The Israel-Hamas War, With Elliott Abrams and Steven Cook

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is the Israel-Hamas War.

 

With me to discuss the context and consequences of Hamas's surprise attack on Israel are Elliott Abrams and Steven Cook. Elliott is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was special representative for Iran and Venezuela in the Donald Trump administration, and he served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bush administration where he handled U.S. policy in the Middle East. He recently wrote "The Hamas Attack Changes Everything" for the National Review.

 

Steven is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies here at the Council on Foreign Relations and a columnist at Foreign Policy magazine. He recently wrote an in-brief for CFR.org titled "Surprise Palestinian Attack Spawns Fears of a Wider Middle East War." Elliott and Steven, thank you for joining me.

 

COOK:
Thanks for having me.

 

ABRAMS:
Thank you.

 

LINDSAY:
Let me begin by noting we face a fluid situation and that the state of the fighting could change significantly by the time our conversation airs. With that caution out of the way, Elliott, I'd like to begin with you. Can you help us understand why this attack, why now?

 

ABRAMS:
This attack obviously was planned, and I would think it had to have been planned for a year. This is not two weeks of planning. Therefore, the logic suggests to me it's for the fiftieth anniversary of the 1973 War. If you think about timing it for trying to block the Israeli-Saudi rapprochement, they didn't know about that much a year ago. They didn't know where it would be a year later. So it's, I think, a benefit to Hamas and to Iran. But I think it's the fiftieth anniversary that explains the timing.

 

And I think the attack itself explains to us all, and here there ... I think an analogy to 9/11. Nobody thought these primitive terrorists could take over planes and take down the World Trade Center. It was unthinkable. And I think for the Israelis and for many analysts, and I include myself in this, it was clear that Hamas wanted calm in Gaza. They governed Gaza. They wanted West Bank violence and terrorism, but they wanted calm in Gaza. And they actually fooled us into thinking that by the way they've been behaving in the last few months. And it was completely wrong. It was complete misconception about the capabilities of Hamas and the intentions of Hamas, which have nothing to do with the people who live in the territory they govern. It's all about attacking Israel.

 

LINDSAY:
Steven, I don't know if you share Elliott's assessment of the reasons for the attack, but I also want to get into this question of what it is that Hamas is trying to achieve strategically. Presumably, this invasion is linked to some strategic goal. If you could help us understand that.

 

COOK:
Thanks. In large part, I agree with Elliott. This attack was really a quantum leap in changes in the way in which Hamas operates and its tactics in terms of attacking Israel, so it had to been planning for quite some time. And the first thing I noticed about it was the date. There was some, you know, a kind of macabre, poetic nature to this. A side benefit, of course, is the regional implications of it—the potential for Israel-Saudi normalization to come to a halt. Although, that itself had a dynamic all its own. But clearly, as this war unfolds, it's going to be more and more difficult if civilian casualties pile up on the Palestinian side.

 

LINDSAY:
They're serious right now.

 

COOK:
Yes.

 

ABRAMS:
Yep.

 

COOK:
And, you know, with the Israelis laying siege officially to the Gaza Strip, those numbers are going to change and grow exponentially. In terms of what Hamas wants, we're specifically looking at this operation. I think it's clear and it gives word to the lie that the problem is solely Israeli settlements and solely Israeli conduct in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. After all, Hamas attacked Israeli towns. They've attacked Tel Aviv. They've attacked Ashkelon. They mercilessly murdered Israeli civilians, and you have to go back-

 

LINDSAY:
Consciously targeted civilians.

 

COOK:
... Consciously targeted civilians. Some of the early footage that came out of it ... People driving along the highway in the south came upon these people and were just murdered in their cars. You have to go back to the documents, the Hamas Charter, which flatly rejects Israel's existence, calls things like the Balfour Declaration, the UN Resolution 181 dividing Palestine, as null and void and illegal and reiterates the legality of the armed struggle. Now, that charter was amended in 2017 that allegedly softened Hamas's position. So, I think that the combination of encouragement from the Iranians, which was clearly happening throughout the spring, the fiftieth anniversary of the October 1973 War, and this desire to destroy Israel ... Now, they're not going to be able to do that.

 

LINDSAY:
Let me draw you out on that. I understand that Hamas rejects Israel's right to exist. How is this attack going to advance any conceivable goal Hamas has? Because my impression is that the Israelis are going to go after Hamas hard and heavy, and the collateral damage for Palestinians, almost all of whom have no say in this, is going to be horrific.

 

COOK:
Let me just say that we need to think like Hamas leadership.

 

LINDSAY:
Well, that's what I'm asking you to do.

 

COOK:
And whether this brings them victory in the battlefield, that it is going to actually destroy Israel, I think is immaterial to the idea of resistance. Resistance for the sake of resistance, whether it's in this kind of nihilistic way or not, burnishes them, makes them an important actor, demonstrates how important they are as opposed to Arab sheikhs in the Gulf who are interested in making money with the-

 

ABRAMS:
Or the PA in West Bank.

 

COOK:
... Or the Palestinian Authority, which is basically irrelevant. As you point out, the unfortunate damage is going to be mostly to the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip that has nothing whatsoever to do with this. But this idea that Hamas is taking on, is seeking revenge ... It has said in its statements, it is seeking revenge, that the days of the Zionist entity carrying on its attack without accountability and with impunity are now over. That's the goal. That is the goal.

 

I think also, Hamas, thinking in a different way, they see Israelis will go in hard and that in time, as those civilian casualties pile up as they're likely to be, that Europe, members of Congress, the Arab world will start putting pressure to get the Israelis to stand back.

 

LINDSAY:
I want to come back to that point, but Elliott, you wanted to say something?

 

ABRAMS:
This brings us to Iran because the only other people besides Hamas who are basically saying death to Israel is the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I think for many Israelis, this will be a reminder that when people say they want to kill you, you ought to take them seriously.

 

LINDSAY:
What degree of complicity does Iran have? I've seen reports. Like the Wall Street Journal did an article saying that there was a meeting in Beirut and the Iranians greenlit this operation. Do we have reason to believe that's true? My understanding is Biden administration officials have pushed back on that, and now we're getting into this. Maybe it's a semantic argument about what we mean by complicity or involvement.

 

ABRAMS:
Well, I think we're going to find real complicity. And I saw a film clip today—it's available, it's on the web—of people engaged in these terrorist attacks in Southern Israel, and somebody shouting something in Farsi. Now-

 

LINDSAY:
So you think actual Iranians may be involved.

 

ABRAMS:
... I think if you think about it, and you're the IRGC and you help them for-

 

LINDSAY:
The IRGC is?

 

ABRAMS:
... The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

 

LINDSAY:
But I thought they had been sidelined because we had killed Mr. Soleimani?

 

ABRAMS:
Obviously not.

 

LINDSAY:
Okay.

 

ABRAMS:
And the logic is they are the people who would be helping Hamas plan it, arm up for it, figure out the attack, and then do it. Is it not logical that some of the revolutionary guard guys want to be there? It looks as if some were. I did hear Kevin McCarthy say...

 

LINDSAY:
Former Speaker of the House.

 

ABRAMS:
Former speaker of the House, say on Monday, "How is it that the Wall Street Journal seems to know more about Iranian complicity than the Secretary of State?" I think the White House, State Department are pushing back a little bit too hard on this because the logic is we have more to learn.

 

COOK:
Yeah. I think the indications of Iranian complicity in this are fairly clear. Last spring-

 

LINDSAY:
Well, they had been arming and sponsoring Hamas for quite a while.

 

COOK:
Right. Not in the same ways that Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a patron, but there are more indications than that. In the spring, the Al Quds Force, which is this branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the leader, General Esmail Qaani, met with Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in Beirut and encouraged them to attack the Israelis in coordinated fashion ... the video of the Hamas leadership in Gaza yesterday thanking the Iranians for their weaponry and their support. And then finally, in the week or so before this, the Supreme Leader was particularly active on social media threatening Israel, saying that-

 

LINDSAY:
He still has an account on X.

 

COOK:
... Yes, he still has an account on X. And he's been particularly active, saying "The Zionist regime is dying." Clearly they had prior knowledge of this. I agree with Elliott. I think the administration is being too quick to deny it because I think that there will be evidence. The tactics are reminiscent of Hezbollah. It seems likely that the Iranians had a hand in this.

 

LINDSAY:
Okay. Before we talk about responses, I want to ask one last question about getting to this point. Why is it that Israeli intelligence services were taken by surprise? I would also note, American intelligence services were taken by surprise. And again, the United States pays attention to a lot of things around the world, keeping in mind how closely you paid attention to the threat the Russians posed to Ukraine. And I would note, Steven, this gets back to one of your favorite countries. Egyptian intelligence services either didn't notice anything or didn't say anything because historically, the Egyptians have claimed to be very well wired into what's happening in Gaza, which after all, does share a border with Egypt. So, how do you explain this intelligence failure?

 

ABRAMS:
I think part of it is Israeli intelligence relies heavily on high-tech stuff. If you have complete message discipline, you go back to the Stone Age in a way—that is, "We're going to use pieces of paper and messengers." Then there's nothing in the ether that the Israelis can pick up.

 

LINDSAY:
But usually, even then, you have people who talk. You have informants and the like.

 

ABRAMS:
Some of the informants may have been turned. I remember in the Reagan administration, we found out that every agent we had in Cuba, every, had been turned by the Cubans. So, that's another possibility. There were also signs. If you go back for the couple of weeks before this attack, pickup trucks were going up and down the Gaza side of the border and everybody understood that didn't mean anything. So, you get back to 9/11, you get back to the conception—or the Israelis say it in Hebrew, תְפִישָׂה. If you believe it's inconceivable that Hamas would come across the border in large numbers and try it, then you don't use the famous phrase, connect the dots.

 

LINDSAY:
Okay. The failure of imagination is another way of describing it.

 

ABRAMS:
Yes.

 

LINDSAY:
Steven, do you want to jump in here?

 

COOK:
Yeah. Contributing to that, I spoke to Israelis over the weekend. They said, "We were absolutely complacent. We did not imagine that this would happen," the idea that, you know, Hamas wanted to rule Gaza. But, you know, there would be these moments where there would be violence, but we'd go back to a sense of status quo, and they had become complacent to it. There was also this issue of moving forces away from the Gaza border into the West Bank because there was violence in the West Bank.

 

LINDSAY:
Did that actually happen or is that just an allegation?

 

COOK:
My understanding is that that actually happened, and that the Gaza border was really one that was left for ... thinly guarded with lots and lots of technology. And talking about the Egyptians, yes, this is what they say that they are experts at—that they have Gaza wired, that they are the ones who, you know, can knock the heads together when things get out of control. I would not underestimate the incompetence of the Egyptian intelligence directorate. They've made any number of mistakes. And it's on them as well, but obviously it's on the Israelis.

 

LINDSAY:
So Elliott, we have this attack. It's clearly a very well planned, very well orchestrated attack from Gaza. Must've been tremendous operational security on the part of Hamas for word of this not to trickle out. What about Israel's other borders? Are there any signs of trouble either from the north or signs of trouble in the West Bank? That is, are we looking at a fight that's going to be contained to Gaza, which is located essentially in the southwestern portion of Israel? Or are we seeing a broader, perhaps two or three front war?

 

ABRAMS:
Well, in the first few days of the war, we have not seen much in the West Bank, much. There has been some terrorist activity in the West Bank, and it ties down Israeli forces. But there's no big uprising. And I don't think there's going to be a big one. There's no spontaneous uprising, and Abbas isn't going to call for one.

 

LINDSAY:
Well, let me ask you a question. In terms of Hamas, does Hamas have any support, followers, strength, infrastructure in the West Bank?

 

ABRAMS:
It does, and it is able to commit acts of violence in the West Bank. If you ask people, "Who're you going to vote for? The Fatah party of President Abbas or Hamas?," votes are split in both the West Bank and Gaza, but that's just a vote. That doesn't tell you whether somebody's willing to go risk his life trying to kill Israelis. So, we haven't seen that yet. I don't believe we're going to see it in the West Bank. I can be wrong tomorrow, but I don't think we're going to see it.

 

Hezbollah is a different question. Hezbollah has been making a few moves, like, you know, Howitzer shots, or ... it appears that they sent one team into Israel. What's unclear, as we speak, is whether this is, in a way, to save their honor; that is, they got to do something that suggests solidarity.

 

LINDSAY:
Just be clear, Hezbollah is based in southern Lebanon.

 

ABRAMS:
... In southern Lebanon, and is completely dependent on Iran. The theory had always been, Hezbollah is Iran's second strike capability. That's what stops Israel from attacking Iran, the notion that Hezbollah will then have a war with Israel. I still think that's true, but I say that, you know, with a little more hesitation now because it's a conception, it's a view. Is it inconceivable that Iran should decide, "Let's give Israel wars on two fronts"? It is not inconceivable.

 

LINDSAY:
Steven, do a little primer for us. Hamas, Palestinian Jihad, Hezbollah, differences, similarities?

 

COOK:
Let's start with Hamas and Islamic Jihad first, and then I'll move on to the Lebanese. Now, Palestinian Islamic Jihad is something that existed before Hamas existed, and something that is, like Hezbollah, a proxy of Iran. This is Iran's effort to—after the revolution in 1978, 1979—to engage in Arab politics and the resistance against Israel, and keeping with the kind of revolutionary views of Ayatollah Khomeini. Hamas was actually created out of the Palestine branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in response to Islamic Jihad terrorist attacks against Israelis. This was an effort for the Brotherhood in Palestine to burnish its nationalist image by creating this violent organization that would spill Israeli blood because they felt that Islamic Jihad was drawing off support from the Brotherhood because of its attacks on Israelis.

 

There's a canard out there that the Israelis created Hamas. No, at worst, they turned somewhat of a blind eye to the emergence of Hamas because they thought it would be a challenge to Yasser Arafat and the PLO at the time, which it turned out to be, but now has become their greatest foe. Hezbollah was an organization that actually grew out of the situation in southern Lebanon. It is an Indigenous organization, but as Elliott points out, it has become essentially an expeditionary force for the Iranians. They not only operate in Lebanon and have engaged in the spectacular violence against Israel—wars with Israel over many, many years—but you find Hezbollahs in Iraq. You find them in Yemen training the Houthis. They obviously have provided a backbone of support for the Assad regime. This really is part of Iran's way in which it creates chaos around the Middle East.

 

ABRAMS:
I think what's really changed here is that Israel thought it could live with Hamas control of Gaza. And they have, for years and years. And, you know, they negotiate indirectly through the Egyptian intelligence services, "Stop sending Howitzers into Israel. We'll take more Gazans and give them jobs in Israel."

 

LINDSAY:
Well, there was talk about increasing the number of Gazans who have committed to that.

 

ABRAMS:
Yeah.

 

COOK:
It had been happening

 

ABRAMS:
And it was on the rise. Now they realize, you can't live with Hamas. You will die with Hamas.

 

LINDSAY:
Okay, but-

 

ABRAMS:
And that's what's going to lead.

 

LINDSAY:
... That raises the question-

 

ABRAMS:
Yeah.

 

LINDSAY:
... What does Israel do? Israel has declared war, whatever that means when you're talking about a non-state actor. Israel has said it is going to impose a complete siege on Gaza. But Israel has been in Gaza before and it left for a good reason back in 2005. So, what does the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu do?

 

ABRAMS:
All the options are bad. I think what they cannot do is what they've done in the past when you've had these, you know, four day skirmishes with Hamas, and then somebody, usually Egypt, negotiates a deal. And Israel knows where that leads now. So they can't do that. I still believe they don't want to go to the other end of the spectrum and take over and govern Gaza for years. So what-

 

LINDSAY:
Well, again, they left in 2005-

 

ABRAMS:
... Right.

 

LINDSAY:
... and when they took over southern Lebanon, that became a Pyrrhic victory.

 

ABRAMS:
Right. What's in between those two? And I think it's unclear, but examples ... Create a buffer zone on the Gaza side of the border of 1,000 feet, 1,000 yards, and say, "That's a no man's land. Anybody in that will be killed." That's been in the Israeli press already from retired generals. Maybe go into Gaza in places for three days or five days, in raids that are meant to destroy Hamas. There will obviously be lots and lots of air attacks. And I think what they're doing, we've seen already. They've said in certain places, "This is all going to be destroyed, so you who may live there, get out. We know that the basement of your apartment building is a Hamas arms depot. We're going to destroy your apartment. Get out." And they've started destroying some of these places. I think we're going to see a lot more of that. Can they destroy the Hamas rule of Gaza?

 

LINDSAY:
But do they want to destroy the Hamas rule of Gaza?

 

ABRAMS:
I think now they do.

 

LINDSAY:
Because doesn't that open up to the question that something worse may follow Hamas?

 

ABRAMS:
I think at this point, they're not going to worry about that. These people have slaughtered and massacred hundreds of Israelis. From the Israeli point of view, they need to die and they need to be pushed out of power. Now, your question is a very good one because when the Israelis got out of Gaza, it was the hope of the United States that the Palestinian Authority would take over Gaza. And it did for two years until Hamas threw out the Palestinian Authority, the Fatah party, and took over.

 

So that's why I say, I mean, there are no good choices for the Israelis, but it seems to me now that the one thing they all do agree on is that the degree of damage they do to Hamas has got to be very, very great. Just one more example you can read in the Israeli press and in the discussions, we know where the Hamas leadership is. Some of them live in Turkey. Some of them live in Doha, Qatar. There'll be assassination attempts made against all these people, very actively. It may take a year, but if they can assassinate people inside Iran, they can assassinate people inside Qatar.

 

COOK:
Yeah. Just to pick up on this for one quick second, to give you a sense of the change in Israeli thinking about this. In 2014, during one of these episodes—actually it lasted forty-nine days between Israel and Hamas—the Egyptian government very much wanted the Israelis to go in and kick down every single door in the Gaza Strip and destroy Hamas. And the Israelis said, "We can't do that because we're worried. Without Hamas, who comes next? And we don't want it to be us." I think that with 700 plus dead Israelis, more than 2,500 injured, deterrence so undermined, the Israelis are going in hard, fast. And the concern is, there is no real good solution here. They may get them, find themselves caught there. There may be some form of an Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip no matter how much they try not to because, as you point out, this is a very dynamic situation and rooting this out is going to be very hard. It's going to be multifaceted. But in the process, many, many die and the Israelis do risk—not saying that this is an illegitimate thing for them to do, to try to root out and destroy Hamas—but they risk getting caught in Gaza once again.

 

LINDSAY:
But Steven, how does Israel address the problem you flagged early on? ... Which is it will go into Gaza, it will hit hard and it will hit heavy. Even if it has great intelligence, you know there're going to be civilian casualties. Even if every target they hit is a military target, we know Hamas will take refuge among civilians. Even if you tell them to leave, you're going to kill people who are innocent civilians. It's going to get covered. And you're going to see the kind of pressure we've seen time and time again. Countries begin to say, "It's time to pull back. You shouldn't be acting so harshly," and the sort of international mood turns.

 

COOK:
I wonder ... I'm interested in Elliott's perspective on this because my sense is that something really has changed in Israel, that the Israeli public demands the destruction of Hamas, and that will give the government a certain additional kind of political space to prosecute this-

 

LINDSAY:
But also a strong push.

 

COOK:
... war, no matter how much protest there is from the Norwegians and other Europeans, and even from members of Congress about this, that this has become existential. And that as Elliott says, when people say, "We're going to kill you," you're going to believe them. You know, months ago, during the turbulence in Israeli domestic politics, there were Israelis who'd say, "Well, I don't fear Hamas as much as I fear what the government is going to do to our democracy." There are many, many Israelis who are rethinking that view right now. So, to the extent it's become existential, no doubt that pressure is going to come from countries and blocks in the international community. But it strikes me that Israel is going to resist that for as long as they possibly can.

 

LINDSAY:
What does the Israeli government do when it's faced by the reality that Hamas has hostages and those hostages will be at risk?

 

ABRAMS:
I have had Israelis say to me in the course of the weekend, "You have to make policy without regard to the hostages." That is-

 

LINDSAY:
Easier said than done.

 

ABRAMS:
.. It is easier said than done, and there are lots of Israeli parents, sisters, brothers who will say that. But there are more Israelis, I think, who will say, "We can't live like this and we need to destroy Hamas." Now, going back to what Steven said, you know, there's another test here: Joe Biden. Joe Biden said, you know, "Unwavering, solid, blah, blah, blah support." He said that, I think, Saturday. It was a great speech. I thought, "Let's see where he is in a month" because he's going to be getting those calls from, you know, European prime ministers and the Pope saying, "Too much violence. It's time to stop."

 

LINDSAY:
Well, I still have memories in the 1980s of the Israeli siege of Beirut-

 

ABRAMS:
Yes.

 

LINDSAY:
... and the response of the Reagan administration.

 

ABRAMS:
Right.

 

LINDSAY:
And President Reagan-

 

ABRAMS:
Right.

 

LINDSAY:
... seeing enough that he wanted it to come to an end.

 

ABRAMS:
We had it in 2006 in the Lebanon war, Israel against Hezbollah, where the world—including the Arab world, because this was Shia, Hezbollah—was pro-Israeli for about ten days. And then it turned. And frankly, I'll tell you who turned with it: the State Department. And there was a lot of State Department pressure on the White House and on President Bush.

 

LINDSAY:
Because the State Department's hearing from the rest of the world.

 

ABRAMS:
Exactly right.

 

LINDSAY:
And the State Department's job is to relay what the rest of the world is saying.

 

ABRAMS:
Exactly right.

 

COOK:
Inevitably, there is going to be some disaster in which large numbers of Palestinian civilians are killed all at once. ... Very, very unfortunate. I mean, very often, the Palestinian civilians are the ones that are sort of left out of these conversations, but there is going to be devastation there that's going to kill entire families. And that is the footage, the social media, the Al Jazeera reporting is going to galvanize people. But again, I wonder if the Israelis are now—given the dead and injured—are going to be more resistant to it.

 

I spent some time this weekend also speaking to Israelis. And the pictures of the people who have been taken hostage—many, many young women and teenage girls, either at this music festival or doing their duty on the Gaza border ... It strikes me that the Israeli public is deeply, deeply concerned with their children. But that, again, as Elliott pointed out, I think the overall feeling is we can't live with this.

 

LINDSAY:
Okay. So this podcast is called The President's Inbox, so I want to close by talking about what should the United States do because there are also American citizens who are being held hostage. You mentioned President Biden has said the United States is going to stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel. But there is also the issue of Iran, and if Iran's extensive complicity—we all agree there's some complicity, but certainly if there is active planning of this operation—what does the United States do?

 

ABRAMS:
Well, I am a critic of Biden, Iran policy. I'd say, United States should do two things. On the Israeli side, unwavering diplomatic support, including at the UN, and resupply, which they're going to need. On the Iran part, I think the President should abandon his current policy. When Trump left office, Iran's reachable reserves in terms of money, $4 billion, now $70 billion. They've gotten rich because the Biden administration is not enforcing oil sanctions. Now, the hostage deal will give them another $6 or $9 billion.

 

LINDSAY:
Okay.

 

ABRAMS:
... Hasn't yet.

 

LINDSAY:
I have to ask you about that, Elliott, because there had been a number of allegations that the fact that the Biden administration signed off on a deal that will free up $6 billion of Iranian funds, I guess they're held in Qatar right now, basically financed this operation.

 

ABRAMS:
Well, that's silly because the money ... This operation has been in the planning for however many months. This money, the hostage payment money, has not been spent at all yet. So, I think that that allegation strikes me as just ridiculous.

 

LINDSAY:
So, that's unfair to the administration.

 

ABRAMS:
That's unfair to the administration. What is fair is that, to repeat it, their reserves, under the maximum pressure campaign, their reserves were down to $4 billion for a country of seventy million. They were broke. And now they're rich, again, because the administration is not enforcing oil sanctions the way its predecessor did.

 

LINDSAY:
Is it that or the fact that oil prices have gone way up?

 

ABRAMS:
It's both. But when you stop enforcing, one of the things is, the discounts that Iran is forced to give, was forced to give, disappeared. They're able to get 100 percent on the dollar for their oil. So, I think it is fair to say that they felt, in the last two and a half years, a reduction of U.S. pressure, a desire on the part of the United States to negotiate. And I think that ought to change. Now, whether the president's willing to do that, I just don't know.

 

LINDSAY:
Do you think the United States should take military action against Iran?

 

ABRAMS:
I think we should contemplate whether when we have nine dead Americans, which is the figure I've seen, there should be some way to punish Iran for that.

 

LINDSAY:
Steven, you want to weigh in on what U.S. choices are?

 

COOK:
They're not good ones. Clearly, Biden has announced that, you know, he remains in lockstep with Israel. Moving this aircraft carrier group into the eastern Mediterranean clearly is a warning to the Iranians and Hezbollah about widening this conflict. I think though, one thing I want to echo that Elliott said, say it in a somewhat different way, I think that policymakers and analysts in Washington have sort of misguided view of Iran. That some of them believe that with just enough diplomacy and just enough carrots and just enough incentives, just enough engagement, as they say, with the Iranians, will change their behavior, with the belief that the Iranians genuinely want a different kind of relationship with the United States.

 

There's really no evidence that the Iranians want a different kind of relationship with the United States. They want to push the United States out of the Middle East. They don't like the American led order there. And as a result, have used their assets like Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and now Hamas to sow as much chaos as they possibly can. And the sooner that analytic community of which we are a part and officials disabuse themselves of this view, the better off we are. And there are clear policy choices. 

 

One of them is, as Elliott pointed out, contemplating military actions. And my own view is that containing the Iranians and deterring the Iranians, which does not rule out the use of military action whatsoever, to establish the rules of the road around the region would be much better than what we have right now, which is chasing the Iranians around the region and then not reciprocating. Every agreement we make with the Iranians they agree. And then in some other realm, they engage in malevolent activities. It is a pattern over and over again. Presidents of both parties have reached out to the Iranians. That has never been reciprocated. We need to disabuse ourselves of the fact that engagement is going to make some sort of real difference here with this regime in Iran.

 

LINDSAY:
I want to ask you both one final question, and do so quickly. Consider this lightning round. American politics for a decade now, certainly in the last five to seven years, has been about getting out of the Middle East. We're dealing with an Iran that clearly is malevolent, a lot of pressure on the administration to do something, perhaps military force. Do you see American public support for military action against Iran?

 

ABRAMS:
If the President leads on it, and given the way Iran has been, in my view, rightly demonized for Americans since 1979, I do think there'd be public support.

 

LINDSAY:
Steven?

 

COOK:
As you know, Jim, from my forthcoming book, I don't believe that the United States should leave the Middle East. And I do think that a clear-eyed, well articulated position about what our interests are and how Iran is seeking to undermine our interests and harm us and our allies would find support among Americans. Americans aren't necessarily isolationists. They need to understand why we're there though.

 

LINDSAY:
Okay, Steven, you're following the old mantra, always be closing. You teased your forthcoming book, but you didn't state the title and when it's coming out. I'm going to give you fifteen seconds.

 

COOK:
The End of Ambition: America's Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East, and it's slated to be published June 3rd, 2024. Thanks for that, Jim.

 

LINDSAY:
We will have you back on The President's Inbox to discuss it, Steven. And on that note, I'm going to close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guests have been Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies here at CFR, and Steven Cook, the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies here at the Council. Elliott and Steven, thank you for joining me.

 

COOK:
Many thanks, Jim.

 

ABRAMS:
Thank you.

 

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The President's Inbox on Apple Podcast, Spotify, wherever you listen, and leave us a review. We love the feedback. If you want to reach out to us, please email us at [email protected]. The publications mentioned in this episode, including Steven's forthcoming book, The End of Ambition, as well as a transcript of our conversation are available on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on CFR.org. As always, opinions expressed in The President's Inbox are solely those of the host or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

 

Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang, with Director of Podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. Markus Zakaria was a recording engineer. Special thanks go out to Michelle Kurilla. This is Jim Lindsay, thanks for listening.