Morocco

There have been many analyses of former Secretary of State Clinton’s testimony this week about Benghazi, but most are political. Here’s a bureaucratic analysis. Mrs. Clinton’s critics claim that she should have known about the late Amb. Chris Stevens’ requests for improved security. The Washington Post said "On the matter of why the Benghazi diplomatic outpost was so poorly defended, despite requests for additional security, she said Thursday what she has said all along — that those requests never reached her desk." Let’s assume that that is true. The questions then becomes whether it tells us anything about the way Secretary Clinton managed the Department. Does it matter that those requests did not reach her desk? The "No" argument is simple. The Department is huge and has hundreds of overseas posts--embassies and consulates, mostly--and many of them are in dangerous or potentially dangerous places. Just about all of them face some risk from terrorists, not just in Tripoli and Benghazi but even in Ottawa and London. Judgments about the required level of security should be left to professionals. Moreover, given the torrent of information coming in from posts, no secretary can read more than a small percentage of emails and cables--even important ones. One can also add that while Stevens did indeed request more security from the State Department (for example in this July cable) he did not apparently try to reach the Secretary directly--even when his requests were denied. I’m a bit surprised by this, and would have expected him to try to send a cable directly to her--not to the bureaucracy. Ambassadors can caption a cable "From the Ambassador to the Secretary" and use other bureaucratic maneuvers to get a request additional attention. Apparently, Stevens never did this. But the opposite argument is simple, too, and in my view more compelling. Libya was not in 2012 a backwater of small interest to the seventh floor of the State Department (where the top officials are located) or the White House: the United States had undertaken a military intervention there in 2011. Amb. Stevens had just gotten there himself in June, 2012. Secretary Clinton had sworn him in herself in May, an honor not all ambassadors get. The administration was interested in Libya and wanted it to be a success story. But she then dropped the ball. She swore him in on May 14 but after that she never spoke to him again. Obviously, any secretary of state is too busy to talk to her ambassadors all day, but I do recall that during the 2006 Lebanon crisis (which lasted six weeks) Secretary of State Rice spoke many times with Amb. Feltman in Beirut. What’s more, there are I believe no records of any email or cable exchanges between Secretary Clinton and Amb. Stevens. Nor are there records, I believe, of any contact with Stevens by anyone in Secretary Clinton’s entourage: from Jake Sullivan or Cheryl Mills or from the Executive Secretary of the Department, Stephen Mull. It seems that Stevens was simply on his own out there, attached to the State Department just as an ambassador to Belgium would be but with no links to the Secretary. Thus for example, when he wanted more security and was turned down, he does not appear to have had the ties to the Secretary’s intimate staff that might have permitted a quiet appeal. Every secretary of state must assemble a team that he or she trusts and that is used to meet the overwhelming responsibilities of the position. The secretary’s time is the most valuable commodity in the building, and the close staff helps the secretary manage her time, the Foreign Service, the hundreds of foreign posts, relations with Congress, relations with the White House, and so on. In  my own experience with Secretaries Haig, Shultz, and Rice, they did not bring such teams with them, but rather cobbled them together mostly from the available resources in the Department. Secretary Clinton’s case was different: she brought a team with her, consisting largely of people from her years in politics. Shultz’s closest aide, for example, was Charles Hill, a career Foreign Service officer. Haig’s was Jerry Bremer, also a career officer.  This is possibly of significance because it may have explained why Stevens did not seek to get around the denial of his request for more security. He may simply not have had the relationships that would have been required to do this when the Secretary’s closest aides were political allies rather than career officers. Then there is the question of what cables are important and should reach the secretary, in any administration. State has an elaborate secretariat one of whose duties is to decide this, so that the Executive Secretary can move up to the secretary those cables that are viewed as really must reading. Given the situation in Libya, it is extraordinary to me that no one thought to let the Secretary know that Amb. Stevens was saying he was in danger out there due to inadequate security--indeed saying that the Department’s own standards were simply not being met. And this was at a time when there had been an assassination attempt on the British ambassador. Stevens’ request was denied by the Under Secretary of State for Management, Patrick Kennedy. It appears that Kennedy never raised this with Clinton, and that no one in Clinton’s close team raised it with her. Perhaps none of them knew about it. This was the summer of 2012. Had all of this transpired in the summer of 2009, this would have been a new team. But now they had had more than two years in post, working out how things were brought to the Secretary’s attention. The failure of anyone-- apparently, anyone at all--to understand that this cable was important, that the Secretary had to see it, that she had to be told Stevens’ request was in, that she had to be told Stevens’ request was being denied--is extraordinary. It suggests that Clinton’s team, whatever its other merits, failed at this critical task: being able to bring really important things to her attention. This doesn’t require a meeting or take an hour. It just means that at some scheduled meeting, someone says "Oh, don’t know if you’ve seen this, but Chris Stevens in Tripoli says his security is bad, and doesn’t meet Department standards, and the situation is crummy, but his request for more help was turned down." That’s ten seconds. Perhaps Clinton would have said nothing, and left it to the professionals. Perhaps she’d have asked why. Perhaps she’d have reversed the decision. But she says no one ever told her. As we know, she was exchanging emails on Libya with Sidney Blumenthal-- but not with Chris Stevens. Putting politics aside that is a bureaucratic failure, an indictment of the management and information system she established in the Department.  

After the death of Muammar al Gaddafi, Administration spokesmen and those journalists who pretty much take dictation from them have been triumphant. This was, they have said, final proof of the exquisite brilliance of Obama policy in Libya (despite the “howling” of critics, to quote David Ignatius). I would hold off on the triumphalism, for the Obama approach had many flaws. The limitations imposed on the use of American military power lengthened the Libyan internal conflict. The Transitional National Council estimated a total of twenty-five thousand dead and sixty thousand wounded. Had we acted faster and not restricted the American role, those numbers would be smaller—perhaps far smaller, and the damage to Libya’s infrastructure also smaller. And had we used more air power to end the war faster, in weeks instead of months, perhaps the Libyan regime’s arsenals, including the extremely dangerous MANPAD shoulder-launched missiles, could have been captured intact. Instead, stolen Libyan weaponry will present a threat for years to come. Those limitations on the use of American power also shook NATO. NATO is an alliance always led by the United States, which is why its commander is always an American. When the United States backs away from leadership (the phrase “leading from behind” became famous during the Libya conflict), our allies question our broader commitment to NATO. They wonder how we will approach the next crisis and whether we will lead “from behind” or indeed not at all. These questions are asked not only by NATO allies but by others whose security is linked to our willingness to act. Arab interlocutors with whom I have spoken have said that the American approach in Libya shook their faith that we would ever protect them from Iran. (The Administration’s reaction to the Iranian terrorist plot that might have blown up a restaurant in downtown Washington will, of course, add to those doubts.) Then there was the Administration’s handling of the War Powers Act. Hostilities in Libya required a firm stand: was the act constitutional or did it too greatly limit presidential power? The Administration refused to protect presidential powers and instead presented the nonsensical argument that what we saw in Libya were not hostilities at all. Any administration would be claiming success for its policies after the demise of Gaddafi, but the Obama spokesmen appear to believe they have devised a brilliant formula here that eliminated all problems and achieved every goal at almost no cost. The record suggests that is wrong: it can be argued this excellent outcome might have been achieved with far less death and damage in Libya, and far less damage to the faith of friends and allies in our commitment to their security.    

In his Congressional testimony today, Secretary of Defense Gates overstepped his authority and undermined the president’s role as Commander in Chief. According to the New York Times, Gates first said “What the opposition needs as much as anything right now is some training, some command and control and some organization. It’s pretty much a pick-up ballgame at this point.” But, he continued, providing training and weapons is “not a unique capability for the United States, and as far as I’m concerned, somebody else can do that.” “As far as I am concerned” is an interesting phrase. Was the secretary speaking for himself, for the Pentagon, or for the president? What if the president determines later that the United States should in fact supply arms to the opposition? Why is Gates speaking out now to foreclose the president’s options? On March 3 he called discussions of a no-fly zone “loose talk,” but it seems that experience has made him more rather than less aggressive in ruling options in and out. Far worse was Gates’s answer when asked if there would be American “boots on the ground.” According to the Times Mr. Gates replied “Not as long as I’m in this job.” Who elected Bob Gates? That is a decision the president, or the president and Congress, should make. The secretary of defense has the obligation to give the president his unvarnished views—privately. It is wrong, and subversive of the president’s constitutional role, for the secretary of defense to threaten that he would resign if the president makes that decision. How else can one read Gates’s remark except as saying “I oppose this, and I won’t do it, and if the president orders me to do it I will quit.” Mr. Gates is a short-timer and apparently now feels free to escape White House discipline and substitute himself for the president. If that is his view he should resign his post now. The right answer--indeed the only acceptable answer--to the question about “boots on the ground” was “The president will make that decision.”

Libya's Foreign Minister Musa Kusa addresses the foreign press in Tripoli on March 7, 2011. (Chris Helgren/Courtesy Reuters) On March 30, Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa apparently defected. The UK Foreign Office statement on Musa Kusa is as follows: "We can confirm that Musa Kusa arrived at Farnborough Airport on 30 March from Tunisia. He travelled here under his own free will. He has told us that he is resigning his post. We are discussing this with him and we will release further detail in due course. “Musa Kusa is one of the most senior figures in Qadhafi’s government and his role was to represent the regime internationally--something that he is no longer willing to do. “We encourage those around Qadhafi to abandon him and embrace a better future for Libya that allows political transition and real reform that meets the aspirations of the Libyan people." Kusa was for fifteen years Libya’s spy master. I met him in London in 2004 as part of the negotiations over Qaddafi’s handover to the United States of his WMD programs. He was a handsome, well-dressed man who spoke perfect English, acquired as an undergraduate at Michigan State (Class of 1978). He was an easy and relaxed conversationalist—until one recalled that as Qaddafi’s intelligence chief, Kusa had plenty of blood to answer for. I wonder how the British will now treat the man probably responsible for the Lockerbie bombing, the act of terrorism that brought down Pan Am 103 in 1988. Libya has long claimed that Iran was responsible for this act of terror, and if Kusa can prove that he’ll be worth listening to. His defection is a serious blow to Qaddafi. This is the first loss of such a close comrade, and Kusa may well have a great deal of useful information about other potential defectors. In fact his ability to defect, to secure a plane and fly off to England under Qaddafi’s nose, suggests that the regime is falling apart despite its battlefield victories in the last two days. What to do with Kusa once the Qaddafi regime falls will be a difficult question for lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic, and he can expect endless law suits. But his departure tells us that the people closest to Qaddafi expect they now know how this story ends, and do not wish to be with the dictator when that end comes.

After a week of travel in the Middle East, I have returned to Washington and will be writing about what I saw and what is transpiring in the region. The first article is "Ridding Syria of a Despot" in the March 26tedition of the Washington Post. In this op-ed, I urge that we do all we can to help Syrians bring down the bloody Assad regime. Like the Gaddafi regime in Libya, the Assad regime has a special history with the United States. In the Gaddafi case, it is the terrorism that killed hundreds of Americans on Pan Am 103 and in the La Belle discotheque. In the Assad case, it is the regime’s enthusiastic assistance to jihadis from all over the world who wanted to reach Iraq to kill Americans. From Morocco or Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Libya, they converged on Damascus International Airport, from which they were carefully shepherded into Iraq to join the fight. We owe it to Syrians fighting for freedom, but far more we owe it to the many Americans and many more Iraqis killed with the help of the  Assad regime, to help bring an end to this vicious clan.

It is a serious problem for the United States when our top officials make categorical statements and then do nothing to enforce them. On February 28 the secretary of state said this about Libya: "Colonel Qadhafi and those around him must be held accountable for these acts, which violate international legal obligations and common decency. Through their actions, they have lost the legitimacy to govern. And the people of Libya have made themselves clear: It is time for Qadhafi to go – now, without further violence or delay." On March 3, the president added his own voice: "Going forward, we will continue to send a clear message: The violence must stop. Muammar Qaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead and he must leave. Those who perpetrate violence against the Libyan people will be held accountable. And the aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy and dignity must be met." These statements raise an interesting question about Qaddafi’s “loss” of legitimacy, to which both officials referred. When exactly did he have that legitimacy, and how did he earn it? He held power, but that is a different matter entirely. But the larger problem is that these statements by the president and secretary of state do not appear to animate U.S. policy. “Lots of people throw around the phrase of ‘no-fly zone,’ and they talk about it a though it’s just a game, a video game or something, and some people who throw that line out have no idea what they’re talking about,” said the new White House chief of staff, William Daley. Secretary of Defense Gates has come close to mocking those who would use military power, calling discussion of a no-fly zone “loose talk.” Considering that this “loose talk” came from among others Sen. John McCain, whose military experience is a bit more impressive than Gates’s or Daley’s, these comments were offensive: not an argument but a substitute for argument. Just where the administration now stands is, accordingly, unclear. The president has gone as far as he can go rhetorically, but apparently without any plan to turn his words into reality. That’s always a mistake for an American leader, and one that must give our allies around the world the shakes. It must also cause wonder among Americans, who are footing the bill for our military establishment. Total military spending for FY2011 was $739 billion, according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Total Libyan defense spending was somewhat lower. And some parts of the Libyan air force and air defense system are not operational, while others have now defected to the opposition to Qaddafi. It is very difficult to believe that enforcement of a no-fly zone is beyond the capacity of the U.S. military, or that it is a very hard project. Sen. John Kerry suggested that a one-time cratering of runways could make most of Libya’s remaining air force unable to take off. The president should decide these things before he speaks, not weeks after.

Rebel soldiers teach civilian volunteers at a school in Benghazi on March 2, 2011. (Suhaib Salem/Courtesy Reuters) "Give us the tools and we will finish the job," Winston Churchill said in a famous speech broadcast by the BBC in 1941. Yesterday, a leader of the opposition to the Qaddafi regime in Libya told the Washington Post that "providing military equipment" would help his forces. That seems obvious. There is now a war under way in Libya, between the Qaddafi regime and most of the population. The United States has very clearly said that Qaddafi must go, as has the so-called "international community." The problem is that Qaddafi does not agree, and he is making a fight of it. He is no doubt well aware that what awaits him if the regime falls is prosecution and perhaps execution, not some form of peaceful and wealthy exile. There is great reluctance to engage in any form of direct military intervention, and the reluctance is understandable--though I favor establishment of a no-fly zone. For one thing, direct intervention would rob the Libyan people of what the Egyptians and Tunisians have gained by removing dictatorial regimes without foreign intervention: a sense of  control of their nation’s destiny. But allowing Qaddafi to win this war, stay in power, and wreak vengeance against all his enemies is simply unacceptable, so it would be sensible to ask what might be done to help Libyans fight back. Sending them not only humanitarian materials--which is already being done, but should be increased--but also arms seems logical. Not troops, not American or other foreign "boots on the ground," but the tools they need to fight back against Qaddafi, his sons, and their well-equipped brigades. If even that is too much for the United States government to stomach, could we at least press the Saudis (who have long hated Qaddafi) or Egyptians or other Arabs to supply the anti-Qaddafi forces? The Obama administration has finally taken sides here, and the United States cannot now allow itself to be defeated by Qaddafi. Arranging directly or indirectly for the supply of some weapons to the opposition will not only provide it with critical practical assistance but also give it a huge morale boost. Such assistance would also help push more of the still-loyal Qaddafi supporters and more of those still sitting on the fence to break with him. Given the reports today of how resistant the Pentagon is to direct intervention, including a no-fly zone, perhaps the supply of arms would gather some support at DOD as a better alternative. The American position cannot, in any event, be strong rhetorical support for the opposition combined with absolute inaction. Our words must have meaning and must be the precursor to action.

Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi meets with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Tripoli on September 5, 2008. (Stringer(LIBYA)/Courtesy Reuters) In an article in the Wall Street Journal today, I discuss the bargain struck between the United States and Libya in December 2003. Under it, Qaddafi abandoned support for terrorism and handed over his nuclear, chemical, and missile programs. In return, the United States ended sanctions against Libya, exchanged ambassadors, and muted its opposition to his regime. How that bargain looks today is the subject of the piece.

China is sending a warship, among other planes and ships, to evacuate its citizens from Libya. According to the report, "The PLA Navy has just dispatched Xuzhou, a Type 054 Jiangkai-II class missile frigate, from the ongoing seventh PLAN anti-piracy task force deployment off Somalia to steam to Libyan coast to provide support and protection for the ongoing evacuation mission there." In recent days, the White House has been saying that the United States had to watch its words and actions because American citizens were at risk in Libya. So instead of acting, we are building a diplomatic coalition. China has taken a different tack: to use power. Instead of biting their tongue, the Chinese appear to be making it clear to the Qaddafi regime that no danger to Chinese workers will be tolerated. That’s the path the United States should follow as well. As I’ve said elsewhere, we should be making it clear to Qaddafi and his remaining henchmen that the safety of Americans in Libya is their safety; if Americans are attacked or held hostage, they will end up the way Saddam Hussein did. But the use of power will do more than ensure the safety of Americans; it will also help bring Libya’s civil war to a better end. Today there are no doubt many Libyan officials and military officers who are on the fence. They know that a victorious Qaddafi will take vengeance against those who opposed him, so they won’t jump until they are confident he will lose. American power can help them make that decision. We too should be moving ships and planes, and visibly taking the steps that show our own power. The message should be that we want Qaddafi to lose and will help ensure that he does. The sooner we do this, the fewer Libyans will lose their lives to Qaddafi’s murderous machine and the sooner the violence in Libya will end. It’s depressing that we need to take lessons from Beijing about how to be a world power, but perhaps this will persuade the White House that its reticence is counter-productive. To see what is right and not do it is want of courage, Confucius said. In this situation, with Americans at risk and thousands of Libyans dying, what’s right is a display and utilization of American power.