Nuclear Weapons

The prevailing narrative in the American media regarding newly-elected South Korean president Moon Jae-in’s first meeting with Donald Trump (aside from how to approach the presidential handshake) revolves around expectations that the chemistry between the left-leaning Moon and the conservative Trump will be bad. These expectations are amplified by the apparent gap in both leaders’ approaches to the rising North Korean threat and China’s attempts to make missile defense a wedge issue for the U.S.-ROK alliance. But the main challenge that each leader faces--and the one that will ultimately keep them together--is whether either alliance partner can truly afford to go it alone in the face of a rising North Korean threat. Moon’s choice: alliance or autonomy For Moon, the challenges stem from the perennial tension in South Korea’s foreign policy between the desire for autonomy and the need for alliance with the United States to ensure its security (something I detail in my forthcoming book "South Korea at the Crossroads"). The rising peninsular threat from North Korea and growing regional tensions among great power neighbors China, the U.S. and Japan are simply too serious for South Korea to risk its security by pursuing autonomy and abandoning the alliance with the United States. South Korean progressives are advocating for autonomy within the alliance and have urged Moon to convince Trump to let South Korea “take the lead” on North Korea while also encouraging Seoul to gain greater leverage with China by appeasing Beijing’s objections to the installation of a U.S. mid-tier missile defense system in South Korea. But Moon must also worry that an overly-assertive approach might bring Trump to devalue consultation with South Korean allies just at a time when South Korea is struggling to overcome signs of “Korea passing” in regional relations following South Korea’s political leadership vacuum and impeachment of the former president. Thus, South Korea faces contradictory and simultaneous fears that Trump will abandon South Korea and that the U.S. will entrap South Korea amidst rising tensions between Washington and Beijing. Because of the devastating consequences that would arise from a conflict with North Korea, it is in South Korea’s interest to maximize its influence and solidarity within the alliance with its security guarantor, the U.S. Trump’s choice: unilateralism or joint action against North Korea The Trump administration’s number one international security challenge stems from North Korean efforts to develop the capability to launch a missile that could be used to launch a direct nuclear strike on the United States. The administration has conducted a policy review and is urgently addressing the North Korean threat primarily by stepping up pressure on China and the international community to enforce sanctions. Any review of available instruments designed to induce a change in direction in North Korea quickly reveals that South Korean cooperation is essential and that the consequences to South Korea of North Korean retaliation to military coercion would be devastating. The costs to the United States of unilateral actions that ultimately risk rather than preserve the security of its allies would be prohibitive unless they are demonstrably essential to homeland defense against an imminent attack. The massive pressure and engagement strategy adopted by the Trump administration involves an international campaign to make the costs of North Korea’s nuclear program prohibitive and, as Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris has testified before Congress last April, “to bring Kim Jong Un to his senses, not to his knees.” Likewise, efforts to secure greater cooperation from Beijing will only work to the extent that China recognizes that the U.S.-ROK alliance is regarded as essential in thwarting North Korean aims. Common threats and common purpose Given the shared U.S.-ROK objective of ending this common threat, there is ample ground for the U.S. and South Korea to build common purpose through a stronger alliance that should deflect North Korean challenges while outweighing the South Korean impulse for autonomy or any American impulse for unilateralism. Both Trump and Moon may dream of alternatives to the alliance, but in choosing to hold an early summit, both men are also admitting that as a practical matter when it comes to North Korea, there is no viable alternative to cooperation through the U.S.-ROK alliance. This post originally appeared on Forbes.

The following is an excerpt from a piece published on The National Bureau of Asian Research.   South Korea’s newly elected progressive president Moon Jae-in was swept into office six weeks ago on a domestic anticorruption agenda and pledges of dialogue with North Korea, following a bribery scandal that led to the impeachment of his predecessor. While piecing together a new cabinet, Moon has faced an unremittingly steep learning curve in foreign policy: North Korea has challenged his offers of dialogue by conducting a series of missile tests in the weeks following his election, and he faces conflicting pressures between Beijing and Washington over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. Now Moon faces his most consequential foreign policy challenge: the task of working with the Trump administration to ensure the continued smooth management of the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK).   Read the full piece here.

Hwang Jihwan is an associate professor at University of Seoul and a visiting scholar at Catholic University of America. Trump, Moon, and North Korea Many in Washington and Seoul are concerned that tensions might emerge between the United States and South Korea during the upcoming summit between President Trump and President Moon. Given Trump’s diplomacy in Europe and Moon’s liberal approach to foreign policy, nobody can be sure of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD)’s future, the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), and the North Korean nuclear issue. However, the summit meeting is also a good opportunity for both sides to show their diplomatic credibility to the world, particularly on North Korea, which has risen as the most urgent national security issue for the alliance. Trump and Moon both understand the importance of the on-going sanctions effort against North Korea. For now, the two leaders should focus on finding a coordinated approach on North Korea while leaving other issues to be discussed later Diplomatic Strategies and Prospects for Dialogue with North Korea Given the current situation with North Korea, new administrations in the United States and South Korea are unlikely to achieve much by opening a dialogue with North Korea. However, several years have passed since the U.S. government had a dialogue with North Korea with the breakdown of the Leap Day Agreement of early 2012. In the meantime, North Korea has conducted three more nuclear tests and several ballistic missile tests. Much has changed, and it is necessary to examine North Korea’s changing reference point on the nuclear issue. If Trump and Moon open a dialogue with North Korea in the near future, the expectation should not be any substantial progress on the denuclearization issue, but seeking to understand what North Korea wants and can do to compromise or negotiate in future talks. It is improbable that North Korea would agree to denuclearize because it has already declared itself a nuclear weapon state like the United States and China. Rather, North Korea will seek to make use of such a dialogue to consolidate its position. Against this backdrop, it is not desirable to expect a grand bargain with North Korea in the short term. However, it may still be worth opening a new round of dialogue because the United States and South Korea will be able to examine North Korea’s current reference point and have a chance to discuss a realistic, practical, and alternative counterarguments and proposals. Exchanges of ideas and positions can occur. The goal would be to decrease the gap in positions and to understand what can be negotiated. A dialogue can begin with North Korea’s moratorium on nuclear and missile tests. The freeze should be merely a start. In addition, there should be North Korea’s pledge to eventually denuclearize, agreements on the future of U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean relations, and a peace regime. They may be agreed comprehensively but should be discussed gradually. In this process, there should be some division of labor between the United States and South Korea. The United States needs to deal directly with China while South Korea needs to reach out to the North on inter-Korean issues. Between Denuclearization and Peace Regime The United States and South Korea need to think about a new framework for denuclearizing North Korea and building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has consistently made Kim Il Sung’s claim that the United States has caused the crisis on the Korean peninsula by deploying nuclear weapons in Korea. This is why North Korea believes that a peace treaty should be established first before any measure on denuclearization. Although the United States and South Korea believe that a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula would be meaningless unless North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons program, North Korea is reluctant to denuclearize. While North Korea intends to make its regional security environment favorable with its nuclear weapons, the international community will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Therefore, the United States and South Korea need to think about the meaning of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Although the Korean War is still on-going, both internal and external situations on the Korean peninsula have changed much during the past decades, and the armistice established in 1953 does not guarantee peace and security in the region. Because the United States and South Korea do not accept the North Korean version of the peace treaty intended to weaken the U.S.-Korea alliance, it is imperative to prepare for an American and South Korean version of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The United States and South Korea are unlikely to be able to make any progress on denuclearization without a realistic plan for a peace regime. China has also recently started arguing for the need to discuss both the denuclearization and peace treaty issues at the same time. A new peace initiative on the Korean peninsula should include the change in North Korea’s national strategy from the Byungjin (simultaneous nuclear and economic development) to an economy-first policy, and its official pledge and initial steps to denuclearize eventually. Resolving the North Korea Issue, Not the Nuclear Issue China is one of the most important parties in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. However, China is unlikely to put much pressure on North Korea to the degree that the United States and South Korea are seeking. Although China possesses the economic leverage enough to coerce North Korea, it does not want to destabilize the North Korean regime. If neither North Korea nor China cooperates to resolve the nuclear issue, the United States and South Korea need to approach North Korean people directly in order to accelerate the slow and long-term change in North Korean society by supporting marketization and introducing more outside information. This does not mean that the United States and South Korea should seek a coercive and sudden change in North Korea. A coercive change is unlikely to produce a positive effect on the future of the Korean peninsula. It would be another Iraq after Saddam Hussein. North Korean people would not support the United States and South Korea now even if the Kim Jong Un regime were to collapse. The United States and South Korea have failed in securing North Korean people’s support for decades. If some contingencies occur inside North Korea, North Korean people are more likely to build a new regime rather than support a South Korea-led unified Korea on the peninsula. China will also seek to use such an opportunity to usher in a new pro-China regime. Therefore, the United States and South Korea should pursue a policy that changes North Korean society itself. This is why the North Korea issue as a whole, not just the nuclear issue aspect, needs to be resolved. This is the agenda that Trump and Moon should focus on in the upcoming summit meeting.

Park Hyeong Jung is a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. With the inauguration of Moon Jae-in as the new president of South Korea, North Korea is sure to launch a renewed push to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. Here are five main drivers of North Korea’s policy toward South Korea and the United States. First, Kim Jong-un believes that even a liberal South Korean president would be incapable of delivering what North Korea wishes to achieve strategically in relations with the South. North Korea may have three wishes: first, separate the issue of inter-Korean rapprochement from his nuclear and missile provocations; second, persuade the South Korean public to take strong enough measures to guarantee the Kim regime’s survival as it is politically, economically, and security wise; and third, make South Korea exert influence on the United States to soften its North Korea policy. Second, Kim Jong-un believes that a serious reciprocation by his part to South Korean wishes for a renewal of inter-Korean rapprochement would result in the end only in delaying the completion of his paramount strategic objective for the time being, i.e. accomplishment of a system of deterrence and coercion based on a variety of conventional and nuclear tipped missiles, including the capacity to hit the United States with an inter-continental ballistic nuclear missile. He might think this delay could extend the period of North Korea’s vulnerability through lengthening heightened pressure and sanctions by the international community and neighboring countries. Third, Kim Jong-un knows better than anyone else that the coming years would be a period of intensified tension, not one appropriate for testing rapprochement, on the Korean peninsula. He seeks to greatly augment its nuclear and missile capabilities as fast as possible in the coming years and needs to promote a policy to increase, not decrease, provocative actions. He welcomes and enjoys the permanency of escalated tension on the Korean peninsula for two reasons: first, this would help make case for the urgent necessity of peace agreement on the Korean peninsula on North Korean terms; second, this would divert attention from North Korea’s permanently serious internal problems and strengthen the justification for economic deprivation and strengthened internal political discipline. Fourth, Kim Jong-un does not believe in the possibility of an inter-Korean rapprochement or one with any other country contingent on a nuclear/missile-freeze deal because he knows better than anyone else that he does not have to assent to a freeze deal that would be acceptable to the United States and/or South Korea. He knows better than anyone else what his ultimate strategic objective is, and how urgent it is to achieve it under the current circumstances of increasingly heightened pressure and sanctions. In addition, he knows better than anyone how much cost he has had to accept in the hitherto process of nuclear and missile build-up and that it has been rather tolerable up until now. He would be confident that, though it could be ratcheted up, the cost would remain under tolerable limits, given the cleavages among neighboring countries, particularly with regard to China’s concerns about potential instability in North Korea. He believes, though with increased risks, he can muddle through in the end and achieve his strategic objectives. Fifth, with these calculations as backdrop, North Korea might show tactical flexibility in its approaches to South Korea and the United States. Pyongyang might think that, though not valuable in strategic terms, South Korea’s new approach in its North Korea policy might bring favorable tactical opportunities, which should be tested and taken advantage of. North Korea’s tactical flexibility would aim at attaining three objectives; first, weaken the international united front and efficiency of pressure against North Korea; second, buy time for recuperation and preparation for the upcoming crisis; third, test the depth of concessions either by the South and/or the United States; fourth, exacerbate cleavages in South Korea and among neighboring countries. In dealing with this challenge, the Moon and Trump administrations agree and disagree on many issues. The two parties share a consensus on the dual track approach of pressure and diplomacy. In addition, both the Moon and Trump administrations are dealing with the challenge under acute time pressure and have a “now or never” mindset. But the two sides disagree on whether it is worth testing North Korea’s intentions seriously, even at this juncture, with some inducement. The two parties need to bridge the gap and assign appropriate attention to the other party’s priorities and concerns.

South Korea’s new president decided to halt deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system last week—pending environmental review. Why the immediate trigger? Moon’s administration discovered the ROK Ministry of National Defense did not brief the incoming president that four additional THAAD launchers scheduled for deployment as components of the battery deployed last April near Seongju had already arrived in-country. The failure to provide critical information regarding South Korea’s security rightly incensed Moon, and ensured he will clean house. Increased transparency More broadly, Moon campaign supporters were dismayed by USFK’s expedited deployment of the THAAD battery and two launchers only two weeks prior to South Korea’s election. Given the Moon campaign’s longstanding criticisms that the previous administration had failed to manage the THAAD decision and deployment in a transparent manner, it was inevitable that there would be a domestic review of decisions made by the acting government in the months prior to Moon’s election. However, outside observers are skeptical that the review may be a ploy to reverse South Korean public support for the deployment. This despite assurances from the government to the United States that the decision by Moon will not change the outcome of South Korean support for the THAAD deployment. It shouldn't. Barely a day after Moon Jae-in’s announcement, North Korea reportedly launched four short-range anti-ship missiles. North Korea's missile advances across the board are cause for concern--and cause for defensive countermeasures. The risks and vulnerabilities are out in the open: South Korea’s indigenous missile defense efforts are developing too slowly to counter North Korean progress, and that could put U.S. Forces in Korea at risk. Moon's decision carries risks The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea. Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea. The way forward The THAAD debate has become overheated and politicized, generating risks of miscalculation and overreaction. A pause that defuses the political issues surrounding the THAAD deployment would be a good thing, but a pause as prelude to reversal could do great damage to the U.S.-ROK security alliance. Moon will hold his first summit with Trump in later this month. At that time, the United States and South Korea should reestablish a coordinated strategy for addressing the North Korean problem and focus on South Korean vulnerabilities to North Korean missiles in a comprehensive fashion, while also improving South Korean governmental transparency on these issues.   But if the deployment is paralyzed by opponents of the system in South Korea's new government, that outcome would mark gain for North Korea and China and a setback for the U.S.-ROK alliance. This post originally appeared on Forbes.

The election of the left-leaning Moon Jae-in is a confidence booster for South Korea, in terms of both the country's democratic process and the prospects for fighting endemic corruption. But it took only four days for North Korea to test an intermediate-range ballistic missile following Moon's election. The launch serves as a reminder that despite the new administration's aspirations to promote peace and reconciliation, foreign policy is likely to be the biggest challenge of Moon's presidency. Seoul faces an increasingly insecure Northeast Asia and must cope with the uncertainty of the Donald Trump administration. The enduring tension that shapes South Korea's foreign policy is the desire for autonomy versus the necessity of the alliance with the U.S. -- an alliance that has prevented war and enabled regional prosperity for over six decades. South Korea's power shift from a conservative to a progressive leadership will tip the scale further toward autonomy, on the template of Moon's liberal predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun. Moon wants to revitalize inter-Korean dialogue, renew economic cooperation, reclaim South Korea's responsibility for wartime decision-making from the U.S., and resume six-party talks on North Korea's denuclearization. But even though some of Moon's advisers desire greater independence from the U.S., there is no viable alternative that can guarantee South Korea's security. Trump and Moon will face a number of flashpoints in their relationship: the goal of denuclearizing North Korea; the sharing of costs and responsibilities within the Washington-Seoul alliance; trade relations and the possible revision of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, known as KORUS; and how to improve South Korea's relations with Japan. STICKS OR CARROTS? The nub of the North Korea issue is how most effectively to achieve denuclearization. The Trump administration expects to dial up international pressure on Pyongyang as needed by convincing China to tighten the screws economically, while admitting the eventual need for negotiations. But Moon has expressed his preference for early negotiations and his desire to reopen the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex, which was closed by the conservative Park Geun-hye administration in February 2016 after North Korea's fourth nuclear test. A coordinated strategy will be essential: Conflict here would strain the alliance and drain American congressional and public support for South Korea. Following North Korea's missile test in early March, the U.S. hurriedly deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea's Seongju County. And although Trump's demand in late April that South Korea pay for THAAD probably boosted support for Moon prior to the election, publicly airing such unilateral demands will politicize the alliance and undermine local support for U.S. Forces Korea. Trump's comments have created a pretext for THAAD critics within the Moon administration to investigate Park's decision to deploy the system, even though South Koreans strongly supported the move. That support could erode if Park administration officials are deemed to have exceeded their power within the acting government during the impeachment. As for KORUS, Moon advisers proudly point to it as a trade deal the Roh government originally negotiated with the George W. Bush administration in 2007. The Barack Obama administration later ratified an "improved" version of the agreement. Now, Trump's obsession with a swelling merchandise trade deficit ignores that the U.S. enjoys a growing surplus in exports of services to South Korea, and that KORUS has fostered high-quality, job-creating inward investment from South Korea in the automobile and electronics sectors, among others. And then there is the Japan problem. An additional source of friction between the Trump and Moon administrations could arise if South Korea tries to renegotiate the December 2015 deal over World War II "comfort women" with Japan. The agreement included an apology from the Japanese prime minister to Korean victims, and a nearly $9 million donation to a South Korean government-run foundation that supports the women and their families. Moon supporters would claim the 2015 agreement did not satisfy Korean public expectations for Japan's formal expression of remorse, but Tokyo is unlikely to renegotiate. Regardless of how Japan-South Korea bilateral relations move forward, the U.S. will continue to see trilateral coordination with the Asian neighbors as essential for an effective pressure strategy against North Korea. Moon's efforts to strengthen his country's diplomatic leadership within the alliance is likely to conflict with Trump's "America first" approach to alliances. Rather than a divergence of interests, the great risk to coordination between Trump and Moon is bad chemistry. If mishandled, the collision of these forces could endanger the alliance, just at the moment when the world needs maximum coordination to bring North Korea's growing nuclear threat to heel. Scott Snyder is author of the forthcoming book, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers. This post originally appeared on Nikkei Asian Review.

North Korea is not abandoning its nuclear ambitions, as proven by Saturday’s failed ballistic missile test. However, neither is the United States abandoning its plan to pressure North Korea into submission.  The key to the success of U.S. President Donald Trump’s strategy? China. Trump’s efforts to win China over to his “maximum pressure and engagement” approach to North Korea started at the Mar-a-Lago summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in early April. Days later, Trump expressed his “absolute confidence that [Xi] will be trying very, very hard” to resolve the North Korea issue and mentioned that “some very unusual moves have been made over the last two or three hours.” Shortly thereafter, there were rumors in media reports that China might have reduced the flow of petroleum to Pyongyang, causing gas rationing in the capital. Concerns over U.S. pressure Despite China’s uneasiness with a nuclear North Korea, however, China continues to see ramped up U.S. military pressure on North Korea as an even bigger concern. An editorial in the state-run Global Times shows Beijing’s frustration with a possible U.S. military response to Pyongyang’s threats. And in a call between Trump and Xi on April 24, the Chinese president switched back to urging Trump to exercise restraint. At the United Nations, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi counseled enforcement of sanctions along with his usual urging all parties to manage the issue peacefully through dialogue. The Chinese position elicited a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that the U.S. does not seek regime change. The commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific command, Admiral Harry Harris, also said that U.S. pressure is designed to “bring the North Korean leader to his senses, not to his knees.” Yet U.S. military maneuvers and warnings about future North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile development from U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley overshadow these statements and have drawn ever more shrill responses from Pyongyang. A litmus test for China-U.S. relations The Trump administration is clearly eager to change North Korea’s trajectory—in any way possible. And Beijing’s role in helping do so seems to be a litmus test that will influence the future of the U.S.-China relationship. I explained to the President of China that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem! — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) April 11, 2017 Yet Chinese and American analysts alike point out the likely limits of China’s willingness to pressure North Korea to the extent the Trump administration desires. While Chinese analysts recognize the dangers posed by North Korea, they have long seen Chinese influence as limited and believe that U.S. hostility toward North Korea is the root cause of peninsular tensions. But American analysts and political leaders are increasingly frustrated that China has not cut the umbilical cord of food and energy supplies that the North depends on for its economic survival despite its political isolation. Frustration in Washington  Secretary Tillerson has identified gaps in Chinese enforcement of UN sanctions as the missing ingredient in successfully curbing North Korea. The Trump administration ultimately expects Beijing to put enough pressure on Pyongyang to make Kim realize that the nuclear program endangers rather than assures the survival of his regime. However, this course of action imposes on China higher risks than the country has been willing to take so far. It prefers the status quo to the dangers of political instability and refugee flows across China’s border.  Another area in which frustration in Washington has boiled over is related to China’s cautious and permissive approach that enables North Korean front companies and elites to skirt sanctions by embedding North Korean procurement in China’s supply chain so that North Korean entities can secure necessary financing from Chinese banks despite UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on such activities. The UN sanctions reports are intended to strengthen enforcement of the UN resolutions, but instead they show how North Korean sanctions evasion methods have neutralized the economic impact of the resolutions.  There are moves in Congress afoot to force the Trump administration to take a more aggressive unilateral approach to punishing Chinese business partners and financial enablers of North Korea through the unilateral application of secondary sanctions, but the question is how to do so without sparking global financial stability, given that North Korean operations seem to be deeply embedded in China’s financing system. Will China pay up?  Ever since North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, China has struggled with a menu of policy options toward North Korea that are even more unsatisfactory compared to those faced by the United States. Placing the level of pressure needed to force Kim Jong-un to give up his nuclear weapons program risks the North Korean regime collapsing, leading to refugee flows and potentially a unified Korea allied with the United States; refusing to crack down on North leads to a North Korea racing toward its nuclear finish-line, U.S. military build-up in Northeast Asia, and even a direct military conflict with the United States. The price that Beijing pays for its longstanding support for a North Korean regime that exports instability as its only sure means of regime survival is a bill that has finally come due. The Trump administration seems intent on securing outstanding payments as a principal means by which to pressure Pyongyang. Can Trump convince China to pay up? This posted originally appeared on Forbes.com.

President Trump has sent a stern warning to Xi Jinping that if China does not help us with North Korea, it will be bad for China and the U.S. will act on its own. Although sounding tough, the President may be dooming his meeting with Xi to just another round of failure on North Korea. The past several years have demonstrated that the long-standing U.S. demand that China must play the central role in a strategy of expanding sanctions with North Korea may be misguided and unrealistic. While China has shared interests in resolving the crisis, there are clear limits to the pressure China is willing to apply. This reticence is due to China's fears of a refugee influx it cannot control if the North Korean regime collapses, and its fear of losing a buffer state on its border. China also benefits from North Korea distracting the U.S. presence in Asia, as China's own presence rises. China's security interests are not going to change. What needs to change is how we work with China. Trump cannot just bully Xi to another nominal yes on North Korea. He needs to work with Xi's security interests, so that China's support for pressuring the renegade state becomes implemented, sustainable policy. Washington has had two long-standing objectives: to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and to reunify the Korean peninsula. President Trump should remain steadfast on the first and return North Korea to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear power. An agreement that only freezes North Korean capabilities will not solve the crisis and will only, again, kick it down the road.   The U.S. is on firm ground demanding North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons. The U.S. unilaterally removed its nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, and South Korea is a member in good standing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea has reintroduced nuclear weapons onto the peninsula in defiance of regional and global obligations. A nuclear capable North Korea will leave open the dangerous alternatives of the U.S. reintroducing nuclear weapons onto the peninsula and/or South Korea and Japan developing their own nuclear arsenal. Despite President’s Trump’s own misplaced musings, U.S. and global security continue to be best served by fewer nuclear weapons at the disposal of dispersed, unpredictable leaders. Kim Jung Un is at the top of that list. But where the U.S. should show flexibility is on reunification. This goal has threatened China’s interest of a buffer state on its border and has inhibited Chinese cooperation on the imminent North Korea threat. Furthermore, unification is also being questioned within South Korea, particularly among the younger generation who are concerned about the economic sacrifice that may be required by the much more affluent South. While we cannot live with a nuclear-capable Kim regime, the question is whether we can live with a non-nuclear Kim regime on a divided peninsula. If the answer is yes, policy options open up to achieve that goal with Chinese cooperation. Since the North Korea crisis first moved to the top of the U.S. agenda in the 1990s, North Korea has focused on the U.S. providing incentives in return for the end of its nuclear program -- food aid, energy aid, security guarantees, and a peace agreement to replace the 1953 truce. Providing these incentives has received skeptical reception in the U.S. given North Korea’s track record of broken agreements, proliferation, and human rights abuses. But, since 1994, China’s economic and security prowess in the region has greatly expanded, including its support for North Korea after the Soviet Union collapsed. The responsibility should shift to China to provide the incentives. It has a lot to offer: security guarantees, by strengthening its 1961 mutual assistance agreement; more investment in North Korean industry and infrastructure; membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and integration into its One Belt One Road initiative, among others. If more sanctions are needed, China’s leverage may be better played by focusing on North Korea’s illicit economy, a major source of cash flow and an area where some Chinese entities have been implicated -- proliferation, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cyber bank robberies -- as opposed to its legitimate economy. Cracking down on illicit activities requires commitment, financial resources, international support, all of which China can help deliver. Furthermore, North Korea’s legitimate economic development will be a cornerstone of a more stable, nuclear free North Korea and, in the short term, will not offset the loss of cash flow from its illicit practices. Stopping a determined nation from developing nuclear weapons is difficult. Reversing established capabilities is even harder. But it has been done. To move North Korea into the success column, Trump needs to ensure Xi Jinping recognizes North Korea is a U.S. priority, that we are willing to work with China’s security interests, and that the U.S. will keep its eye on the ball and not blink.

In a matter of weeks, all of China’s fears have come to a head on the Korean Peninsula. At an airport in Malaysia in mid-February, the exiled half-brother of North Korea’s ruler was assassinated with a nerve agent, reminding the world that the Hermit Kingdom is run by a paranoid and violent regime. Closer to home, North Korea conducted two rounds of ballistic missile tests in stark violation of UN Security Council resolutions. In response, the United States, South Korea, and Japan all vowed to tighten military ties and step up pressure on Pyongyang, underscored by the initial deployment, much to China’s dismay, of a new U.S. missile defense system in South Korea. Leaders in Beijing had reason to be nervous. An unpredictable ruler in North Korea was once again tempting war on the Peninsula, which would be disastrous for China in the form of refugees flooding across its border and loose nukes on its doorstep. In addition to the immediate crisis, a collapsing North Korea would likely result in a unified country led by a U.S.-friendly government in Seoul, removing China’s strategic buffer that keeps the United States and its South Korean ally at a more comfortable distance. At the end of the day, Beijing isn’t happy with Pyongyang’s saber rattling, but trying to manage a nuclear North Korea remains preferable to rolling the dice with instability. This is why China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, at a news conference in Beijing last week, proposed a deal to lower tensions and get the parties back to the table. Under the rubric of a “double suspension,” China recommended that North Korea halt its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for the United States and South Korea cancelling major military exercises. At first glance, the proposal has its appeal. It’s hard to argue, after all, that the current approach is working: North Korea conducted two nuclear weapon tests and 24 missile tests in 2016 alone, and is reportedly poised to launch its first trial of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the United States. Returning to negotiations and freezing North Korea’s programs, so the argument goes, may be less virtuous than outright denuclearization, but it’s both a more realistic goal and better than the alternative of allowing North Korea to march toward a much larger nuclear arsenal with more sophisticated missiles to deliver them. But senior U.S. and South Korean officials were right to stand shoulder-to-shoulder at the United Nations and turn down the offer. U.S. ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley reiterated the Obama administration’s position of demanding that Pyongyang first demonstrate that it is interested in complying with UN Security Council Resolutions that require walking back its nuclear ambitions. Her South Korean counterpart added a point familiar to Korea watchers: that provocation and aggression should not be rewarded with dialogue and accommodation. These arguments are good policy in the tactical sense, but three more fundamental issues led the Obama administration to shelve a similar “freeze-for-freeze” proposal. First, particularly given North Korea’s record of evasion and deceit, any reasonable suspension would require an extraordinarily invasive verification regime, well beyond what even the most sympathetic observers believe Pyongyang would stomach. If you can’t verify, the deal isn’t worth the paper it’s written on. Second, U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises are not just symbolic shows of force. They are necessary to ensure that the United States and its allies are prepared for what would assuredly be a nasty war. Pentagon officials are quick to warn against putting the reduction of military readiness on the table, much less as an opening gambit. Finally, and this is the kicker, it’s bad strategy to agree to a mutual suspension at this particular moment—even if you think negotiations are the only viable path to stabilizing the Peninsula. Instead, as the dust settles around South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, the United States should continue working with allies and partners, as well as China, to implement fully the two UN Security Resolutions secured by the Obama administration last year. These provide unprecedented sources of financial and diplomatic pressure on North Korea, including strict limits on the export of raw materials and access to global financial markets. If faithfully enforced, North Korea’s hard currency could be cut by upwards of $800 million, slowing its ability to fund its weapons programs while creating potential antibodies to Kim Jong-un’s rule. Several elements of the new sanctions package have never been tried and were only put into place in recent months, meaning skeptics will have to hold their breath before assessing the true effectiveness of the pressure campaign—it is simply not the case that this is old wine in new bottles. All this is to say that diving into negotiations now would be throwing away a key source of leverage over North Korea. It would also take the pressure off of China prematurely, just when newfound U.S. resolve is driving Beijing to finally step up its game in constraining North Korea’s economy. Why start bargaining when you’re on the cusp of dramatically strengthening your hand? Instead, the United States can create more favorable conditions for successful negotiations by first demonstrating seriousness of purpose to Beijing and imposing novel costs on Pyongyang. Only after the new sanctions regime is fully implemented will the time be ripe to consider mutual concessions. A version of this post originally appeared in Fortune. Follow me at @elyratner.