino male workers, as well as one Russian Israeli man who was released in the exchange. So a significant number of Israeli hostages were released. In return, more humanitarian aid flowed into the Gaza Strip during the pause. Of course, as you pointed out, the pause has come to an end and military operations have resumed in the Gaza Strip.

LINDSAY:
Okay. Before we go into that, Steven, do we have a handle on how many hostages Hamas continues to hold?

COOK:
The number's well over one hundred, although it's very unclear who Hamas holds, whether Hamas is holding all of those. There are other groups, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, others, gang members who are holding hostages. And of course, the big unknown is how many of those hostages are now dead. From the testimonies of those who have been held hostage, people have been held in very stark conditions with little or no medical care, scarce amounts of food. So there were any number of hostages who were taken who were grievously wounded in the attacks, and it remains unknown whether any of those are living, but the numbers are above one hundred.

LINDSAY:
Any evidence, Steven, that during this pause or temporary ceasefire, however you want to characterize it, that either the Israelis or Hamas used the lull in fighting to improve their military position?

COOK:
Well, it stands to reason that both sides have done that, took the opportunity to re-arm and refit and reposition themselves. There was a part of the agreement that the Qatari government helped to strike with the help of the United States that led to this pause that essentially blacked out the Israelis for about six hours a day in the Gaza Strip. I mean, they were unable to fly surveillance drones over the Gaza Strip. And so, the criticism of the deal coming from some Israelis, as well as some Americans, was that this was going to allow Hamas to regroup after very heavy Israeli military pressure over the previous six or seven weeks. But it also could accrue to the benefit of the Israelis who can reassess how much they have done and how much they need to do. And they have returned to a full combat load with the full force of the IDF. So it doesn't seem to have adversely affected the momentum that the IDF had gained over those previous weeks.

LINDSAY:
So why did the pause come to an end?

COOK:
So there are competing stories about this, but Secretary of State Antony Blinken placed the blame squarely on Hamas, saying that one, they reneged on what they believed ... what the United States believed was a deal for all women and children to be released. I'll note that there are still Americans and American women and children who are being held in the Gaza Strip. And late last week, there was an incident in which Hamas militants were firing on Israeli positions, which quite obviously broke the pause in the fighting. It's notable that the Israelis pulled their negotiating team out of Doha saying that at this point, it was their assessment, the Israeli assessment, that Hamas and the Qataris were essentially stalling and there were no agreements to be had. So the Israelis left and made a statement by the Israeli Air Force bombing a Qatari funded housing complex in the Gaza Strip.

LINDSAY:
Are you suggesting, Steven, that Hamas wanted the truce to come to an end?

COOK:
Well, it seems very unclear what Hamas's goal was at this point. To be honest with you, it's hard to tell. I mean, Hamas stands to benefit from a pause in the fighting. But of course, during the pause of the fighting, it was expected that they were going to perform. And they were either unwilling to or were unable to, as I alluded to before. It's unclear how many hostages they actually hold versus others. But at the same time, the Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, given the fact that it seems clear that the terms of engagement are rather loose and the large number of Palestinian civilian casualties and killed accrues to Hamas's benefit in terms of global public opinion, and even opinion in the halls of Congress. So there's reasons for Hamas to both want to maintain the pause as well as reasons for Hamas to want it to come to an end.

LINDSAY:
Well, let's talk about Israel's focus now on attacking southern Gaza. Does that mean that the Israelis have eliminated the threat that Hamas poses from northern Gaza, or is there some other more fundamental change in the Israeli approach to the fighting?

COOK:
Well, the Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant had declared prior to the ceasefire that Israel was in effective control of the northern part of the Gaza Strip, something that Hamas has denied. It was notable that some of the hostage handovers to the International Committee of the Red Cross happened in the Northern Gaza Strip, which raises questions about how effective that control may be. Nevertheless, the Israelis are turning their attention to the southern part of the Gaza Strip where they believe a very significant number of Hamas fighters are, where some have, you know, drifted south, along with the large numbers of Palestinian civilians who've moved south at Israel's urging and direction. And the particular focus of the Israelis now in the Gaza Strip is going, actually, after the leadership of Hamas, many of whom are in the southern Gaza Strip, whether in tunnels or actually reside in places in the Southern Gaza Strip.

What makes this phase of the conflict more difficult for the IDF is that they have now told many, many, many Palestinians who have heeded their warnings to move to the south. And there is a significant global pressure on them, as well as pressure from the United States, to do everything they can to ensure the protection of civilians. There's now no place left for Palestinian civilians to go. In conversation with Israeli interlocutors in the last week or so, they relate to me that they understood that how military operations unfold in the south was going to have to be different from the way they had done it in the north. But thus far, Israelis continued to use air power and artillery in order to pave the way for ground forces. I suspect that when they were telling me that it was going to be different, and I think what they were saying was that Israelis are going to actually have to kick down doors in the southern Gaza Strip rather than do what they did in the north, which was essentially bring down large numbers of buildings.

LINDSAY:
Steven, I want to get to the issue of how other countries are reacting to the renewal in the fighting. But first I want to focus on what is the thinking inside of Israel? Is there broad-based support for the way the IDF is going about the fighting in Gaza? Are we seeing political divisions arising among Israelis?

COOK:
So far, we haven't really seen political divisions. Of course, Prime Minister Netanyahu's approval ratings are quite low. We've seen what we've seen since early October, which is a rallying around the flag rather than a rallying around the government. I think the most thinking is is that when the conflict comes to an end, there will be an election and Netanyahu will be forced from office. But we're not seeing the sharp divisions in Israel that we saw prior to the conflict or even the kind of usual divisions that you see within Israeli politics. There is, obviously, the very strong belief that the government should be working very hard to get hostages back. And particularly, you know, the families want a continuation of the negotiations. But obviously at this point, at least according to the United States and the Israeli government, Hamas is not willing to negotiate. And certainly Hamas has said from the beginning that it would not release soldiers and soldiers including young women.

So there is, I think, a consensus in Israeli society about using military force. And of course, a number of polls have demonstrated that there is at least a significant number of Israelis who believe that the IDF hasn't used enough force in the Gaza Strip. Now, I will say—it's hard to actually articulate this—but I saw footage. I saw uncut footage of the attacks on October 7th, and this was body cam footage from Hamas terrorists, GoPro footage from Hamas terrorists, CCTV footage from Israeli traffic junctions or kibbutz security cameras, victims footage from their cell phones. It gives you some insight into the existential sense that the Israelis view this conflict. I don't want to get into any kind of normative discussion here, but the brutality of the violence, the way in which the Hamas terrorists talked about their victims, strongly suggested that, you know, at least for Hamas, they were operating under their original 1988 charter, which has blood-curdling language about killing Jews, as opposed to their 2017 guidelines and principles, which focuses more on Israel rather than Jews writ large. But there is a sense in Israel that this is an existential fight for survival, and that's why there's so much support for the full force of the IDF being used in the Gaza Strip.

LINDSAY:
I take that point, and I take the reaction of the Israeli public to the barbaric attacks on October 7th. But let's talk about reactions elsewhere. What are the reactions in Arab capitals over the last several days to the resumption of fighting?

COOK:
Well, I think Arab capitals have ... I think leaders in the Arab world have understood that there was likely going to be a resumption of the fighting. Israeli government has been very clear that a pause did not mean a ceasefire, as much as the big five—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar—were working very hard, along with the United States, to extend the pause and perhaps find a way towards a durable ceasefire.

LINDSAY:
And I should note that all of those countries, maybe with the exception of Qatar, are not fans of Hamas.

COOK:
Yes, that is without a doubt. These are governments that are hostile to Hamas and hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood from which Hamas was carved out in 1987. And they're all countries that Israel has some form of relations, whether it is normal diplomatic relations or robust dialogue, behind the scenes relationship. But the images coming out of the Gaza Strip of devastation, of the large numbers of civilians, women and children, killed by the IDF, which clearly has not taken the kind of care that I think the Biden administration would like it to take in its targeting that would avoid these types of civilian deaths or some of these civilian deaths. This has outraged people in the Arab world.

Now, what's interesting is that we have seen moments of protest in the Arab world, but it has not been at an intensity that one might expect. Perhaps that's a function of the fact that this is a long war, or long for in terms of the kinds of conflicts that Israel and Hamas have engaged in since 2008. Also, governments have begun to crack down on protests. Whereas, for example, in Egypt, President Abdel Al-Sisi had allowed some protests in the early weeks of the war, recent protestors have been arrested. That's happened in Morocco. In Jordan, the security forces have been ... have contained a protest. But nevertheless, this is putting a significant strain on Israel's relations with countries that have normalized with it or who would like to normalize with it ... is setting back Israel's relations with those countries. But, of course, the Israeli response to this is, "What choice do we have?" The idea of a ceasefire is essentially a unilateral surrender to the ever present threat of Hamas terrorism. Prior to October 7th, the Israelis believe that they can deter Hamas. They no longer believe that they can or that deterrence is desirable.

LINDSAY:
Steven, the perception that the Israeli government is not doing enough to minimize civilian casualties in Gaza is a feeling that's held not just in Arab capitals or in the Arab world or the Islamic world. We're seeing the same reaction worldwide, including here at the United States. The Biden administration, which fully embraced the Israeli government in the immediate aftermath of the October 7th attacks, has become more public and more vocal about its concerns that Israel is not doing enough to protect Palestinian civilians. I'll note over the weekend, Vice President Kamala Harris said, "As Israel defense itself, it matters how." And Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said over the weekend that Israel risks strategic failure if it continues to fail to do more to minimize civilian casualties. How is that playing, out or how is that being received in Israel?

COOK:
It's important that the administration has begun to shift its rhetoric, as you point out, both from the vice president and secretary of defense, as well as secretary of state who was in Israel over the weekend as well. The question is whether this is a shift in rhetoric or it presages the shift in the Biden administration's substantive approach to the conflict. Thus far, it doesn't seem like it's the latter. It seems like it's more rhetorical warnings to the Israelis. And I'll point out that after Secretary Blinken met with Israel's war cabinet, which is five people, Israel's Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant contradicted Secretary Blinken who had said that the Israelis had weeks. And Gallant said, "We will take as much time as necessary, including months, in order to achieve our strategic objectives."

So I think one of the things that in watching this conflict is the, kind of, limits of American power, especially as the Israelis have defined this conflict in existential terms. The Israelis believe that they are fighting for their lives. Somehow, this is for them civilizational. It seems unlikely that they're going to heed the warnings from the administration, no matter how important the United States is to Israel. You know, I think also the Israelis calculate that although there is debate within the Democratic Party about the U.S. relationship with Israel, that on the other side of the aisle it's rock solid. We're entering into an electoral season. Israel could be a wedge issue for the president's opponents. And that Israel has the rock solid support of the American Jewish community as well, as well as another constituency—the evangelical community—that they can take risks by defying at least the vice president, the secretary of defense, and the secretary of state. I'll note that the president himself has not made these statements. It'd be interesting to see what happens if President Biden himself comes out strongly on this issue of doing more to protect civilians.

LINDSAY:
Well, that's the question, isn't it, Steven? Can the United States, can the Biden administration afford not to be seen putting pressure on Israel to do more to protect civilians? I take your point that there are limits to American power, and the United States may make demands on the Netanyahu government that the Netanyahu government rejects. But at this point, as best we can tell, President Biden hasn't chosen to do so. My sense was his calculation was by embracing Israel in the immediate aftermath of October 7th, that would give him credibility and stature behind the scenes to give guidance to the Israelis, to persuade the Israelis to think about how this is being perceived. Because that should be part of Israel's strategic calculation. That, back to this point, doesn't seem to be paying off.

Now, I'll note in the past, if you go back, you know, 1982, when the Israelis had encircled West Beirut and were pounding it with artillery, Ronald Reagan reached a point where he said "enough is enough" and put tremendous pressure on Israel. We saw something similar with George W. Bush back in 2005 over Gaza. Is it your sense that Biden administration might get to that point? Or do you think it's going to hold back?

COOK:
It very well may get to that point, although from where I sit and look at this situation, it's different from Beirut in 1982—which by the way, President Reagan docked the Israelis' F-16 jets that they wanted because of the siege of Beirut. Golda Meir defied the Nixon administration in surrounding Egypt's Third Army in 1973. So the Israelis do have a history of doing this kind of thing. I think that it may very well be that the president thought that he could shape the Israeli response to the attacks on October 7th by giving them embrace. I think it was a miscalculation. He and his advisors underestimated the way in which the Israelis were going to frame this conflict, as I said before, in existential terms. And thus, they overestimated how much they could influence the conduct of Israel's military operations.

So far, directly to your question, because it's been the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the vice president, it strikes me that the administration is doing ... is saying the kinds of things it's saying because it's feeling the pressure both domestically, as well as from its partners abroad, that it needs to say something. I think on the substantive level, we'll have to wait for the president to make these kinds of statements and see how the Israelis are going to react. But again, I think it's different from Beirut in 1982, which was, you know, a war of choice, whereas this is a war that was foisted on the Israelis and in quite shocking brutality, and the Israelis have vowed that the rules of the road will change.

LINDSAY:
What is your sense, Steven, of what the chances are of a wider war? In the immediate aftermath of October 7th, there was a lot of speculation that this might lead to a regional conflagration, a lot of focus on what Hezbollah in southern Lebanon might do, Iranian proxies. Things have seemed relatively quiet on that front recently, emphasis on relatively. I will note that it's presumed that Houthis in Yemen fired drones at shipping in the Red Sea that U.S. ships shot down. Have we sort of moved out of the period of maximum danger of a wider war, or is that still an ever present threat?

COOK:
I don't think so. I think your emphasis on the word "relative" is an important one. The Israelis have hit Hezbollah targets, and are continuing to do so. And Hezbollah is firing back. That's been part of the, kind of, routine of this conflict. But the Israelis have upped the ante somewhat in recent days by going further and deeper into Lebanon than they had. I think there is a sense that the Israelis want to push Hezbollah further back away from its border than it's been, given the fact that UN forces there have proved for decades to be unwilling and unable to do that.

You point out that the Houthis have been active in firing drones and rockets and missiles in Israel's direction, and that the U.S. Navy has provided missile defense. The Israelis responded to the Houthis over the weekend by firing their own missiles and drones at Houthis targets in and around the Yemeni capital Sana'a. And the Israelis have said that the time will come for the Houthis. I think the one piece of this that should also be worrisome is the West Bank, where, by all accounts, the IDF has allowed radical settlers to have their way with Palestinians—trying to drive them off their land—and that there is a significant reservoir of support for Hamas in the West Bank, which is where the Israelis were focusing much of their attention prior to October 7th. So I think that there's danger all around. And I will echo something that our colleague Ray Takeyh has pointed out, that the moment really of maximum danger of a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is when the Israelis come closer to actually destroying Hamas, if they get there. Because Hamas-

LINDSAY:
Is that an achievable goal?

COOK:
Yeah, it's something that's been debated from the very beginning, from the time that the Israelis said that they would destroy Hamas. I suspect that what the Israelis were aiming to do is similar to what the United States and its partners have done with ISIS, which is to render the Islamic State unable to be an existential threat to the Iraqi state. ISIS still exists. ISIS still conducts attacks. But the overthrow of Baghdad is, at least for the moment, something of the past. I think, probably, that's where the Israelis are going to end up, as well as they will do that in the Gaza Strip, and then they will go after Hamas leadership abroad. They promised, actually, to do that. So in that sense, destroy Hamas. 

But so, even then, that's a problem for the Iranians and Hezbollah and this Axis of Resistance. And you could see the logic there because although Hamas is, I think, more autonomous from the Iranians than the Hezbollah is. Hamas is an asset to the Axis of Resistance. And it would be a tremendous blow if the Israelis were to render Hamas unable to be a threat.

LINDSAY:
So Steven, how does the current Israeli leadership see this conflict playing out? What is going to happen in Gaza? What is going to happen in the West Bank? Because eventually the fighting is going to end, we would think. We'll go to some kind of ceasefire, however it's stable or durable it might be. But again, the fighting is going to end. So what does the Netanyahu government thinks will come next?

COOK:
That's interesting. This is sort of a case study in what Fred C. Iklé, who was a defense official in the 1980s and a defense intellectual ... He wrote a famous book called Every War Must End, in which he pointed out that the decision to go to war is often made in a vacuum without any consideration of how to bring a war to an end and what those goals are.

LINDSAY:
What the desired end state is.

COOK:
Exactly. And it's very unclear. I think that the Israeli defense establishment has been clear that they don't want to be in a position where they have to occupy, administer the Gaza Strip. Again, the defense minister said Israel will destroy Hamas, leave the Gaza Strip, and then cut the umbilical cord between Israel and Gaza. That means, you know, no aid going in or out of Gaza Strip, that Israel would just literally seal this thing off. The assumption being-

LINDSAY:
No workers either.

COOK:
No workers, nothing. And that this would eventually become the responsibility of the UN, the Egyptians, the Arab world. I think that that's somewhat unrealistic. Contrary to Yoav Gallant, the defense minister, the prime minister and his closest advisor, Ron Dermer, who's the minister for strategic affairs—both members, obviously, of the war cabinet—have spoken of an overriding Israeli security responsibility for the Gaza Strip for the foreseeable future. Dermer went so far as to say, "We have been unable to do what we do in the West Bank in Gaza because we haven't been there in seventeen years. That has to change." That suggests that they are thinking in terms of an occupation of part of the Gaza Strip, all of the Gaza Strip, for some period of time after the fighting comes to an end.

I think the American plans for a reinvigorated Palestinian Authority and internationals stabilization force for the Gaza Strip and another round of negotiations towards a two-state solution look good in kind of perfect world, but are non-starters for almost everybody involved. So I think ... In fact, I'm writing something right now where I look at the inevitability of an Israeli occupation, even if they don't want to. They may be left with very little choice but to occupy the Gaza Strip for some period of time that's longer than a number of weeks, is my point.

LINDSAY:
So what should the United States do in that situation, Steven? Again, the Biden administration has said we got to find a way to get to a two-state solution. The obvious challenge is there are, one, the Israelis don't seem interested in a two-state solution at this point, given what they experienced on October 7th. But also the real question, who would the Israelis' partner be? And whenever I hear the Palestinian Authority mentioned, it's usually coupled with the words "sclerotic leadership" and "corruption." So what does the Biden administration do going forward?

COOK:
Well, again, Secretary Blinken seems to believe that working through the Palestinian Authority is the best way forward. He has talked over and over again about reinvigorating the Palestinian Authority. One has to assume this would be new funding for the Palestinian Authority, a new leadership for the Palestinian Authority. But I think it's important for Palestinian leaders not to be seen as an American and Israeli proconsul in the Gaza Strip, especially given the fact that Hamas's popularity among the Palestinian population has improved since October 7th. 

There's these differing accounts of how the Palestinians are to achieve justice. The Palestinian Authority says "We should negotiate with the Israelis, and that's the best way to seek redress and justice in our state." But over the course of negotiations that began in 1993, they've gotten no closer to justice and a state. Hamas has said, because of that situation, the way to do this is through resistance and the destruction of Israel. And they're unable to reconcile these two views. And when Hamas criticizes the Palestinian Authority for its approach, it's not entirely wrong. So that's why I think the administration is going to move forward with the Palestinian Authority and this idea of extending over stages the Palestinian Authority's administration of the Gaza Strip. I just remain skeptical that it is something that we can realistically achieve.

LINDSAY:
Is it your sense that Israel is headed in the direction of saying the two-state solution is off the books forever?

COOK:
Well, there's no one in power in Israel right now who is supportive of a two-state solution. Prime Minister Netanyahu made a statement about the two-state solution in 2009, but under extreme amounts of pressure from President Barack Obama and other American officials as well as Congress, quite honestly. The closest you get in the current war cabinet is Benny Gantz, the former defense minister. He has previously, in government, has sought to have relations with the Palestinian Authority and improve the lives of Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. But he remains coy about whether he supports a two-state solution. And of course, after the terrorist attacks on October 7th, after the Palestinian Authority, from the Israeli perspective, was slow to respond and to condemn it, and statements that Palestinian leaders in Ramallah have made since have rendered even dovish Israelis skeptical about the idea of a two-state solution. This may be one of those problems—it's very, very hard for people to get their heads around—but that's just not resolvable.

LINDSAY:
But that means perpetual conflict.

COOK:
Yeah, right. That's extremely unfortunate for everybody involved. But you'll have these moments of violence. Because what the Palestinians require from the Israelis for peace is not something that Israeli domestic politics can bear. And vice versa, what the Israelis need for peace are things that domestically, Palestinian leadership cannot deliver for them. And so you have this stalemate. And in the stalemate you have continued settlement, virtual annexation, and very unstable status quo punctuated by periods of violence. Now, prior to October 6th, you would've said punctuated by periodic moments of violence, like previous conflicts between Hamas and Israel or what was happening in the West Bank prior to October 7th, Israeli raids into Hamas strongholds, not the kind of brutal conflict that is being waged in the Gaza Strip right now.

LINDSAY:
But wouldn't that kind of conflict leave Israel more and more isolated?

COOK:
I think the Israelis at the moment aren't thinking in those terms. They don't care. But I do think it will leave them more isolated. I think this is a setback for them, certainly in the Arab world. Although no Arab country that has diplomatic relations with Israel has formerly broken their relations. There may have been recalls of ambassadors, but no one has broken relations with them. Its relationship with European countries remains intact. But, yes, it is a real risk for the Israelis that they are more isolated in the world. And of course, the politics of Israel in the United States is also changing. So the risks abound for the Israelis in this operation. But what they keep saying is, "What choice do we really have here?"

LINDSAY:
On that sobering note, I'll close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guest has been Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies here at the Council. Steven, thanks again for joining me.

COOK:
Thanks for having me, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The President's Inbox in Apple Podcast, YouTube, Spotify, wherever you listen, and leave us your review. We love the feedback. The publications mentioned in this episode and a transcript of our conversation are available on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on CFR.org. As always, opinions expressed on The President's Inbox are solely those of the host or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang with Director of Podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. Special thanks go out to Michelle Kurilla for her research assistance. This is Jim Lindsay, thanks for listening.