Iraq

This week marks the one-year anniversary of the U.S.-led airwar against the self-declared Islamic State, which in October 2014 was named Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). What began with “targeted strikes against ISIL terrorist convoys” to protect the Iraqi city of Erbil, according to President Obama, expanded into a pledge “to degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State, which has recently been altered to “lasting defeat,” by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. Some U.S. military officials consistently claim that the Islamic State is losing because “they’re defending more than they’re on the offensive. Their attacks are smaller, they are more focused, and they’re less enduring,” as Brig. Gen. Kevin Killea, chief of staff of the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR, described it on July 31. Other officials echo the sentiment of Lt. Gen. Bob Neller, who told the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 23 that the Islamic State was not winning: “I don’t believe they’re winning either, I believe they’re at a stalemate.” Everybody in uniform or the U.S. intelligence community that I have spoken to about this would either agree with Neller’s assessment or be more pessimistic about the U.S.-led coalition’s progress toward either Obama or Carter’s declared strategic objective. The one thing that has certainly been achieved, which is unsurprising given the nearly four hundred strike aircraft involved and benign air defense environment, is a tremendous number of suspected fighters have been killed (12,000 by the last estimate provided in May) and their assorted equipment and fighting positions have been destroyed (10,684, according to the Pentagon). As I demonstrated last month, this airwar is relatively limited when compared with recent U.S.-led air campaigns. In many ways this intervention resembles the Iraqi no-fly-zones of the 1990s, where pilots operated under rules of engagement that allow them to do just enough to give the appearance of doing something. “Groundhog Day” was how the commander of the northern no-fly-zone described it to me. Although the Obama administration gave no estimate of how long this air war would last early on, by late fall they settled upon three years, while outgoing Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno recently estimated “10 to 20 years.” To visualize progress during this first year of war, please see the two charts provided below. Understand that these are based upon data provided by the U.S. military, specifically the U.S. Air Force Central Command and the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR.  The first chart covers the overall strike sorties by the United States and coalition partners from August 8, 2014 through August 8, 2015. The second chart is a month-by-month breakdown. Source: Public Affairs Office, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve. Source: U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Airpower Summaries.

It has been nearly a year since the self-proclaimed Islamic State kidnapped an estimated three thousand Yazidi women and children during an attack on their villages in northern Iraq. The Islamic State views these attacks, kidnappings, and killings as justifiable because they consider the Yazidi people—a religious minority group—infidels and devil-worshipers. An English-language magazine article published by the Islamic State noted, “Before [the Devil] reveals his doubts to the weak-minded and weak hearted, one would remember that enslaving the families of the [infidels] and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of Shariah.” Another document, published by the Islamic State’s “Religious Edicts Council,” reaffirmed that kidnapped and enslaved women were allowed to be bought, sold, and given as gifts by Islamic State members. The Islamic State subjects the Yazidi women to organized rape, sexual assault, forced marriages, forced conversions, sexual slavery, and other abuses during their captivity. Recent testimony from Yazidi women and girls who have escaped confirm this grim reality. In fact, some women reported being bought and sold for $2,000. Most who escape from the Islamic State do so with assistance from Yazidi activists who have created an underground network of safe houses and guides to help women escape. However, these efforts would not be possible without the critical support of former captives, who are knowledgeable about the Islamic State’s territory and are able to provide information about where enslaved women are being held, among other crucial intelligence. Though the Yazidi activists’ work offers a story of heroism in the face of great brutality, this effort alone is not enough to assist an estimated 3,500 Yazidis still held captive. Currently, there are no major initiatives or concentrated efforts to enter Islamic State’s territory to rescue the rest of the women still in the Islamic State’s captivity. However, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has provided some assistance to activists running the underground network. While the UN has requested $498 million to provide food, water, shelter, and basic education and health care to those fleeing the Islamic State, it has thus far received only 30 percent of the total. Therefore, there is limited support for women and children who escape from the Islamic State’s grip. Some of the women are pregnant and bearing the children of their captors. Abortion is not legal in Iraq, and it is not yet clear how much support the women will receive from their communities to raise these children. Many of the escaped women and children now live in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where most of the Yazidis fled in August 2014. The KRG provides health services for escaped Yazidi women, but access to psychological care is limited. In September 2014, a prominent Yazidi religious leader, Baba Sheikh, issued a statement, asking the community to welcome women who escaped from the Islamic State back into the community. This statement reportedly has helped prevent Yazidi women from being negatively stigmatized and allowed them to more easily reintegrate back into daily life. According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, 513 Yazidi women and 304 Yazidi children have escaped from the Islamic State as of March 15, 2015. Thousands more remain enslaved by the Islamic State. From a humanitarian perspective, further efforts to rescue and help these women reintegrate into their communities is urgent. Their experiences also have the potential to offer critical insight into the inner workings of the Islamic State. Those who have escaped could offer a blueprint for how to rescue others as well as critical intelligence that can help combat the Islamic State.

It has been nearly a year since the self-proclaimed Islamic State kidnapped an estimated three thousand Yazidi women and children during an attack on their villages in northern Iraq. The Islamic State views these attacks, kidnappings, and killings as justifiable because they consider the Yazidi people—a religious minority group—infidels and devil-worshipers. An English-language magazine article published by the Islamic State noted, “Before [the Devil] reveals his doubts to the weak-minded and weak hearted, one would remember that enslaving the families of the [infidels] and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of Shariah.” Another document, published by the Islamic State’s “Religious Edicts Council,” reaffirmed that kidnapped and enslaved women were allowed to be bought, sold, and given as gifts by Islamic State members. The Islamic State subjects the Yazidi women to organized rape, sexual assault, forced marriages, forced conversions, sexual slavery, and other abuses during their captivity. Recent testimony from Yazidi women and girls who have escaped confirm this grim reality. In fact, some women reported being bought and sold for $2,000. Most who escape from the Islamic State do so with assistance from Yazidi activists who have created an underground network of safe houses and guides to help women escape. However, these efforts would not be possible without the critical support of former captives, who are knowledgeable about the Islamic State’s territory and are able to provide information about where enslaved women are being held, among other crucial intelligence. Though the Yazidi activists’ work offers a story of heroism in the face of great brutality, this effort alone is not enough to assist an estimated 3,500 Yazidis still held captive. Currently, there are no major initiatives or concentrated efforts to enter Islamic State’s territory to rescue the rest of the women still in the Islamic State’s captivity. However, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has provided some assistance to activists running the underground network. While the UN has requested $498 million to provide food, water, shelter, and basic education and health care to those fleeing the Islamic State, it has thus far received only 30 percent of the total. Therefore, there is limited support for women and children who escape from the Islamic State’s grip. Some of the women are pregnant and bearing the children of their captors. Abortion is not legal in Iraq, and it is not yet clear how much support the women will receive from their communities to raise these children. Many of the escaped women and children now live in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where most of the Yazidis fled in August 2014. The KRG provides health services for escaped Yazidi women, but access to psychological care is limited. In September 2014, a prominent Yazidi religious leader, Baba Sheikh, issued a statement, asking the community to welcome women who escaped from the Islamic State back into the community. This statement reportedly has helped prevent Yazidi women from being negatively stigmatized and allowed them to more easily reintegrate back into daily life. According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, 513 Yazidi women and 304 Yazidi children have escaped from the Islamic State as of March 15, 2015. Thousands more remain enslaved by the Islamic State. From a humanitarian perspective, further efforts to rescue and help these women reintegrate into their communities is urgent. Their experiences also have the potential to offer critical insight into the inner workings of the Islamic State. Those who have escaped could offer a blueprint for how to rescue others as well as critical intelligence that can help combat the Islamic State.

Victor Argo revisits the persona of longtime Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Nadia Marzouki and Hamza Meddeb question the assumptions behind the claim that Tunisia is a democratic success story. Malise Ruthven takes an inside look at the self-declared Islamic State as she reviews Abdel Bari Atwan’s latest book on the organizational efficiency and digital prowess of the terror group.

Sara Pursley, in a two-part report on Jadaliyya, debunks the myth of Iraq as an artificial state. Mahmoud Riad protests the demolition of the National Democratic Party’s headquarters in Cairo. Ahmad Khalil finds that the war in Syria has turned bicycles into valuable commodities as well as political statements.

On Sunday, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter appeared on CNN’s State of the Union during which he reflected on the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces in the recent battle for Ramadi. “What apparently happened was that the Iraqi forces just showed no will to fight,” he said. “They were not outnumbered. In fact, they vastly outnumbered the opposing force, and yet they failed to fight.” It was a stunning admission. The United States has been retraining and reequipping the Iraqi military (again) since last summer and its ignominious performance in Mosul, Tikrit, and every place in between. The defeat in Ramadi and Secretary Carter’s blunt assessment suggests that the Obama administration’s return on investment is close to nil. It is extraordinarily worrisome because the White House’s entire strategy is based on providing local actors, primarily the Iraqi Security Forces, the means to “degrade and defeat” the self-proclaimed Islamic State instead of deploying American soldiers to do the job. The secretary’s statement was particularly surprising since Secretary of State John Kerry assured the press a few days earlier that the Islamic State’s grip on Ramadi would be temporary, while the White House called it a “tactical setback.” Perhaps Carter was responding to the Iraqis who blamed Washington for the defeat. Or maybe he knows better than anyone what is what in Iraq, and when the inevitable accounting is done, Carter and the Pentagon do not want to take the blame for who lost Iraq (again). The most straightforward explanation for the administration’s mixed signals, however, is this: No one really knows or understands what is happening in Iraq. This is all terribly disconcerting given the $2.5 trillion the United States has spent in Iraq as well as the political pressure to deploy more American forces—on top of the three thousand already there—to rescue Baghdad. It is unlikely that the American people will support such a move, but what about an additional five thousand advisors, and then in another six to eight months three thousand more, and when the Iraqis are still having a hard time perhaps another five thousand will be the “game changer”? There are influential people already arguing for an increased American commitment. It is a fair argument to make. Iraq was held together in 2006 and 2007 through the combination of American arms and money. Maybe “Surge 2.0” or “Grandsons of Iraq” would work. Then again as the Turks say, “You cannot bathe in the same bath water twice.” So what to think about Iraq? The fog of war—Remember in April when Islamic State fighters were driven from Tikrit and everyone started talking about the coming battle to retake Mosul? At around the same time the Kurds cut the main artery leading to the Islamic State’s rear in Syria. The Islamic State, we were told, was on the defensive. The military situation was looking very good. Islamic States fighters could not move, their lines of communication were disrupted, and they were having a hard time resupplying. Then the Islamic State took Ramadi (and Baiji, which remains contested) and the sky was falling again. The current conflict is likely to be a long and grinding one—the Pentagon has planned for a thirty-six-month campaign—and who has the battlefield momentum is likely to change again and again. Already, Shia militias and Iraqi Security Forces are preparing to retake Ramadi. Carter was correct—The Iraqi Security Forces are bad. It is a damning state of affairs. By my count, the United States has trained the Iraqi military at least four times (maybe it is five, but it could be six). Anyone with even a passing familiarity with what has been happening in Iraq these days understands that when battlefield success has come, it has been the result of American airstrikes, the Popular Mobilization Units—the Hashed, or Shia militias, to use the media’s catch-all term—Kurdish peshmerga, and tribal fighters. In the battle to liberate Tikrit, the Iraqi Security Forces were present in relatively small numbers. There are, of course, units of the ISF that are better than others, but overall, it is a poorly led force that has proven over and over again that no matter how much time, energy, and resources Washington puts into it, the Iraqi military cannot or will not fight. Iraq has come undone—The Islamic State is a major threat to Iraq, but with enough firepower one can certainly imagine that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s forces can be diminished significantly. Some analysts perceive this to be happening already, despite gains in Ramadi and the renewed threat to Baiji (it was under Islamic State control from July to November 2014, then again in December, and it has been back and forth ever since). As I have written previously, the apparent remedy for the Islamic State problem—giving weapons to the ISF, the Kurds (subject to Baghdad’s approval), turning a blind eye to Iranian efforts to fight the Islamic State through local Shia militias—creates a whole set of new problems. Every undergrad who has ever taken “Introduction to Political Science” is aware of Max Weber’s observation that the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence is a necessary condition of statehood. For Weber, this did not mean that only the state had the capacity to use violence, but that it did so legitimately was of central importance. The state could permit others to use violence, but it could also revoke its consent. Does the Iraqi state have a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence? Would the Kurds or Shia militias lay down their arms should the Iraqi prime minister demand they do so? The answer to both these questions is likely to be, “No.” What this says about the future of Iraq is an issue that too few people are willing to confront directly: The Iraqi state is increasingly irrelevant. There is a lot of breathless commentary about Iraq mostly because the people on television or the people who write columns are surfing the news cycles. If they had some perspective, they might recognize that the battles for Ramadi and Baiji are moments in a longer process that has been playing out for some time in which Iraq is coming apart. We are lost in Iraq because Iraq—no matter what the outcome of the struggle with the Islamic State may be—is itself lost.

As I write, Mother’s Day 2015 is coming to a close. It was a special day. Who is better than Mom? I called my mother, made breakfast in bed for my wife, spoke to my mother-in-law, and cheered all the Moms whose photos showed up on my Facebook feed. Yet for all of the celebration of Mom, there remain a few Mothers who—to the best of my knowledge— have gone without recognition this year, which is a bummer for them. So here goes, my favorite Middle Eastern Moms: Umm Kalthoum (Mother of Kalthoum) whose real name was Fatimah Ibrahim al-Sayyid al-Biltagi, captivated the heart and souls of Arabs with an astonishingly beautiful voice and often haunting lyrics of love and loss during a five decades-long career. She was born in Egypt’s Nile Delta in 1904 and died in 1975.There is not an Egyptian I know who does not get a broad smile on their face at the mention of Umm Kalthoum. Many Egyptian friends—even the ones born after her death—can recite the lyrics to her songs. I cannot think of any artist in the United States who occupies the place that Umm Kalthoum does in Egypt’s national lore. I would probably offend a lot of Egyptians if I tried. As big as Frank Sinatra was, as devoted and fanatical the fans of Barbara Streisand may be, as much as Elvis was the King of Rock and Roll, and Michael Jackson fashioned himself as the King of Pop, none of them can touch Umm Kalthoum. Egyptians often refer to their country as Umm al-Dunya or Mother of the World. Let’s not allow Egypt’s current state of political repression, economic uncertainty, nationalist freak out, decrepit infrastructure, and deteriorating security, to obscure its cultural and historical legacies. I have seen a lot of cool things in my travels, but nothing (still) takes my breath away like the step pyramid of Sakkara, Karnak, the Valley of the Kings, the Temple of Hatshepsut, and many other sights. It is not just ancient Egypt that deserves our respect on Mother’s Day. For (mostly) better or worse, Egypt has long-maintained cultural hegemony in the region, nurturing a world of art, literature, and cinema that policy geeks often over-look. Some of this waned with the stagnation of the last decade of Hosni Mubarak’s rule and the stifling sway of the Muslim Brotherhood, which often framed cultural debates, but even so Egypt remained a crucial player in the arts despite the fact that it did not have the resources to bankroll outposts of the Louvre, Guggenheim, and a variety of other projects in the region. The Bibliotecha Alexandrina makes the Gulf countries investments in mega-museums seem…well…cheap (despite their enormous price tags) in comparison to what Egypt has given the world. Umm Ahmed was my shaghala (house keeper) when my wife and I lived in Cairo in 1999 and 2000. I wrote a little bit about her for a piece in Slate.com a number of years ago. In that article, I relayed how she saved me from being flattened by a bus as it went the wrong way down an allegedly one-way street in our little edge of Zamalek. I can’t say that I got to know Umm Ahmed all that well. She came and went as she pleased and was always very friendly. I think she got a kick out this khawaga with the goofy Arabic—part Egyptian, part Palestinian, part Modern Standard, all with a distinctly Jordanian accent. Umm Ahmed was just a good egg. I hope she is well. When allied forces began air operations against Saddam Hussein on January 17, 1991, the Iraqi leader predicted the fight would be Umm al-Ma’arik or the Mother of All Battles in which his armies would prevail. Obviously, it did not work out that way, but Saddam unwittingly gave Americans a new idiom. I’ve heard people use “Mother of all…” to refer to everything from traffic and engagement rings to desserts and toddler meltdowns. So despite the despicable and violent life of Umm al Ma’arik’s forebear, it is usefully evocative. In all seriousness, in the violence that is engulfing four Middle Eastern states, the burden on caring for children, the elderly, the infirm, and wounded falls on who it always falls upon around the world—Moms. Regardless of your views of the origins of these conflicts and how to deal with them, it is hard not to be sympathetic to the brave, self-sacrificing women whose God-given inner strength makes everything a little bit better. Thank you, Mothers…

Allyson Beach is an intern for energy and environment at the Council on Foreign Relations. As a requisite resource, water and its infrastructure are decisive targets in the self-declared Islamic State’s (IS) strategy for regional expansion in the Middle East. Although IS has not demonstrated the capacity to operate technologically intensive water infrastructure, it continues to pursue control of dams and water systems in Iraq and Syria that, if acquired and adequately maintained could partially legitimize its rule, or alternatively be exploited as a weapon. To counter this threat, the United States should prioritize the protection of major hydroelectric dams and water infrastructure in areas under or near IS occupation. It should also create viable alternatives to IS-supplied resources through increased water aid in Syria and Iraq, and support to allied infrastructure and supplies increasingly challenged by migration and water scarcity. Delaying this action poses added barriers to the coalition strategy to defeat IS because, as one Mosul resident stated, “if [IS] could only maintain services—then people would support them until the last second.” Institutionalizing management of water resources and systems is a realistic means for IS to expand its sources of funding and further legitimize itself among local populations. Unlike IS’s production of oil that (illegally) operates within a global market, water is a regional commodity that is largely dependent on the operation of local hydroelectric dams. For IS, these dams are “the most important strategic locations in the country,”says Shirouk al-Abayachi, a member of the Iraqi parliament and former adviser to the Ministry of Water Resources in Iraq. “They should be very well protected because they affect everything—economy, agriculture, basic human needs and security.” In the ongoing conflict, the desire to command water is nothing new. IS’s quest to seize water infrastructure began in 2013 with the occupation of the Tabqa Dam, Syria’s largest hydroelectric dam that supplies electricity to rebel and government territories, including the city of Aleppo. Advancing toward a hydraulic state during its invasion of Fallujah, IS effectively employed surrounding dams, canals, and reservoirs as weapons—denying water to areas outside of its territory and flooding the route of the approaching Iraqi army. And in the eastern Syrian city of Raqqa, IS exhausted water reserves and disrupted distribution networks, forcing residents to rely on untreated water sources and leading to the spread of waterborne diseases such as Hepatitis A and typhoid. Although other actors, including the Bashir al-Assad regime and Syrian rebel groups, target water systems and strategically withhold aid, IS’s endeavors have the potential to inflict greater damage. This was evident in the organization’s occupation of the Mosul Dam, Iraq’s largest hydroelectric facility that supplies water and electricity to the majority of the country and is considered “the most dangerous dam in the world.”A 2006 U.S. military survey concluded that its collapse would release a twenty meter-high wave on the city of Mosul, which could destroy the city and kill over fifty thousand people. During its occupation, IS ultimately did not have sufficient forces to sustain its control, and the dam was reclaimed by Kurdish forces with the help of U.S. airstrikes in August 2014. While the annexation of the Mosul Dam did not end in a devastating collapse, IS sufficiently damaged the region by failing to perform basic state functions—reports claimed that the city experienced dire shortages of water and food, and near economic collapse during the occupation. IS did, however, employ destructive flooding in the April 25 seizure of the Tharthar Dam near Fallujah. U.S. intelligence reports suggest that IS has opened at least one of the dam’s gates to flood nearby areas following an attack which reportedly killed 127 Iraqi troops. Source: “Key Iraqi dams taken or at risk of being taken by Islamic State,” BBC, September 7, 2014 Reckless behavior in Fallujah, Raqqa, and Mosul are indications that IS does not possess the resources needed to employ soft power governance through the management of the region’s technologically intensive infrastructure. Unlike IS’s common forms of funding, such as cash from the plunder of antiquities and kidnappings for ransom, wealth accrued from the command of resources like oil and water is contingent upon infrastructural planning and a skilled workforce. Supervision of dams requires a highly specialized skill set, and, according to Russell Sticklor, a water researcher for CGIAR, “there is no indication that the Islamic State possesses it.”Rather than initiate its own civil workforce, IS has borrowed skilled labor from its predecessors—the Assad Regime and government in Bagdad continue to pay many engineers and skilled workers operating under IS supervision. Although this unsustainable appropriation of labor prolongs the opportunity for the United States and its allies to build an alternative to IS command, as IS’s sources of revenue diminish, the organization may increasingly shift their focus towards state building tactics of water infrastructure management to maintain influence in the region. This would not be surprising given that, IS reportedly collects money from business owners in Raqqa in exchange for electricity, water, and security. Previously estimated at $1 million per day, the organization’s crucial revenue derived from oil has significantly declined due to airstrikes against IS’s already incapable industrial base—reducing production to 5 percent of its previous extraction capabilities. According to Iraq expert Michael Knights, the jihadis will have a hard time providing basic services without oil revenue:“Very quickly, Islamic State has gone from the richest terrorist group in history to the world’s poorest nation-state.”Colin Clark from the RAND Corporation argues, “Without this oil money they are going to have to maybe rethink some of the state building efforts that have been fairly ambitious up to this point.” Unfortunately, water insecurity spreads beyond Iraq and Syria, to U.S. partner countries such as Jordan, increasing the risk that disenfranchised populations will turn to IS if the terrorist organization develops the capacity to provide adequate water resources. Syrian and Iraqi refugees are congregating in some of the most water stressed areas in the Middle East—the region now loses water at the second fastest rate worldwide, behind only northern India. Jordan has faced added stress with the influx of 750,000 Syrian refugees and 60,000 Iraqi refugees. The country is currently exhausting its supply of water at three times the recharge rate, facing extreme drought as it accommodates three thousand new refugees every day. This has left both refugees and Jordanian citizens water insecure. Without addressing this resource burden and insufficient standard of living, disenfranchised Jordanians believe IS will strengthen its territorial hold. “We are waiting for this moment,”said Abu Abdullah, an IS sympathizer in Ma’an. Should IS successfully govern this water infrastructure, refugees may be compelled to return home where there are more reliable sources of water and sympathize with IS—similar to the growing sympathy for IS among the Yarmouk population in Syria, which suffered from Assad’s extreme tactics that resulted in severe water and food shortages. As the leader of the anti-IS coalition, the United States should prioritize the protection of water systems to prevent IS expansion and infrastructural abuse. Unlike the U.S. strategy to halt funding from oil by attacking oil refinement installations, the protection and reclamation of dams requires a strategy that preserves water infrastructure and continues the provision of basic services to the surrounding population. As these operations remain consistent with Obama’s pledge not to reintroduce ground combat in Iraq, the United States will need to rely heavily upon Iraqi ground forces and prioritize the prevention of IS incursion into areas of Iraq and Syria where there is standing water infrastructure. Despite setbacks from airstrikes and counteroffensives across Iraq, IS attempts to broaden its arsenal continue as they pursue control of water infrastructure in Iraq and Syria with the potential to serve as a state building mechanisms or weapons in the ongoing conflict. The April 25 seizure of the Tharthar Dam and opening of one of the dam’s gates demonstrates the growing prioritization of water infrastructure in IS’s strategy. As the leader of the anti-IS coalition, the United States, in collaboration with Iraqi troops, should prioritize the protection of Iraqi-controlled water infrastructure and efforts to reclaim IS-occupied infrastructure. As stated by Michael Stephens, a Middle East expert at the Royal United Services Institute, IS “understands how powerful water is as a tool, and they are not afraid to use it.”

Issandr El Amrani argues that a strong, stable Libya would not solve the migration problems in the Mediterranean. The editors at the Middle East Research and Information Project urge for a humanitarian corridor for foreign nationals and Yemenis to escape Yemen. Arash Reisinezhad discusses how recent advances in Tikrit are a victory for Iran.

Abubakr al-Shamahi’s blog post on the misuse of the terms “Sunni” and “Shia” in the context of Yemen remains as pertinent today as it was when he published it a year ago. Omar al-Jaffal finds that young film directors in Iraq are breathing new life into Iraqi cinema. Guy Taylor argues that Oman is well-suited to be the Middle East’s prime peacemaker.

Aliza Litchman is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations.  The U.S.-led coalition has been unsuccessful in halting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS or ISIL) second largest revenue stream: illegal artifacts. A March 6 UNESCO report attempted to call attention to the ISIS’ bulldozing of the three thousand-year-old city of Nimrud, and a February 25 video shows ISIS militants ransacking the central museum in Mosul. However, the most damage to Iraq and Syria’s cultural heritage is not inflicted with bulldozers and sledgehammers, but through illegal sales in foreign markets, which have thus far provided ISIS with over $100 million U.S. officials estimate. Antiquities dealings are ISIS’ second largest source of funding, and control of over four thousand archaeological sites ensures this revenue source will not expire. For terrorist groupsoperating in the cradle of civilization, ancient sites are cash cows that are readily taken advantage of. Artifacts travel across countries through secret smuggling routes passed down in local families for generations, and sold to contacts in foreign countries who then sell to antique dealers. The number of middle men and labyrinth of routes make it difficult to decipher who dug up the artifacts and track where the money is going. As a result, less than 1 percent of the artifacts looted by ISIS from Iraq and Syria have been recovered. Since the Syrian civil war began, foreign interest in Syrian antiquities has ballooned. In the United States alone,the value of declared antiquities imported from Syria jumped 134 percent in 2013 to $11 million…the undeclared pieces is many multiples higher.” Though the United States has taken concrete steps to stem the flow of terrorist funding by preserving Iraqi and Syrian cultural heritage, it is not achieving results. In 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry affirmed the U.S. commitment to protecting artifacts by stating, “ISIL is not only beheading individuals; it is tearing at the fabric of whole civilizations…President Obama and our administration are laser-focused on protecting the cultural heritage of countries all around the world…Our heritage is literally in peril in this moment, and we believe it is imperative that we act now.” The United States embarked on multiple initiatives aimed at targeting ISIS’ illegal antiquities sales. The State Department (DOS) teamed with the American Schools of Oriental Research and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, started the Syria Cultural Heritage Initiative, and funded the Iraqi Institute for the Conservation of Antiques and Heritage. Collectively, these efforts document damage, promote global awareness, and minimize the impact of damage through preservation projects and attempts to retrieve looted artifacts. However, these initiatives are limited to observing, documenting, retrieving, and repairing destroyed sites, without preventively stopping the damage by dissuading ISIS from continuing its assault on Iraq and Syria’s cultural heritage. While the U.S. government identifies the illegal sale of Syrian and Iraqi cultural heritage as a problem and a source of terrorist funding, preventive efforts have not been instituted or well-funded by government agencies. The United States can pursue a few steps to stop ISIS from using artifact sales for financial gain. First, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program—the main government agency in control of stemming terrorist funding—is not currently tasked with illegal antiquities dealings and should recognize it as a main source of terrorist funding. This will raise its priority and awareness among U.S. officials. Second, the U.S. government should provide financial support to local institutions and individuals actively protecting artifacts. For example, this could include the Heritage Task Force that was established by the Syrian interim government’s Ministry of Culture and Family Affairs and collaborates with international and non-governmental organizations, and community groups to protect Syrian heritage. This task force instituted emergency training programs for museum curators to protect museums and at risk archaeological sites—a preventive effort that could be expanded with adequate support and funding. There are U.S. government individuals hunting down illegal artifacts overseas as part of the Department of Homeland Security’s Cultural Property, Art and Antiquities Investigations and Repatriations Program. However, these individuals are not utilized or funded to disrupt ISIS’ illegal artifact smuggling networks or retrieve looted antiquities sold to fund terrorism. The United States should also heed the United Nation’s call for “Protected Cultural Zones” by incorporating cultural heritage rescue and protection training within the regular training of Iraqi forces and Syrian rebels. Finally, the United States should pass the Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act that was dismissed last year. The act would make retrieving artifacts a priority for the Office of Foreign Asset Control and the Department of Defense, and ensure efficient collaboration among diplomatic, military, and law enforcement Federal agencies.

Rebecca Collard reports on Kurdish men who have joined ISIS and attacked their own people. Nabeel Khoury looks at who the Houthis are, their ambitions, and the options before them. Michael Koplow reflects on U.S.-Israeli relations in light of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s upcoming address to Congress.