• Israel
    U.S.-Israel Relations
    Podcast
    CFR's James M. Lindsay and Robert Danin examine President Donald J. Trump's priorities on Israel.
  • Israel
    President Trump: Peace Processor
    President Donald Trump’s evolving views on Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appear to be coming into greater focus as he prepares to welcome Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the White House later this week. Over the past few months, Trump has expressed two broad sentiments seemingly in tension with one another. In his first interview after the November 2016 vote, then President-elect Trump reiterated a previously expressed desire to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calling it “the ultimate deal.” His desire to pursue such a deal has been matched, however, by a second strand of thinking, reflecting an admiration not only for Israel but also for its far-right settlers. The Israeli settlement movement opposes the idea of a Palestinian state and seeks Israel’s annexation of the entire West Bank. The president seemed to be reinforcing his earlier financial support for the settlement enterprise when he appointed staunch settler supporter and fundraiser, David Friedman, to become the next U.S. ambassador to Israel. Friedman immediately announced his intention to live in Jerusalem, not Tel Aviv, since, he suggested, President Trump would soon be recognizing the Holy City as Israel’s capital. For months, many Middle East observers have wondered how President Trump will reconcile these two strains in his thinking—the quest for the ultimate deal and his support for the settlers who claim all the land as their own. One indicator emerged over the weekend when Israel’s largest circulation Israeli daily newspaper, Israel Hayom, published an interview with President Trump. The president had dined at the White House the night before with the free tabloid’s pro-settlement founder and financier, Sheldon Adelson. In a seeming rebuke to his dinner guest of the night before, President Trump clearly stated his concerns about continued Israeli settlement activity and their potential to impinge upon peace-making: “The [settlements] don’t help the process, I can say that. There is so much land left. And every time you take land for settlements, there is less land left.” That could only have meant: land left for the Palestinians. But lest there remain any ambiguity, President Trump stated clearly: “I am not somebody that believes that going forward with these settlements is a good thing for peace.” At that moment, President Trump acknowledged not only the tension between continued settlement expansion and peace making efforts with the Palestinians, but his clear preference for peace-making. In doing so, Trump fell into line with 50 years of American thinking that has seen Israeli West Bank settlement expansion as unhelpful, at best. Lest the Israel Hayom interview be taken as a one-off, Netanyahu disclosed yesterday to his cabinet that two days after his inauguration, President Trump had privately informed the prime minister of his intention to pursue an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. Told by Netanyahu that the Palestinians are unwilling to make a deal, Trump’s response was, according to the Israeli leader: “They (the Palestinians) will want, they will make concessions.” Having been put on notice by Trump of his intention to pursue Israeli-Palestinian peace, Netanyahu told his cabinet: “we mustn’t get into a confrontation with him.” How President Trump intends to pursue peace and how he will succeed where his predecessors have all stumbled is yet to be determined. It seems that President Trump himself is not yet sure. He is taking a decidedly different approach in launching his efforts than that of his predecessor, President Barak Obama, who announced his intention of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with fanfare just two days after his inauguration. In contrast, President Trump is gradually revealing his intentions while consulting in an uncharacteristically low-key fashion with regional partners. Yet Donald Trump, in one stark and unmistakable way, is no different than the eight presidents that preceded him: He is clearly and unambiguously a peace-processor.
  • Israel
    President Trump’s Settlement Policy Breaks Ground
    For the first dozen days of the Trump administration, it seemed to Israelis that they had a free hand to settle the West Bank. Israel announced its intention to build thousands of new houses, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood before the Knesset and declared that Israel would establish its first new settlement in decades. Washington said nothing. Then, last Thursday night, the White House press secretary issued a statement that caught many in Washington—and Israel—off guard. The statement proclaimed 50 years of American continuity in seeking Israeli-Palestinian peace. It also reiterated President Trump’s personal desire to “achieve peace throughout the Middle East region”—another way of saying a comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement. But the statement also included two sentences that Israelis have been parsing ever since.   While we don’t believe the existence of settlements is an impediment to peace, the construction of new settlements or the expansion of existing settlements beyond their current borders may not be helpful in achieving that goal...The Trump administration has not taken an official position on settlement activity and looks forward to continuing discussions, including with Prime Minister Netanyahu when he visits with President Trump later this month.   Not surprisingly, Israelis are in sharp disagreement over the meaning of these words. Writing in the mainstream Yedioth Ahronoth, Alex Fishman and Orly Azulai stated, “The White House issued a message that new settlements are an obstacle to peace.” In contrast, Ariel Kahane, proclaimed on the pro-settler Israeli website NRG.co.il, “No matter which way you look at it, the White House’s statement about Israeli settlement in Judea and Samaria is wonderful news.” No wonder Israelis are confused; packed into those two sentences are a number of messages. First, the Trump administration’s statement represents a dramatically divergence on settlements philosophically from the Obama administration. The Obama administration clearly saw settlement activity as a primary reason for their failed peacemaking efforts, with Secretary of State John Kerry repeatedly declaring settlements “illegitimate” and, at least tacitly, illegal. The Trump administration is registering a strong disagreement in principle: analytically, existing Israeli settlements in the West Bank are not an impediment to peace. At the same time, the statement declares the White House philosophically uncommitted on the issue of future settlement activity, and called this an issue for future discussions with the Israeli government. Against this philosophical framework, the new White House at the same time drew a gentle yet unambiguous red line around certain Israeli settlement activities in practice, specifically against new settlements and the expansion of existing settlements “beyond their current borders.” Settlement activity, per se, is not necessarily a problem for President Trump. However expanding settlements territorially—i.e. building on more West Bank land—is not acceptable. This is a repackaging and reaffirmation of the settlement policy adopted by President George W. Bush that essentially said settlement activities are acceptable if they do not go beyond the building lines of existing settlements. That approach sought to neutralize any adverse impact of what Israelis call “natural growth”—expansion of the population among the more than half-million Israelis considered settlers by the international community. At the same time, putting in place a territorial limitation leaves open the potential for a viable, contiguous, and sovereign Palestinian state—something opposed by the ideological hard-right in Israel. Last Thursday’s statement is a huge disappointment to those Israelis who had believed they had a tacit green light from the Trump administration to settle anywhere in the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. The United States has now clearly set some limits. Yet for Benjamin Netanyahu, the Trump statement has evident benefits. It is a setback to the prime minister’s right-wing challengers in his party and in his cabinet who have been calling on the prime minister to devote more resources to the settlements. Netanyahu can now say that with its recent spate of building announcements, Israel has tested the limits of the Trump administration and that to go further would be harmful. But the statement was also a clear message to Netanyahu: President Trump plans to pursue an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and he expects a constructive discussion about settlements when the two leaders meet in Washington next week.
  • Israel
    Moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem Is a Bad Idea for Everyone—Except Israeli Hard-Liners and Their American Friends
    Moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem is supposed to show American resolve. It will only sow chaos.
  • United States
    Paved with Good Intentions? France’s Middle East Peace Conference
    The Madrid peace conference in 1991 to launch comprehensive Arab-Israeli negotiations was a diplomatic triumph. The 2007 Annapolis conference relaunched peace-making and a new, well-prepared three track security, economic, and political process on pre-negotiated terms of reference just a few years after the violent second Intifada. These were important moments—historically, and diplomatically. Despite best intentions, the 2017 Paris peace conference was neither historic nor constructive. The meeting was both poorly timed and ill-prepared, such that the two main parties—the Israelis and Palestinians—stayed away. Even Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was otherwise occupied. The absence of the two main protagonists to the conflict was the least of it. The meeting simply underlined outdated thinking that, left uncorrected, will harm future international diplomatic efforts to deliver peace to the Holy Land. In an article penned several days ago for the Israeli daily Haaretz, French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault laid out several core reasons for the conference: Ayrault argued that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, left unattended, will “continue to fuel frustration and will ultimately only worsen the vicious cycle of radicalization and violence. It will continue to give budding terrorists excuses for enlisting.” The dubious implication is that heinous and deadly terrorist attacks and violence unleashed recently in Cairo, Baghdad, and Istanbul—not to mention Damascus, Aleppo, and Raqaa—were the product of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Further justifying the conference he wrote, “I have a very strong conviction…that only a two-state solution will in time bring stability to the region and enable Israel to live in security.” This statement is rooted in thinking from an era, long passed, when the Israeli-Arab conflict was the primary source of regional instability. Moreover, it implies, that former colonial powers such as France know better than Middle Easterners themselves what is in their best interests. This sheer arrogance was remarkably explicit in the conference final communique yesterday in which the participants expressed their expectation of how the democratically elected Israeli and Palestinian governments should relate to their own government’s officials: The conference “participants expect (emphasis added) both sides to restate their commitment to the two-state solution, and to disavow official voices on their side that reject this solution.” Israeli and Palestinian leaders were explicitly called upon yesterday to disavow their own officials whose policy preferences are deemed disagreeable to the Paris conferees. This type of call to intervene in the domestic politics of a democratically elected government is what led British Prime Minister Theresa May to chastise Secretary of State Kerry’s valedictory peace speech several weeks’ ago. It may even explain, at least in part, why the British government limited its representation at the Paris conference to that of observer. Saving Israelis and Palestinians from their leaders is clearly what France had in mind for their conference. As French minister Ayrault put it, “promises of peace from both sides have disappeared and have been replaced by mistrust, resignation, and even false hope that the current situation can go on indefinitely. Saving the two state solution and safeguarding a future of peace and prosperity for peoples in the region is why the international community has decided to take action with the impetus of France.” But experience demonstrates that Western appeals to Middle Eastern peoples over the heads of their governments doesn’t work. President Obama delivered a pitch-perfect speech in Jerusalem to Israelis in 2013 on the virtues of peace that had no discernible effect. Secretary of State John Kerry lectured Israelis and Palestinians about the need to take immediate action for four years—all with no result. Why Ayrault believes Israelis and Palestinians would want to listen to the French government, rather than their own leaders, is unclear. It is tempting to dismiss the Paris meeting as simply a harmless, yet heroic, effort to advance the noble cause of Middle East peace. But does it make sense for significant amounts of taxpayer euros and dollars to be devoted to a pointless conference when Europe and the Middle East are host to the world’s largest refugee crisis since World War II? Against the backdrop of over a million recently displaced Middle Easterners, not a single Palestinian or Israeli life was enhanced by yesterday’s conference. Nor was the cause of Palestine, Israel, or peace between them, in any way advanced. The Paris conference squandered another precious and vital asset to the peaceful conduct of nations: diplomatic capital. Each time world leaders stand before microphones and espouse the need for Middle East peace without actually doing anything about it, the more they debase the currency of diplomacy, and the more they undermine the faith among Israelis and Palestinians that statecraft—appropriately prepared and pursued—can ever help the cause of peace. Trust among Israelis and Palestinians in the possibility of peace is further eroded by ill-timed and ill-conceived diplomatic efforts that seem more designed to express international moral outrage than to produce actual results. International meetings to help Israelis and Palestinians prepare conditions for peace can be constructive. But to be helpful, they must be pursued in ways that are considered legitimate to both parties to the conflict under dispute. A basic prerequisite for all diplomatic efforts—one that French, American and other diplomats have refused to accept recently—is that the views and positions of the protagonists to the conflict need to be taken into account for progress to be made. If would-be peace-makers conclude that the parties themselves are not prepared to offer such views, or make necessary concessions, then diplomatic assets should not be wasted for a certain bad outcome. Better to focus instead on the tedious and unglamorous type of spadework that seeks to prepare the ground for a time when high-level conferences can actually help. This type of daily diplomacy never makes it into the headlines, but it is far more critical right now to explore what limited steps might be possible to help prepare conditions for a time when the parties are actually ready and empowered to negotiate in earnest. It’s not hard to see that neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli governments right now are positioned to move forward toward the two-state peace that the conveners of yesterday’s meeting seek. If nothing else, the peripatetic efforts of outgoing Secretary of State John Kerry have provided a real-world experiment that tested the hypothesis that international goodwill and hard work can prevail upon the Israelis and Palestinians to make concession that they are not prepared to make. This reality makes Paris’ call for a return to negotiations right now not only pointless, but misguided. It is not the message that international leaders should be sending to a new American president who takes office later this week.
  • Israel
    The Paris Peace Conference
      Once upon a time, the term “Paris Peace Conference” was a serious one, and referred to the historic Versailles Conference that ended World War I. That conference began on January 18, 1919, and it is striking that the French would wish to make a mockery of their own history by convening a useless conference on almost exactly the same date—today, January 15. Today nearly 70 countries, and nearly 40 foreign ministers including the one from the United States, are gathering in Paris. Why? Well, why not—from the point of view of the foreign ministers. You do have to sit through an entire day of boring speeches, of course, but then you get the whole weekend in Paris. I’ll bet most arrived Friday for a good dinner, then you have Saturday free for shopping, then another dinner….who would say no merely because the event will be useless or harmful to the cause of peace? For John Kerry this is his swan song, and he is fresh from Vietnam where he walked down memory lane yet again, at God knows what cost to American taxpayers. But thinking of Kerry should lead us to recall who will be engaged in this event. There is Kerry, who will be unemployed in five days. There is French President Francois Hollande, who has announced he won’t even run for re-election in May. There is Palestinian President Abbas, elected in 2005 for a four year term and now entering his 12th year. And Abbas won’t actually be at the conference, just nearby in some gorgeous hotel suite. Israel is boycotting the conference. No one will represent the new American administration. What is the point of this endeavor? According to the French, it is to show support for the two-state solution and urge both parties, meaning Israel and the PLO, to negotiate. That is a demonstration of bias, because it is the PLO not Israel that has been refusing negotiations and rejecting peace plans again and again for years—indeed decades. To treat the government of Israel and the PLO as if their desire for peace were identical is wrong and unfair. If the participants at the conference truly wished to advance peace, they would be pressuring the Palestinians to stop rewarding and inciting terrorism by glorifying terrorists, and pressuring them to start negotiating seriously. This will not happen. There is every reason to believe Mr. Abbas will leave Paris satisfied with the circus and feeling zero real pressure to do anything at all. The other point, perhaps the real point, of the conference is to pressure Israel to stop all settlement growth. In this sense it is a follow-up to UN Security Council resolution 2334 of December, and shares its conclusion that the real barrier to peace is the increasingly rapid, uncontrollable, endless, limitless growth of Israeli settlements. But this is false, as the statistics show. Settlement populations are growing, at about four percent a year, but the notion that they are rapidly gobbling up the West Bank and making peace impossible is a fiction. There may be a third objective for the conference: pressing President-Elect Trump not to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. We can expect language about leaving Jerusalem as a final status issue and doing nothing at all that changes the status quo. If you believe the President-Elect will be dissuaded by such a declaration from a conference such as this, well, I don’t agree. So the conference will soon be nearly forgotten, and go down as yet another feeble effort to undermine Israel’s legitimacy. Of course if you ask the French, they will angrily deny that this was their purpose. I agree that it was not the purpose, but it is the effect, predictably. Like Resolution 2334, it is another diplomatic blow against the Jewish State, trying to isolate it and criticize it and undermine its ideological and diplomatic defenses. And meanwhile, this very month, we will see the PLO pay more money to prisoners convicted of terrorist acts and name more schools or parks or squares after murderers and would-be murderers. But there will be no Paris conference about all of that.  
  • Israel
    What Happens When UN Security Council Resolutions are Ignored?
    What happens when UN Security Council resolutions are ignored? That depends, really—on whether you are any of 192 other members of the United Nations, or are Israel. Defenders of Israel often claim that it is treated differently by the United Nations from any other nation. That claim is accurate, and a brief look at Lebanon offers some proof. It continues to violate Security Council resolutions, year after year—but no one complains, and no one ever argues that Lebanon must be punished with boycotts or prosecutions for doing so. In fact they are often congratulated for their defiance. The United Nations Security Council has been saying for decades that the Government of Lebanon must exercise control of its territory. Resolution 1559 of 2004 “Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” and “Supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory.” By “Lebanese militias” the UN was referring to Hezbollah, but dared not speak its name. In any event, the Government of Lebanon did not comply. Resolution 1583 was adopted unanimously in 2005 and in it the Security Council   Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries and under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon;   Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to fully extend and exercise its sole and effective authority throughout the south, including through the deployment of sufficient numbers of Lebanese armed and security forces, to ensure a calm environment throughout the area, including along the Blue Line, and to exert control over the use of force on its territory and from it….   As the French ambassador said about that resolution when it was adopted, “in keeping with the present demands of the United Nations, Lebanon must extend its authority throughout the south, in particular, by expanding and deploying its forces and by disarming the militias.” But the Government of Lebanon did not comply. Resolution 1701 of 2006, adopted to end the war between Israel and Hezbollah,   Welcomes the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon…to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon….   Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory…for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon.... Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel….   But the Government of Lebanon paid no attention, or more accurately was unwilling to comply because it was afraid. In the last week of December, 2016, Lebanon got a new government under Prime Minister Saad Hariri, and as is customary the new Cabinet issued a “Ministerial Statement” outlining its plans. Those plans openly defied the Security Council’s many resolutions on Lebanon and bowed to Hezbollah pressure. Here are the relevant lines:   In our conflict with the Israeli enemy, we will spare no effort or resistance in order to liberate the remaining occupied Lebanese territory, and to protect our homeland from an enemy who still covets our land, our water and our resources….The Government affirms the right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation, repel the Israeli aggressions and recapture the occupied territories.   Note that it does not say the government of Lebanon has the right to resistance, or the state, or the Army, which would at least have endorsed the authority of the state in principle. The actual language legitimizes Hezbollah as a state within a state and legitimizes its military operations outside the control of the state. It was approved because Hezbollah demanded this, and the opposing forces (who got no visible Western support) were too weak to prevent it. So Lebanon is in violation of Security Council resolutions, and deliberately so. There was plenty of discussion about this issue--what exactly would the Ministerial Statement say about Hezbollah and its "right" to arms--and some key figures resisted the language Hezbollah wanted. But Hezbollah got its way (on this and several other key issues). What was the U.S. reaction? Here it is, from the White House:   The United States congratulates Prime Minister Hariri on the Lebanese parliament’s approval of his cabinet on December 28….The United States stands steadfast in its support for a strong, stable, prosperous, and sovereign Lebanon as the new government works to strengthen state institutions, prepare for timely national elections, and uphold and implement Lebanon’s international commitments.   But of course the Lebanese government had just announced, very clearly, that it was NOT going to “uphold and implement Lebanon’s international commitments.” Now, some critics will say this is not comparable to the situation in Israel and the new Resolution 2334 on Israeli settlements, because the Netanyahu government has the power to act to freeze settlements. Why does it not do so? Ah, well, it’s a coalition government and some members of the coalition would oppose a freeze; indeed they would leave the coalition over this and the government might well collapse. But that’s pretty much the situation in Lebanon. “Hariri cabinet capitulates to Hezbollah demand” was the headline in Gulf News. Had Hariri not agreed, he’d never have become prime minister or his new government would have collapsed. Of course the two situations are not comparable-- not when you consider that Hezbollah is a murderous terrorist group that kills people every day, and was likely involved in killing Saad Hariri’s father Rafik in 2005. As the New York Times reported in 2015 about Rafik Hariri’s murder by car bomb and the UN tribunal investigating that event, “the tribunal is producing overwhelming, albeit circumstantial, evidence that Hezbollah murdered the most important politician Lebanon had ever produced, and indiscriminately slaughtered many others in the process.” So one can sympathize with Saad Hariri and other Lebanese politicians when they bow to Hezbollah. The people who might leave Netanyahu’s cabinet will go home, not pick up machine guns and plant car bombs. But the fact remains that Lebanon is defying the Security Council very clearly and very deliberately, and no one says a word about it (except to applaud). No one is threatening a boycott of Lebanese goods until it complies. No one is suggesting that Lebanese politicians are violating international law by their complicity with and now official defense of Hezbollah. And actually, some pressure from the West might be useful in empowering and emboldening Lebanese politicians who are trying to resist Hezbollah, and risking their lives by doing so. But that’s not the point here. The point is that plenty of countries defy the UN but in very, very few cases is this even noticed, and in fewer still is anyone punished. Israel remains a special case, whose maltreatment in the UN is a disgrace—and one that, until the Obama administration decided to allow Resolution 2334 to pass, the United States fought and prevented in the Security Council. It may be a vain hope that the UN will depart from past practices and stop persecuting Israel, but it seems very likely that under the Trump administration the United States will return to past practices and defend Israel again. That would be a good start for 2017.  
  • Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
    The Misplaced Optimism of the Two-State Solution
    Although Secretary of State John Kerry billed his speech on the Palestinian-Israeli peace process as a last-ditch effort to save the two-state solution, he actually outlined precisely why such an outcome is entirely unlikely.
  • United States
    Secretary Kerry’s Vision-Seeking Israeli-Palestinian Speech
    Secretary of State John Kerry just delivered the speech he’s been eager to give for several years. Following the abrupt failure of his ambitious all-or-nothing peace initiative in April 2014, Kerry and some of his aides have suggested that their efforts had actually broken important diplomatic ground, and that they had produced new innovative formulas for a conflict-ending comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. The secretary apparently wanted to share these ideas, if for no other reason than to document publicly the seriousness of his efforts and as one final plea over the urgency of solving a problem he is convinced will soon become insoluble due to dynamic changes on the ground—namely Israeli settlement activity. President Obama, Kerry’s boss, has not been convinced that the United States should play one of its last remaining diplomatic cards by laying out a detailed vision of comprehensive peace in the waning days of his administration. Obama himself had tried it in May 2011 when, after considerable internal squabbling, he laid out his own partial vision of a solution of Middle East peace in two precisely crafted speeches—one at the State Department and a second one before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Rather than break the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, however, Obama’s 2011 speeches were marked by an absence of follow-up diplomacy. American peacemaking efforts went into hibernation until John Kerry returned to them almost two years later upon becoming secretary of state. No doubt, the impending inauguration of Donald Trump helped convince Obama to let Kerry make today’s speech, if only for legacy purposes. Trump, who previously donated money to a West Bank settlement in honor of his recently named ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, clearly shares few if any of the assumptions on which American peacemaking diplomacy has been conducted over the past eight years. Obama probably surmised that even if it does not advance the cause of peace, at least Kerry’s remarks could help contain the uproar unleashed by the United States’ abstention from last week’s Security Council Resolution 2334, which is strongly critical of Israel. And today, Kerry clearly sought to explain and justify the administration’s thinking in not vetoing the resolution. Yet that today John Kerry, rather than the president himself, went before the cameras suggests that Obama either remains ambivalent over the utility of laying out a comprehensive American vision or doesn’t really see there being much more left to say. Instead, as with Kerry’s peripatetic Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, Obama appeared willing to let his lead diplomat once again scratch a longstanding itch and devote time and effort to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Kerry has already made many remarks on the need for Israelis and Palestinians to make peace, including some delivered just several weeks ago. So why not one more? After listening to Kerry’s speech, the president must feel that his disinclination to give his own speech was correct. For what was striking about Kerry’s 75-minute long address was not what was new, but rather how little new there really was for him to say. Just about everything Kerry said today he has said in one form or another previously in multiple speeches as secretary of state. Kerry has long warned of the danger that settlements pose to a two-state solution, cautioned that time is running out for such a solution to be viable, noted the dangers of a one-state reality in the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, and stressed the need for Israel to chose soon if it wants to be both a Jewish and democratic state. Perhaps even more striking is that despite the lengthiness of the speech, it failed to deliver on the one thing it had promised: New American parameters for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead, Kerry offered up a set of “principles” for the basis of a peace settlement. Kerry did not go further than his boss had done in May 2011. And the ideas that Secretary Kerry offered were remarkably similar to those offered up by President Clinton at the end of his presidency in January 2001. Also missing was any sense of how the principles he articulated can or should be realized. What Kerry seemed to be calling for was something he has been calling for four years: Israeli and Palestinian leaders to become reasonable and prioritize peacemaking in the way Secretary of State Kerry does. Completely absent was a new path to get there, other than through face-to-face negotiations. Inherent in Secretary Kerry’s speech was a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the premise of the speech was that a two-state solution is just about unrealizable, owing largely to continued Israeli settlement activity. At the same time, the purpose Kerry gave for delivering the speech was that some future American peacemakers can pick up and build upon on the principles articulated by Kerry. Presumably Kerry doesn’t expect that President-elect Donald Trump will do so. So then how could a two-state solution along the lines Kerry articulated be viable sometime down the line if time is just about to run out on such an outcome? For years, American leaders have said that the United States cannot want peace more than the parties themselves. While Kerry himself has parroted that line, there is no evidence that the secretary of state actually believes it. Instead, he appears to be driven by a belief that American wisdom and willpower can still prevail over the absence of Israeli and Palestinian urgency. That passionate sense was palpable again today. Absent was a compelling explanation as to why he seems more determined and urgent to make fateful choices for peace right now than Israelis and Palestinians are themselves.
  • Middle East and North Africa
    The United Nations Resolution on Israel
    Since the adoption last week the Security Council resolution on Israel, I’ve had my say in The Weekly Standard and The Washington Post condemning the Obama administration’s decision to allow the resolution to pass. The resolution rewards the PLO for refusing to negotiate and adopts its tactic of replacing serious, face-to-face negotiations with useless dramas in New York. It is a danger to Israel. And by refusing to veto, the Obama administration abandoned the usual American practice of defending Israel from what Jeane Kirkpatrick called "the jackals" at the United Nations. Over this past weekend, administration spokesmen have tried to defend this abandonment of Israel in truly Orwellian terms, inverting the meaning of their action. This was done to help Israel, you see, and to defend it; we know better where its interests lie than does its elected government (and main opposition parties); we abandoned Israel because we are its friend. These were main themes of the President’s aide Ben Rhodes when he spoke to reporters Friday, and among other things said the following, describing:   a resolution that expresses the consensus international view on Israeli settlement activity....this is consistent with longstanding bipartisan U.S. policy as it relates to settlements....one of our grave concerns is that the continued pace of settlement activity -- which has accelerated in recent years, which has accelerated significantly since 2011....   let’s be clear here: We exhausted every effort to pursue a two-state solution through negotiations, through direct discussions, through proximity discussions, through confidence-building measures, through a lengthy and exhaustive effort undertaken by Secretary Kerry earlier in the President’s second term. We gave every effort that we could to supporting the parties coming to the table. So within the absence of any meaningful peace process, as well as in the face of accelerated settlement activity that put at risk the viability of a two-state solution, that we took the decision that we did today to abstain on this resolution.... where is the evidence that not doing this is slowing the settlement construction?   If you enjoyed the children’s exercise where the child is asked to find all the things wrong in a picture--signs upside down, dogs with horns, etc--you will enjoy pondering Mr. Rhodes’s misleading narrative. Yes, the resolution "expresses the consensus international view on Israeli settlement activity," which calls them illegal, and that is the point: until the Obama administration, the United States’s position was that they were unhelpful but not illegal. Therefore the resolution is not "consistent with longstanding bipartisan U.S. policy." As to the pace of settlement activity, Mr. Rhodes is simply wrong. I’ve reviewed the statistics here, in Foreign Policy. There, Uri Sadot and I concluded that   A careful look into the numbers shows that neither the population balance between Jews and Palestinians, nor the options for partition in the West Bank have materially changed....Israeli population in the settlements is growing, but at a rate that reflects mostly births in families already there, and not in-migration of new settlers.   In fact settlement growth has not "accelerated significantly" since 2011, whatever Mr. Rhodes says. His most disingenuous remark is about the failure of negotiations. Indeed the Obama/Kerry efforts failed, because the Palestinians refused to come to the table even when Israel undertook a ten-month construction freeze. One of Mr. Obama’s officials, Martin Indyk, said this in 2014 about those negotiations:   "Netanyahu moved to the zone of possible agreement. I saw him sweating bullets to find a way to reach an agreement," said Indyk. Abbas, for his part, did not show flexibility, Indyk added. "We tried to get Abu Mazen to the zone of possible agreement but we were surprised to learn he had shut down."   So what is to be done when the Palestinians refuse to negotiate? Punish Israel. Join the jackals in Turtle Bay. Adopt the PLO view that action in the United Nations will replace face-to-face talks. That was Mr. Obama’s decision. Mr. Rhodes’s twisted formulation "where is the evidence that not doing this is slowing the settlement construction?" is a kind of epitaph for Obama policy. He explained: "we have a body of evidence to assess how this Israeli government has responded to us not taking this kind of action, and that suggests that they will continue to accelerate the type of settlement construction that puts a two-state solution at risk." Settlements expand if we veto resolutions, he is saying, so we have decided not to veto resolutions. This is precisely wrong, a true inversion of the truth. The Obama account of settlement expansion is invented and avoids the facts to build a case against Israel. Netanyahu is not popular among settlers exactly because he has restrained settlement growth and as noted adopted a ten-month freeze. In 2009 Hillary Clinton said "What the prime minister has offered in specifics on restraints on a policy of settlements ... is unprecedented." What has been the Obama reaction to his restraint, to his freeze, to the PLO refusal to negotiate? The reaction has been to blame Israel and assault Netanyahu year after year, including with childish epithets. And this attitude culminated finally in the abandonment of Israel at the United Nations. Supporters of strong Israel-American relations can only be glad that the 22nd Amendment limits presidents to two terms in the White House.
  • Israel
    Netanyahu, Sisi, Obama and the United Nations Resolution on Israeli Settlements
    The United Nations Security Council was scheduled to vote today (Thursday, December 22) on an Egyptian-sponsored resolution on Israeli settlement activity. Egypt, the Arab representative on the Security Council right now, pulled the resolution this morning, so there will be no vote. There are several mysteries here, including why Egypt did that, and how President Obama planned to vote: yes, abstain, or veto. First, it’s important to realize just how bad the resolution was. Here’s part: The Security Council--   ■ "Reaffirms that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-state solution."   ■ "Reiterates its demand that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem." ■ "Calls upon all States, to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967."   Why is this so bad? The first paragraph above calls all settlement activity illegal under international law. That could have an impact in Europe and elsewhere in how Israeli settlers and officials are treated. Are they all criminals? Can they be brought before the International Criminal Court? Prosecuted in local courts? The second paragraph refers to East Jerusalem, and suggests that all Israeli housing construction must stop--even including construction in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. That’s madness. The third paragraph above, treating everything beyond the old "Green Line" or 1949 armistice line as illegal and demanding that all states do so, begs for boycotts. It logically means that any product from East Jerusalem, the Golan, or the West Bank be boycotted and prevented from being sold. So it would be a terrible, unfair, unbalanced resolution and one with the potential to damage Israel. That’s one reason an American veto should have been automatic--but it wasn’t. The Obama administration refused to say whether it would veto, and I’ve been told by some well-informed journalists that it would not have vetoed. This would have been Mr. Obama’s parting shot after eight years of tension with Israel. Refusal to veto would also have violated decades of American policy that calls for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as the only way forward to peace. The President-Elect recognized this, and Mr. Trump said   The resolution being considered at the United Nations Security Council regarding Israel should be vetoed. As the United States has long maintained, peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians will only come through direct negotiations between the parties and not through the imposition of terms by the United Nations. This puts Israel in a very poor negotiating position and is extremely unfair to all Israelis.   I had actually thought Mr. Obama would veto, because a refusal to do so would certainly do damage to his party--a party that has suffered electoral defeats at the congressional and state level throughout his presidency. But if the information I received was right, he was more interested in departing with another smack at Israel. The remaining question is why President Sisi withdrew the resolution. Press reports all say it was Israeli pressure, which is a negative way of saying he did so because he values Egyptian-Israeli bilateral relations and was asked to pull the resolution by Prime Minister Netanyahu. That’s a good thing; the United States should itself value cooperative Israeli-Egyptian relations. Others have suggested that Sisi wanted to avoid a confrontation with the incoming Trump administration, which was clearly against this text. That’s also a good thing. But note this: none of the news stories suggest the Egyptians acted because of the Obama administration. Just as with the Russian-Turkish-Iranian meeting to discuss Syria (The New York Times’s story began "Russia, Iran, and Turkey met in Moscow on Tuesday to work toward a political accord to end Syria’s nearly six-year war, leaving the United States on the sidelines...."), the Obama administration apparently played no role in Egypt’s decisions. In large part this is because the Obama administration has left friends confused as its objectives and foes without fear of consequences for opposing the United States. Defenders of the administration will say it’s just lame duck status that explains the lack of concern for the wishes of the White House, but I can’t agree. At the very end of the George W. Bush administration, there was a vigorous negotiation in the Security Council over a resolution on the fighting in Gaza, and the United States was at the center of it--right up into January, 2009. Now it’s December, 2016 and we are being ignored. That’s the result of eight years of policy choices, not lame duck status.    
  • United States
    The Next Ambassador to Israel
    President-Elect Trump’s choice of David M. Friedman as his ambassador to Israel has occasioned both appropriate news coverage, and a barrage of nasty, ignorant, politically biased comments. Most of those comments (including the poison-pen editorial in The New York Times) have informed readers that Mr. Friedman is unfit for this post because he is a "bankruptcy lawyer" lacking diplomatic experience. I was previously unaware that being a "bankruptcy lawyer" was equivalent to a crime of moral turpitude, but that is in any event an odd description of Mr. Friedman. In fact he is one of the top lawyers in that field in the United States, year after year being so listed in articles about the very best American lawyers. The New York Times tells us that he has since 1994 been a partner at a firm called Kasowitz, Benson, Torres, & Friedman, but does not bother to tell readers that he is in fact the Friedman of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres, & Friedman--a firm whose name was changed when he joined it, and which he has helped build to about 350 lawyers in seven cities. He is also a self-made man, the son of an Orthodox rabbi who came to the practice of law without the benefit of wealth or fancy connections. To the Times all that is irrelevant; presumably they would prefer a fellow at a white-shoe Wall Street firm whose father or grandfather had been a diplomat, who belonged to the right clubs, and who rather than soil himself with the actual practice of law opens doors and makes connections. But I doubt most Americans take that view, and Mr. Trump did not. I’ve met Mr. Friedman once; we connected because I have a son who works in the Kasowitz firm. What do you learn from one meeting? Only that you’re dealing with one smart cookie, and that his involvement with Israeli affairs for decades has given him a far better insight than the average diplomat. Of course that Mr. Friedman is a "bankruptcy lawyer" is not his only, nor his primary, disqualification in the eyes of the Left. You may be sure that if he were a lawyer handling traffic violations but belonged to J Street, they would all be applauding. Their real problem is that Mr. Friedman’s views are anathema to them. He thinks J Street is actually an anti-Israel rather than a pro-peace organization, that settlements are not an obstacle to peace, and other terrible things. He even thinks the U.S. embassy should be moved to Jerusalem. That these views are apparently shared by the President-Elect and will be American policy is of course what really troubles the Times and others, and they label all these "extremist views" and call Mr. Friedman "dangerous." It is also objected that Mr. Friedman’s views are not those of all Israelis, because he is a man of the Right. Of course, the Times and the Left never object when the United States sends an envoy who is on the Left; that’s considered being a good diplomat. In the George W. Bush years, Prime Minister Sharon complained repeatedly about the leftist leanings of the American envoy, and in other decades it was pretty obvious that Washington and the U.S. ambassador favored the Labor Party and were even working to drive out a Likud prime minister. I cannot recall complaints in The New York Times.  I do not share all of Mr. Friedman’s views, but I am delighted that the United States will soon have an envoy who can do what the Israeli ambassador in Washington can do: call home and speak to the top guy. I’m very pleased that we’ll have an ambassador who has known the country to which he is accredited for decades and won’t need briefing books to learn its geography. I think it’s great that we’ll have someone deeply committed to Israel’s security (consider this story, told by a friend of his: "he decided to buy a home in Jerusalem on the day in 2002 that a Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up at Café Moment, a popular bar in the city, killing 11 Israelis.") and to its well-being (he organized a fund that built a village in the Negev for disabled Jewish and Bedouin kids). Traditional diplomat? Not at all. On the right? For sure. And, brilliant lawyer and deeply committed Zionist. He will have to forge new relationships with Israeli Arabs and Israeli leftists, figure out how to interact with the State Department and other parts of the United States Government, and learn more about Israel’s relations with Russia, and with Egypt and Jordan. So would any new envoy. But they would not come to the position with the knowledge and commitment or the sheer intellectual power that Friedman brings, nor would they have the total confidence of the President of the United States. The coming years could bring more tumult in Arab lands, attacks on Israel by ISIS or Hezbollah, a succession crisis in Ramallah, or even a new Israeli prime minister. Israel and the United States are very much better off when the American ambassador can do far more than deliver messages from Washington, and can instead bring to the U.S. Government and right to the Oval Office his considered analyses of the worst problems-- and the best solutions.
  • Israel
    The United Nations General Assembly, the Golan, and Theater of the Absurd
    This past week the United Nations General Assembly commemorated once again the "International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People" and took the occasion to pass six anti-Israel resolutions. Ranging from the despicable to the absurd, these resolutions of course have nothing to do with reality in the Middle East, nor do they bring peace one minute closer. Let’s take a look at one--the resolution entitled "The Syrian Golan." This resolution (formally known as Agenda item 34 or document A/71/L.8) had many cosponsors. They included, and I quote, such world leaders as "Bolivia (Plurinational State of)" and "Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)," plus Zimbabwe, Comoros, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and of course a bunch of Arab states. The heart of the resolution is this: The General Assembly   Determines once more that the continued occupation of the Syrian Golan and its de facto annexation constitute a stumbling block in the way of achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region...   Demands once more that Israel withdraw from all the occupied Syrian Golan to the line of 4 June 1967 in implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions;   What precisely would happen were Israel tomorrow morning to withdraw from what the UN calls "the Syrian Golan?" Would Islamic State try to overrun it and slaughter Druze living there? Would Iranian-backed militias take part of it? More likely, would the butcher Bashar al-Assad’s Iranian-backed army try to seize it? Or, most likely of all, would Hezbollah forces seize it? How would that affect the people living there? Or the people living in northern Israel? Or the people living across the border from the Golan in Jordan? It seems that neither "Bolivia (Plurinational State of)" nor "Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)" cares much. But who voted against this mindless resolution? According to the UN, there was "a recorded vote of 103 in favour to 6 against (Canada, Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau, United States), with 56 abstentions." Amazing, isn’t it? The United States and Canada joined Israel--and got the support of three tiny Pacific island nations. That means the nations of the EU abstained; not one single European country could bring itself to acknowledge the truth about this resolution. The UN press release notes this, though:   The representative of Syria thanked Member States that had voted in favour of the resolutions....the favourable vote sent a clear message to Israel that its killing, settlement expansion and forcible annexation of land ran counter to international principles.   It’s hard to think of a better example of why the United Nations has become the theater of the absurd. The representative of a regime that rules perhaps ten percent of Syria and has murdered half a million of its own people, including with poison gas, condemns Israel for its "killing." The General Assembly spends a day passing six resolutions denouncing Israel. And representatives of democracies all around the world hide and abstain.
  • Donald Trump
    Trump May Inadvertently Force Netanyahu’s Hand
    The election of Donald Trump has fueled an intense struggle within Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government over the future disposition of the West Bank that Israel has occupied for nearly fifty years. At one end of the debate is coalition partner and Education Minister Naftali Bennett, who leads the pro-settler Jewish Home party. Bennett declared Israel effectively unshackled by American constraints on settlement activity the day after Trump’s victory, saying the “era of a Palestinian state is over.” Bennett has also called for Israel to take immediate steps to annex parts of the West Bank. On Sunday, Bennett reportedly met in New York with three members of President-Elect Trump’s team and urged the new administration to consider alternatives to the land-for-peace approach pursued by previous American presidents. At the other end of the debate is Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, himself a settler and someone not normally associated with Israel’s peace camp. Lieberman has reacted to Trump’s victory by calling for an Israeli settlement freeze in the vast majority of the West Bank. Lieberman seeks to reach an arrangement with the next American administration that in return for such a freeze, the U.S. would agree to certain Israeli settlement activity in the main settlement blocs that constitute less than ten percent of West Bank land, consistent with the understanding reached between former President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon in April 2004. "If I can concentrate construction where eighty percent of the settler population lives and not build outside of the blocs—that is a good thing," Lieberman was quoted as saying. Conspicuously absent from this settlement debate so far has been the Prime Minister himself. One reason that Netanyahu has avoided the heated settlements discussion is immediate and practical: The Israeli prime minister is worried about what President Obama may do before leaving the White House. Foremost amongst Netanyahu’s fears is that the Obama administration will take an unprecedented step and not extend an American veto of a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement activities. Against that backdrop, Netanyahu fears exacerbating or in any way drawing attention to the settlements issue while Obama remains in office. Yet with pressures from within his own government to take a stand on settlements, the prospect of a Trump administration taking office in early 2017 is likely to force Netanyahu’s hand. Throughout the ten years that Netanyahu has served as prime minister, he has had to balance the interests of his pro-settler base with the preferences of American leaders concerned about Israeli settlement activities and committed to the formula of land for peace. Through diplomatic maneuvering, he has been somewhat enigmatic. At times he professes a desire to negotiate with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and ensure that Israel not become a bi-national state. At other times, Netanyahu has winked at the settlers and derided the Palestinians, accusing them of not being a genuine partner. Throughout, he has fueled a parlor game that can but guess at the Israeli leader’s ultimate objectives. To date, Prime Minister Netanyahu has avoided initiating any real path forward or in articulating his vision for the West Bank’s final disposition. The election of Donald Trump—and the impulses it has fueled in Israel —may require Netanyahu to take some fateful decisions for his country’s future.