Middle East and North Africa

Palestinian Territories

  • Israel
    Youssef Ibrahim and Henry Siegman discuss the Middle East Crisis
    The Charlie Rose ShowThis transcript has not been checked against videotape and cannot, for that reason, be guaranteed as to accuracy of speakers and spelling of names. (TW) CHARLIE ROSE, Host: Welcome to the broadcast. The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia went to Crawford, Texas, this week to talk to President Bush. We’ll hear this evening from his foreign policy adviser. Also, two observers of the Middle Eastern scene—Henry Siegman of the Council on Foreign Relations and Youssef Ibrahim. ADEL AL JUBEIR, Adviser to Crown Prince Abdullah: President Arafat is the elected representative or leader and president of the Palestinian Authority. It is not up to anyone else to decide who their leader should be, just like we can’t decide who Israel’s leader should be. The question is do we want to make a peace agreement between adversaries or do we want to dictate the surrender terms from one party to another? In the first case, the peace would be permanent and will hold. In the second case, it will never happen. HENRY SIEGMAN, Council on Foreign Relations: Sharon is clearly focusing not on what is happening on the Arab street. He is not focusing on what is happening in Palestinian towns, many of which are now in a—have been reduced to rubble. He is focusing on the next election in Israel. That is his main focus. CHARLIE ROSE: And what’s happening? HENRY SIEGMAN: And he has decided that if he is to win that election he must move to the right. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM, Council on Foreign Relations: When I was in Saudi Arabia, Secretary Powell was touring the region talking about a Palestinian state. He was asking for an end of the incursions. And at the same time you get a message from Washington where our president describes Sharon as a man of peace. This is confusing, to say the least, and affecting our credibility in the region. CHARLIE ROSE: Also this evening, former CBS News correspondent John Laurence on his book about Vietnam called The Cat from Hue. JOHN LAURENCE, Author, “The Cat from Hue”: For 30 or 40 years most German people just couldn’t even think about World War II. And America, in the shadow of the Vietnam War, has had the same kind of problem looking at it accurately, looking at what actually happened there and living with our conscience for what we did. CHARLIE ROSE: The Middle East and John Laurence. And later, we remember Jay Chiat—coming up. Analysts, Adviser Discuss Mideast Politics, Arafat CHARLIE ROSE: Today, President Bush repeated the message he delivered to Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia at their meeting in Crawford, Texas. Pres. GEORGE W. BUSH (R): Well, I told the Crown Prince that we’ve got a unique relationship with Israel and that one thing that the world can count on is that we will not allow Israel to be crushed. And I think that’s an important statement to make. It’s a part of our foreign policy. It has been a part of our foreign policy. It will continue to be a part of our foreign—The Saudis understand that. I also reiterated what I told the country and the world on—early April. And that is all parties have responsibilities in order to make sure there’s peace. The Crown Prince is interested in peace in the region and so am I. And I said to the Crown Prince and he—and we had a good discussion about the obligations of the Arab nations. The Crown Prince was clear in his denunciation of terror. Chairman Arafat has got obligations and so does the Israelis. And I, once again, enunciated what those obligations are. And I—so that the Crown Prince understands my foreign policy. And it’s important that we speak with clarity. And I will continue to do so. CHARLIE ROSE: In their five-hour meeting yesterday, President Bush addressed Crown Prince Abdullah’s warning that American tolerance of Israeli action in the West Bank was threatening American ties to the Arab world. Adel Al Jabeir, adviser to Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, joins us. Also with me here in the studio, Youssef Ibrahim, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a former Energy Editor of the Wall Street Journal and was a foreign correspondent for the New York Times for 20 years. Also with me here in the studio is Henry Siegman, Senior Fellow and Director of the U.S. Middle East Project at the Council on Foreign Relations. We begin with this question, Mr. Al Jubeir. You were there in Texas. Can you tell me today on this Friday, the last day of the week after the Crown Prince visits with the president, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia and how it’s changed, if at all, because of this meeting? ADEL AL JUBEIR: The relationship is excellent. It’s solid. It’s strong. And it has been so for the past 60 years. The visit was important because it gave the two gentlemen a chance to acquaint themselves with each other and to take each other’s measure. I think that the personalities are very similar. They’re both very sincere, very direct, very frank. They value honesty. And I think the—I know that the—on a personal level they got along extremely well, and also in terms of the issues that are of concern to the two countries. CHARLIE ROSE: Clearly, the Crown Prince made this admonition based on what we’ve heard coming out that the—and you have given voice to it, that the United States ought to do something about the Israeli defense forces within the territory formerly controlled by the Palestinian Authority. And that if not, Sharon will drag the region over a cliff if left to his own devices. Is that essentially the message that was given to the president? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Well, I don’t know that I would characterize it as a message. It was a tour de force. It was a conversation about issues of concern to both countries. We have no problems in our bilateral relationship. The problems that exist are problems that affect both of us and that we both want to find solutions for because it’s in our interests to do so. We firmly believe that the continued violence in the territories, that the continued inability to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict does grave damage to America’s interests. It does grave damage to our interests. And it causes further instability in the region. And therefore we’ve always maintained that it’s crucially important for the United States and everybody else to do all they can to try to bring out a—to bring about a settlement. CHARLIE ROSE: The United States has asked Prime Minister Sharon to withdraw. Has Saudi Arabia asked Yasir Arafat to make sure that he has done everything he can to stop suicide bombings? ADEL AL JUBEIR: We have been weighing in with the Palestinian Authority for—since the inception of the peace process. We have encouraged them to pursue the path of peace. We have encouraged them—we have provided support for them when they needed it. And we have provide admonition to them when they—when it was required. CHARLIE ROSE: So what’s the next step? ADEL AL JUBEIR: We not—because we strongly believe that this problem needs a solution, we also are convinced that the vision that the president has for a settlement is very similar to the vision that the Crown Prince; a Palestinian state living in peace next to Israel. An end to settlements. An end to the occupation. A shift from incrementalism to final status talks and doing it as quickly as possible. And we have on our side the peace plan put forward by the Crown Prince, which became the formal position of the Arab League. We not—we don’t just complain about the need to do something. We’ve offered some proposals to try to break the impasse around Ramallah and to break the impasse around Bethlehem. And also we’ve provided some ideas in terms of how we can jumpstart the peace process and put it back in its proper track so it can lead to the vision that both leaders want to see accomplished. CHARLIE ROSE: There have been a lot of stories this week about how close Prime Minister Sharon came to expelling Yasir Arafat, Chairman Arafat, from Ramallah and that he was only dissuaded by a last-minute telephone call from Secretary of State Powell. What happens if Prime Minister Sharon does that? ADEL AL JUBEIR: It would be a grave mistake on the part of Prime Minister Sharon. President Arafat is the elected representative or leader and the president of the Palestinian Authority. It is not up to anyone else to decide who their leader should be, just like we can’t decide who Israel’s leader should be. The question is do we want to make a peace agreement between adversaries? Or do we want to dictate the surrender terms from one party to another? In the first case, the peace would be permanent and will hold. In the second case, it will never happen. CHARLIE ROSE: Is it possible that a peace conference will come out of this meeting between the Crown Prince and the President? ADEL AL JUBEIR: The—that was one of the issues that was discussed. The important thing is what does it require to jumpstart the process? What does it require to speed up the political process to arrive at a comprehensive settlement. If a conference is the way to go, then so be it. But we have to be careful, Charlie, because people have used the term “conference” many—in different versions. If it’s a conference in which the attendance is dictated by one side, that’s a non-starter. If it’s a conference in which people will discuss modalities and time lines, that’s, frankly, a waste of time. But if it’s a conference in which people accept the principles of a final settlement and the outlines of a final settlement and the attendance to that conference is to reconfirm those and to start serious negotiations towards that end, then it will absolutely be useful to have one. CHARLIE ROSE: What if it’s a conference without President Arafat? ADEL AL JUBEIR: It will be not a conference. CHARLIE ROSE: No one will go? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Why should they? CHARLIE ROSE: Because they Palestinians may send another representative. ADEL AL JUBEIR: They will not. CHARLIE ROSE: So it’s a non-starter? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Absolutely. CHARLIE ROSE: No one from the Arab world will attend? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Absolutely. Nobody from the Arab world will allow Prime Minister Sharon to dictate who he—who he negotiates with on the Palestinian side. Can we decide, can we dictate to the Israeli public who our Israeli interlocutor should be? CHARLIE ROSE: Tell me how your government and the Crown Prince, how do they see Yasir Arafat? What’s their deepest sense about him? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Yasir Arafat is the leader of the Palestinian Authority. He has been a symbol for the Palestinian struggle for freedom and independence since the 1960’s. He is—there is universal support for him among the Palestinians. His—the strength and the depth of the support that he enjoys, if anything, went sky high over the past three or four months. Yasir Arafat, we are convinced, wants to make a deal. He will not surrender to Sharon or any other prime minister. The deal has to be fair. The deal has to be supported by the international community. And if those elements are met, we are confident that he will make the deal. CHARLIE ROSE: But I hear you believing that somehow the Crown Prince and the President sought together a deal that they would like to see, that they think could work. ADEL AL JUBEIR: Yes, because we know the—what is acceptable in terms of the—from the Palestinian side. CHARLIE ROSE: And the President knows what’s acceptable from the Israeli side? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Yes. And they both know what the—what the universal consensus is. CHARLIE ROSE: And they believe a deal is possible, notwithstanding all those people who’ve seen what’s happened in the last 18 months and don’t believe that as long as Ariel Sharon is prime minister of Israel and Yasir Arafat is president of the Palestinian Authority there can ever be peace? ADEL AL JUBEIR: We have to work with the cards that are on the table. And we will have to make the best of it. And we will have to test people’s seriousness and test their resolve. And we have to see where the negotiations lead. But ultimately, yes, there—peace is possible. Even though this appears to be the darkest hour in terms of the peace process, I do not believe that there was a time when we had a universal consensus of what a deal should look like. CHARLIE ROSE: And we do have that now? ADEL AL JUBEIR: I believe so, yes. CHARLIE ROSE: OK. One last quick question before Henry joins in. You—there was much criticism of the president when he said that Ariel Sharon is a man of peace. Let me just turn it around and say do you believe Ara—Yasir Arafat is a man of peace? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Yes. CHARLIE ROSE: So why did you get so upset because Sharon was characterized as a man of peace? ADEL AL JUBEIR: We didn’t get upset. We just—we were asked about our views and we said that we had a hard time believing that Sharon himself believes that he’s a man of peace. CHARLIE ROSE: OK. Henry Siegman? HENRY SIEGMAN: Adel, how are you? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Fine. How are you? HENRY SIEGMAN: OK. You indicated that—and I was delighted to hear it—that you thought there was a shared conception—shared by the president and by the Crown Prince—of what the outline, the parameters of a permanent peace would be. Do you have reason to believe, therefore, or can we conclude from that observation, Adel, that the president has indicated he supports the Crown Prince’s notion that those parameters must fundamentally—on their most fundamental level must include a return to the ‘67 borders? ADEL AL JUBEIR: Well, we have said in terms of the ‘67 borders that the details of the negotiations are left to the parties. The 1967 borders were the basis. At the Taba agreements, the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed to certain minor adjustments in those borders that were acceptable to both sides. If that’s what the Palestinians accept, then that’s what we would accept as the definition of the ‘67 borders. When I say—the president was very gracious in his support for the Crown Prince’s vision when the Crown Prince first stated it to the world. And the president and the U.S. government were very supportive of the Crown Prince’s vision when it as adopted as an Arab peace initiative at the Beirut summit. So, yes, I believe that the U.S. government and this administration, in particular, supports the principles that were put on the table by the Crown Prince. HENRY SIEGMAN: Including the return to the—essentially to the ‘67 lines? The reason I come back to this is because so far on our end in the United States we have received no indication whatever that the president is prepared to make that kind of a commitment. ADEL AL JUBEIR: Well, Henry, when you look at the U.N. resolution 242, it talks about the occupied territories. That’s 1967. When you look at the principles of the Madrid conference and the principles of Land for Peace, it talks about the occupied territory. That’s essentially 1967. When you look at the Oslo agreements; the same thing. When you look at the Taba agreements; the same thing. So I think when—if we want to split hairs and say 1967 exactly, people can disagree. But if we deviate by a foot here or a foot there, is that such a big deal? CHARLIE ROSE: Youssef? ADEL AL JUBEIR: If it’s acceptable to the two parties. CHARLIE ROSE: Thank you very much. Adel Al Jubeir, foreign policy adviser to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. So you had a conversation today with the foreign minister? And you recently were in Saudi Arabia a couple of weeks ago? YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: Yes. I was there a couple of weeks ago. And I think one of the things that struck me most, Charlie, is how angry people are. We have had in the past five years what I call “satellite revolution” in the Arab world. We have had—you know, you wish for something and you get it. We always wished for an Arab satellite station that actually gives real news. And we got Al-Jazeera. You like it; you don’t like it. It has made a big difference. Now it’s imitated by all the other satellite stations. And we have a situation where the Arab people—all 250 million of them—from Algeria to Amman, are now getting some real news from Arab stations that transcend, goes over the head of their leadership. And what these stations are showing is what’s happening in the occupied territories, in Israel, in Palestine. And they are showing it because it’s—the Arabs disagree on a lot of things, but they certainly agree emotionally on this issue. And it has created what Adel was speaking about—an Arab public opinion that is putting tremendous pressure on the leadership. I think Crown Prince Abdullah is visiting this country having transcended his role as ruler—or a ruler of Saudi Arabia. He is here as a spokesman for the Arab world. He is here to get a clear answer from President Bush, from our—CHARLIE ROSE: And express face to face the things that you’re talking about. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: Yes. CHARLIE ROSE: Do you agree with this? HENRY SIEGMAN: Well, I certainly agree that there’s a very angry Arab street. I think the expectations of the Arab world were that a very strong message, an adversarial message, would be presented by the Crown Prince, not just on behalf of Saudi Arabia, but on behalf of the entire Arab world to the president because the Crown Prince—the Crown Prince met with the president just two days after the Israeli prime minister, Mr. Sharon, said that he will not remove even a single settlement anywhere in the West Bank or Gaza as long as he is in office. Now that clearly removes the political horizon that everyone was talking about. That the president, that the secretary of state was referring to as essential for a cease-fire, for progress towards ending the conflict. CHARLIE ROSE: So you believe that because of what’s happened in the last—how long has it been? Not 18 months, but since the Arabs—since the Israelis went into Ramallah and went into Bethlehem and went into other cities, do you believe that Sharon’s attitude has hardened with respect to what’s acceptable for peace? HENRY SIEGMAN: Sharon is clearly focusing not on what is happening on the Arab street. He is not focusing on what is happening in Palestinian towns, many of which are now in a—have been reduced to rubble. He is focusing on the next election in Israel. That is his main focus. CHARLIE ROSE: And what’s happening? HENRY SIEGMAN: And he has decided that if he is to win that election, he must move to the right, which—of where he has been. There isn’t all that much right left considering where he has been. But that’s where he’s moving. In terms of who he’s bringing back into the cabinet, the most extreme right-wing parties. And he’s looking at Bibi Netanyahu. And that accounts for the statement he made yesterday or the day before yesterday that he will not evacuate even one settlement. CHARLIE ROSE: And that they will not leave either Ramallah. And also there have been many more reports about the idea of expelling Arafat. HENRY SIEGMAN: Well, I don’t know about that. CHARLIE ROSE: Well, if it’s towards the president—I’m not suggesting that he’s thinking about it. I’m not suggesting how reliable they are. But, you know, we now have the account that it appeared about Sharon prepared to do it and only an all-night cabinet session only circumvented by Powell’s urgent 2:00 p.m.-- 2:00 a.m. call. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: Charlie, you’ve got to appreciate how much this is affecting our credibility in the region. When I was in Saudi Arabia, Secretary Powell as touring the region, talking about a Palestinian state. He was asking for an end of the incursions. And in the same time, you get a message from Washington where our president describes Sharon as a man of peace. This is confusing, to say the least, and affecting our credibility in the region. There is a question as to exactly our—What Henry is saying is there is a Sharon agenda, but there should also be an American agenda and we are honest brokers—or we’re supposed to be—in this conflict and it doesn’t look like this at the moment if we go along with the Sharon agenda. Or it actually looks like we’re giving this government cover to continue what, in effect, a sort of total destruction of Palestinian civil society. CHARLIE ROSE: Two things. One, about either of you, but, Henry, were you surprised about what he said about how they feel about the Bush administration? Or was that just flattery for the president? HENRY SIEGMAN: I’m glad you characterized this. In fact, what I was thinking as Adel was describing the president’s views that the Bush administration ought to steal him away from the Crown Prince. CHARLIE ROSE: Well, I was listening to that thinking that—my question, if I wanted to get you in, my question at the time was are you prepared here to say that George Bush has been the best president for Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries that there’s been in a long time? You certainly seem to be saying something akin to that by saying—talking about a Palestinian state, by talking about—these are terms that they hadn’t heard before. HENRY SIEGMAN: I suspect that when the Saudis go back to Saudi Arabia and give their accounts of what happened here and their views of the conflict itself, a somewhat different story will be heard. It won’t be quite as complimentary to the president. CHARLIE ROSE: I want to ask this because there’s also the Israeli side. What—has any damage at all been done to Israeli-U.S. relations? HENRY SIEGMAN: With this administration up until now the answer is no. I don’t think there has ever been an Israeli prime minister who could have dreamed that an Israeli government can do the kinds of things that this prime minister has done that must be seen as complicating American relations with the Arab world, with Saudi Arabia specifically, while on the subject of Saudi Arabia. And that the president would continue to be so supportive and so uncritical of such an Israeli government, that’s really quite, quite bewildering. CHARLIE ROSE: You know, at one time in your life you were head of the American Jewish Congress, were you not? HENRY SIEGMAN: Yes. CHARLIE ROSE: I mean, are you surprised though? HENRY SIEGMAN: Yes, I’m very—CHARLIE ROSE: Because of the political pressure that—[crosstalk] We saw the rally in Washington and the—HENRY SIEGMAN: I’m surprised for many reasons. But, first, the most important reason I am surprised about is this is not a favor to Israel. I understand and endorse—CHARLIE ROSE: What’s not a favor to Israel? HENRY SIEGMAN: To continue to give a green light to the policies of—the current policies of Prime Minister Sharon is not a favor to Israel. It is essentially to destroy the possibility of achieving an end to the conflict. CHARLIE ROSE: Yeah, but then let—then the question is, is that the message of American Jews to American leadership? HENRY SIEGMAN: No, it is not. CHARLIE ROSE: What is the message of American Jews to American leadership? HENRY SIEGMAN: The message of American Jews—CHARLIE ROSE: If they can speak as one. I don’t want to suggest that there is—HENRY SIEGMAN: Of course, you can’t. But those who are the activists, those who got to Washington to demonstrate, their message is—CHARLIE ROSE: Or lobbyists. HENRY SIEGMAN: Their message was expressed when the administration’s representative, Wolfowitz, spoke at the rally. And after expressing full support for the state of Israel and for this government, when he said that remember also that there are Palestinians who are being killed and were being—and that, too, was a great tragedy, he was booed. That was their message to the administration. CHARLIE ROSE: That was their message to the administration. Booing Paul Wolfowitz when he said—HENRY SIEGMAN: To—here’s a man who, if anything, has played—well, he has played the key role in persuading people in the defense department and at the White House to provide this kind of full support, uncritical support, and he is booed for showing some sympathy, some empathy for Palestinian sovereignty. That’s not a good thing that all the Jewish—CHARLIE ROSE: I have to get out of here. But say something, I have a question. Go ahead. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: Charlie, there’s another—the other side of this. The point is I feel we are risking a rupture in an important relationship with Saudi Arabia. Despite all the nice talk that’s going to come out of this meeting, I think we are in a—this may—we may look back and say this is a defining moment in Arab-American relations. And we shouldn’t talk about Saudi Arabia as though it is a relationship we can dispense with easily. This is a country that has been friendly to the United States for 70 years. More importantly, it is sitting on one-third of the world’s oil reserves. The other third belongs to Iran and Iraq and we are on no—we are not on speaking terms with either of them. Saudi Arabia has been a moderating force in OPEC on oil prices. And it is giving us a strategic military dimension. A lot of pundits here have been saying why do we need Saudi Arabia? Why don’t we just pull our forces out of Saudi Arabia, put them in Qatar; put them in Kuwait; put them in Amman. Saudi Arabia is the godfather of the Arab Gulf. If Saudi Arabia were to rupture a strategic military relationship with us, how long do you think it will take for Bahrain, which has our largest Naval base in the region, before it follows suit? And how much would Kuwait or Qatar be able to do all by themselves? In other words, we need this district. We need Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia needs us. We need to nurture this relationship. CHARLIE ROSE: The only thing that I would ask at this time is that, I mean, all the parties—whether it’s Saudi Arabia or Egypt or the United States or Israel or the Palestinians—didn’t they have any sense that if they didn’t do more it was coming to this? HENRY SIEGMAN: Good point. And let me stress that perhaps the greatest failure of leadership is on the part of Arafat himself. This man, by failing in his responsibilities, probably has done more damage to the Palestinian cause than Israel’s adversaries. CHARLIE ROSE: Yeah, but my question again—my question also, though, is who had leverage and influence and how well was that exercised? YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: We did. CHARLIE ROSE: With respect to Arafat? YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: We did on everybody. I mean, with respect to Arafat, Arafat perhaps should have been out of the scene a lot earlier. I’ve covered him for 25 years. CHARLIE ROSE: Yeah, but that reality didn’t happen, so—YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: But he is here. Nobody really has that kind of leverage on Arafat. Arafat is a loner. He works on his own. CHARLIE ROSE: Where does he get his funding? YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: He has had funding previous to arriving in Gaza, as you know. And he does—like Saddam Hussein—has kept a large amount of money outside the country. Arafat doesn’t have—doesn’t need that much money. CHARLIE ROSE: So that means the support of the Saudis, Egyptians, the Syrians, the Iranians, the Iraqis, anybody. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: Absolutely. I don’t think—[crosstalk] CHARLIE ROSE: He can stand alone in defiance of the world—[crosstalk] YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: I think he liberated himself from the Arabs some time ago. But what Henry said about his failure in leadership is absolutely correct. He has failed. Having that liberty, having that position, he has failed to really use it. Sharon, I don’t think has done much better. HENRY SIEGMAN: But wouldn’t you agree in all fairness that that failure was also surrounded as it were by the failure of the wider Arab world? Because there was a time when he was dependent and was lavishly supported by much of the Arab world. And the view—the view that he had of Israel was, up until a certain point in history, was widely shared in the Arab world. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: I think that’s why we have—that’s where we are. I think what the Saudi initiative really says is we’re all exhausted. HENRY SIEGMAN: Exactly. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: We are exhausted. Let’s make a deal. HENRY SIEGMAN: That’s what makes it important. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: We’ deliver—we’ll deliver the Arab world to you; you deliver the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians. Let’s just cut the deal and let’s move on because we haven’t had any economic development. We’ve had a problem with Saddam Hussein, who has paralyzed our politics for 10 years. We’ve got to deal with all of this, let’s just—[crosstalk] HENRY SIEGMAN: And the U.S. failed, so far, in responding to that. CHARLIE ROSE: Or to encourage it. That was my point in making the last point. Thank you very much. Good to have you here. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM: Thank you, Charlie. CHARLIE ROSE: Good to have you.
  • Israel
    The Powell Mission
    An explosion, apparently set off by a suicide bomber, killed at least six people at a bus stop near Jerusalem’s outdoor market Friday in an attack that coincided with a peace mission by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, police said. Bombing Rocks Jerusalem After Powell Meets Sharon, (Wire Reports, April 12) Dr. Warren Bass, director of the Special Projects/Terrorism Program and fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was online Friday, April 12 at 2:30 p.m. EDT, to discuss the conflict in the Middle East, Powell’s visit and the U.S.’s role in diplomacy. Bass’ articles on Middle Eastern affairs and U.S. foreign policy have appeared in publications including The Washington Post, The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and The New Republic, and he edits the Council’s new “Terrorism: Questions & Answers” Web site. A transcript follows. Editor’s Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions. Dr. Warren Bass: Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for coming. Wish it was under less grim circumstances. Washington, D.C.: The Palestinians seem to be fighting with the only weapon they have, the suicide bomber. Do you think the increased frequency of bombings will eventually wear down the Iraelis to the point where they’ll have to recognize a Palestinian state and finally tackle the tougher issues (Jeusalem, right of return, etc.)? Dr. Warren Bass: This seems a good place to start, because the premise is not only wrong but wrong in an important way. Suicide bombings are not the only weapon the Palestinians have. It’s said that terrorism is the “weapon of the weak,” but even the weak have other choices. The Palestinians could have chosen diplomacy—indeed, according to Yasir Arafat’s own statements and signatures, they chose precisely that during the 1990s Oslo peace process. For that matter, the Palestinians—and I know this isn’t terribly realistic—could have chosen civil disobedience. Remember how the Israeli troops meekly let that cavalcade of European leftists troop right past Israeli barricades and into Arafat’s compound in Ramallah? The sheer embarrassment of having to deal with nonviolent protest could have been a very powerful lever for a democracy like Israel. Suicide bombings may wear the Israelis down. But they wear the Palestinians down too—by coarsening their political culture and distorting their society. And let’s be clear: the Oslo accords explicitly committed Israel to tackling the tougher issues you mention—Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Ehud Barak was talking about what Israel could do on both scores at Camp David a few short years ago—and Arafat wasn’t ready to talk turkey. So let’s be clear: the Palestinians had other paths to choose. That doesn’t mean Israel hasn’t missed opportunities, too. But let’s at least be clear that suicide terrorism is a choice, not an inevitability. Rockville, Md.: Much is made of things the PA has or hasn’t done since Oslo, but the Israelis have also done plenty to undermine that agreement. The bulding of new settlements and the expansion of existing ones undermines confidence that Israel will actually recognize a free Palestine and serve as an obstacle to peace. What are your thoughts? Dr. Warren Bass: And on the Israeli side of the ledger… I think Israelis of good will never quite got how badly settlement-building freaked out the Palestinians. The solid Israeli center over the 1990s that backed a West Bank pullout never fully grasped that settlements summoned up the central demon of the Palestinian national narrative: dispossession, being driven off the land. Israeli doves thought that the doubling of the number of settlers over the 1990s wasn’t that big a deal; after all, the Labor Party was ready to create a Palestinian state, so the settlements would get taken care of later. But it soured a lot of Palestinians on Oslo. Settlements—like refugees and Jerusalem—are “final status issues” under Oslo, which is to say migraine-inducing issues to be tackled well down the road once the sides trust each other better. So while settlement-building wasn’t against the letter of Oslo, it sure undercut Oslo’s spirit. I know plenty of people believe settlements make Israel safer, but on the evidence today, I just can’t make that case. Flushing, N.Y.: Do you think Secretary of State Powell will be able to get some kind of a deal with after what happened today? Do you think the Uunited Nations should do more than what the U.S. is doing? Dr. Warren Bass: Today’s suicide bombing—which killed six innocents near a Jerusalem marketplace— sure doesn’t help. The bomber came from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a militia associated with Arafat’s own Fatah faction and formally classified by the State Department as a terrorist group. In effect, today’s bombing is the Brigades’ way of telling Arafat: either you’re with us or you’re against us. Powell can still get somewhere. But he has to be ready to crack some skulls—diplomatically speaking. That means Arafat cannot be allowed to hold onto the preposterous charade that he simply can’t control some 20-year-olds in his own Fatah movement. On the UN…Kofi Annan had a pretty heated statement today that’ll start a big UN debate over international peacekeepers for the West Bank. But the UN (as Stalin said of the pope) has no divisions; it’ll only move when the members move, and the most important member has its foreign minister in motion right now. Bayside, N.Y.: Could this pose a threat to domestic security? Dr. Warren Bass: Yes. Hate to be so blunt about it…but after 9/11, all Americans know that suicide bombers can hit here, too. That doesn’t mean it will happen, but it could. Also, if the Israeli-Palestinian crisis spirals even further out of control and gets directly in the way of the US-led war on al-Qaeda, that’s not great for US domestic security either. So Americans have a dog in this fight. Elmira, W.Va.: Are, as Thomas Friedman of the New York Times advocates, U.S troops a necessecity in the Middle East, or will they just confuse the situation? Dr. Warren Bass: First: Do I get in trouble for praising Tom Friedman on the Washington Post? Second: the situation looks pretty confused already… I think Friedman has a point. Look: nature abhors a vacuum, and so does politics. So somebody’s got to control the West Bank. It can’t be Israel; that means restarting a nasty occupation that Israeli diplomacy has been trying to extricate the country from since at least 1993. And Israel just can’t rule indefinitely over 3 million furious Palestinians. Increasingly, though, it looks like it can’t be Arafat’s Palestinian Authority, either. The PA had its chance, and it’s flatly failed to give Israelis the quiet they were entitled to in return for their Oslo withdrawals. Plus, the PA is inefficient, unaccountable, has let Hamas provide social services for its Gazan citizens, and has generally proven to be a rotten government under which to live. So if it’s not Israel and it’s not the PA, that leaves…someone else. Or a lot more muddling through. Chicago, Ill.: Why is Palestinian civil disobedience, in your words, “unrealistic?” Dr. Warren Bass: I wish they’d tried it; but it’d be a real departure for Palestinian political culture. (It was a stretch for American political culture in the civil rights years, too.) But there’s no real advocates of civil disobedience among the Palestinians today. Alas. Instead, there’s around 70 percent support for suicide bombings. That’s pretty unsettling. Fresh Meadows, N.Y.: Can you please explain to me what is the “right for the Palestinian refugee to return” they argue about? Dr. Warren Bass: It’s the central grievance of Palestinian nationalism. In 1948, when Israel was created, about 700-800,000 Arabs fled the fighting. Israelis say they left voluntarily; Palestinians say they were ethnically cleansed; and the emerging historical literature says the problem was produced by war, not design by either side. The Palestinian armed struggle from the 1960s onwards has been dedicated to getting the refugees’ the “right of return”—that is, letting them go back to the homes in Jaffa, Haifa, and other cities within modern-day Israel that they fled during Israel’s War of Independence. The objection of many Arabs, Palestinian and otherwise, to the Oslo accords is that they mostly helped the West Bankers and Gazans living under Israeli occupation, not the refugees still stuck in camps in Lebanon and Jordan. (Both groups number around 3 million.) At Camp David, Israel was flirting with a right of return—but not to Israel, but to a newly created West Bank state of Palestine. Israelis across the political spectrum say that the 1960s-style “right of return” means the death of Israel as a Jewish state. It’s an incredibly tough nut to crack—something to make brave diplomats weep. And it’s far beyond the grasp of some of the feeble leadership the Middle East’s been seeing recently. Stanford, Calif.: Good afternoon, doctor. What do you make of the suggestion, in the Israeli press and elsewhere, that Sharon intends to press for a Madrid-style conference as the political mechanism to work towards a negotiated settlement? Will the U.S. and EU, which had so much invested in the specific mechanism of Oslo, go for it? Will Arafat and the Palestians? (Will any of them have a choice?) And, is this serious, or is it just a diversion? Dr. Warren Bass: Actually, the reports I’ve seen show that a “Madrid II” conference is Powell’s idea, not Sharon’s. It’d be a nice goodie, rather than a real negotiating forum. That has to lie with the parties for it to go anywhere, even with US help. It’d be good to have something to change the storyline—away from devastation and gore and back to diplomacy. But Powell’s got to get somewhere on the ground first before you can throw a party. Maryland: I think it’s obvious that the Palestinians need their own nation on the West Bank. As long as there is no independent Palestine, the bloodshed will continue. Sharon’s campaign is not winning Israel any friends among the moderate Arabs, who might otherwise want to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Every time Israeli troops kill a unarmed Palestianian, it makes the monsters who bomb Passover seders look like heroes. And he’s dragging America’s reputation down with him. Both sides need to compromise, obviously, but Israel will only give up something if forced by the U.S. Does Bush have the inclination or the will to make Israel give up its claim to the West Bank? Dr. Warren Bass: I’m with the UN Security Council: the best bet for a way out of this misery is two states, Israel and a demilitarized Palestine, living side by side in security. Now, as for how to get there… One of the colossal shortfalls of Palestinian diplomacy in the past few years has been what it’s done to Israel’s left. The Labor Party of Rabin, Peres, and Barak was ready to give the Palestinians a state. But by refusing to get serious about terrorism, Arafat kept sawing off the legs of Israeli doves. I’m deeply, deeply skeptical that Sharon’s current policy will do much to make Israel safer over the long term. But if Arafat doesn’t like Prime Minister Sharon, he shouldn’t have wrecked Barak. And while loss of Palestinian civilian life is just as bad as loss of Israeli civilian life, I don’t agree that Israel killing innocent Palestinians “makes the monsters who bomb Passover seders look like heroes.” They still look like monsters to me. I don’t agree that Israel will give up the West Bank only if forced by the US. It might well have given it all up if it was soothed by the Palestinians. But again, I can’t see how Israel can run the West Bank. New Haven, Conn.: Do you think Powell will be able to accomplish anything in the Middle East this weekend? Dr. Warren Bass: He’s not going to have a relaxing weekend… Powell has said he’s willing to spend several days there. That sounds prophetic…I wouldn’t expect instant results. Potomac, Md.: Why is state-sponsored oppression against a class or race of powerless people not considered terror and if not, then what is it and how is it different? Do acts of systemic racism by a powerful state hold higher ground than individual acts of terrorism by powerless people? Dr. Warren Bass: Defining terrorism is still something experts argue over; there’s a good discussion on the website I edit, www.terrorismanswers.com. Not everything bad is terrorism. Here’s one overly simplified way to look at it: if a non-state group deliberately kills civilians to inspire fear for political purposes, that’s terrorism. If a state does the same thing, that’s a war crime. Both, it should go without saying, are dreadful. Bethesda, Md.: Although the suicide bombings definitely show that terrorism continues, doesn’t it also show that the current Israeli tactics are ineffective? I’m torn on where the truth lies, and hope that our President as clearer information on what Arafat and Sharon are really up to. Does Sharon really intend to live up to land for peace? Or is his real plan to take apart the PA and de-nationalize the Palestinians? He’s always been a BIG supporter of the settlements -- does he view this as his chance to “go all the way?” And does Arafat really intend to live up to land for peace? Or is his real plan to eliminate the Israeli state? Does he view this as his chance to “go all the way?” Where is the truth? Dr. Warren Bass: All fine questions. And I doubt the president is that much clearer on them than we are. The bottom line is that both sides are behaving in confusing ways. Start from the (historically grounded, I think) premise that the only solution to this mess is a two-state solution, and then look around. You’ve got Palestinian terrorists murdering Israeli civilians in Tel Aviv, Netanya, and Jerusalem, and you’ve got Israeli tanks in Jenin, Nablus, and Ramallah. That doesn’t look much like disentanglement to me. I think these sides would be well-served by, as it were, a shotgun divorce. But depressingly large numbers of both Israelis and Palestinians keep fighting for room in the same failed marital bed. Harrisburg, Pa.: Might it be possible that a coalition government with both Israeli and Palestinian input could someday govern the disputed land? I have asked this same question to many experts, and I have never received an answer. Is this idea unthinkable? If so, why? Dr. Warren Bass: It’s not unthinkable; it’s called a “binational” state, and it’s had some prominent advocates over the years. In the 1940s, the brilliant Israeli philosopher Martin Buber pushed strongly for it; today, the Palestinian intellectual-activist Edward Said has backed it as an alternative to Oslo. I just think it’s a dream, unfortunately. There are two very angry nationalisms between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and no amount of wishful thinking is going to get them to rule together as if it’s Canada. So now you’ve got your answer—sorry it wasn’t more encouraging… Chicago, Ill.: It seems obvious that the attacks on Israelis will continue no matter what Arafat does. What evidence is there that Arafat could control the bombers, especially now?Dr. Warren Bass: It’s not obvious. I always get suspicious when authoritarians suddenly insist that they can’t crack down on their foes; they always seem to manage to do it when their own hides are on the line. Arafat can’t turn terror off like a faucet. But he could start trending it in the right direction. Obviously, with the PA trashed by the Israeli incursion, he’s got a lot less to work with—and a huge tide of resentment and rage to manage from his street, his deputies, and his militias. But I’d like to see him forced to try—and not just by Colin Powell. For all their distaste for Sharon, the Egyptians, Saudis, Jordanians, Moroccans, Kuwaitis, Qataris, Bahrainis, and so on all need to speak up and say that suicide terrorism is repulsive. And the Europeans could do a lot of good by getting tough with Arafat as well as Sharon. Arafat’s only going to act when he’s got no other choice— f then. Israel’s incursion—its stated ends to the contrary—hasn’t “isolated” Arafat. Just the reverse. But isolating him might not actually be the worst idea to try—really try. Silver Spring, Md.: Is it true that nations like Saudi Arabia and Iraq pay the families of the suicide bombers? Could there be financial incentive for these terrorist activities as well as the political “statement” they are trying to make? Dr. Warren Bass: Yes, Iraq pays off the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. As for the Saudis, there’ve been rumblings; we know lots of Saudi money goes to Hamas, and we know the Saudis held a telethon to raise millions to help the families of Palestinian “martyrs”— a term that the Saudi government swears just means innocents caught up in the fighting but that’s also widely used to mean suicide bombers. At a minimum, since 15 of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 were Saudi, I can’t see the harm in having the Saudi government get its language clear— and get those money flows to Hamas chopped off. Bethesda, Md.: What book(s) would you recommend that would shed the most light on current events in the Middle East? Dr. Warren Bass: I can’t resist this as a last question… A few good ones: From Beirut to Jerusalem by Tom Friedman; Waging Peace by Itamar Rabinovich; Making Peace with the PLO by David Makovsky; Righteous Victims by Benny Morris; The Dream Palace of the Arabs by Fouad Ajami; The United States and the State of Israel by David Schoenbaum; Palestinians by Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal; How Did This Happen? (on 9/11, by the editors of my old magazine, Foreign Affairs); and the best single volume on terrorism, Inside Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman. That should have you all thoroughly depressed for months. Dr. Warren Bass: Thanks again for all your questions, everyone. Here’s hoping for a good weekend in the Middle East…and for good leadership.
  • Palestinian Territories
    The Foreign Policy of Hamas
    Overview Hamas is not a monolithic organization. Hamas is not a fundamentalist movement. Opposition to Oslo and subsequent Israeli- Palestinian agreements, violent attacks on Israeli targets, challenges to the Palestinian Authority (PA), and anti-American polemics, all have fed the belief that Hamas is a militant movement on a collision course with the West and with the forces of moderation in the Arab world. This view must be reassessed. As the peace process moves forward with the signing of the Sharm el-Shaykh agreement between Israel and the PA in September 1999, the foreign policy of Hamas becomes more important to understand because it may have a direct bearing on the Arab-Israeli peace process. At least in this sense, Hamas' policies are extremely relevant for U.S. policymakers. Hamas' presence in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as in Arab countries that neighbor Israel, makes it particularly relevant to America's efforts to forge regional peace and stability. The Palestinian territories and the Arab countries that neighbor Israel are at the heart of the peace process. Political developments in these areas also have a direct bearing on the policies of the Gulf governments. In addition, Hamas is a major voice of dissent against U.S. policies in the Middle East. Hence, the future course of Hamas may promote or hinder peace and stability in the region. Hamas' political activism, especially its acts of violence against Israel in the mid-1990s, coincided with the rise of the Muhammad Muslih and the United States to a position of unchallenged preeminence in regional and international politics. The confluence of these two currents has challenged America's two declared foreign policy goals: promoting political pluralism and containing radical Islamic movements. For many in the West, it is axiomatic that Hamas is a combative, ideological monolith that poses a direct threat not only to the peace process but also to Western interests in the region. American policymakers, like the public in general, see Hamas solely in terms of extremism and terrorism. While this is understandable in light of the violent actions of Hamas, it fails to take into account the diversity of the movement and the multiple and complex manifestations of its policies. Hamas should not be viewed as the monolithic enemy of America and the Middle East peace process. Its policies do not reduce to a rigid doctrine of religious reassertion. Equally important, Hamas proved that it can change and adapt to new developments. The dynamic of the peace process is placing tremendous strains on the movement. The pressures of the PA and of other parties involved in the peace process have added to these strains weakening the infrastructure of Hamas and forcing it to reevaluate its policies and its modes of action. This paper analyzes the foreign policy of Hamas and the diversity of its multiple manifestations. It also discusses the international ramifications of this policy and concludes by suggesting practical measures the United States can take to encourage the inclusion of Hamas in peacemaking and nation-building in Palestine. This paper assumes that a policy of inclusion will broaden the base of Palestinian support for the peace process. It will also encourage more moderation on the part of Hamas.
  • Palestinian Territories
    Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions
    The Palestinian Authority (PA) must improve its ability to govern democratically and effectively—and do so urgently—or risk losing the support of its people, according to this independent Task Force report. The independent Task Force believes that the PA has made significant achievements to date, but recommends that it go much further in building a more participatory political system and pluralist civil society, as well as developing a free-market economy and sustainable growth. The report notes that although “the PA has achieved levels of service delivery, revenue mobilization, financial accountability, and utilization of international assistance that are at least commensurate with, and in some aspects exceed, those in countries of comparable development and income...much remains to be done.” Specifically, the PA should adopt a constitution; establish accountability for the executive branch to the legislature; centralize all public revenues and expenditures in the Ministry of Finance; and ensure the independence of the judiciary. Opinion polls among Palestinians show “dissatisfaction with the level of public services, a perception of waste and corruption in the public administration and police, and a loss of faith in the institutions of governance, particularly the Palestinian Legislative Council and the judiciary.” Confidence in the PA’s institutions affects its contest for legitimacy with radical elements that reject the Oslo accords and claim to do a better job than the PA at delivering certain services to the Palestinian people. This confidence bears on the PA’s ability to negotiate and compromise with Israel and affects Israel’s confidence in the PA’s ability to implement agreements. Good governance is therefore a necessary condition for the success of the peace process. The report, after conducting a comprehensive assessment of the public institutions of the PA, their structure and procedures, and their transparency and accountability, offers a number of steps the PA can take to remedy its problems.
  • Palestinian Territories
    U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process
    The collapse of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians over the past year and the ability of opponents of peace on both sides to exploit incremental measures to their advantage have brought the Middle East peace process to a dangerous impasse. The chief principles of U.S. policy are no longer effective: Incrementalism, far from building confidence, threatens to undermine it further; and an American role limited to facilitation will not enable the parties to resume successful negotiations. Therefore, intensive diplomatic efforts by the United States are needed to join the parties in the hopes of establishing a new Declaration of Principles, which would set the framework for final-status negotiations. This 1997 Independent Task Force, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, calls for a bold American initiative to help Israel and Palestine reach an agreement on the broad contours of a final settlement that can satisfy the minimal aspirations of both parties. Headed by Project Coordinator Henry Siegman, the report establishes the goals of the Declaration of Principles as framing the difficult issues of settlements, boundaries, and Jerusalem “in the context of agreed general goals.” Moreover, the report asserts that only the promise that these aspirations are achievable can revitalize the peace process and sustain it to a successful conclusion, reinforcing the utter importance of establishing a realistic Declaration.