Middle East and North Africa

Saudi Arabia

  • Saudi Arabia
    Donald in Arabia: What Did We Learn From Trump's Encounter With the Saudi Monarchy?
    While Trump's visit to the famously repressive Saudi kingdom was quite a show, U.S. policy looks awfully familiar.
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook May 30, 2017 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • Iran
    A New Mideast Cold War Intensifies
    The reelection of Iran’s Hassan Rouhani, as well as U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s strong affirmation of ties with Sunni Arab states, sets the stage for an intense new round of competition in the Middle East.
    Expert Brief by Ray Takeyh May 25, 2017
  • Donald Trump
    President Trump’s Peace Efforts Require A Regional Approach
    President Donald Trump’s non-stop flight from Riyadh to Tel Aviv is being described as the first ever non-stop flight between Saudi Arabia and Israel. That the Saudis allowed this direct flight, usually banned, reflects the fact that the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia, like that of Israel with a number of Gulf states, has been quietly but perceptibly thawing in recent years. This thaw reflects the growing convergence between Israel and the Sunni states of the Arab world, all who share a view that Iran is the biggest threat to their security and regional stability. Matching that convergence was the message conveyed by President Trump, first in Saudi Arabia and then in Israel, of a geo-strategic shift in U.S. policy. It was just one year ago that then-President Obama, seeking a modus vivendi with Tehran, said that America’s Gulf allies need to “share the Middle East” with the Iranians. That view of the Middle East was decisively repudiated this week, with Trump clearly aligning the United States with the majority of the Sunni Arab world, and Israel, against Iran. Yet despite this shift and some hints of an improved tone, President Trump carried no explicit public message of peace from Riyadh to Tel Aviv on Air Force One. Nor did he explain—either in Riyadh, or in Israel—the specific possibilities for peace between Israel and the larger Arab world. Instead, President Trump focused on Palestinian President Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu as the committed partners for peace, adding only that the Arab world would like to see the two leaders reach a bilateral agreement. Without integrating the leaders of the Arab states he just met in Riyadh into a new framework for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, President Trump is unlikely to achieve the peace he seeks. The Arab states have a crucial role to play, both in incentivizing the Israelis to make sacrifices for peace, and in supporting the Palestinians in concluding a conflict-ending agreement with Israel. Perhaps most striking was President Trump’s choice not to mention the Arab Peace Initiative (API), which Israel and the Arab states agree can serve as a basis for a comprehensive approach. While the API, when proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2002, originally offered peace between Israel and the Arab world after a complete Israeli withdrawal to boundaries existing prior to the 1967 Six Day War, the proposal has since been modified by the Arab states to make it more palatable to Israel. For several years now, the Arab states have suggested that the plan can serve as a basis for negotiations, and that progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace can be met with parallel progress toward peace between Israel and other Arab states. Recognizing these changes, Netanyahu last year broke over a decade of official Israeli silence and spoke positively at the Knesset of the API. Contrasting with President Trump’s focus on Israeli-Palestinian peace and his relative silence regarding a regional approach are the comments of Israeli and Arab officials themselves. In Riyadh, it was Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Jubeir who praised President Trump for going to Israel as part of an effort to move away from conflict toward partnership. And it was Netanyahu who noted alongside President Trump that the only variable that may have changed to make peace more attainable is the regional environment, noting that “common dangers are turning former enemies into partners. And that’s where we see something new and potentially something very promising.” Perhaps in the weeks and months ahead, President Trump will seek to exploit the regional goodwill he hinted at and which exists to facilitate Israeli-Palestinian peace. Other than the new Middle East regional environment, there is little to suggest that myriad obstacles that have prevented a bilateral peace agreement between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian President Abbas before can now be overcome, particularly pursued the same tried and tested way through direct bilateral negotiations. Unless President Trump adopts a new approach—one that integrates the Arab states as active participants in support of a deal, not as bystanders to another round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations—there is scant reason to believe the new U.S. president will have any greater success in brokering a peace deal between these two Middle Eastern leaders than did the previous administration.
    Blog Post by Robert Danin May 22, 2017 Middle East Matters
  • Saudi Arabia
    How Stable Is Saudi Arabia?
    Saudi Arabia’s stability is not under immediate threat, but questions about the Kingdom's fate in longer-term will persist.
    Expert Brief by Paul B. Stares and Helia Ighani May 15, 2017 Center for Preventive Action
  • Saudi Arabia
    Why the Myth of Sunni-Shia Conflict Defines Middle East Policy—and Why It Shouldn’t
    Is the Muslim world divided over an ancient sectarian conflict? Not really: It's twenty-first-century power politics.
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook May 8, 2017 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • Saudi Arabia
    Should the U.S. Maintain its Alliance With Saudi Arabia? Unfortunately, We’re Stuck With Them
    Our unhappy marriage with Saudi Arabia will probably endure—because the Saudis can’t be trusted on their own.
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook February 27, 2017 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • Syria
    Weekend Reading: A Changing Discourse on Syria, Salman’s Saudi Troubles, and Turkey’s Soft Power
    Reading selections for the weekend of January 6, 2017.
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook January 6, 2017 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • Egypt
    Weekend Reading: Egypt’s Church Bombing, Jihadi Street Art, and Saudis Go to the Track
    Reading selections for the weekend of December 16, 2017.
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook December 16, 2016 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • Egypt
    Thinking About Culture and the Middle East
    Can observers incorporate culture into their analyses of the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy toward the region?
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook October 24, 2016 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • Saudi Arabia
    Managing the Saudi-Iran Rivalry
    Overview The growing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran—and by extension, their allies and proxy forces in the region—will likely shape the Middle East for many years, and possibly even decades, to come. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, while historical and religious in origin, has evolved into a geopolitical competition. The Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations convened an international group of twenty experts at the Tufts University European Center in Talloires, France, on July 6–7, 2016, for the workshop "What to Do About the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry?" Workshop participants analyzed the Saudi-Iran rivalry—in particular its evolution, drivers, current manifestations, and plausible trajectories—while assessing policy options to help manage the conflict. Participants discussed what the United States and Europe can do collectively and with partners in the region, and also with other international actors (e.g., China, India, and Russia) that have growing interests in the Middle East. Although the rivalry has manifested itself mostly in the Middle East—namely in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain—general instability and war threaten broader security, and the West could experience spillover effects if a war were to actually break out between the two countries. The report, which you can download here, summarizes the discussion's highlights. The report reflects the views of workshop participants alone; CFR takes no position on policy issues. Framing Questions for the Workshop Understanding the Saudi-Iran Rivalry: Sources and Dynamics What are the principal sources of rivalry and friction? To what extent are these national, political, religious, economic or military in nature? How has the relationship evolved historically, and what accounts for periods of relative cooperation and confrontation? How might the rivalry evolve as a result of internal political changes in either country? How likely are such changes in the foreseeable future? Will the rivalry evolve primarily as a consequence of internal changes or external pressures? Assessing the Risks of Saudi-Iranian Rivalry: Current and Emerging Concerns What is the likelihood that the current Saudi-Iran rivalry will intensify in the short term (one to three years)? What are the principal areas of contention and axes of escalation? What are the most serious risks—political, security, economic, humanitarian—primarily for the United States and Europe, should the rivalry intensify? What new areas of competition and friction might evolve in the longer term? For example, what happens after the terms of the JCPOA expires? Managing the Present: What Should or Can the United States and Europe Do? What are the broad strategic options for the United States/Europe to manage the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and reduce the associated risks to the West? What are the policy implications of each and their relative merits and shortcomings? How can the United States and Europe manage, if not resolve, the specific sources of tension and competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially the ongoing proxy wars? What are the West's principal instruments of leverage and opportunities for exerting influence, either directly or indirectly, through other actors? Failing active mitigation efforts, how can the United States and Europe contain, or otherwise limit, the harmful spillover effects on their regional interests and national security? Shaping the Future: Forestalling Dangerous New Developments What initiatives could be taken to minimize new and potentially dangerous avenues of competition and, more broadly, promote stability in the Gulf region? This can include unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral initiatives having to do with, among other things, arms sales, security assistance/guarantees, arms control agreements, economic aid, and regional institution-building. How much would such initiatives hinge on near-term efforts to manage the Saudi-Iranian rivalry? How can other important international actors—for example, the UN as well as major powers with a growing stake in the Gulf, such as China and India—be engaged in support of U.S./European goals?
    Report by Helia Ighani October 24, 2016 Center for Preventive Action
  • Middle East and North Africa
    Reading The Jerusalem Post in Riyadh
    It is easy to exaggerate the opening that is occurring between Israel and several Gulf states, but it’s easy to underestimate it too.  The most recent change: Saudi Arabia has stopped blocking access to Israeli newspapers on line. As Al Akhbar in Beirut reported in a story entitled "Saudi Arabia Lifts Ban on Israeli Press." Here’s a part of the story:   “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is gradually endorsing its relations with Israel and widening these relations’ scope by moving from the political communication calls and mutual visits into media normalization. This indicates that things will further escalate in a way as to prepare for subsequent steps.   “Yesterday, the Hebrew media revealed that the ban and surveillance that were imposed on the Saudis preventing them to enter Israeli news websites have been lifted knowing that this ban had gone one for years. This Saudi step was seen in Tel Aviv as an indication to enhancing the [bilateral] relations and normalization.... “The Israeli Jerusalem Post newspaper, which is published in English, had confirmed that Saudi Arabia lifted the surveillance and ban imposed on the Israeli press and that the Saudis can now enter and browse its website and other Israeli websites including the websites of the Hebrew media. The newspaper indicated that the number of people browsing its website from Saudi Arabia is on the rise. It further quoted journalists via social communication networks as saying that entering the website as well as other Israeli news websites is now possible....Israeli users of the social communication networks expressed their joy over what they called the normalization with the Kingdom and the enhancement of the relations between the two parties.”   (And here is the original, in Arabic.) This not so small a step. Sure, Saudis could get around the ban in the past--but now access to the Israeli press is normal and no big deal, just like reading The Times of London or The Washington Post. Sure, very few Saudis read Hebrew, but there are many Israeli news sites in English, from The Times of Israel to The Jerusalem Post to Ynews. Reading such sites will give Saudis a view of Middle Eastern, and Israeli-Palestinian, affairs that’s quite different from their Foreign Ministry’s official line. It will give them far deeper insights into Palestinian and Israeli politics, U.S.-Israel relations, and Israeli society. What’s more, it will show them that a free press does exist in at least one place quite nearby in the Middle East, able to criticize government policy without fear. So it is an entirely positive development, and one must give credit to the Saudi government. The Saudis keep saying there is change and reform underway in the Kingdom. This is a sign that they mean it.    
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams October 8, 2016 Pressure Points
  • United States
    What the 9/11 Lawsuits Bill Will Do
    Congress overrode a presidential veto to enable the families of 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia in U.S. courts. But the law will be a thorn in U.S. foreign relations, and plaintiffs will not likely get justice. 
    Interview with Zachary Laub and Stephen I. Vladeck September 28, 2016