Saudi Arabia

This article was originally published here on Fortune.com on Wednesday, January 6, 2016.   Earlier this week, Saudi Arabia cut off diplomatic ties with Iran after authorities executed a popular Shiite cleric. Anyone watching this meltdown unfold has every reason to think of worse-case scenarios, as it will only deepen the Middle East’s widening sectarian divide, intensify the region’s multiple conflicts, and set back efforts to defeat the Islamic State and end the bloodshed in Syria.   For years, the Middle East has been defined by political instability, and the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr and subsequent attack on the Saudi embassy in Teheran is only the most recent episode in a longstanding rivalry between the two powers dominating opposite shores of the Gulf — the world’s most important oil chokehold through which 30% of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows. Each claims to be the face of the true and authentic variant of Islam. Saudi Arabia, custodian of Islam’s two leading holy places in Mecca and Medina, sees in the Islamic Republic of Iran a revolutionary Shiite Persian power expanding its reach into the Sunni Arab heartland. Having seen Tehran spread its influence into Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria, the Saudis, led by a new and more activist king, are sending a strong message to the world that it will not sit by passively. The most immediate casualty of intensified Saudi-Iranian tensions will be the recently launched U.S.-led diplomatic effort to end the horrific Syrian war that has already claimed more than 250,000 dead. Iranian forces are fighting and dying in Syria to preserve president Bashar al Assad’s regime, while Saudi Arabia is actively backing rebels seeking to topple the dictator. Just getting the Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers into the same room last month was touted as a major accomplishment by Secretary of State John Kerry. While Iran and Saudi Arabia profess a desire to cooperate diplomatically, both countries are now sure to double down their support for the opposing sides in Syria’s war. The Syrian opposition, meanwhile, has urged all Arab countries to break relations with Tehran. A second casualty of Iran’s strained relations with Saudi Arabia is likely to be the regional effort to combat the so-called Islamic State, or Daesh, that currently occupies a large swath of territory across Iraq and Syria. While the United States and Europe, reeling from Islamist terrorism, see defeating Daesh as the paramount objective in the Middle East, this sense of priority is not shared by many Arab allies within the anti-Daesh coalition. That a number of Gulf states have followed Saudi Arabia’s lead and suspended relations with Tehran reflects the fact that they see Shiite Iran, not the Sunni Islamists in Daesh, as their paramount enemy.   Continue reading on Fortune.com  

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Sharif Abdel Kouddous reports on the human toll of the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Christine Petre looks at Sidi Bouzid five years after Tunisian fruit seller Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation that sparked the Arab uprisings. Ursula Lindsey explores public space in the Arab world and the lack of discourse on them.

Sanja Kelly directs the Freedom on the Net project at Freedom House. It has been a tumultuous few weeks in the world of Internet freedom. Among several high-profile arrests, a blogger in Kuwait was sentenced to four years in prison, with hard labor, for posting critical comments about Saudi Arabia on Twitter, allegedly affecting a cordial relations between the two countries. And in Bangladesh, six social media and messaging apps—including Facebook and WhatsApp—were blocked indefinitely amid “security concerns.” These disconcerting developments, unfortunately, are not isolated incidents. They are a part of a growing trend by governments to limit what can be said and done online. According to a new edition of Freedom on the Net, Freedom House’s annual assessment of online censorship released in late October, Internet freedom around the world has declined for the fifth consecutive year.  Of the sixty-five countries assessed, thirty-two have been on a negative trajectory since June 2014. Intensified censorship, growing surveillance, crackdown on encryption and anonymity, and more frequent arrests for online activities were identified as some of the most worrisome trends. China was the year’s worst abuser of Internet freedom. As President XI Jinping made “cyber sovereignty” one of the priorities of his tenure as leader of the Chinese Communist part, Internet users endured crackdowns on “rumors,” greater enforcement of rules against anonymity, and disruption to the circumvention tools that are commonly used to bypass censorship. Though not entirely new, these measures were implemented with unprecedented intensity. Google, whose services were frequently interrupted in the past, was almost completely blocked, veteran human rights defenders were jailed for online expression, and official directives during the year suppressed online commentary on topics ranging from Hong Kong pro-democracy protests to stock-market volatility. Globally, in a new trend, many governments have sought to shift the burden of censorship to private companies and individuals by pressing them to remove content, often resorting to direct blocking only when those measures fail. Local companies have been especially vulnerable to the whims of law enforcement and a recent proliferation of repressive laws. But large, international companies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter have faced similar demands due their significant popularity and reach. In some instances, instead of turning to tech companies, authoritarian governments have gone directly to individual content creators and coerced them into deleting material. In Bahrain, for example, after the arrest of the user behind the satirical Twitter account @Takrooz, almost 100,000 tweets were deleted. Only one tweet remained: “They tortured me in prison.” Undeterred by the international backlash against surveillance following the NSA revelations, most governments have continued to strengthen their surveillance capacity—through new legal measures and through new technical means. This trend was evident in both democratic and non-democratic countries. For example, Australia, Italy, and the United Kingdom instituted new data retention requirements. However, this trend is even more concerning in countries where Internet freedom violations occur more frequently. Russia, for example, required ISPs to update their surveillance technologies, and many other former Soviet republics followed suit.  Meanwhile, in Thailand, where authorities frequently arrest users for criticizing the royal family on social networks, one of many orders issued by the military government in 2014 mandated military surveillance of social media sites. It is not a surprise then that given the mounting concerns over government surveillance, companies and Internet users have taken up new tools to protect the privacy of their data and identity. Unfortunately, some governments have moved to limit encryption and undermine anonymity for all Internet users, often citing the use of these tools by terrorists and criminals. In August 2015, for example, three staff members working for Vice News were arrested in southeastern Turkey and charged with supporting terrorists after authorities found encryption software on one of their computers. Similar accusations were brought against three Al-Jazeera journalists who were detained in Egypt and Zone 9 bloggers in Ethiopia. While our research has previously noted an increase in offline punishments for online expression, the penalties and reprisals reached a new level of severity in the past year, as both authorities and criminal groups made public examples of Internet users who opposed their agenda. Of the sixty-five countries, forty imprisoned people for sharing political or social content through digital networks.  In Iran, a cartoonist was sentenced to twelve years in prison for posting an image on Facebook that depicted members of parliament as animals. Sentences issued during 2015 for alleged online insults to Thailand’s monarch have exceeded twenty-five years in prison. And in China, an academic was sentenced for lifetime imprisonment, partly for running a website on Uighur affairs. In many ways, the past year was one of the consolidation and adaptations of Internet restrictions. Governments that had already greatly expanded their arsenal of tools for controlling the online sphere are now strengthening their application of these methods. It remains to be seen whether repressive efforts will be sustainable in the long run. Although their impact has so far been limited, activists in many countries have become better informed and better equipped to push against deteriorating conditions for global Internet freedom. It is their efforts that could help ensure that the fight for a free and open Internet ultimately succeeds, despite the setbacks that have affected so much of the world in recent years.

Coauthored with Callie Plapinger, intern in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. As the world watches Syria burn, a tiny glimmer of hope shines in Yemen. Today, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee disclosed that it will use new oversight powers to more closely monitor U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, which for nine months has been carrying out a brutal campaign against Houthi rebels that’s left thousands of civilians dead. The news comes on the heels of an announcement earlier this week by Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, that he would begin a renewed push for peace talks in Geneva next week. To be sure, near-term prospects for peace are low, given the conflicting interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran and the growing presence of both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Even so, the United States should welcome the UN’s latest initiative. More broadly, it should consider what Yemen teaches about the limits of backing proxy interventions—and the need to build up the UN’s multilateral conflict management capabilities. First, a little context. During the Arab Spring in Yemen, many national dialogues failed to produce meaningful results, and this lack of progress is to a large extent what gave rise to the Houthis, who took advantage of the power vacuum created by stagnating peace talks by consolidating power in the northern part of the country. Like Syria, however, Yemen has fragmented into a bloody civil war largely along the faultlines of the broader sectarian struggle engulfing much of the Middle East. Shia Houthi rebels deposed Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi earlier this year, prompting a Saudi-led coalition—backed by the United States—to intervene in March. Since then, Saudi air strikes have taken a heavy human toll, killing over 2,600 civilians. Besides civilian deaths, these air strikes have stalled the delivery of food and fuel supplies, displaced nearly two million people, and rendered a whopping twenty-one million Yemenis in need of humanitarian assistance. The Saudi coalition, which includes airplanes and auxiliary support from the Gulf states, the United States, and the United Kingdom, seeks to weaken the Houthi rebels’ hold on territory and, ultimately, reinstate the government of President Hadi, now exiled in Riyadh. Meanwhile, Iran is providing the Houthi rebels with military hardware, funding, and training. Although Saudi Arabia has publicly committed to a peace process under UN auspices, it has not ceased its bombing campaign. The conflict in Yemen is further complicated by the presence of AQAP and the Islamic State, both of which have seized on the power vacuum to stage a series of deadly attacks throughout the country in their endeavor to acquire territory. Most recently, AQAP, which has long been active in Yemen, gained control of the capital city of Abyan Province, as well as smaller towns in the area. In early December, the Islamic State conducted a bombing attack that killed the governor of Aden, a crucial port city, and dozens of civilians. Over the past two years, the UN has mediated a series of inconclusive peace talks. A first such effort, in late May 2014, was aborted before it even got off the ground. The following month, delegates representing the warring sides refused to meet in person, forcing UN negotiators to shuttle back and forth between separate rooms, which ultimately proved a futile exercise. In both April and May 2015, both sides neglected to adhere to a ceasefire negotiated by the UN, intended to allow for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. Meanwhile, the UN effort continues to flounder, thanks to wounds both self-inflicted and from powerful parties. Critics accuse UN mediators of undermining prospects for peace by excluding significant parties in the conflict, including southern separatists affiliated with neither the Saudi-backed government nor the Iranian-backed Houthis. But UN mediation efforts are also being stymied by the interests of outside powers. They include not only Saudi Arabia, but also its U.S. and UK backers, who view the war as part of a larger geopolitical struggle to counter Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the region. Unless they come on board and accept Houthi participation in the Yemeni government, the UN will lack the weight to shepherd, much less safeguard, a workable peace plan. Recent events in various UN fora have only reinforced this impression. In the most recent September session of the UN Human Rights Council, the Netherlands drafted a resolution calling for a UN mission to examine potential human rights and international law violations in Yemen. Saudi Arabia blocked the proposal, offering an alternative that excluded any mechanisms to evaluate human rights violations. And although the Security Council reiterates its commitment to a peaceful settlement to the conflict, it has taken no concrete action. Saudi Arabia, for its part, continues to draw international attention to Syria, likely to draw attention away from its geopolitical agenda in Yemen. Last month, the Saudi delegation introduced a draft resolution in the UN General Assembly, cosponsored by the United States, France, and other allies, seeking to formally condemn the actions of Iran and Russia in Syria. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has declined to use its position on the Security Council to moderate the conflict—essentially giving Saudi Arabia a free hand. The time for doing so is over. Investigation into the gross human rights violations in Yemen are long past due. In this regard, the Senate’s forthcoming investigation is a step in the right direction. In the meantime, the United States should back increasing calls for an impartial UN inquiry into human rights violations in Yemen. Finally, the United States must support the negotiation and implementation of a long-term peace agreement among Yemeni parties to the conflict, as well as relevant regional and global powers. Sustained political attention and economic investments will be critical to consolidating peace and stimulating recovery in one of the world’s most fragile, poor, and water-stressed countries. Any eventual agreement must be accompanied by a major pledging conference led by the World Bank and major donor governments, so that Yemen can proceed with demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating combatants, rebuilding infrastructure, and ensuring a smooth political transition. The United States and its allies should be prepared to provide aid and resources as necessary, but in order to ensure lasting peace in the country, local political solutions should be facilitated under UN oversight, rather than reflecting the historical pattern of global powers imposing political structures in post-conflict Middle Eastern countries.

Hanin Ghaddar talks to Magda Haroun, head of Cairo’s Jewish community, about her people’s legacy to Egypt. Nora Stel explores the role of mukhtars—elected neighborhood- or village-level state representatives—in Lebanon’s consociational political system. Abdulrahman al-Rashed finds much to be optimistic about now that over nine hundred women will be running, for the first time, in Saudi Arabia’s upcoming municipal elections.

Reza Marashi argues that ending the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is necessary to create a new and effective security framework in the Middle East. Alex Rowell examines the slow and quiet return of the Free Syrian Army to prominence as a relevant player in Syria’s civil war. Johnny Kairouz explores the shortcomings of Lebanon’s recent protests.

Six months ago today, the White House announced U.S. support for the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen via press release: “President Obama has authorized the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]-led military operations.” As is true for all interventions, U.S. officials offered a buffet of justifications and objectives for backing the GCC side in Yemen’s chaotic civil war. In an earlier piece, I counted seven. Unsurprisingly, these are no longer mentioned by officials. Rather, they call upon all parties in the conflict to halt their fighting, failing to mention that the United States military is one of the parties by providing material support, without which the GCC would not be able sustain airstrikes over Yemen for any period of time. When pushed by reporters about U.S. responsibilities, they reply “we continue to discuss with Saudi authorities….We’re in constant and close communication with them,” or simply deflect, “I would refer you to the Saudis.” First and foremost, understand that the United States undertook this obligation without any comprehension of what the Saudi-led coalition was attempting to accomplish. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), said in March, “I don’t currently know the specific goals and objectives of the Saudi campaign, and I would have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of success.” He added that he was simply contacted by the Saudi chief of defense a few hours before operations began. So much for taking the time to think through the consequences of the U.S. political and military commitment. Nevertheless, since March 25, the United States has been providing in-air refueling, combat-search-and-rescue support (including the rescue of two Saudi pilots whose helicopter crashed in the Gulf of Aden), detailing forty-five intelligence analysts to help advise on target selection, and redoubling weapons exports and contractor support to the GCC countries. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States is primarily as a source of cash for weapons. Since October 2010 alone, the Obama administration has agreed to sell $90.4 billion in weapons to the Gulf kingdom, according to the Congressional Research Service. That President Obama would so enthusiastically endorse arming such a brutal authoritarian government is unsurprising, since the United States is by far the leading arms dealer (with 47 percent of the world total) to what an annual State Department report classifies as the world’s “least democratically governed states”—those in the lowest quintile based upon Freedom House’s “political rights” ranking and the World Bank’s “voice and accountability” score. Thus, the flow of weapons and contractor support sustaining the GCC intervention has not merely continued, but the Pentagon has actually sped-up preexisting orders to assure there are sufficient bombs to drop on Yemen. Two weeks into the U.S. involvement, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken proclaimed while in Riyadh that, "Saudi Arabia is sending a strong message to the Houthis and their allies….As part of that effort, we have expedited weapons deliveries, we have increased our intelligence sharing.” In total, the State Department has authorized $8.4 billion in foreign military sales to GCC countries since the start of the air war, $7.8 billion to the Saudis alone. Here is a list of major arms and logistical support sales to GCC countries since March 25: • On May 27, Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control was awarded a $12,037,639 contract for post-production support services for the Royal Saudi Land Forces Aviation Command Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor program. • On June 11, Boeing Co. was awarded a $41,146,387 contract for Apache helicopter post-production services and maintenance in Saudi Arabia. • On June 24, L-3 National Security Solutions was awarded a $95,000,000 contract for air operations center training to Royal Saudi Air Force personnel. • On July 24, Raytheon Co. was awarded a contract for 355 AGM-154 Block III C Unitary Joint Stand-Off Weapon missiles for Saudi Arabia, including associated supplies and services. • On July 13, Booz Allen & Hamilton was awarded a $12,386,000 contract for support services in the areas of training and education, engineering, technical, and management support services to the Saudi navy. • On July 29, the State Department approved the sale of $500M “for ammunition for the Royal Saudi Land Forces and associated equipment, parts and logistical support.” • On July 31, DynCorp International was awarded a $17,313,518 contract for maintenance support to the Royal Saudi Land Forces Aviation Command aviation program. • On September 24, Boeing Co. was awarded a $22,311,055 contract for 13 Harpoon lll-up round tactical missiles and seven Harpoon air launch missile containers to Saudi Arabia. Most disturbing has been the GCC’s use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, or cluster munitions, which are manufactured by the Textron Systems Corporation. Those were sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in recent years, and have been used in numerous attacks that killed civilians. Cluster munitions were banned in 2008 by the UN Convention on Cluster Munitions, though Saudi Arabia and the United States have not ratified the agreement. On August 20, State Department spokesperson Rear Admiral John Kirby stated that the administration had “discussed reports of the alleged use of cluster munitions with the Saudis” and considered them “permissible” if they are “used appropriately and according with those end-use rules.” Unfortunately, civilians have disproportionately suffered in the air war. Of the 5,239 people killed or injured by explosive weapons between January and July, 86 percent were civilians. According to the UN, between the start of Saudi operations and June 30, a total of 971 civilians were killed by GCC coalition air strikes, accounting for more than 60 percent of all conflict-related civilian deaths—clearly, U.S. weapons are not being “used appropriately.” Moreover, 1.5 million people have been displaced and over 90 percent of the remaining population is in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Earlier this month, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, conveyed what was an astonishing observation about U.S. support for, and detachment from, what was happening: With respect to Yemen, we have very deep concerns. We are able, because it’s the nature of our relationship, to again provide certain types of support to the efforts in Yemen, but also, I think, to be frank, when we believe that more care needs to be taken to avoid civilian casualties. And that will be an ongoing position that we take. And look, we have to hold all of ourselves to the highest possible standard when it relates to preventing civilian deaths, and that will continue to be a part of our dialogue as it relates to Yemen. What is disturbing about such comments is that the Obama administration is establishing a troubling precedent, whereby it has no obligations for military operations conducted by other countries for which the United States is playing an essential, enabling role. U.S. officials keep “calling on all sides” to end hostilities without recognizing that the United States itself is one of these sides. Though Congress and the media appropriately monitor and evaluate uses of force when conducted by U.S. armed forces, citizens should be equally concerned and vigilant about operations for which U.S. logistical, intelligence, and weapons support are instrumental, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and air refueling to the French forces in Mali, GPS-guidance kits to the Colombian government to help fight insurgents, and drone surveillance for Turkish fighter jets bombing northern Iraq. These types of military operations, with the United States providing a crucial supporting role to partner militaries, will become far more common into the future. One research side note: The Pentagon will not reveal how much this support for Saudi operations is costing American taxpayers. On June 30, I first sent a request to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, which directed me to submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to CENTCOM. A public affairs officer at CENTCOM then suggested redirecting the FOIA to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, which has not yet responded to the request. This is not classified information, and given that CENTCOM and the Department of Defense (DOD) consistently update the total cost operations for Operation Inherent Resolve, they should do the same for DOD support to GCC forces. Finally, the United States is not bound by a mutual defense treaty to defend Saudi Arabia. President Obama’s decision six months ago to provide apparently unlimited military support for the air war in Yemen was therefore a war of choice. The air war, which the Saudis bizarrely dubbed “Operation Renewal of Hope” on April 21—a disastrous word choice—is one for which Obama is personally responsible and could stop immediately by turning off America’s overwhelming, expedited, and vital direct support. Weapons sales are supposed to build a relationship between supplier and recipient, which is supposed to provide some leverage for the supplier over how the recipient uses those weapons. Either President Obama is fine with how U.S.-supplied weapons are being used in Yemen, he is refraining from using leverage to stop their use, or there is no leverage to speak of. In which case, all the United States has gained over the past six months is participating in and extending a civil war, which has been an enormous humanitarian disaster.

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