Moon Jae-in

On November 9, South Korean President Moon Jae-in unveiled his “New Southern Policy,” aimed at deepening relations with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Moon’s announcement, made on a state visit to Indonesia, came amid a flurry of diplomatic activity in the region ahead of the latest ASEAN summit in the Philippines and U.S. President Donald Trump’s trip to Asia. In an email interview, Scott Snyder, a senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the forthcoming book South Korea at the Crossroads, discusses what is behind the New Southern Policy and what it means for South Korea’s allies and neighbors. Read the interview on WorldPoliticsReview.com.

On 29 June 2017, South Korean President Moon Jae-in arrived in Washington for an early summit with his US counterpart Donald Trump. Despite dramatic contrasts in the circumstances, ideologies and style of these two unlikely partners, the convergence of national interests and common objectives concerning North Korea was sufficient to keep the US–South Korea alliance on track. Ironically, successful coordination on the issue of North Korea exposed differing views on trade and burden sharing that will keep diplomats from both countries busy. Prior to the summit, it was common to find analyses suggesting that the chemistry between Moon and Trump would be analogous to mixing oil and water. The progressive Moon has been an understated and personable domestic bridge-builder, elected on an anti-corruption platform following a presidential impeachment scandal. In contrast, the conservative Trump has pursued a brash and divisive approach to governance that takes no prisoners and has blurred ethical boundaries between government and business. An Asan Institute poll showed that South Korean support for the alliance remains high —despite Trump’s declining personal popularity compared to former president Barack Obama — with over half of South Koreans polled supporting the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment. Moon supporters expressed wariness that Trump and Moon would have no chemistry or that Trump would embarrass and humiliate Moon. But Moon’s strategy of alignment with Trump on security issues — forecast in public interviews in the weeks prior to the summit — took almost every security issue off the table before Moon arrived in Washington. Moon declared in those interviews that he was in agreement with Trump on the need to increase pressure on North Korea, while seeking opportunities for substantive dialogue. Moon also allayed fears surrounding his authorisation of an environmental assessment of THAAD, indicating it was intended to strengthen support for the system and the legitimacy of its deployment by following transparent and democratic procedures. By the time Moon arrived in Washington to meet Trump, no big picture security issues remained on the table that could spark disagreement. But the convergence on security issues left space for Trump to express his longstanding, personally-held views of South Korea as an economic free rider. Trump tweeted following dinner with Moon that he was already renegotiating the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), an announcement that shocked South Korean communications officials accompanying Moon. Trump also placed discordant emphasis on the need for reciprocal trade and for South Korea’s cooperation to level the playing field for US auto exports and avoid facilitating unfair dumping of steel in US markets. The South Korean side defended itself by stating that economic differences expressed by Trump were not included in their Joint Statement. The Joint Statement itself underscored the extensive institutionalisation of US–South Korean cooperation within the alliance, while reflecting an evolution in views on some key issues. It also reflected important continuities with the 2009 and 2013 US­–South Korea Joint Vision statements, including commitment to ‘conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control’, development of deterrence capabilities, ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner’, concern about North Korean human rights conditions, and the importance of maintaining US–Japan–South Korea trilateral cooperation. The joint commitment to ‘foster expanded and balanced trade while creating reciprocal benefits and fair treatment between the two countries’ synthesized efforts to address emerging US­–South Korea gaps on trade relations and burden sharing. While it is too much to say that the KORUS FTA is being renegotiated, the terms and trade-offs underlying existing bilateral trade and security frameworks are clearly under pressure to adapt to new leadership priorities. Despite the media focus on the chemistry of Moon’s first meeting with Trump, three events surrounding the Moon–Trump summit appear more likely to influence future US–South Korea cooperation and regional dynamics. First, only days prior to the summit, the US treasury department announced the unilateral designation of the Bank of Dandong under Section 311 of the Patriot Act, the same provision of US law used to sanction the Banco Delta Asia in 2005 — a sanction that had significant reputational effects for financial institutions doing business with North Korea. It represents the first US unilateral effort since 2005 to use the Patriot Act for the purpose of applying secondary sanctions against Chinese entities doing business with North Korea. The new Bank of Dandong sanctions underscore that US patience for Chinese sanction enforcement failures is running out. The sanctions announcement was also perceived by some analysts as a blow to any South Korean effort to implement economic engagement strategies toward North Korea at the expense of pressure. Second, Trump and Moon also announced a trilateral dinner with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the G20 summit. This dinner stands in stark contrast to the failure of Japan, China and South Korea to schedule their next trilateral summit meeting, reportedly as a result of Chinese frustration with Moon’s failure to reverse the THAAD deployment. Finally, North Korea’s successful intercontinental ballistic missile test on 4 July 2017 has provided a direct challenge to Trump’s tweet in January that such a test would not happen, generating even greater pressure on the President to force Kim Jong-un to reverse course. Trump and Moon may make an odd couple. The fact that they are getting along suggests a triumph of pragmatism over ideology, which marks a good start for the time being and will be crucial as the relationship faces even greater challenges ahead. This post originally appeared on East Asia Forum.

The prevailing narrative in the American media regarding newly-elected South Korean president Moon Jae-in’s first meeting with Donald Trump (aside from how to approach the presidential handshake) revolves around expectations that the chemistry between the left-leaning Moon and the conservative Trump will be bad. These expectations are amplified by the apparent gap in both leaders’ approaches to the rising North Korean threat and China’s attempts to make missile defense a wedge issue for the U.S.-ROK alliance. But the main challenge that each leader faces--and the one that will ultimately keep them together--is whether either alliance partner can truly afford to go it alone in the face of a rising North Korean threat. Moon’s choice: alliance or autonomy For Moon, the challenges stem from the perennial tension in South Korea’s foreign policy between the desire for autonomy and the need for alliance with the United States to ensure its security (something I detail in my forthcoming book "South Korea at the Crossroads"). The rising peninsular threat from North Korea and growing regional tensions among great power neighbors China, the U.S. and Japan are simply too serious for South Korea to risk its security by pursuing autonomy and abandoning the alliance with the United States. South Korean progressives are advocating for autonomy within the alliance and have urged Moon to convince Trump to let South Korea “take the lead” on North Korea while also encouraging Seoul to gain greater leverage with China by appeasing Beijing’s objections to the installation of a U.S. mid-tier missile defense system in South Korea. But Moon must also worry that an overly-assertive approach might bring Trump to devalue consultation with South Korean allies just at a time when South Korea is struggling to overcome signs of “Korea passing” in regional relations following South Korea’s political leadership vacuum and impeachment of the former president. Thus, South Korea faces contradictory and simultaneous fears that Trump will abandon South Korea and that the U.S. will entrap South Korea amidst rising tensions between Washington and Beijing. Because of the devastating consequences that would arise from a conflict with North Korea, it is in South Korea’s interest to maximize its influence and solidarity within the alliance with its security guarantor, the U.S. Trump’s choice: unilateralism or joint action against North Korea The Trump administration’s number one international security challenge stems from North Korean efforts to develop the capability to launch a missile that could be used to launch a direct nuclear strike on the United States. The administration has conducted a policy review and is urgently addressing the North Korean threat primarily by stepping up pressure on China and the international community to enforce sanctions. Any review of available instruments designed to induce a change in direction in North Korea quickly reveals that South Korean cooperation is essential and that the consequences to South Korea of North Korean retaliation to military coercion would be devastating. The costs to the United States of unilateral actions that ultimately risk rather than preserve the security of its allies would be prohibitive unless they are demonstrably essential to homeland defense against an imminent attack. The massive pressure and engagement strategy adopted by the Trump administration involves an international campaign to make the costs of North Korea’s nuclear program prohibitive and, as Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris has testified before Congress last April, “to bring Kim Jong Un to his senses, not to his knees.” Likewise, efforts to secure greater cooperation from Beijing will only work to the extent that China recognizes that the U.S.-ROK alliance is regarded as essential in thwarting North Korean aims. Common threats and common purpose Given the shared U.S.-ROK objective of ending this common threat, there is ample ground for the U.S. and South Korea to build common purpose through a stronger alliance that should deflect North Korean challenges while outweighing the South Korean impulse for autonomy or any American impulse for unilateralism. Both Trump and Moon may dream of alternatives to the alliance, but in choosing to hold an early summit, both men are also admitting that as a practical matter when it comes to North Korea, there is no viable alternative to cooperation through the U.S.-ROK alliance. This post originally appeared on Forbes.

Following a decade of convergence between South Korean conservatives and the Obama administration, American analysts have been bracing for a new round of alliance-shuddering tensions under Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in similar to those that existed a little over a decade ago during the George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. But this analysis overlooks constraints Moon faces that are likely to keep him on track; instead, South Koreans are holding their breath over the possibility that the greatest risks to the U.S.-ROK alliance could come from uncertainties generated by President Trump himself. Moon served as Roh’s chief-of-staff and his campaign borrowed directly from the Roh administration’s playbook. Moon’s decision to temporarily halt implementation of the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) U.S. missile defense system due to procedural concerns about transparency and domestic environmental standards have reminded Americans of the prickly challenges that beset alliance relations between Washington and Seoul a decade ago. But Moon Jae-in faces a dramatically different domestic and international situation as president compared to the one he experienced as chief-of-staff in the Roh Moo-hyun administration. Domestically, Moon leads a government that holds a minority of seats in South Korea’s National Assembly and South Korean public support for the U.S.-ROK alliance (as well as the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system) is high. Moon’s electoral mandate revolves primarily around the need to root out domestic corruption and address economic inequality; to do so, he must pursue a pragmatic and responsible foreign policy, the centerpiece of which will be the security alliance with the United States. Second, North Korea under Kim Jong-un is different from the North Korea that his father Kim Jong-il led a decade ago. Despite Moon’s stated desire during the campaign to cultivate dialogue and renew economic relations with Pyongyang, North Korean missile tests—conducted only four days after Moon’s election—served as a wake-up call. North Korea long ago abandoned denuclearization negotiations and has rebuffed early Moon administration efforts to reopen nongovernmental exchanges. North Korea under Kim Jong-un has appointed military leaders focused on subversion to handle relations with South Korea and has shown little interest in dialogue. Third, the international context is different. Moon’s proposed revitalization of inter-Korean economic engagement will run counter to the Trump administration’s pressure campaign and likely violate UN sanctions on North Korea unless Pyongyang returns to denuclearization. Additionally, Moon administration efforts to improve relations with China have been stymied by increasing pressure from Beijing to undermine the United States and abandon the THAAD deployment. Given the constraints and risks South Korea faces in the current international environment, Moon is wisely tacking toward pragmatism and alignment with the United States. In advance of his visit to Washington, Moon has visibly moved to minimize potential differences with the Trump administration in interviews with American media outlets. He has argued that his ideas for diplomacy with North Korea are consistent with Trump’s policy toward Pyongyang of “maximum pressure and engagement.” Moon noted that President Trump himself offered to have a hamburger with Kim Jong-un during his campaign. While emphasizing a willingness to go along with the U.S.-led sanctions and pressure campaign, Moon has downplayed resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation efforts such as the possible reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. He has conditioned such efforts on evidence of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization. Moon expressed his outrage at North Korea’s responsibility for the death of American college student Otto Warmbier and called Kim Jong-un “an unreasonable leader and a very dangerous person” in a June 20 interview with the Washington Post. Moon’s pragmatic style thus far is a stark contrast to that of his populist political mentor Roh Moo-hyun. But Moon’s decision on THAAD has reportedly angered President Trump, despite his administration’s assurances that the environmental review will not result in a reversal of South Korea’s decision to accept the missile defense system. Likewise, Trump’s longstanding personal perceptions of South Korean defense and trade free-riding could come to the surface at any time, despite Moon’s pledges to strengthen South Korea’s defense and his country’s substantial financial contributions to the construction of a new base for U.S. forces south of Seoul. The two countries are set to negotiate South Korea’s future share of financial contributions in support of U.S. Forces in Korea later this year, and it is entirely reasonable to expect trade negotiators to review the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement as well. South Korea’s greatest fear is that bad chemistry between Moon and Trump will erode the assurances on which South Korea’s security is based. These worries are likely to persist, despite deep institutional ties within the alliance, a deeply shared common purpose in countering growing peninsular and regional instability, and strong public support for the security alliance in both countries. This post originally appeared on The National Interest.

The following is an excerpt from a piece published on The National Bureau of Asian Research.   South Korea’s newly elected progressive president Moon Jae-in was swept into office six weeks ago on a domestic anticorruption agenda and pledges of dialogue with North Korea, following a bribery scandal that led to the impeachment of his predecessor. While piecing together a new cabinet, Moon has faced an unremittingly steep learning curve in foreign policy: North Korea has challenged his offers of dialogue by conducting a series of missile tests in the weeks following his election, and he faces conflicting pressures between Beijing and Washington over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. Now Moon faces his most consequential foreign policy challenge: the task of working with the Trump administration to ensure the continued smooth management of the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK).   Read the full piece here.

Hwang Jihwan is an associate professor at University of Seoul and a visiting scholar at Catholic University of America. Trump, Moon, and North Korea Many in Washington and Seoul are concerned that tensions might emerge between the United States and South Korea during the upcoming summit between President Trump and President Moon. Given Trump’s diplomacy in Europe and Moon’s liberal approach to foreign policy, nobody can be sure of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD)’s future, the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), and the North Korean nuclear issue. However, the summit meeting is also a good opportunity for both sides to show their diplomatic credibility to the world, particularly on North Korea, which has risen as the most urgent national security issue for the alliance. Trump and Moon both understand the importance of the on-going sanctions effort against North Korea. For now, the two leaders should focus on finding a coordinated approach on North Korea while leaving other issues to be discussed later Diplomatic Strategies and Prospects for Dialogue with North Korea Given the current situation with North Korea, new administrations in the United States and South Korea are unlikely to achieve much by opening a dialogue with North Korea. However, several years have passed since the U.S. government had a dialogue with North Korea with the breakdown of the Leap Day Agreement of early 2012. In the meantime, North Korea has conducted three more nuclear tests and several ballistic missile tests. Much has changed, and it is necessary to examine North Korea’s changing reference point on the nuclear issue. If Trump and Moon open a dialogue with North Korea in the near future, the expectation should not be any substantial progress on the denuclearization issue, but seeking to understand what North Korea wants and can do to compromise or negotiate in future talks. It is improbable that North Korea would agree to denuclearize because it has already declared itself a nuclear weapon state like the United States and China. Rather, North Korea will seek to make use of such a dialogue to consolidate its position. Against this backdrop, it is not desirable to expect a grand bargain with North Korea in the short term. However, it may still be worth opening a new round of dialogue because the United States and South Korea will be able to examine North Korea’s current reference point and have a chance to discuss a realistic, practical, and alternative counterarguments and proposals. Exchanges of ideas and positions can occur. The goal would be to decrease the gap in positions and to understand what can be negotiated. A dialogue can begin with North Korea’s moratorium on nuclear and missile tests. The freeze should be merely a start. In addition, there should be North Korea’s pledge to eventually denuclearize, agreements on the future of U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean relations, and a peace regime. They may be agreed comprehensively but should be discussed gradually. In this process, there should be some division of labor between the United States and South Korea. The United States needs to deal directly with China while South Korea needs to reach out to the North on inter-Korean issues. Between Denuclearization and Peace Regime The United States and South Korea need to think about a new framework for denuclearizing North Korea and building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has consistently made Kim Il Sung’s claim that the United States has caused the crisis on the Korean peninsula by deploying nuclear weapons in Korea. This is why North Korea believes that a peace treaty should be established first before any measure on denuclearization. Although the United States and South Korea believe that a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula would be meaningless unless North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons program, North Korea is reluctant to denuclearize. While North Korea intends to make its regional security environment favorable with its nuclear weapons, the international community will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Therefore, the United States and South Korea need to think about the meaning of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Although the Korean War is still on-going, both internal and external situations on the Korean peninsula have changed much during the past decades, and the armistice established in 1953 does not guarantee peace and security in the region. Because the United States and South Korea do not accept the North Korean version of the peace treaty intended to weaken the U.S.-Korea alliance, it is imperative to prepare for an American and South Korean version of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The United States and South Korea are unlikely to be able to make any progress on denuclearization without a realistic plan for a peace regime. China has also recently started arguing for the need to discuss both the denuclearization and peace treaty issues at the same time. A new peace initiative on the Korean peninsula should include the change in North Korea’s national strategy from the Byungjin (simultaneous nuclear and economic development) to an economy-first policy, and its official pledge and initial steps to denuclearize eventually. Resolving the North Korea Issue, Not the Nuclear Issue China is one of the most important parties in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. However, China is unlikely to put much pressure on North Korea to the degree that the United States and South Korea are seeking. Although China possesses the economic leverage enough to coerce North Korea, it does not want to destabilize the North Korean regime. If neither North Korea nor China cooperates to resolve the nuclear issue, the United States and South Korea need to approach North Korean people directly in order to accelerate the slow and long-term change in North Korean society by supporting marketization and introducing more outside information. This does not mean that the United States and South Korea should seek a coercive and sudden change in North Korea. A coercive change is unlikely to produce a positive effect on the future of the Korean peninsula. It would be another Iraq after Saddam Hussein. North Korean people would not support the United States and South Korea now even if the Kim Jong Un regime were to collapse. The United States and South Korea have failed in securing North Korean people’s support for decades. If some contingencies occur inside North Korea, North Korean people are more likely to build a new regime rather than support a South Korea-led unified Korea on the peninsula. China will also seek to use such an opportunity to usher in a new pro-China regime. Therefore, the United States and South Korea should pursue a policy that changes North Korean society itself. This is why the North Korea issue as a whole, not just the nuclear issue aspect, needs to be resolved. This is the agenda that Trump and Moon should focus on in the upcoming summit meeting.

Park Hyeong Jung is a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. With the inauguration of Moon Jae-in as the new president of South Korea, North Korea is sure to launch a renewed push to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. Here are five main drivers of North Korea’s policy toward South Korea and the United States. First, Kim Jong-un believes that even a liberal South Korean president would be incapable of delivering what North Korea wishes to achieve strategically in relations with the South. North Korea may have three wishes: first, separate the issue of inter-Korean rapprochement from his nuclear and missile provocations; second, persuade the South Korean public to take strong enough measures to guarantee the Kim regime’s survival as it is politically, economically, and security wise; and third, make South Korea exert influence on the United States to soften its North Korea policy. Second, Kim Jong-un believes that a serious reciprocation by his part to South Korean wishes for a renewal of inter-Korean rapprochement would result in the end only in delaying the completion of his paramount strategic objective for the time being, i.e. accomplishment of a system of deterrence and coercion based on a variety of conventional and nuclear tipped missiles, including the capacity to hit the United States with an inter-continental ballistic nuclear missile. He might think this delay could extend the period of North Korea’s vulnerability through lengthening heightened pressure and sanctions by the international community and neighboring countries. Third, Kim Jong-un knows better than anyone else that the coming years would be a period of intensified tension, not one appropriate for testing rapprochement, on the Korean peninsula. He seeks to greatly augment its nuclear and missile capabilities as fast as possible in the coming years and needs to promote a policy to increase, not decrease, provocative actions. He welcomes and enjoys the permanency of escalated tension on the Korean peninsula for two reasons: first, this would help make case for the urgent necessity of peace agreement on the Korean peninsula on North Korean terms; second, this would divert attention from North Korea’s permanently serious internal problems and strengthen the justification for economic deprivation and strengthened internal political discipline. Fourth, Kim Jong-un does not believe in the possibility of an inter-Korean rapprochement or one with any other country contingent on a nuclear/missile-freeze deal because he knows better than anyone else that he does not have to assent to a freeze deal that would be acceptable to the United States and/or South Korea. He knows better than anyone else what his ultimate strategic objective is, and how urgent it is to achieve it under the current circumstances of increasingly heightened pressure and sanctions. In addition, he knows better than anyone how much cost he has had to accept in the hitherto process of nuclear and missile build-up and that it has been rather tolerable up until now. He would be confident that, though it could be ratcheted up, the cost would remain under tolerable limits, given the cleavages among neighboring countries, particularly with regard to China’s concerns about potential instability in North Korea. He believes, though with increased risks, he can muddle through in the end and achieve his strategic objectives. Fifth, with these calculations as backdrop, North Korea might show tactical flexibility in its approaches to South Korea and the United States. Pyongyang might think that, though not valuable in strategic terms, South Korea’s new approach in its North Korea policy might bring favorable tactical opportunities, which should be tested and taken advantage of. North Korea’s tactical flexibility would aim at attaining three objectives; first, weaken the international united front and efficiency of pressure against North Korea; second, buy time for recuperation and preparation for the upcoming crisis; third, test the depth of concessions either by the South and/or the United States; fourth, exacerbate cleavages in South Korea and among neighboring countries. In dealing with this challenge, the Moon and Trump administrations agree and disagree on many issues. The two parties share a consensus on the dual track approach of pressure and diplomacy. In addition, both the Moon and Trump administrations are dealing with the challenge under acute time pressure and have a “now or never” mindset. But the two sides disagree on whether it is worth testing North Korea’s intentions seriously, even at this juncture, with some inducement. The two parties need to bridge the gap and assign appropriate attention to the other party’s priorities and concerns.

South Korea’s new president decided to halt deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system last week—pending environmental review. Why the immediate trigger? Moon’s administration discovered the ROK Ministry of National Defense did not brief the incoming president that four additional THAAD launchers scheduled for deployment as components of the battery deployed last April near Seongju had already arrived in-country. The failure to provide critical information regarding South Korea’s security rightly incensed Moon, and ensured he will clean house. Increased transparency More broadly, Moon campaign supporters were dismayed by USFK’s expedited deployment of the THAAD battery and two launchers only two weeks prior to South Korea’s election. Given the Moon campaign’s longstanding criticisms that the previous administration had failed to manage the THAAD decision and deployment in a transparent manner, it was inevitable that there would be a domestic review of decisions made by the acting government in the months prior to Moon’s election. However, outside observers are skeptical that the review may be a ploy to reverse South Korean public support for the deployment. This despite assurances from the government to the United States that the decision by Moon will not change the outcome of South Korean support for the THAAD deployment. It shouldn't. Barely a day after Moon Jae-in’s announcement, North Korea reportedly launched four short-range anti-ship missiles. North Korea's missile advances across the board are cause for concern--and cause for defensive countermeasures. The risks and vulnerabilities are out in the open: South Korea’s indigenous missile defense efforts are developing too slowly to counter North Korean progress, and that could put U.S. Forces in Korea at risk. Moon's decision carries risks The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea. Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea. The way forward The THAAD debate has become overheated and politicized, generating risks of miscalculation and overreaction. A pause that defuses the political issues surrounding the THAAD deployment would be a good thing, but a pause as prelude to reversal could do great damage to the U.S.-ROK security alliance. Moon will hold his first summit with Trump in later this month. At that time, the United States and South Korea should reestablish a coordinated strategy for addressing the North Korean problem and focus on South Korean vulnerabilities to North Korean missiles in a comprehensive fashion, while also improving South Korean governmental transparency on these issues.   But if the deployment is paralyzed by opponents of the system in South Korea's new government, that outcome would mark gain for North Korea and China and a setback for the U.S.-ROK alliance. This post originally appeared on Forbes.

Scott Snyder ([email protected]), senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Brad Glosserman ([email protected]), executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, are coauthors of The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States (Columbia University Press, 2015). South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in, has a long list of priorities. Topping the list is restoring faith and credibility in his country’s political system and getting the struggling economy on its feet. In foreign policy, chief concerns include ensuring that the alliance with the United States remains strong, getting China to ease up on its campaign of economic intimidation and ending the freeze in North-South relations and imparting momentum into diplomacy to reduce tensions and remove the North Korean nuclear threat. Another critical issue Moon must manage is relations with Japan. That task will be complicated by his campaign platform pledges to unwind the December 2015 comfort woman agreement negotiated by his discredited predecessor, Park Geun-hye. In his first conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Moon noted that his fellow South Koreans could not emotionally accept all the items in the agreement. At the same time, and to his credit, he also appears to have made space for Japan-South Korea relations, noting that they should not be contingent on the resolution of the comfort woman issue. This “two-track” formula could help him avoid the box that Park created for herself over the issue when she took office in 2013. President Moon is likely to find that a strong relationship with Tokyo will pay important dividends and help him deal with other grave geopolitical challenges. Relations between South Korea and Japan have long been fraught: a tangled history, imperial conquest, territorial disputes, and the residues of Japanese occupation have poisoned the bilateral relationship for more than seventy years after the end of World War II. After several years of ambivalence, President Park tried to set a floor on the relationship by striking a deal on comfort women and approving a long-delayed agreement on information sharing between the militaries of Japan and South Korea. At U.S. prodding, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have moved forward on greater trilateral cooperation to address the North Korean threat. Yet cooperation remains controversial and contingent. Worse, Park’s impeachment has tainted the measures she adopted to improve relations. While Moon has said that the December 2015 comfort women agreement will not be the starting point for relations with Japan, he said during the campaign that “both the agreement and the negotiation process were wrong,” and that the agreement “must be renegotiated [in accordance with] the will of the majority of the public.” This approach risks stalemate with Japanese counterparts who negotiated with the Park administration in good faith. Moon’s top national security challenge is North Korea. To do that effectively, he needs the support of both China and the United States. Beijing offers Seoul important leverage in dealing with Pyongyang. But China’s relations with the South have been troubled in recent months. The primary problem is Seoul’s decision to ignore Beijing’s objections and proceed with deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile defense system that is intended to counter the North Korean missile threat. China is convinced that the system threatens its own nuclear deterrent and has responded to Seoul’s indifference to Chinese concerns with fury, boycotting Korean cultural exports, shutting down Chinese tourism to Korea, and closing 90 percent of the Lotte stores in China (punished because it swapped the land the South Korean government is using for the THAAD deployment). China’s 8.1 million visitors accounted for about half of South Korea’s tourists last year, and 70 percent of duty-free operators’ annual revenue of 8.6 trillion won ($7.59 billion) according to the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO); that number is estimated to plunge 50 percent in 2017. Korea Development Bank forecasts $20 billion in potential losses in trade with China, should the diplomatic spat continue, more than half of which are in the tourism and duty-free sectors. For its part, the United States provides security guarantees to South Korea against the North Korean threat, and gives Seoul credibility in the eyes of Beijing. Astute South Korean policy-makers concede that China would not take them seriously if they did not have the United States behind them. In addition, Pyongyang ultimately wants a deal with Washington, and Moon needs a good relationship with the United States to prevent the North from negotiating behind his back. In this context, a deal with Tokyo gives Moon breathing room. A strong relationship with Japan also gives South Korea more credibility with China; without a partner, South Korea is susceptible to the type of pressure that China has brought to bear in the wake of the THAAD controversy. While the United States should continue to provide that protection, there is greater uncertainty and less assurance in South Korea about U.S. positions in the Donald Trump administration. Regardless of whether the United States is encouraging good Japan-South Korea relations or appears more untrustworthy from the vantage point of Tokyo and Seoul, a stable Japan-South Korea relationship provides both governments with a measure of assurance in an increasingly volatile security environment. Moreover, a strong Japan-South Korea relationship would prevent Beijing and Tokyo from coming to agreement on interests in East Asia in ways that prejudice South Korean interests. In other words, a durable Japan-South Korea relationship is an insurance policy for Seoul. Building that relationship will take time. It will be incremental. It could begin with Moon’s personal affirmation of a future-oriented relationship, followed by outreach to Abe to construct a larger and more enduring bilateral relationship. Abe should respond with an offer of assistance (in the appropriate form) to mitigate the damage being done to South Korean economic interests by China. A resumption of the expired currency swap agreement would also be a nice gesture. While the Japanese government is likely to resist formal renegotiation of the 2015 comfort woman agreement, it is undeniable that Japan-South Korea relations will be constrained without broader Korean public acceptance of Japan’s efforts to address the past. Both leaders will have to do more to change the situation. The challenge for Moon is to show that South Korea’s public grievances toward Japan can be satisfied, while Abe will need to make greater efforts to win over South Korean public support. Over time, Japan-South Korea cooperation should evolve into a genuine framework of reconciliation. In many ways, Moon is the most appropriate leader for such a deal. The real tensions in the Japan-South Korea relationship are generated by the right in Japan and the left in South Korea, both of which are struggling with the political status quo in their own countries. Moon, a progressive, and Abe, a conservative, are the leaders best able to deliver the constituencies that would make reconciliation between the two countries meaningful. Both short- and long-term considerations should impel them to get started now.

The election of the left-leaning Moon Jae-in is a confidence booster for South Korea, in terms of both the country's democratic process and the prospects for fighting endemic corruption. But it took only four days for North Korea to test an intermediate-range ballistic missile following Moon's election. The launch serves as a reminder that despite the new administration's aspirations to promote peace and reconciliation, foreign policy is likely to be the biggest challenge of Moon's presidency. Seoul faces an increasingly insecure Northeast Asia and must cope with the uncertainty of the Donald Trump administration. The enduring tension that shapes South Korea's foreign policy is the desire for autonomy versus the necessity of the alliance with the U.S. -- an alliance that has prevented war and enabled regional prosperity for over six decades. South Korea's power shift from a conservative to a progressive leadership will tip the scale further toward autonomy, on the template of Moon's liberal predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun. Moon wants to revitalize inter-Korean dialogue, renew economic cooperation, reclaim South Korea's responsibility for wartime decision-making from the U.S., and resume six-party talks on North Korea's denuclearization. But even though some of Moon's advisers desire greater independence from the U.S., there is no viable alternative that can guarantee South Korea's security. Trump and Moon will face a number of flashpoints in their relationship: the goal of denuclearizing North Korea; the sharing of costs and responsibilities within the Washington-Seoul alliance; trade relations and the possible revision of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, known as KORUS; and how to improve South Korea's relations with Japan. STICKS OR CARROTS? The nub of the North Korea issue is how most effectively to achieve denuclearization. The Trump administration expects to dial up international pressure on Pyongyang as needed by convincing China to tighten the screws economically, while admitting the eventual need for negotiations. But Moon has expressed his preference for early negotiations and his desire to reopen the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex, which was closed by the conservative Park Geun-hye administration in February 2016 after North Korea's fourth nuclear test. A coordinated strategy will be essential: Conflict here would strain the alliance and drain American congressional and public support for South Korea. Following North Korea's missile test in early March, the U.S. hurriedly deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea's Seongju County. And although Trump's demand in late April that South Korea pay for THAAD probably boosted support for Moon prior to the election, publicly airing such unilateral demands will politicize the alliance and undermine local support for U.S. Forces Korea. Trump's comments have created a pretext for THAAD critics within the Moon administration to investigate Park's decision to deploy the system, even though South Koreans strongly supported the move. That support could erode if Park administration officials are deemed to have exceeded their power within the acting government during the impeachment. As for KORUS, Moon advisers proudly point to it as a trade deal the Roh government originally negotiated with the George W. Bush administration in 2007. The Barack Obama administration later ratified an "improved" version of the agreement. Now, Trump's obsession with a swelling merchandise trade deficit ignores that the U.S. enjoys a growing surplus in exports of services to South Korea, and that KORUS has fostered high-quality, job-creating inward investment from South Korea in the automobile and electronics sectors, among others. And then there is the Japan problem. An additional source of friction between the Trump and Moon administrations could arise if South Korea tries to renegotiate the December 2015 deal over World War II "comfort women" with Japan. The agreement included an apology from the Japanese prime minister to Korean victims, and a nearly $9 million donation to a South Korean government-run foundation that supports the women and their families. Moon supporters would claim the 2015 agreement did not satisfy Korean public expectations for Japan's formal expression of remorse, but Tokyo is unlikely to renegotiate. Regardless of how Japan-South Korea bilateral relations move forward, the U.S. will continue to see trilateral coordination with the Asian neighbors as essential for an effective pressure strategy against North Korea. Moon's efforts to strengthen his country's diplomatic leadership within the alliance is likely to conflict with Trump's "America first" approach to alliances. Rather than a divergence of interests, the great risk to coordination between Trump and Moon is bad chemistry. If mishandled, the collision of these forces could endanger the alliance, just at the moment when the world needs maximum coordination to bring North Korea's growing nuclear threat to heel. Scott Snyder is author of the forthcoming book, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers. This post originally appeared on Nikkei Asian Review.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. New president, new approach? Moon Jae-in, South Korea’s new president, has pledged to pursue dialogue with North Korea and stated that he was willing to meet with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, if it would bring about lasting peace to the Korean peninsula. In comparison with Moon’s two conservative predecessors, who stressed a united approach with the United States in attempting to isolate North Korea through sanctions and pressure, Moon has often called for South Korea to take the lead in diffusing tensions through negotiations and dialogue.The last inter-Korean summit meeting occurred in 2007 between the previous North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and the president of South Korea at the time, Roh Moo-hyun, a longtime friend and ideological ally of President Moon’s. Roh’s “Sunshine Policy,” which focused on engaging North Korea through dialogue, joint economic projects, and humanitarian aid, is generally expected to serve as the basis of Moon’s North Korea policy. Its successful implementation remains to be seen, however, as Moon has also vowed to reinforce South Korea’s relationship with the United States and President Trump, whose diplomatic overtures and fractious military posturing toward North Korea have led to general bafflement in the region. 2. Philippines faces new extremist threats. Alarms rang this week over the possibility that terrorist groups would kidnap tourists at popular destinations in the Philippines. In particular, Western embassies warned of plans to target tourists at two locations on the island of Palawan. The threats emanated from the southern Philippine terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, which has a decades-long history of kidnapping foreigners and locals for ransom. Now Abu Sayyaf, which claims allegiance to the self-proclaimed Islamic State group, is increasing its power as it uses the high-value ransoms to finance new weapons purchases. And the group’s influence is rising despite Philippine President Rodrgio Duterte’s military operations against them. Earlier this month, the Islamic State also claimed responsibility for explosions in Manila, although Philippine officials denied that the group had been involved. President Duterte has pledged to take an aggressive stance against terrorism. Never one to shy away from coarse language, he even said that he would eat militants—“give me salt and vinegar and I'll eat his liver.” As threats from both the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Southeast Asia mount, President Duterte would do well to pursue a more comprehensive strategy than just sharpening his knife and fork. 3. Taiwan vies to join World Health Assembly. Despite objections from Beijing, Taiwan is pushing to be included as an observer in this year’s World Health Organization’s World Health Assembly in Geneva, which will take place from May 22 to May 31. This seventieth annual gathering will include the election of a new director general from a finalist pool of three candidates. China has consistently tried to block Taiwan’s participation in international agencies due to its claims of sovereignty over the island. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Beijing continues to wield strong political influence at both the UN and WHO. President Tsai Ing-Wen has remained vocal on Twitter, writing “Taiwan should not be excluded from W.H.A. this year for any reason… Health issues don’t stop at border & Taiwan’s role is impt to global health.” Taiwan’s minister of health and welfare, Chen Shih-chung, has told the press that Taiwan plans to send a delegation to Geneva even without a formal invitation. 4. Japan and South Korea hit impasse over comfort women dilemma. South Korea’s newly elected President Moon Jae-in has cast doubt on a 2015 deal with Japan over the issue of wartime sex slaves known colloquially as “comfort women.” On Thursday, Moon told Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that a 2015 deal to resolve a dispute over Korean women forced into sexual service for Japanese soldiers during World War II was “unacceptable” to most South Koreans. Moon’s remarks are likely to reignite the emotionally charged issue between Japan and South Korea during a time when cooperative efforts against the North Korean nuclear threat are more significant than ever. Under the 2015 agreement, Mr. Abe offered his “most sincere apologies and remorse” to all former “comfort women,” and the two countries agreed to “finally and irreversibly” settle the comfort women issue; additionally, Japan disbursed 1 billion yen ($8.9 million) last year to a South Korean fund designated to help former comfort women and their families. However, victim advocacy groups have protested that the apology did not do enough to address the Japanese government’s role in forcing tens of thousands of women in Asia into sexual slavery as part of the “comfort women” program. Such groups have also pointed to Japanese history books that underplay Japan’s war crimes. Moon had promised to seek a renegotiation of the agreement with Japan as one of his key election pledges but it remains to be seen if this historically fraught issue will impede the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan and joint efforts to address the North Korean nuclear threat. 5. Chinese millennials snap up foreign properties via smartphone. According to an HSBC survey published earlier this year, 70 percent of Chinese millennials (born between 1981 and 1998) are home-owners—twice the rate in the United States. And many millennials are shopping for foreign properties on their smartphones with mobile apps like Uoolu and SouFun, just two examples of the Chinese mobile fintech boom. Uoolu reports that 80 percent of its active users are between 20 and 39, and that 20,000 customers have already purchased or are purchasing properties outside of China through their app. The company even encourages prospective customers to “hurry to invest” in Southeast Asia as part of Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road development strategy. A few factors are driving the scramble for overseas real estate: foreign investments as a hedge against a depreciating yuan; ever-climbing real estate prices in Chinese cities; and an interest in living abroad in a clean city rather than enduring China’s worrisome environmental pollution. Despite China’s strict capital controls (including a $50,000 annual limit on investments or money transfers abroad), buyers seem undaunted and leverage family members or other smurfing techniques to make their purchases. As Uoolu’s COO stated, “The more the government limits people, the more they want to invest overseas.” Bonus: Once upon a time on the Silk Road… The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative entered its next frontier this week: bedtime stories and bubblegum pop. In a series of videos released by China Daily, American father and journalist Erik Nilsson regales his daughter with tales of Xi Jinping’s vision for OBOR. Before he joins guests from nearly one hundred and thirty countries at this weekend’s Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, he explains that the project is about more than just new transportation routes—it’s about “people and cooperation.” Meanwhile in a new music video from the ever-entertaining Fuxing Road Studios, children from Belt and Road nations, accompanied by a ukulele and cartoon backdrops, extol the virtues of the initiative in song. While it is unclear why China Daily or Fuxing Road feel they need to convince children that OBOR is not a bore, at least this is one audience unlikely to pose thorny geopolitical questions about the initiative’s future.

After a historic election in South Korea, progressive Moon Jae-in is the country’s new president. Exit polls estimate Moon won 41% of the vote and conservative Hong Joon-pyo, his closest competitor, has conceded defeat, along with Moon’s other political rivals. President-elect Moon Jae-in will take office in a South Korea that has been consumed by domestic politics resulting from Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and a compressed national election campaign. But now as president, he will quickly be forced by rising Northeast Asian tensions to reassert South Korean political leadership that has been absent. Despite aspirations to enhance South Korea’s impact and voice, Moon will face a steep learning curve. A return to liberal foreign policy The Moon campaign template for foreign policy outlines a return to the liberal foreign policies that his political mentor Roh Moo-hyun followed a decade ago before conservatives re-took control of the Blue House. The Roh Moo-hyun administration, in which Moon Jae-in served as chief of staff, pursued greater autonomy while maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance, sought greater balance in South Korea’s position between China and the United States, and emphasized inter-Korean and regional security cooperation by fostering regional economic and political integration. But a return to these priorities by the Moon administration face many obstacles that did not exist a decade ago. New obstacles First, the immediacy of Moon’s transition to power means that he and his team must switch gears from campaigning to governing within 24 hours. Moon will take office as president with a transitional government that will remain in place until a new prime minister and cabinet can win approval from a National Assembly that his Democratic Party does not control. The need for consensus within the National Assembly will influence the selection of Moon’s cabinet and will constrain his capacity to pass laws supporting his policy agenda. South Korean attitudes will form a second constraint on Moon’s approach to foreign policy. While there is agreement on the need for a clean start domestically, public approval for the security alliance with Washington and anxieties about China are high, while expectations for cooperation with North Korea are low. The South Korean public has moved in a conservative direction on major foreign policy issues over the past decade, and it will take time to build a successful record for the progressive Moon administration to reverse this trend. A different international landscape Third, the international landscape has changed drastically during the last decade, making it more difficult for Moon to implement many elements of his platform that had once been priorities under Roh Moo-hyun. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has advanced and Kim Jong Un has tied his survival to the nuclear project. UN Security Council resolutions restrict many economic activities that were permissible when Moon was last in power. South Korean companies, burned by the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea, have moved on. Moon and his advisors will have to convince North Korea to reverse its nuclear trajectory before dreams of a common Korean market will be feasible. Fourth, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has moved forward in setting its policy toward North Korea while South Korea has been caught up in its own political leadership vacuum. Moon Jae-in comes into office as the concrete has begun to set on Trump administration preferences, albeit still self-contradictory and uncertain. Little room for error To be an effective advocate for South Korean interests, the liberal Moon must figure out both how to talk to Trump and how not to push buttons that might jeopardize the relationship.  The fact that Moon inherits deeper mechanisms for coordination between Washington and Seoul than existed a decade ago under Roh Moo-hyun will help keep the alliance moving in the right direction, but bad chemistry between the two leaders would do much to undermine deeply shared U.S.-ROK interests in a non-nuclear peninsula and a prosperous Northeast Asia. To achieve success, Moon Jae-in must restore South Korea’s confidence in the institutions of leadership at home while navigating a narrowing strategic space in Northeast Asia. It is a daunting task. Time will tell if Moon is up for the job. This post originally appeared on Forbes. Mr. Snyder’s upcoming book is South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rising Regional Rivalry.