Nationalism

Countries have done too little to fix a broken humanitarian system. 

General elections for India’s lower house of parliament began on April 11 and will last through May 19, with all ballots counted on May 23. This is the world’s largest democratic exercise. I had the chance to ask Dr. Kanchan Chandra, professor of politics at New York University, about ethnic politics, caste, and Hindu nationalism. Our exchange, the fourth of a series of Q & As on the Indian elections, appears below. The first is here, the second here, and the third here. You have done pioneering work on ethnic and caste politics in India. How do you see caste and ethnicity evolving as a feature of Indian politics? This election is distinguished by an effort by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to construct a political majority out of India’s Hindu demographic majority, and an effort by other parties to prevent this from happening. Hindus in India are a very diverse lot. They consist of many castes, languages, regions, and tribes. The same goes for members of other religious categories but I will focus on Hindus in this answer. In principle, this election could go two ways. The mobilization of caste, linguistic, regional, and tribal identities might cut across religious identities and prevent the consolidation of the Hindu majority. Or, the BJP may be able to homogenize caste, linguistic, regional, and tribal identities in service of a larger Hindu majority. I think the first scenario is more likely. In November, you wrote an essay for Foreign Affairs that examined “The Triumph of Hindu Majoritarianism” in Indian politics, noting that the shift away from Nehru’s idea of secularism began back in the 1980s. Can you explain for a general reader what a more moderate approach to religion in public life might look like, one that in your words “offers equal respect not only to India’s non-Hindu minorities but also to the many different ways of being Hindu”? Unlike Catholicism, which has a Church and a Pope, Hinduism is a religion of many traditions, many books, and many religious institutions. There is no single book, church, priest, or institution that defines it. A state could offer equal respect to all of these traditions (Hindu as well as non-Hindu) by following a highly differentiated policy toward religion that recognizes all these traditions. Such a state would do away with the notion of majority and minority altogether by recognizing a multiplicity of traditions. It would also be equidistant from, rather than neutral toward, all religious traditions. The version of India as a secular state as laid down in its Constitution approximates the ideal of equidistance but could do more to recognize the diversity within Hinduism. This kind of state is now unlikely in India. What is happening in India now is a change both in the form of the state and in the form of religion itself. Hinduism itself is undergoing a transformation from a religion of many traditions to a religion that is becoming evangelized and approaching the idea of a single great tradition. And the state is beginning to recognize and institutionalize this homogenized, evangelized form of Hinduism. The politics of Hindu nationalism, coupled with the liberalization of the economy and the creation of a nationwide media, has a lot to do with that. India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, is the size of a large country, with its 200 million people. You have focused closely on the politics of this state. What will you be watching in the coming weeks? Uttar Pradesh is the classic case of the politics of caste and ethnicity cross-cutting the politics of religion. The BJP is defending its position in this state by focusing on religious mobilization. The two main opposition parties – the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP) – are attempting to neutralize this trend toward religious mobilization by emphasizing the distinct interests of subordinate caste groups and religious minorities. I will be watching for the number of seats each combination takes away, which could also have a major impact on who forms the government at the center. What will you be watching most closely at the national level during India’s 2019 general election? I have been paying close attention to the way in which most political parties have begun to capitalize on the politics of religion. The BJP is trying to mobilize a Hindu majority by activating fear (of terrorism, of Pakistan, of instability). The Congress is trying to mobilize a Hindu majority in a different way, by emphasizing the religiosity of its leaders and their commitment to Hindu values. No matter who wins, this will change the relationship between India’s Hindu majority and the government, and therefore the nature of India as a secular state. I will be watching to see how this plays out. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, was published by Oxford University Press in January 2018. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

Nigerians are reveling in the international accolades the Super Eagles—their national football team—are receiving for their dress as they travel to their World Cup matches in Kaliningrad. London’s Daily Mail wrote, “First, it was the announcement of their tournament kits that sent football supporters crazy. Now it is their travel attire that has everybody talking again.” According to the Sun, also based in London, “Nigeria once again won the fashion stakes at this year’s World Cup, with their incredible travel outfit.” Nigerian media is also delighted. The Guardian, based in Nigeria, all but gushed when it wrote, “This is another plus following the craze that the team’s sexy home kits has caused as it went on sale worldwide this month,” and “From head to toe, the Nigerian squad have indulged in their culture and clearly have no intention of blending in with the crowd [of] other nations looking to upset the odds in Russia. One Nigerian commentator sounded a more sober note: “It is not a problem for the team to savour [sic] the euphoria of its global fashion rating but it should realize that the main rating will be their performance on the pitch.” Nigerians like to say that theirs is the world’s most religious country. Some urged their fellow citizens to pray for the team because of the “huge burden of expectation” the nation is imposing on the players. The Premium Times reports that players born outside of Nigeria will likely occupy all four defender positions, creating an “oyibo wall.” (In Nigeria, oyibo is a pidgin word that usually refers to a European.) Two were born in the Netherlands, one in Germany, and one in Russia, but they all chose to play for their parents’ country of birth. They might have been born abroad, but they are still Nigerian. However, the coach of the Super Eagles, Gernot Rohr, is a German with no family connection to Nigeria. Even so, in a country with a still-developing sense of national identity, and with many regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages, the Super Eagles are a strong—perhaps the strongest—symbol of national unity. For more on Nigeria, Matthew Page and I provide an overview of its politics, history, and culture, including the threat of Boko Haram and religious conflicts in, our new book, Nigeria: What Everyone Needs to Know, which will be published by Oxford University Press in July.

Japan’s choices in a changing Asia will define the region’s future and will have tremendous impact on U.S. policy in Asia. Japanese today, like their neighbors on the Korean peninsula and in China, are grappling with a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. Moreover, as a new generation of leaders comes to the fore, Japanese are also openly debating their postwar experience, asking new questions about what changes may be required to ensure their security and prosperity in this new era. Japanese politics and Asia’s geopolitics now intersect in ways that question Japan’s future strategic choices. Will Japan abandon its postwar constitution and pursue a more “normal” military strategy? Will Japanese leaders continue to embrace reconciliation and remembrance in their approach to relations with their Asian neighbors? Will the Japanese people continue to feel secure in the U.S.-Japan security bargain crafted over half a century ago? These are only some of the questions we address in our new podcast series, Nationalism, Japan, and a Changing Asia. This series contains eight podcasts with experts from Japan and the United States, which were recorded in Tokyo, in Washington, and at times by telephone, in the years since the nations of Northeast Asia commemorated the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. These conversations reveal the complex interaction between geopolitical change in Asia and changing Japanese thinking about their security, their past, and their constitution. The first four discussions focus on Japan’s relations with its neighbors, and feature Hitoshi Tanaka, Akio Takahara, Yoshihide Soeya, and Yuichi Hosoya, who are among Japan's leading academic and policy experts. They analyze the external dynamics that affect policy making in Japan, and we try to separate the politics from the policy debate over Japan’s relations with the major powers of Asia. Following our discussion of foreign policy, I discuss Japan’s identity debate with America’s leading scholars of Japan, who have taken varying approaches to thinking about the nationalisms of Northeast Asia: Jennifer Lind, Nathaniel Smith, Celeste Arrington, and Thomas Berger. Looking within Japan and other nations, we examine the currents of change in thinking about Japan’s military and war memory, and consider the advocates that identify as the new “right” in Japan.   Please join us as we consider how Japan is contending with this challenging and unpredictable moment in world politics.    This podcast series is part of a project on Northeast Asian Nationalisms and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, which is made possible through support from the U.S.-Japan Foundation.

Ayobami Egunyomi is a Franklin Williams intern for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She received her BA in International Relations from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis. She is a native of Nigeria. In light of the renewed clamor for the secession of Biafra, it is evident that the country is far from settling its national question, and attainment of true nationhood is not on the horizon of Nigeria. Although Nigeria is striving to promote national unity, the country seems to still be battling with the ethnic tension it faced after its independence that ultimately led to the outbreak of its three-year civil war. After the Nigerian Civil War ended in 1970, as part of the “3R” program—reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation—the government created the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to bridge ethnic and religious divisions in Nigeria and to foster the spirit of Nigerian nationalism. General Yakubu Gowon, the military head of state at the time, created the NYSC as one of many ways to achieve national unity in Nigeria. The program is a mandatory one-year service to the country after the completion of a first degree for youths below the age of thirty. Participation is a prerequisite for admission into graduate schools and employment in Nigeria. Although it was established with great intent, many Nigerians think it is high time that the forty-four year old scheme was scrapped, arguing that it has its lost its relevance in present-day Nigeria. This view stems from the fact that since its inception, the scheme has neither been reviewed nor updated to fit the realities of modern Nigeria, despite its glaring problems. Even though the federal government allocates about 70 billion naira ($194 million) to the program yearly, the NYSC, like many other Nigerian institutions, is riddled with mismanagement and corruption. This results in unreliable officials administering the scheme, a general lack of faith in the NYSC, and complacency among the participants. According to its original design, the scheme deploys youths to unfamiliar locations and places of primary assignment to fields relevant to their academic pursuits and job interests. In reality, however, it mostly deploys youths to teach in local schools as a way to make up for the educational shortcomings of the state, rather than finding them suitable job assignments geared toward their interests. Consequently, “corpers” feel undervalued and view themselves as a source of cheap labor for the government. Furthermore, youths who have the financial resources can “work it”—use connections to serve in choice locations—or “ghost”—secretly not participate in the service. For those that do participate, their safety is not assured, as there have been numerous cases of “corpers” dying in service due to post-election violence, sectarian wars, and medical negligence. The question that thus arises is, has the NYSC been successful in achieving its main objective of “developing common ties among the Nigerian youths and promoting national unity and integration?” For all its faults, the answer is still yes, to some extent. By posting “corpers” to unfamiliar places in order to interact with people from different backgrounds, the NYSC brings together Nigerian youths from different socio-economic and ethno-religious backgrounds. This helps bridge the ethnic and religious divisions in the nation by providing exposure to other ethnic groups, which is a positive step towards building a stronger nation. Moreover, the scheme aids social integration by providing opportunities for cross cultural interaction that has led to inter-tribal marriages, helping to reduce inter-ethnic stereotypes and suspicions that were prevalent during the period after the war. The scheme further serves as an employment buffer by offering employment to recently graduated youths, as some places of deployments retain the “corpers,” thereby, aiding economic integration in the country. Likewise, NYSC fosters a sense of patriotism among Nigerian youths; participation is regarded as obeying the clarion call to serve the fatherland, since there is no military conscription in Nigeria    With the renewed agitation for the secession of Biafra, the need for the NYSC remains high and illuminates the fact that the scheme is far from achieving its mission of fostering national integration. Based on the design of the NYSC, it is a good scheme and a great avenue to promote nationalism in Nigeria. The program has a lofty objective and has achieved some positive goals. Even with all its mistakes, there is still hope for the Nigerian Youth Service Corps, but it is crucial that it be reviewed, updated, and better managed in order to preserve and strengthen the cause of national unity.